In Different Times and Places

2019 ◽  
pp. 146-164
Author(s):  
Mark Rowlands

The idea of pre-intentional self-awareness is extended to incorporate awareness of one’s mental states or acts and of the “lived” body. The temporal parameters of pre-intentional self-awareness are also extended by way of a detailed consideration of episodic memory in animals. Whether animals are capable of such memory is controversial, due to our inability to determine whether they represent past episodes in the right way. Even if animals cannot episodically remember, they still have pre-intentional awareness of themselves through time. This pre-intentional awareness of the self through time consists in a sense of familiarity, which is explained in parallel with perception: in terms of a generated series of anticipations in which the person who remembers is implicated.

Ethnologies ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 5-28
Author(s):  
Marine Carrin

Anthropologists have stressed the relationship between symptoms of distress, ritual action and unwanted possession. The article stresses the importance of language and performance in two therapeutic cults in India. The crucial issue here involves showing how ritual becomes a means for either representing or manipulating special mental states. We see how individuals may use possession as a strategy to frame a reformulation of the self. Healing thus involves self-awareness.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Victoria Southgate

From early in life, human infants appear capable of taking others’ perspectives, and can do so even when the other’s perspective conflicts with the infant’s own. Infants’ success in perspective-taking contexts implies that they are managing conflicting perspectives despite a wealth of data suggesting that doing so relies on sufficiently mature Executive Functions, and is a challenge even for adults. In a new theory, I propose that infants can take other’s perspectives because they have an altercentric bias. This bias results from a combination of the value that human cognition places on others’ attention, and an absence of a competing self-perspective, which would, in older children, create a conflict requiring resolution by Executive Functions. A self-perspective emerges with the development of cognitive self-awareness, sometime in the second year of life, at which point it leads to competition between perspectives. This theory provides a way of explaining infants’ ability to take others’ perspectives, but raises the possibility that they could do so without representing or understanding the implications of perspective for others’ mental states.


Author(s):  
Oleksandra KUZO ◽  
◽  
Lyubov KUZO ◽  
Olha ZAVERUKHA ◽  
◽  
...  

The article presents the authors’ theoretical model of Self-image functioning with a peripheral part on the border of the relationship between the Self and the significant other person. An experimental study of the peculiarities of Self-image dependence is provided. The study involved 150 students of Lviv State University of Internal Affairs. Peculiarities of self-relation (dependence of the Self-image on significant other people) of students with high and moderate levels of neuroticism have been studied. The method of rapid diagnosis of neurosis (K. Heck; H. Hess), methods of self-assessment of mental states (according to H. Eysenck), author's experimental study of the "dependent" characteristic of the Self-image were used. Correlation analysis and Mann-Whitney comparative analysis were used for statistical data processing. As a result of the ascertaining experiment, it was found that the peripheral part of the Self-image of boys and girls with a high level of neuroticism (HN) is more dependent on the opinion of reference other people (unstable Self-image) than of persons with moderate neuroticism (MN) and this is accompanied by high levels of anxiety, frustration and rigidity. The hypothesis that students with a high level of neuroticism will more often depend on the opinion of significant others than students with a moderate level of neuroticism was confirmed. The studentship is a sensitive period for effective psycho-correctional influences in order to form a stable, positive and independent Self-image, and therefore, the quality use of psychological services of psycho-corrective influences can significantly affect well-being, learning and quality of life. The self-awareness of students with a high level of neuroticism should be considered both as the main object and as a fundamental support for psycho-correctional influence, and the resource of this influence should be sought in an adequate relationship.


Author(s):  
Theresa Schilhab

Mirror self-recognition (MSR) refers to the empirical investigation of self-awareness, also known as the ‘mirror and mark test’ introduced by psychologist Gordon G. Gallup (1970). The ability to direct behaviour to previously unseen parts of the body such as the inside of the mouth or to groom the eye by the aid of mirrors has been interpreted as the recognition of the self and evidence of a self-concept. Unknowingly, a similar approach was developed independently with children (Amsterdam 1972). The successful passing of the mirror and mark test has been widely used as a benchmark for distinguishing conscious and non-conscious species within fields with a general interest in evolutionary perspectives on consciousness and cognition such as comparative psychology and cognitive ethology, although controversies about the methodology and theoretical framework persist. These disputes question our intuitions about consciousness and accentuate the epistemic difficulty of obtaining evidence on mental states in others.


2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (I) ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
Chris Letheby

Can there be phenomenal consciousness without self-consciousness? Strong intuitions and prominent theories of consciousness say “no”: experience requires minimal self-awareness, or “subjectivity”. This “subjectivity principle” (SP) faces apparent counterexamples in the form of anomalous mental states claimed to lack self-consciousness entirely, such as “inserted thoughts” in schizophrenia and certain mental states in depersonalization disorder (DPD). However, Billon & Kriegel (2015) have defended SP by arguing (inter alia) that while some of these mental states may be totally selfless, those states are not phenomenally conscious and thus do not constitute genuine counterexamples to SP. I argue that this defence cannot work in relation to certain experiences of ego dissolution induced by potent fast-acting serotonergic psychedelics. These mental states jointly instantiate the two features whose co-instantiation by a single mental state SP prohibits: (a) phenomenal consciousness and (b) total lack of self-consciousness. One possible objection is that these mental states may lack “me-ness” and “mineness” but cannot lack “for-me-ness”, a special inner awareness of mental states by the self. In response I propose a dilemma. For-me-ness can be defined either as containing a genuinely experiential component or as not. On the first horn, for-me-ness is clearly absent (I argue) from my counterexamples. On the second horn, for-me-ness has been defined in a way that conflicts with the claims and methods of its proponents, and the claim that phenomenally conscious mental states can totally lack self-consciousness has been conceded. I conclude with some reflections on the intuitive plausibility of SP in light of evidence from altered states.


1990 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Gaskin

Bruno Snell has made familiar a certain thesis about the Homeric poems, to the effect that these poems depict a primitive form of mindedness. The area of mindedness concerned is agency, and the content of the thesis is that Homeric agents are not agents in the fullest sense: they do not make choices in clear self-awareness of what they are doing; choices are made for them rather than by them; in some cases the instigators of action are gods, in other cases they are forces acting internally on the agent and over which he has no control. Homeric heroes act in the way Descartes thought an animal acts: agitur, non agit. Such agents ‘handeln nicht eigentlich (d.h. mil vollem Bewuβtsein eigenen Handelns), sondern sie reagieren’. The model of the agent which we nowadays have is roughly of a self which determines, rather than is determined to, action; the self arrives at this determination by considering available reasons for action in the light of its overall purposes, and it moves to action in full self-consciousness of what it is doing, and why. This model of action, Snell claims, is not met in Greek literature before the tragedians. I think anyone ought to concede that there is some difference between the way Homer portrays decision-making and the way it is portrayed in tragedy (with further differences among the tragedians themselves); but has Snell located the difference in the right place? I shall argue in this paper that he has not.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2 (9) ◽  
pp. 3-9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kristina M. Blaiser ◽  
Mary Ellen Nevins

Interprofessional collaboration is essential to maximize outcomes of young children who are Deaf or Hard-of-Hearing (DHH). Speech-language pathologists, audiologists, educators, developmental therapists, and parents need to work together to ensure the child's hearing technology is fit appropriately to maximize performance in the various communication settings the child encounters. However, although interprofessional collaboration is a key concept in communication sciences and disorders, there is often a disconnect between what is regarded as best professional practice and the self-work needed to put true collaboration into practice. This paper offers practical tools, processes, and suggestions for service providers related to the self-awareness that is often required (yet seldom acknowledged) to create interprofessional teams with the dispositions and behaviors that enhance patient/client care.


2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 145-175 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rosemary Sayigh

Colonialism deprives colonised peoples of the self-determined histories needed for continued struggle. Scattered since 1948 across diverse educational systems, Palestinians have been unable to control their education or construct an authentic curriculum. This paper covers varied schooling in the Palestinian diaspora. I set this state of ‘splitting through education’ as contradictory to international declarations of the right of colonised peoples to culturally relevant education. Such education would include histories that explain their situation, and depict past resistances. I argue for the production of histories of Palestine for Palestinian children, especially those in refugee camps as well as in Israel and Jerusalem, where curricula are controlled by the settler-coloniser. Black and Native Americans have dealt with exclusion from history in ways that offer models for Palestinians.


Think India ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 14-19
Author(s):  
Ms.Geetika Patni ◽  
Dr.Keshav Nath

In the realm of feminist study, the woman story writers deal with the themes of love, marriage, loneliness and quest for identity. Self is related to individual where as the Identity is concerned with position in society. Cultural identity of feeling makes connection to the part of the self conception and self awareness. It concerns with nationality, customs, religious and religious convictions, age group, community and any other social group type. The present paper reveals the discussion on the key findings with regard to the ‘self’ and cultural identity of protagonist in the short stories of Jhumpa Lahiri in special reference to The Interpreter of Maladies. She is a superb interpreter of a cultural multiplicity. Lahiri’s stories are insightful critique of human relationships, bonds as well as promise that one has to make with native soil along with the migrated land


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