scholarly journals The Extent of Al-Qaeda’s Presence in Africa: Security Threats and Policy Implications to the U.S.

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 26-41
Author(s):  
Daniel Chigudu

Following a period close to fifteen years of fighting the extremist terrorist group Al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, the United States (US) is faced with diverse security threats from affiliates of Al Qaeda in Africa. This study explores the extent of Al Qaeda’s presence in Africa, security threat and policy implications to the US. A qualitative methodology through document analysis and informed by the interpretivist research paradigm was employed. With Al Qaeda’s continued growth, there could be nuclear terrorism, arms and drug trafficking among other threats. Policy recommendations are given for the United States of America.

Author(s):  
Sue Anne Bell ◽  
Lydia Krienke ◽  
Kathryn Quanstrom

Abstract Alternate care sites across the US were widely underutilized during the COVID-19 outbreak, while the volume and severity of COVID-19 cases overwhelmed health systems across the United States. The challenges presented by the pandemic have shown the need to design surge capacity principles with consideration for demand that strains multiple response capabilities. We reviewed current policy and previous literature from past ACS as well as highlight challenges from the COVID-19 pandemic, to make recommendations that can inform future surge capacity planning. Our recommendations include: 1) Preparedness actions need to be continuous and flexible; 2) Staffing needs must be met as they arise with solutions that are specific to the pandemic; 3) Health equity must be a focus of ACS establishment and planning; and 4) ACS should be designed to function without compromising safe and effective care. A critical opportunity exists to identify improvements for future use of ACS in pandemics.


Significance These have caused the United States to begin the process of shuttering its Baghdad embassy -- while signalling that it could reverse the process if the government moves more aggressively against pro-Iran groups within the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) that are blamed for the strikes. Impacts Groups will step up attacks designed to lever the US-led coalition out of Iraq, while seeking to mask their identity. The United States will have greater latitude for military action to weaken Tehran in November or December, if it closes the embassy. Japanese, Saudi, Emirati and some European embassies relying on US evacuation and warning services might also be forced out. Washington might opt instead to downsize the embassy, which cannot operate normally due to COVID-19 and security threats. Even if the US embassy closed, some coalition military sites and the US consulate in the Kurdistan region would remain open.


2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Manpreet Sethi

This article analyses the three kinds of nuclear threats that India faces; Pakistan, China and nuclear terrorism. To counter Pakistan‟s nuclear threat against India‟s conventional military superiority, India‟s strategy has been assured retaliation in response to a „first use‟, irrespective of its yield or choice of target. Though, China‟s nuclear strategy is against the United States, it poses a considerable security threat to India. India has acquired a nuclear triad to be able to mount an effective second strike capability, reaching almost all the cities of China. To counter nuclear terrorism, India collaborates internationally to counter such challenges.


Author(s):  
Paul Rogers

This chapter examines how global terrorism, and particularly the war on terror, has shaped US foreign policy. It first provides an overview of the 9/11 terror attacks and definitions of terrorism before discussing the US experience of terrorism prior to 9/11 as well as the political environment in Washington at the time of the attacks. It then considers the response of the Bush administration in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as the nature and aims of the al-Qaeda organization. It also reviews the conduct of the war on terror in its first nine years, along with the decline and transformation of al-Qaeda after 2010. Finally, it analyzes the options available to the United States in the war against al-Qaeda, ISIS, and like-minded groups.


Author(s):  
Timothy Andrews Sayle

In March 2003 US and coalition forces invaded Iraq. US forces withdrew in December 2008. Approximately 4,400 US troops were killed and 31,900 wounded during the initial invasion and the subsequent war. Estimates of Iraqi casualties vary widely, ranging from roughly 100,000 to more than half a million. The invasion was launched as part of the US strategic response to the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, and ended the rule of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. After the collapse of the regime, Iraq experienced significant violence as former regime loyalists launched insurgent attacks against US forces, and al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), a group linked to al-Qaeda, also attacked US forces and sought to precipitate sectarian civil war. Simultaneously with the increasing violence, Iraq held a series of elections that resulted in a new Constitution and an elected parliament and government. In 2007, the United States deployed more troops to Iraq to quell the insurgency and sectarian strife. The temporary increase in troops was known as “the Surge.” In November 2008, the US and Iraqi governments agreed that all US troops would withdraw from Iraq by December 2011. In 2014, AQI, now calling itself the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), attacked and captured large swaths of Iraq, including several large cities. That year, the United States and allied states launched new military operations in Iraq called Operation Inherent Resolve. The government of Iraq declared victory over ISIL in 2017.


2013 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 538-548 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roland Paris

The US-led invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001, which deposed the Taliban regime, was followed by a major international effort to stabilize that country. More than a decade later, this effort has yielded neither security nor political stability in Afghanistan. After having been ousted from power, the Taliban reestablished itself in the borderlands of Pakistan and began fighting an effective guerrilla war against international and Afghan government forces. Despite heavy losses in recent years, the insurgency shows no sign of giving up. Meanwhile, attempts to establish a credible and legitimate Afghan government have been similarly disappointing. President Hamid Karzai, once hailed as the country's democratic savior, came to be seen instead as the leader of one of the most corrupt regimes on the planet, a perception that has damaged his government's legitimacy both at home and abroad. Afghanistan's development and human rights indicators have improved, but it remains to be seen if these gains can be sustained as the international effort is scaled back. Finally, although the United States and its partners succeeded in weakening Al Qaeda in the region, both Afghanistan and nuclear-armed Pakistan appear to have become considerably less stable over the course of the mission, with untold consequences for the future.


2016 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 150-175 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank Foley

AbstractWhile US counterterrorism has improved in many respects since the attacks of 11 September 2001, there have still been turf battles and many cases of inadequate coordination between security agencies, which have had damaging effects on intelligence work and operations against terrorist groups. Why, more than 14 years after 9/11, do US inter-agency operations still break down in this manner? By comparing the United States with the United Kingdom, this article provides a new explanation for the deficiencies in the American response. It shows how US inter-agency conflict has negative operational consequences and draws a contrast with the British security agencies, which tend to be more closely integrated and refrain from engaging in major turf battles. I argue that the differences between the cases stem from a combination of distinct institutions and different organisational routines in the US and UK. In the United States, divided national institutions and the informal routines of its security agencies have proved problematic for joint operations and intelligence work. The article also critiques some influential existing accounts of US inter-agency counterterrorism, which emphasise bureaucratic politics or organisational culture, and shows how such perspectives can produce unrealistic policy recommendations. A focus on the deep-seated routines and institutions of the United States leads one to be more sceptical about the prospects for meaningful organisational reform.


2007 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 469-499 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dong Sun Lee

This article explains why, in the wake of South Korea's democratization, the US-Republic of Korea alliance has suffered a steady decline while avoiding an abrupt collapse. The author argues that democratization weakened this asymmetric alliance by increasing the political influence of nationalism in South Korea. New South Korean democratic elites, subscribing to nationalist ideals, demanded an autonomous, equal relationship with the United States regardless of the de facto power disparity between the two countries. These elites also deemphasized the security threat from North Korea—with which they perceived a shared national identity—and adopted an unconditional engagement policy with that nation. The United States, in turn, resented the apparently unrealistic policies of these elites and showed a decreased interest in the alliance. Democratization, however, did not cause an abrupt end to the alliance, for two reasons. First, North Korea's military strength preserved a significant strategic need in South Korea for allied support. Second, as the result of a measured transition process, old pro-alliance elites in South Korea retained enough political clout to proscribe a radical shift in foreign policy away from the alliance with the United States, while new elites had opportunities to reconcile their nationalist ideals with strategic realities.


Author(s):  
Aaron B. Wagner ◽  
Elaine L. Hill ◽  
Sean E. Ryan ◽  
Ziteng Sun ◽  
Grace Deng ◽  
...  

AbstractSocial distancing measures, with varying degrees of restriction, have been imposed around the world in order to stem the spread of COVID-19. In this work we analyze the effect of current social distancing measures in the United States. We quantify the reduction in doubling rate, by state, that is associated with social distancing. We find that social distancing is associated with a statistically-significant reduction in the doubling rate for all but three states. At the same time, we do not find significant evidence that social distancing has resulted in a reduction in the number of daily confirmed cases. Instead, social distancing has merely stabilized the spread of the disease. We provide an illustration of our findings for each state, including point estimates of the effective reproduction number, R, both with and without social distancing. We also discuss the policy implications of our findings.


2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (33) ◽  
pp. 27
Author(s):  
Osman Mohammed Afzal

The almost nineteen years of international troops’ presence and their support and donations to strengthen a democratic state in Afghanistan were in vain. The state-building process began with the toppling of a retrogressive regime, which was considered the base of al-Qaeda leaders who masterminded the 9/11 attacks in the United States. Within 20 years, the Afghan government could not use the opportunities made available by the international community and the US presence in the country. Although most criticisms are leveled at the United States for this state-building failure, on the contrary, its roots in Afghanistan can be precisely traced back to the central government. In other words, the state-building failure in Afghanistan has inner flaws. The blame is not attributable to its international allies regarding the fragility of the state and decay of democracy. This article illustrates how state-building at the pivotal centre of democracy failed in Afghanistan. The main hurdles of state-building are also scrutinised.


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