scholarly journals Language, Truth, and Pedagogy

2021 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Henderson ◽  
Dadul Namgyal ◽  
Mark Risjord
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
World Views ◽  
Buddhist Logic ◽  
Contemporary Science ◽  
Science Initiative

Early in the planning the Emory-Tibet Science Initiative, we realized that the encounter between Buddhism and contemporary science demanded that Buddhist logic and epistemology encounter Anglophone philosophy of science. A titanic clash of world views was anticipated, but as we began the conversation, we found something different. Many philosophical concerns were shared, but these problems were understood differently. While fundamental elements of epistemology, like observation and inference, had similar functions in both traditions, subtle differences in conceptualization challenged mutual intelligibility. Through thousands of years of erudite debate, each tradition had honed their tools. While each cut cleanly, they carved in different joints. This essay will briefly discuss the linguistic, philosophical, and pedagogical adjustments that made for mutual comprehensibility.

Biological Teleology in Contemporary Science

1998 ◽  
pp. 309-316
Author(s):  
Spas Spassov
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Modern Science ◽  
Biological Science ◽  
Second Line ◽  
Contemporary Philosophy ◽  
Complete Understanding ◽  
Biological Phenomena ◽  
Contemporary Science ◽  
Scientific Mind

Continuous controversies about how Aristotle's teleological biology relates to modern biological science address some widely debated questions in contemporary philosophy of science. Three main groups of objections made by contemporary science against Aristotle's biology can be identified: 1) Aristotle's biological teleology is too anthropomorphic; 2) the idea is tied too substance based; 3) Aristotle's final ends contradict the mechanistic spirit of modern science, which is looking for physical causes. There are two ways of dealing with these objections. The first consists in showing misinterpretations of Aristotle's thought that underlie these arguments. A second line of defense explores the idea that teleological concepts are not only incorporated and widely used in contemporary science, but that in fact biology does not have to renounce teleology in order to reconcile with the modern scientific mind. I suggests that a complete understanding of complex biological phenomena can only be achieved by combining different approaches to this issue.

Imagination in Action

2019 ◽  
Vol 56 (4) ◽  
pp. 62-77
Author(s):  
Yulia V. Shaposhnikova ◽  
Lada V. Shipovalova ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Science Studies ◽  
Specific Kind ◽  
Contemporary Science ◽  
The One ◽  
Interdisciplinary Interaction ◽  
Scientific Interaction ◽  
Communicative Role ◽  
Complicated Situation

The intention of this article is to study the role of imagination in science. We are going to examine the communicative role that imagination plays in interdisciplinary scientific interaction. We are referring to that specific kind of interaction in which science is the object of research that is to a complicated situation in the contemporary science studies. We posit that the interaction between different disciplines engaged in the study of science is far from being concordant. This is especially true of the history and philosophy of science. Currently, the situation is such that, on the one hand, the philosophical reference to the historical research of science has proved being constructive in nature. On the other hand, historians remain mostly indifferent to the philosophy of science, seeking no methodological guidance from philosophers. Revealing the reasons for such an asymmetry of interests, and, as a consequence, the failure of the constructive interaction of history and philosophy of science, we analyze one hypothesis which directly refers to the work of imagination in the Kantian sense. Next, we determine that Kant's appeal to imagination opens the way for another interpretation of both the work of imagination and, as a result, the interaction of history and philosophy of science. We demonstrate why the analysis of the role of image, associated primarily with art, becomes relevant in modern research of science. Additionally, we turn to imagination, not just as a transcendental condition of knowledge but as an effective tool to organize specific research practices of interdisciplinary interaction. Therefore, an important component of our research is an appeal to a “successful” example of the synthesis of historical and philosophical research of science, which is the contemporary historical epistemology, in which one can see imagination in action.

Teleology and Final Causation in Aristotle and in Contemporary Science

Dialogue ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 50 (3) ◽  
pp. 511-536 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Chase
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Self Organization ◽  
Organization Studies ◽  
Historical Process ◽  
Contemporary Science

ABSTRACT: With a view to suggesting the possible relevance of Aristotelian thought to current notions of complexity and self-organization, studies Aristotle’s notions of teleology and final causation. After a sketch of the historical process by which such notions were finally rejected in the science of Galileo and Newton, attention is drawn to some contemporary trends in philosophy of science that argue for a return to some (modified) versions of the notion of final causation (I. Prigogine, R. Thom, S. Rosen). These arguments are illustrated by the example of Bénard cells, and the theories of Schneider, Kay, and D. Sagan.

Weltanschauungsanalyse und Abduktion

Conceptus ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 38 (93) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan Radler
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Explanatory Model ◽  
Abductive Inference ◽  
World Views ◽  
Recent Developments ◽  
Scientific Context

SummaryErnst Topitsch’s analysis of world views is presented. His explanatory model consists of an elaborated projection-reflection-scheme. It is argued that the projection is an abductive inference. As a consequence Topitsch’s analysis of world views can be linked to recent developments in the philosophy of science. Finally the question is considered whether the projection can be interpreted as an inference to the best explanation. This is denied because an inference to the best explanation roots in a scientific context, whereas Topitsch’s (abductive) projection obviously does not.

scholarly journals MOKSLAS KAIP MOKSLO FILOSOFIJOS PROBLEMA

Problemos ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 79 ◽  
pp. 55-66
Author(s):  
Albinas Plėšnys
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Scientific Investigation ◽  
Logical Analysis ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
World Views ◽  
Historical School ◽  
Scientific Revolutions ◽  
Structure Of Scientific Revolutions ◽  
Over Time ◽  
Science Experience

Normatyvinėje mokslo filosofijoje siekiama atsakyti į klausimą, kas yra mokslas. Tiek Carnapas, tiek Popperis pasiūlo savus mokslo apibūdinimus, remdamiesi logine pažinimo turinio analize. Tie apibrėžimai yra universalūs ir laikui bėgant nekintantys. Jais remdamasis tyrinėtojas gali atskirti mokslines teorijas nuo nemokslinių ir nuspręsti, kada atsiranda mokslas. Kitokia padėtis susiklosto istorinėje mokslo filosofijos mokykloje, kuri siekia atskleisti įvaizdžius, pasaulio suvokimo būdus ir mokslinio tyrimo praktiką, vyravusią tam tikru istoriniu laikotarpiu, net ir tuos, kurie šiandien yra atmesti, primiršti ar laikomi klaidingais. Istorinis požiūris į mokslo raidą verčia klausti visai kitko – ne kas yra mokslas, o kaip vartojama ir kaip buvo vartota mokslo sąvoka. Tačiau Kuhnas to nedaro ir aiškinasi, kas yra mokslas. Matyt, tai yra viena iš jo nesėkmės kuriant naują mokslo filosofijos variantą priežasčių.Pagrindiniai žodžiai: falsifikacija, fizika, loginė analizė, menas, mokslas, patyrimas, verifikacija.Science as a Problem in the Philosophy of ScienceAlbinas Plėšnys SummaryThe question what is science arises in the normativephilosophy of science. Both Carnap and Popper proposed their own definitions of science. For this purpose they used the logical analysis of language in which the content of science was expressed. These definitions are universal and stable over time. On the basis of these definitions investigator can discern scientific theories from non-scientific ones and determine when the science started up. The issue was treated quite differently in historical school of philosophy of science where the historians of science attempted to display even those images, world-views and practices of scientific investigation which dominated in their own time and are now discarded. The new sort of questions arises to the followers of the historical school of philosophy of science: how was the concept of science used in their investigations but not what is this thing called science. However, Kuhn still attempts to answer the old question in his Structure of Scientific Revolutions. In our opinion the failure of his theory was determined by this fault.Keywords: falsification, physics, logical analysis, art, science, experience, verification.

scholarly journals Iconoclasm and Imagination: Gaston Bachelard’s Philosophy of Technoscience

Human Studies ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hub Zwart
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
Scientific Practice ◽  
Gaston Bachelard ◽  
Unique Position ◽  
Contemporary Science ◽  
Key Concepts ◽  
History Of ◽  
Epistemological Obstacle ◽  
Mother Earth

Abstract Gaston Bachelard (1884–1962) occupies a unique position in the history of European thinking. As a philosopher of science, he developed a profound interest in genres of the imagination, notably poetry and novels. While emphatically acknowledging the strength, precision and reliability of scientific knowledge compared to every-day experience, he saw literary phantasies as important supplementary sources of insight. Although he significantly influenced authors such as Lacan, Althusser, Foucault and others, while some of his key concepts (“epistemological rupture,” “epistemological obstacle,” “technoscience”) are still widely used, his oeuvre tends to be overlooked. And yet, as I will argue, Bachelard’s extended series of books opens up an intriguing perspective on contemporary science. First, I will point to a remarkable duality that runs through Bachelard’s oeuvre. His philosophy of science consists of two sub-oeuvres: a psychoanalysis of technoscience, complemented by a poetics of elementary imagination. I will point out how these two branches deal with complementary themes: technoscientific artefacts and literary fictions, two realms of human experience separated by an epistemological rupture. Whereas Bachelard’s work initially entails a panegyric in praise of scientific practice, he becomes increasingly intrigued by the imaginary and its basic images (“archetypes”), such as the Mother Earth archetype.

The Reception of Aquinas in the Philosophy of Nature and Science

2021 ◽  
pp. 537-553
Author(s):  
Michael J. Dodds
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Modern Science ◽  
Thomas Aquinas ◽  
Philosophy Of Nature ◽  
Contemporary Science ◽  
Understanding Of Science

Although Thomas Aquinas’ philosophy of nature had a stormy reception by modern science, the discoveries of contemporary science have led to a warmer welcome. This chapter explains Aquinas’ understanding of science and the philosophy of nature and then reviews his account of the distinction of the sciences, including the ‘mixed sciences’ that apply mathematics to the study of nature. It briefly explains material, formal, efficient, and final causality as these function in his hylomorphic philosophy. It then considers his thought in relation to modern and contemporary science, sketches various approaches to a philosophy of nature in different schools of Thomism, and suggests how his thought might contribute to a philosophy of science. It concludes with a few principles essential to any authentic reception of his philosophy of nature.

Computational Science and Its Effects

2019 ◽  
pp. 21-33
Author(s):  
Paul Humphreys
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Scientific Revolution ◽  
Computational Science ◽  
Interface Problem ◽  
Central Concept ◽  
Technological Advances ◽  
Contemporary Science ◽  
The World ◽  
Epistemic Opacity

A new kind of scientific revolution is described, one called an emplacement revolution. Emplacement revolutions are contrasted with Kuhnian revolutions and Hacking revolutions. The concept of the anthropocentric predicament is introduced and the associated concept of the interface problem. Each provides a challenge in understanding the world from the perspective of computational science. The central concept of epistemic opacity is described and connected to the interface problem. Some reasons why computational science is new are given, arguments are provided for why philosophy of science should not restrict itself to in principle results, and the fact that contemporary science is inextricably entwined with technological advances is explored.

scholarly journals Carnab’s Confirmability Principle and Popper’s Objections

2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 165
Author(s):  
Mohsen Almoallem
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Crucial Role ◽  
Scientific Progress ◽  
Logical Positivism ◽  
The Other ◽  
Inductive Method ◽  
Karl Popper ◽  
Scientific Methods ◽  
Contemporary Science

This article deals with the work of the prominent philosopher and logician Rudolf Carnab in establishing the Confirmability Principle as a tool to distinguish scientific from metaphysical statements, and the objections raised by the philosopher of science Karl Popper to this principle. It also focuses on the philosophical and logical argumentation that lasted decades between them and its outcomes which had an influence on the contemporary shape of the philosophy of science in the twentieth century and how each one of them presented his own account for the nature of scientific methods that contemporary sciences must follow. While Carnab and the logical positivism group in general created the “verification principle” and then the “confirmability principle” as the proper way to eliminate metaphysical ideas from science that hindered its eventual progress for several decades, relying on the inductive method as a ground for scientific progress, Popper on the other hand, thought that in order to achieve such progress one must adhere to scientific theories and more specifically to the “Falsification Principle” in addition to relying on the “Virtual method” which grants the “Rational Hypothesis” a crucial role in contemporary sciences. The article concludes with the results of this argumentation and with how philosophy of contemporary science ended up giving more weight to the rational hypothesis and less to the confirmability principle due to the retreat of rigid empiricism in contemporary sciences, especially in physics. This led contemporary science to depend on philosophy once again. 

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