Bidders Premium on Government Land Auction: Floor Price vs. Winning price

Author(s):  
ALEBEL B. Weldesilassie ◽  
GENANEW B. Worku
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Jean Christophe Bureau ◽  
Luois Pascal Mahé

- The aim of this paper is to reconsider the objectives of European farm policy taking a long-term view to assessing the instruments currently in place and advancing some suggestions for the design of the future Cap due in 2013. The pro- posed guidelines for reforms include defining targeting instruments on clear objectives, guaranteeing social return for public money and replacing assistance with incentives. Measures are suggested to make EU agriculture more competitive by adapting instruments and regulations to that purpose. It is proposed to amend the current complex payment schemes, which could be simplified with a set of payments based on "contracts for services" only, including potentially three basic levels of services (basic husbandry of the countryside preserving farming landscapes; territorial services; environmentally sensitive measures). Regarding market management, it is proposed to reform but maintain public intervention to guarantee a floor price (or "safety net") restricted to exceptional circumstances. Sharing financial responsibility between the EU and the Member States according to the principle of subsidiarity would imply some co-financing of the first pillar. EconLit Classification: Q180 ,Q100


Significance This came after the government announced plans for a 4G spectrum auction in March 2021, after a five-year gap. There is growing speculation that this will be followed by an auction of 5G spectrum later in the year. Impacts Reliance’s lead on 5G will boost its broader digital business strategy. New financial support to indebted telcos will help to avoid further strain on public sector banks. Data tariffs are likely to remain competitive in India, even after a new floor price.


1987 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-64
Author(s):  
D. G. Stoneman

The highly competitive situation that has evolved in energy markets and in the gas industry itself has made regulations impractical. In anticipation of this situation the Canadian Petroleum Association (CPA) formulated an Alternate Energy Policy to cope with the rapidly changing market conditions and to avoid the confusion resulting from ambiguous regulations. The policy was also designed to be adequate for the complexities of gas marketing and to meet the challenges of other energy forms by competitive pricing. As a result of the intricate nature of the operations of the Canadian natural gas industry the process of deregulation has been lengthy and difficult. Nevertheless significant changes have taken place. By the fall of 1986 some 400 billion† cubic feet or 35% of the eastern Canadian market was served by renegotiated prices under Competitive Marketing Programs started in November 1985. A deregulated natural gas industry will be characterized by multiple buyers and sellers, negotiated wholesale prices free of restrictions and a non-discriminatory gas transportation system. Issues of deregulation still to be resolved include: conflict between honoring contracts and the needs of changing market circumstances; review of the surplus test which governs export quotas; elimination of the export floor price. There are also concerns in the industry about the hindrances to finding other markets and the elimination of provincial taxes.


2018 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 142-171
Author(s):  
Kavitha Ranganathan ◽  
Poonam Singh

We examine the 52-week anchoring effect in the Indian takeover market that has a unique regulatory design. The Indian takeover regulation mandates the minimum offer price to be function of the target’s 26-week or 60-day high price. We show that the 52-week anchoring effect is robust even in the face of other regulatory anchors that differ from the widely cited 52-week high price. The anchoring effect dominates when the offer price exceeds the 52-week high price. Regulatory intervention in 2011 that shifts the floor price to a recent market price, such as the 60-day high price, does not attenuate the 52-week anchoring effect. We infer that acquirers are willing to pay a higher premium while anchoring to the 52-week high price, even when the regulatory focus is on lower reference prices. Besides, regulatory anchors also serve as additional focal points, demonstrated by the significance of the 26-week high price during its own period of regulation (2002-2011).


Author(s):  
Ndèye Fatou FAYE ◽  
Abdoulaye DIENG ◽  
Saliou NDIAYE

Livestock is a strategic sector that occupies nearly 60% of rural households and accounts for 4.3% of Senegal's Gross Domestic Product (ANSD, 2016). The dairy sector plays a decisive role in this sector, given its importance in the food security of the population and the income it generates (Alari et al, 2011). However, national milk production is in deficit; the country relies on imports of large quantities of milk powder, 25,000 tons/year, to cover its consumption needs (MEPA, 2016). These imports weigh heavily on public finances, up to 60 billion FCFA/year, thus accentuating the trade balance deficit, which was 2,977 billion FCFA in 2016 (ANSD, 2018).  The analysis of the milk value chain highlights, in addition to the difficulties of securing production in the dry season, the poor access to energy in production areas (Enda Energie, 2015). Thus, in these localities, the milk can neither be preserved nor processed to be valorized and allow producers to earn stable incomes. It is in this context that a milk valorization platform was installed in 2016, in the village of Tatki located in a dairy basin in northern Senegal. After two years of operation of the platform, the financial results showed real difficulties in making the business of selling fresh milk to dairy industries profitable, given the landlocked nature of the area. Indeed, the cost price is 320 CFA francs per liter, for a price proposed by the industrialist set at 325 CFA. According to economic calculations, the floor price of a liter of fresh milk should be set at 550 CFA francs, for a minimum average commercialized volume of 471 liters per day, within the framework of a concessional credit at a rate of 5%. These conditions do not correspond to the reality of the current market and could not be applied without a subsidy. Thus, in order to make the platform profitable, it seems essential to add value to the milk by processing it on site. In this regard, the production of yogurt has given very interesting results that could be replicated in other villages in the northern zone. The financial analysis of the activity, for financing at a subsidized rate of 7.5% per year for a period of 7 years and a deferred repayment of 2 years, shows a rate of return of 18% for a period of 15 years, when local milk is processed into yogurt. The wealth generated (10% NPV) amounts to 227,269,450 FCFA and the time to recover the capital invested is 3.90 years.  


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