Immigration, Self-Determination, and Global Justice: Towards a Holistic Normative Theory of Migration

2012 ◽  
Vol 8 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 135-146
Author(s):  
Jorge M. Valadez
2020 ◽  
Vol 2019 (4) ◽  
pp. 314-328
Author(s):  
Regina Kreide

AbstractOver the last years, the debate over global justice has moved beyond the divide between statist and cosmopolitan, as well as ideal and non-ideal approaches. Rather, a turn to empirical realities has taken place, claiming that normative political philosophy and theory need to address empirical facts about global poverty and wealth. The talk argues that some aspects of the earlier “Critical Theory” and its notions of negativity, praxis, and communicative power allow for a non-empiristic link between normative theory and a well-informed social science analysis that is based on experienced injustice. The analysis of border politics and housing politics will serve as an example for a critical theory of global injustice that addresses regressive as well as emancipative developments in society.


2009 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 325-347 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles R Beitz

“The Moral Standing of States” is the title of an essay Michael Walzer wrote in response to four critics of the theory of nonintervention defended in Just and Unjust Wars. It states a theme to which he has returned in subsequent work. I offer four sets of comments. First, by way of introduction, I describe the controversy between Walzer and his critics and try to identify the central point of contention. Second, I make some observations about the wider conception of global justice suggested by Walzer's remarks, emphasizing the extent of the difference between this conception and the traditional view of a “society of states” to which it stands as an alternative. The central value in Walzer's conception is collective self-determination, so I comment about its meaning and importance. Finally, I consider whether and how concerns about the moral standing of states bear on the kinds of cases of humanitarian intervention that the world community has actually faced since the book and article were written, particularly since the end of the cold war.


Author(s):  
Pablo Gilabert

This chapter addresses two interconnected questions about human rights and the pursuit of global justice: Is there a human right to democracy? How does the achievement of human rights, including the human right to democracy, contribute to the pursuit of global justice? The chapter answers the first question in the affirmative. It identifies three reasons for favoring democracy and explores the significance of those reasons for defending it as a human right. It answers important worries that acknowledging a human right to democracy would lead to intolerance and lack of respect for peoples’ self-determination, exaggerate the importance of democracy for securing other rights, generalize institutional arrangements that only work in some contexts, and tie human rights to specific ideas of freedom and equality that do not have the same universal appeal and urgency. Regarding the second question, the chapter distinguishes between basic and non-basic global justice and argues that democracy is significant for both. It claims that the fulfillment of human rights constitutes basic global justice, explains how a human right to democracy has significance for the legitimacy of international besides domestic institutions, and shows how forms of global democracy and the exploration of cosmopolitan and humanist commitments underlying human rights may enable and motivate the pursuit of non-basic demands of global justice (such as those concerning socioeconomic equality). The key claim in the chapter is that the fulfillment of the human right to democratic political empowerment is crucial for the pursuit of global justice.


Author(s):  
Brooke A. Ackerly

Just responsibility is a way of taking responsibility for all forms of global injustice (not just women’s human rights) and to all people, even those who consider themselves removed from the politics of global injustice (though they want to be engaged). Chapter 7 applies the theory to taking responsibility through the enactment of roles in the political economy—those of consumer, donor, worker, and activist—and beyond. It summarizes the view of political community, accountability, and leadership essential to transformative politics. Just responsibility is more than a normative theory of human rights principles. It is also a normative political theory of how to carry out those principles not only in the practices proscribed by our roles in the political economy, but also in imaginative practices that defy the boundaries of those roles in order to transform the political economy. Just responsibility is a human rights theory of global justice.


2021 ◽  
pp. 275-298
Author(s):  
Stephanie Lawson

This concluding chapter draws together some of the themes running throughout this book to address some key issues of justice and the future of global politics. In addition to outlining the concept of global justice, it deals with two contrasting normative approaches to issues in global politics, namely, cosmopolitanism and communitarianism, taking particular note of the debates that emerged in the post-Cold War period and which have been especially important for the analysis of human rights. The chapter looks at how these approaches map onto opposing strands of thought within the English school, namely, solidarism and pluralism. It then moves on to some specific issues in contemporary global politics involving the application of normative theory—citizenship, migration, and refugees. Finally, the chapter considers issues of intergenerational justice with respect to the normative links between past, present, and future and the responsibilities these entail.


2021 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 527-541
Author(s):  
Anna Stilz

AbstractThis essay replies to three critics of my book Territorial Sovereignty: A Philosophical Exploration. First, in response to Kit Wellman, I defend the claim that states sometimes have a right against external interference even when their decisions depart from the requirements of social justice. This “right to do wrong” is grounded in respect for a legitimate procedure of collective self-determination, in which the state's members have an important interest. Second, I reply to Michael Blake's concern that there is an inconsistency in my treatment of people's actual wills in politics. I clarify that my view places weight on the actual wills only of “cooperators” (a technical term), and that cooperators’ actual wills matter because they have claims against alien rule. There is no inconsistency in treating political annexation differently from immigration since immigrants rarely threaten to impose alien rule on cooperators. Finally, I address Adom Getachew's concerns about the imperial dimensions of the states system, arguing that my book contains resources for theorizing remedial claims to land in settler colonial societies and other reparative duties of global justice.


2019 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 367-386
Author(s):  
Ayelet Banai ◽  
Eszter Kollar

AbstractIn this article, we propose a reconciliation between global equality of opportunity and self-determination, two central and seemingly conflicting principles in the contemporary theory of global justice. Our conception of reconciliation draws on the family-people analogy, following the account of familial relationship goods, developed by Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift, on permissible parental partiality and domestic equality of opportunity. We argue, first, that a plausible conception of global equality of opportunity must be able to distinguish morally arbitrary aspects of nationality that require mitigation from morally permissible ones. Second, we argue that a plausible criterion for the distinction integrates a person’s normative interests over a lifetime: (i) the interests of a child born into societal circumstances that impact her life prospects; and (ii) the interests of an adult citizen in collective self-determination. Third, we outline an account of ‘people relationship goods’, as a principled way to circumscribe the permissible scope of self-determination. Fair global equality of opportunity requires mitigating nationality-tracking inequalities, except those that fall within the permissible scope of collective self-determination.


2012 ◽  
Vol 33 (01) ◽  
pp. 45-56
Author(s):  
Robert Berman

The Just State, as Richard Winfield notes at the outset, is the culmination of an ambitious project devoted to limning the contours and content of a systematic philosophy of right. Apart from its value as a substantial contribution to the understanding of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, The Just State offers its own self-standing, content-rich account of political justice. Winfield's book is overflowing with argument and analysis, which calls for careful, detailed consideration, and the brief set of comments that follow cannot possibly do it full justice. It is useful, however, to focus on a specific topic concerning normativity discussed in the ‘Introduction’. In particular, I would like to raise some questions about the principle of equal opportunity and the adjustment problem that arises from it.Before turning to those questions, it might be helpful to offer an overview of the overarching structure of The Just State. The ‘Introduction’ and eight chapters can be clustered thematically into three parts. The ‘Introduction’ has the important task of clearing away the obstacles thrown up by sceptical arguments against the very possibility of a normative theory of political justice. Chapters 1-3 set the stage for the account of political justice proper, which then takes up the remainder of the book, chapters 4-8. So the argument starts, in the ‘Introduction’, with a refutation of the sceptical denial of the project of political philosophy understood as the normative theory of political justice. This is important because the positive upshot of this anti-sceptical argument is the identification of a singular normative criterion: self-determination.


Author(s):  
Brooke A. Ackerly

When disaster strikes, what is the just thing to do? When local or global crisis threatens the human rights of large parts of humanity, what is the just thing to do? Can we respond to injustices in the world in ways that do more than simply address their consequences? Just Responsibility provides a human rights theory of global justice that guides how we, each in political community together, can take responsibility for injustices wherever they are. Using empirical research into the ways that women’s human rights activists have done so under conditions of little political privilege, Just Responsibility offers a theory of global injustice and political responsibility that can guide the actions of those who are relatively privileged in relation to injustice, whether they are citizens, activists, academics, policymakers, or philanthropists. We can take responsibility for the power inequalities of injustice, what, following John Stuart Mill, the author calls “injustice itself,” regardless of our causal responsibility for the injustice and regardless of the extent of our knowledge of the injustice. Using a feminist critical methodology, Just Responsibility offers a grounded normative theory for taking political responsibility. The book integrates these ways of taking political responsibility into a rich theory of political community, accountability, and leadership in which taking responsibility for injustice itself contributes to and transforms the fabric of our political life together.


Legal Studies ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 430-451 ◽  
Author(s):  
Garrett Wallace Brown

There has been considerable debate about how it would be possible to move from cosmopolitan normative theory to cosmopolitan legal practice. These debates range from an uncertainty about what specific moral and normative principles should underwrite cosmopolitan law, to how those requirements should be institutionalised at the global level. In addition, many cosmopolitan theorists rest their more elaborate institutional models on the assumption of an already existing and thoroughgoing practice of cosmopolitan law, without detailed considerations regarding applied theory. The purpose of this paper is to examine the concept of cosmopolitan law and to argue how legal cosmopolitanism provides a necessary linchpin and transitional conduit between cosmopolitan theory and more institutionally based forms of cosmopolitanism. The paper examines the historical development of legal cosmopolitanism, the uniqueness of contemporary cosmopolitan legal theory within international legal debates, and maps the various approaches for moving cosmopolitan legal theory to legal practice. Through mapping the discipline, it is argued that Kantian legal cosmopolitanism represents the most coherent attempt to move from cosmopolitan legal theory to global institutional practice. This is due to the fact that it represents a minimal and moderate form of legal cosmopolitanism that accepts that any move to a cosmopolitan order would need to evolve from our current legal order. In this regard, it is argued that Kantian legal cosmopolitanism can occupy a transitional position, that not only satisfies the cosmopolitan concern for human worth, but that is also not guilty of being grossly utopian in its quest toward global justice.


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