Women’s Organisations and Communities of Interest: Introduction

Author(s):  
Maria DiCenzo

THE INTERWAR PERIOD saw the proliferation of women’s organisations – voluntary, popular, non-political, party- and faith-based – some of which engaged with feminist discourses and others that deliberately avoided these associations, defining and generating a new array of women-defined collective identities.1 The work of feminist historians in recent decades has been instrumental in redefining the parameters of the women’s movement to include the efforts of non-feminist organisations as advocates for women’s rights. Maggie Andrews captures this tendency in the phrase ‘the acceptable face of feminism’ in her groundbreaking study of the Women’s Institute as a social movement, challenging the ‘jam and Jerusalem’ image so often attributed to these forms of women’s associational culture (1997). Recently Karen Hunt and June Hannam have argued for ‘a new archeology of “women’s politics”’ as a way to reframe and arrive at a more nuanced understanding of the participation and role of women in various areas of public life (2013). While many of the periodicals showcased in this section were not overtly feminist, they certainly engaged in women’s politics and forms of advocacy in this broader sense, and they did so across the political spectrum. It is important to recognise why it might have been more appealing and even more practical for organisations to distance themselves from feminism, particularly in a climate of hostile reaction. As DiCenzo and Eustance note in the previous Part, the ‘demise’ school of interwar history has not always fully recognised the adversarial conditions women faced and the resistance with which their demands were met....

1999 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 216-258 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruth Gavison

A discussion of the role of courts in Israel today demands some introductory remarks. The Supreme Court and the President of the Supreme Court enjoy great acclaim and respect within Israel and abroad, but have recently come under attack from a variety of sources. These attacks are often confused, and many of them are clearly motivated by narrow partisan interests and an inherent objection to the rule of law and judicial review. But these motives do not necessarily weaken the dangers which the attacks pose to the legitimacy of the courts in general, and the Supreme Court in particular, in Israel's public life. The fact that in some sectors extremely harsh criticism of the court is seen to be an electoral boost, testifies to the serious and dangerous nature of the threat. This situation creates a dilemma for those who want a strong and independent judiciary, believing it is essential for freedom and democracy, but who also believe that, during the last two decades, the courts have transgressed limits they should respect. The dilemma becomes especially acute when the political echo sounds out in one's criticism, and when one is part of the group that believes that the legal and the judicial systems have made some contribution to the prevalence of these hyperbolic and dangerous attacks, as I am.


Author(s):  
E.A. Jalmagambetov ◽  
◽  
E.Zh. Aziretbergenova ◽  

The Kyzylorda period in the development of the education system of Kazakhstan occupies a special place. The center's move to the city of Kyzylorda gave a new impetus to the political and public life of the region. Young people seeking education started coming to the city of Kyzylorda from other regions. After assigning the status of the capital in the city of Kyzylorda began to open up new educational institutions. The Kazakh Institute of education and medical schools moved from Orenburg. The city has opened educational schools of the first and second categories. Special boarding schools were opened for people living in remote areas. The work of boarding schools was constantly monitored by special commissions. In 1925, the famous writer Gabiden Mustafin worked and studied in the city of Kyzylorda. Also, S. Mukanov, A. Kenzhin and other representatives of the Kazakh intelligentsia worked in the education system.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Teo Ballvé

This introductory chapter briefly explores the ways in which imaginaries of statelessness have structured the political life of Urabá, Colombia. It argues that Colombia's violent conflicts have produced surprisingly coherent and resilient regimes of accumulation and rule—yet this is not to say they are benevolent. In order to do so, this chapter approaches the state as a dynamic ensemble of relations that is both an effect and an instrument of competing political strategies and relations of power. In Urabá, groups from across the political spectrum, armed and otherwise, all end up trying to give concrete coherence to the inherently unwieldy abstraction of the state in a space where it supposedly does not exist. The way this absence exerts a generative political influence is what this chapter establishes as the “frontier effect.” The frontier effect describes how the imaginary of statelessness in these spaces compels all kinds of actors to get into the business of state formation; it thrusts groups into the role of would-be state builders.


Author(s):  
Henrik Oscarsson ◽  
Lauri Rapeli

Political sophistication refers to the role of expertise and the use of information in the forming of political judgments. Citizens in a democracy need a sufficient level of political sophistication to make sense of politics and to hold office holders accountable. Most people do not seem to be as sophisticated as theory would expect, and political sophistication also seems to be very unevenly spread among individuals. The consequences for democratic governance continue to be a matter of much scholarly debate. Although most researchers agree that sophistication among citizens tends to be low, many issues in the research field are deeply contested. First, several concepts such as awareness, sophistication, and knowledge are used more or less interchangeably in analyses of the political competence of citizens. It is, however, unclear whether the terminology conceals essential conceptual differences. Second, the empirical strategy of using surveys to measure sophistication has been heavily criticized. For some, the survey is an unsuitable method because it measures the respondents’ ability to produce correct answers under suboptimal conditions, rather than measuring what they actually know about politics. For others, the survey questions themselves are an inadequate measure of sophistication. Third, it is not clear what the effects of citizens’ political sophistication or lack thereof are on democratic governance. According to one group of scholars, the aggregated opinions and electoral choices of democratic publics would not look very different even if they were more sophisticated. The opponents of this low-information rationality theorem claim that increases in citizens’ sophistication would lead to substantial differences in democratic output. In other words, perceptions of the significance of sophistication for democracy deeply divide scholars working in the field. There is less disagreement concerning the individual-level determinants of sophistication. Although being male, well educated, and in a socially advantaged position still stand out as the strongest predictors of high sophistication, recent findings provide a more nuanced understanding of how sophistication is distributed among citizens. In addition to many enduring disputes, some questions remain largely unanswered. Without cross-nationally standardized survey items, scholars have struggled to conduct comparative studies of political sophistication. Therefore, role of political institutions as facilitators of political sophistication is to some extent uncertain. Whether and how sophistication changes over time are equally important, but mostly unexplored, questions.


1980 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 539-563
Author(s):  
Mark O'Neill ◽  
Ged Martin

Historians have in recent years used several approaches to explain the first Reform Act. Michael Brock's elegant account sets the whole Reform crisis in its political context. D. C. Moore has attempted a ‘sociological’ explanation of ministers’ intentions, while John Milton-Smith has offered a more traditional analysis of their private papers. This emphasis on the men who framed and steered the measure through parliament perhaps obscures the role of the ordinary members in whose hands its fate rested. Like the ministers, the backbenchers also suffered intense periods of indecision, soul-searching and calculation based on a confused mixture of pragmatism and principle. This is especially true of the moderates, the men of the parliamentary centre, who provided the vital votes for the government's hair-breadth majority on the second reading in February 1831, but who deserted them to support General Gascoyne's motion a few days later. Only fifteen M.P.s voted both for the Bill and for Gascoyne's motion, thus locating themselves - at least temporarily - at the very centre of the political spectrum.


2014 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
pp. 469-488 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Horvath

This article examines the rise of Russkii Obraz, a Russian ultranationalist organization whose leaders cultivated a neo-fascist ideology and collaborated with skinhead gangs. Despite its extremism, Russkii Obraz played an important role in the Kremlin's “managed nationalism,” a set of measures to manipulate the nationalist sector of the political arena. During 2008–2009, Russkii Obraz collaborated closely with pro-Kremlin youth organizations and enjoyed privileged access to Russia's tightly controlled public sphere. This article argues that the key to Russkii Obraz's brief ascendancy was its duality, its capacity to project moderation in public and extremism in private. For several years, this duality enabled Russkii Obraz to participate in public life while building a support base in the skinhead subculture. But the two projects collided when the security organs exposed Russkii Obraz's links to an ultranationalist death-squad. Nevertheless, official indulgence of Russkii Obraz cannot be attributed merely to ignorance of its violent potential. This indulgence also reflected the fact that it was precisely those at the neo-fascist limits of the political spectrum who were most willing to collaborate in the regime's efforts to suppress demands for democratization.


2020 ◽  
Vol 63 (2) ◽  
pp. e160722
Author(s):  
Charles Klein ◽  
Milena Mateuzi Carmo ◽  
Alessandra Tavares

This article examines political subjectivities, community engagements and voting practices among residents of São Paulo’s Zona Sul peripheries in the three years preceding Brazil’s 2018 presidential election. Building on a 398-person household survey, 46 in-depth interviews, and extensive participation observation over the course of a four-year study, we argue that although most residents of our study communities across the political spectrum are disenchanted with institutional politics, many maintain political engagement through their everyday lives, including activism centered on intersectional identities and state-sponsored violence/genocide. Our discussion combines statistical analysis and auto-ethnographic inflected vignettes and is in dialogue with two common themes present in recent analyses of the Brazilian political landscape: the role of urban periphery voters in the election of Bolsonaro, and the complex connections between moralities and political subjectivities. In conclusion, we reflect on opportunities and challenges for progressive political engagement in the (post)Bolsonaro era.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Tommaso Gravante ◽  
Alice Poma

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to empirically investigate the role of emotions in the polarization that emerged during the first months of the pandemic. So, the authors will analyze the social response of two opposing social actors: political elites that have minimized the risks of the pandemic and grassroots groups that have promoted mutual support for vulnerable people suffering from the various effects of the pandemic.Design/methodology/approachFor the analysis, the authors will primarily refer to Hochschild's proposal and the recent literature on emotions and protest. The method is to analyze official statements by politicians from the UK, USA, Mexico, Brazil, Spain and Italy and the social responses that have emerged from different mutual support groups and solidarity networks in those countries, as well as in Chile and Argentina.FindingsThe authors will show how the conflicting responses can exacerbate social polarization in our societies. This polarization goes beyond the political spectrum, and in some cases even social classes, and reaches into the realms of values, emotions and practices. The authors will also show how the response from grassroots activism makes it possible to overcome guilt, shame and other emotions of trauma, among other things.Originality/valueAn analysis of the emotional dimension of two opposing responses to the pandemic will show how these responses have a deep impact on society, ranging from demands for values and practices that legitimize a status quo, to discussing, breaking away from or overcoming social behavior based on individualism and social determinism.


Author(s):  
Harald Bodenschatz

This article discusses the role of housing in the political agenda of dictatorial regimes in the interwar period, in particular in the agenda of Italian Fascism. It brings about the factors that contributed to make public housing a key component in securing the support of the middle classes in the creation of social consensus necessary for the preservation of Mussolini’s dictatorial regime. The maps advances a typological mapping of housing complexes for Mussolini’s Rome, which illustrates a policy based on the urbanization of the middle classes, and the de-urbanization of the urban poor.


2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 322-336
Author(s):  
A G Kiselev ◽  
P N Kirichek

The article considers the trends of political communication under the social-cultural dynamics of post-industrial society; emphasizes the maximization of the political-communicative factor in accelerating social progress; assesses the role of political communicative systems in the causal complex of social transformations; describes the resources of political communication to solve the problems of organization and self-organization of public life; considers the constructive possibilities of political-communicative systems to optimize relations between the state and society on the democratic basis; identifies the role of political communication in the development of civil society. The authors describe two mega-elements in the political communication - mechanics (form) and socionics (content); provide an updated and expanded description of the object and subject of political communication in connection with its structural-functional arsenal (activity, semantic, normative and systemic); explain the optimal mode of information exchange between citizens through the channels of political communication - political discourse and its genres in the public sphere with an emphasis on television talk shows; assess the importance of the moral-ethical aspect for the political sector of public life; compare the same in essence and different in specifics ‘faces of power’ in connection with its functions. The article also identifies political-communicative conditions for the agreement (compromise) between the government and the people on socially significant issues; clarifies the ideological-technological features of the contemporary political communication; defines the “golden ratio” of communication in the political sphere - a managerial decision, and provides positive and negative examples of managerial decisions within the political-communicative transfer; emphasizes the need to construct a political-communicative process as a dialogue between the elite (government) and the masses (people).


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