scholarly journals Evolutionary Constraints on Connectivity Patterns in the Mammalian Suprachiasmatic Nucleus

2021 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Connor Spencer ◽  
Elizabeth Tripp ◽  
Feng Fu ◽  
Scott Pauls
Keyword(s):  
Suprachiasmatic Nucleus ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Evolutionary Constraints ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Basic Model ◽  
Trade Offs ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Antagonistic Games

The mammalian suprachiasmatic nucleus (SCN) comprises about 20,000 interconnected oscillatory neurons that create and maintain a robust circadian signal which matches to external light cues. Here, we use an evolutionary game theoretic framework to explore how evolutionary constraints can influence the synchronization of the system under various assumptions on the connection topology, contributing to the understanding of the structure of interneuron connectivity. Our basic model represents the SCN as a network of agents each with two properties—a phase and a flag that determines if it communicates with its neighbors or not. Communication comes at a cost to the agent, but synchronization of phases with its neighbors bears a benefit. Earlier work shows that when we have “all-to-all” connectivity, where every agent potentially communicates with every other agent, there is often a simple trade-off that leads to complete communication and synchronization of the system: the benefit must be greater than twice the cost. This trade-off for all-to-all connectivity gives us a baseline to compare to when looking at other topologies. Using simulations, we compare three plausible topologies to the all-to-all case, finding that convergence to synchronous dynamics occurs in all considered topologies under similar benefit and cost trade-offs. Consequently, sparser, less biologically costly topologies are reasonable evolutionary outcomes for organisms that develop a synchronizable oscillatory network. Our simulations also shed light on constraints imposed by the time scale on which we observe the SCN to arise in mammals. We find two conditions that allow for a synchronizable system to arise in relatively few generations. First, the benefits of connectivity must outweigh the cost of facilitating the connectivity in the network. Second, the game at the core of the model needs to be more cooperative than antagonistic games such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma. These results again imply that evolutionary pressure may have driven the system towards sparser topologies, as they are less costly to create and maintain. Last, our simulations indicate that models based on the mutualism game fare the best in uptake of communication and synchronization compared to more antagonistic games such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma.

scholarly journals Win-Stay-Lose-Shift as a self-confirming equilibrium in the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma

2021 ◽  
Vol 288 (1953) ◽  
pp. 20211021
Author(s):  
Minjae Kim ◽  
Jung-Kyoo Choi ◽  
Seung Ki Baek
Keyword(s):  
Observational Learning ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Large Uncertainty ◽  
Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Best Response ◽  
The Cost ◽  
With Memory ◽  
Iterated Prisoner’S Dilemma

Evolutionary game theory assumes that players replicate a highly scored player’s strategy through genetic inheritance. However, when learning occurs culturally, it is often difficult to recognize someone’s strategy just by observing the behaviour. In this work, we consider players with memory-one stochastic strategies in the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, with an assumption that they cannot directly access each other’s strategy but only observe the actual moves for a certain number of rounds. Based on the observation, the observer has to infer the resident strategy in a Bayesian way and chooses his or her own strategy accordingly. By examining the best-response relations, we argue that players can escape from full defection into a cooperative equilibrium supported by Win-Stay-Lose-Shift in a self-confirming manner, provided that the cost of cooperation is low and the observational learning supplies sufficiently large uncertainty.

scholarly journals Nonlinear trade-offs allow the cooperation game to evolve from Prisoner's Dilemma to Snowdrift

2017 ◽  
Vol 284 (1854) ◽  
pp. 20170228 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lin Chao ◽  
Santiago F. Elena
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Group Size ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Gene Products ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Defective Interfering Particles ◽  
Trade Offs ◽  
High Level

The existence of cooperation, or the production of public goods, is an evolutionary problem. Cooperation is not favoured because the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game drives cooperators to extinction. We have re-analysed this problem by using RNA viruses to motivate a model for the evolution of cooperation. Gene products are the public goods and group size is the number of virions co-infecting the same host cell. Our results show that if the trade-off between replication and production of gene products is linear, PD is observed. However, if the trade-off is nonlinear, the viruses evolve into separate lineages of ultra-defectors and ultra-cooperators as group size is increased. The nonlinearity was justified by the existence of real viral ultra-defectors, known as defective interfering particles, which gain a nonlinear advantage by being smaller. The evolution of ultra-defectors and ultra-cooperators creates the Snowdrift game, which promotes high-level production of public goods.

scholarly journals Using Artificial Intelligence to classify Jobseekers: The Accuracy-Equity Trade-off

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
SAM DESIERE ◽  
LUDO STRUYVEN
Keyword(s):  
Artificial Intelligence ◽  
Maximum Level ◽  
Employment Services ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
The Public ◽  
Foreign Origin ◽  
Trade Offs ◽  
Graphical Tool ◽  
The Cost

Abstract Artificial intelligence (AI) is increasingly popular in the public sector to improve the cost-efficiency of service delivery. One example is AI-based profiling models in public employment services (PES), which predict a jobseeker’s probability of finding work and are used to segment jobseekers in groups. Profiling models hold the potential to improve identification of jobseekers at-risk of becoming long-term unemployed, but also induce discrimination. Using a recently developed AI-based profiling model of the Flemish PES, we assess to what extent AI-based profiling ‘discriminates’ against jobseekers of foreign origin compared to traditional rule-based profiling approaches. At a maximum level of accuracy, jobseekers of foreign origin who ultimately find a job are 2.6 times more likely to be misclassified as ‘high-risk’ jobseekers. We argue that it is critical that policymakers and caseworkers understand the inherent trade-offs of profiling models, and consider the limitations when integrating these models in daily operations. We develop a graphical tool to visualize the accuracy-equity trade-off in order to facilitate policy discussions.

THE EFFECT OF PINNING CONTROL ON EVOLUTIONARY PRISONER'S DILEMMA GAME

2010 ◽  
Vol 24 (25) ◽  
pp. 2581-2589 ◽  
Author(s):  
WEN-BO DU ◽  
HONG ZHOU ◽  
ZHEN LIU ◽  
XIAN-BIN CAO
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Pinning Control ◽  
Control Mechanisms ◽  
Control Cost ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Scale Free ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
Control Degree

The evolutionary game on graphs provides a natural framework to investigate the cooperation behavior existing in natural and social society. In this paper, degree-based pinning control and random pinning control are introduced into the evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on scale-free networks, and the effects of control mechanism and control cost on the evolution are studied. Numerical simulation shows that forcing some nodes to cooperate (defect) will increase (decrease) the frequency of cooperators. Compared with random pinning control, degree-based pinning control is more efficient, and degree-based pinning control costs less than random pinning control to achieve the same goal. Numerical results also reveal that the evolutionary time series is more stable under pinning control mechanisms, especially under the degree-based pinning control.

scholarly journals High and dry: Trade-off in arboreal calling in a treefrog mediated by local environment

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amanda S Cicchino ◽  
Nicholas A Cairns ◽  
Grégory Bulté ◽  
Stephen C Lougheed
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Conditions ◽  
Ground Cover ◽  
Local Environment ◽  
Environmental Data ◽  
Calling Behavior ◽  
Vegetation Density ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Trade Offs ◽  
Mating Call ◽  
The Cost

Abstract Trade-offs shaping behavioral variation are often influenced by the environment. We investigated the role that the environment plays in mediating trade-offs using a widespread frog with a conspicuous mating display, Pseudacris crucifer. We first demonstrated, using playback and desiccation experiments, that calling site selection involves a trade-off between sound transmission and desiccation. We then determined the influence of local environmental conditions on the intensity of the trade-off by examining range-wide behavioral and environmental data. We showed that the benefit of improved call transmission is positively influenced by vegetation density and ground cover. Behavioral data are consistent with this relationship: sites with a greater transmission benefit have increased prevalence of arboreally calling males. We also found that the prevalence of arboreal calling behavior increases with relative humidity and air temperature, suggesting an influence of these environmental variables on the desiccation cost of arboreal calling. This study provides a clear example of the role of the environment in mediating trade-off intensities and shaping critical behavioral traits. Local environment mediates the intensity of a trade-off associated with arboreal calling behavior in a treefrog. Combining observational and experimental approaches, we show that arboreal calling behavior increases the transmission of a mating call while potentially subjecting individuals to a rate of desiccation six times greater than terrestrial calling. Local environmental conditions influence both the benefit and the cost of this trade-off, subjecting different populations to varying trade-off intensities and shaping arboreal calling behavior.

scholarly journals Optimal maintenance scheduling for local public purpose buildings

2016 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 120-135 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arnt O. Hopland ◽  
Sturla F. Kvamsdal
Keyword(s):  
Local Governments ◽  
Formal Model ◽  
Maintenance Scheduling ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Maintenance Schedule ◽  
Public Purpose ◽  
Trade Offs ◽  
Optimal Maintenance ◽  
The Cost

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to set up and analyze a formal model for maintenance scheduling for local government purpose buildings. Design/methodology/approach – The authors formulate the maintenance scheduling decision as a dynamic optimization problem, subject to an accelerating decay. This approach offers a formal, yet intuitive, weighting of an important trade-off when deciding a maintenance schedule. Findings – The optimal maintenance schedule reflects a trade-off between the interest rate and the rate at which the decay accelerates. The prior reflects the alternative cost, since the money spent on maintenance could be saved and earn interests, while the latter reflects the cost of postponing maintenance. Importantly, it turns out that it is sub-optimal to have a cyclical maintenance schedule where the building is allowed to decay and then be intensively maintained before decaying again. Rather, local governments should focus the maintenance either early in the building’s life-span and eventually let it decay toward replacement/abandonment or first let it decay to a target level and then keep it there until replacement/abandonment. Which of the two is optimal depends on the trade-off between the alternative cost and the cost of postponing maintenance. Originality/value – The paper provides a first formal inquiry into important trade-offs that are important for maintenance scheduling of local public purpose buildings.

Exploring the Culture of Surveillance: A Qualitative Study in Portugal

2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-95
Author(s):  
Délcio Faustino ◽  
Maria João Simões
Keyword(s):  
Qualitative Study ◽  
Detailed Analysis ◽  
Social Inequalities ◽  
Cost Benefit ◽  
Theoretical Framework ◽  
Surveillance Culture ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Trade Offs ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Subjective Meanings

By following the theoretical framework of the surveillance culture this article aims to detail the surveillance imaginaries and practices that individuals have, capturing differences and social inequalities among respondents. We present an in-depth look into surveillance awareness, exploring subjective meanings and the varying awareness regarding commercial, governmental, and lateral surveillance. Furthermore, a detailed analysis is made on how individuals sometimes welcome surveillance, expanding on the cost-benefit trade-off, and detailing it on three distinct trade-offs: the privacy vs. commercial gains/rewards, the privacy vs. convenience and, the privacy vs. security. Lastly, we present a section that explores and analyzes resistance to surveillance.

Evolutionary game dynamics of death-birth process with interval payoffs on graphs

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Bichuan Jiang ◽  
Lan Shu
Keyword(s):  
Natural Selection ◽  
Dynamic Equation ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Fixation Probability ◽  
Weak Selection ◽  
Birth Process ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Game Dynamics

In this paper, we study the evolutionary game dynamics of the death-birth process with interval payoffs on graphs. First of all, we derive the interval replication dynamic equation. Secondly, we derive the fixation probability of the B-C prisoner’s dilemma game based on the death-birth process under the condition of weak selection, analyze the condition of the strategy fixed in the population, that is the condition of strategy A being dominant is analyzed. So we can judge whether natural selection is beneficial to strategy A in the game process through this condition. Finally, the feasibility of this method is verified by several examples.

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