scholarly journals La Justicia Redistributiva Global y la Complejidad de las Estructuras Realistas

2017 ◽  
Vol 2 (11) ◽  
pp. 96-104
Author(s):  
Santiago Francisco Carranco Paredes
Keyword(s):  
Natural Resources ◽  
Key Words ◽  
Global Justice ◽  
International System ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
The Real ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Palabras Clave ◽  
Distribution Of Resources ◽  
The Veil

En 1973 Charles Beitz reconstruyó un modelo idealista global de justicia redistributiva utilizando los principios de la teoría Rawlsaniana, como son el velo de la ignorancia y la repartición equitativa de libertades y recursos. Beitz, que partió de premisas cosmopolitas liberales, dedicó su estudio a los desequilibrios que existen dentro del sistema internacional, planteando justamente que las causas de la desigual repartición de recursos corresponden a articulaciones sistémicas. Este texto que consta de tres apartados, discutirá si la representación de Charles Beitz sobre la justicia global es satisfactoria o no. En la primera parte se expondrá el argumento idealista del autor, en el segundo apartado se resaltarán las falacias teóricas que se puede encontrar en dicha propuesta, y la última parte se dejará para prescribir un balance de la moral realista que mantienen los estados y cómo dichos principios aún imperan dentro del sistema internacional. Abstract In 1973 Charles Beitz used the principles of Rawls's Theory of Justice such as the veil of ignorance and the fair redistribution of liberties and resources to reconstruct a cosmopolitan model of redistributive justice, Beitz, who used liberal and cosmopolitan premises in his theory, has dedicated his analysis to study the imbalances that exist within the international system, rightly arguing that the causes of unfair distribution of resources are systemically produced. This text, which consists of three sections, will discuss whether Charles Beitz's representation of global justice is satisfactory or not. The first part will analyse Beitz´s idealist argument, whereas the second section will expose the theoretical fallacies that can be found in Beitz´s theory, while the final part will analyse the real politics among an anarchical international system. Palabras Clave: Justicia Redistributiva, Recursos Naturales, Desarrollo, Sistema Internacional. Key Words: Redistributive Justice, Natural Resources, Development, International System.

scholarly journals F.H. Bradley: ¿un espinosista hegeliano?

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michele Cardani
Keyword(s):  
Key Words ◽  
German Idealism ◽  
The Real ◽  
Palabras Clave ◽  
The Absolute ◽  
British Idealism

Resumen: La doctrina de Spinoza constituye una de las principales inspiraciones del más célebre entre los idealistas británicos, F.H. Bradley, cuya filosofía se caracteriza a su vez por elementos típicos del idealismo alemán y, en particular, de Hegel. Según A. Seth Pringle-Pattison, la presencia de estas dos tendencias conflictivas reduce el planteamiento de Appearance and Reality a una disposición filosófica esencialmente mística. Sin embargo, a pesar de las reales influencias de Spinoza y Hegel en el contexto del idealismo británico, los cimientos de la metafísica bradleyana (la incognoscibilidad de lo Absoluto, su transcendencia respecto al pensamiento, el rechazo del panteísmo y del panlogismo) sugieren una postura difícilmente identificable con Spinoza o Hegel, o con ambos. Palabras clave: Absoluto - Idealismo británico – Monismo – Panlogismo - Panteísmo.Abstract: Spinoza’s doctrine represents one of the greatest inspirations for the most well-known representative of the British Idealism, F.H. Bradley, whose philosophy is also marked by some of the most typical elements of German Idealism, especially those of Hegel. According to Seth Pringle-Pattison, the presence of these conflictive tendencies reduce the standpoint of Appearance and Reality to an essentially mystic philosophical attitude. However, despite the real influences of Spinoza and Hegel in the context of British Idealism, the foundations of Bradley’s metaphysics (the unknowability of the Absolute and its transcendence, as well as the rejection of pantheism and panlogism) suggest that Bradley is defending a perspective that can hardly be identified with Spinoza or Hegel, or with both of them. Key words: Absolute - British Idealism – Monism – Panlogism - Pantheism.

What Does Nozick's Minimal State Do?

1987 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 275-305 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gene E. Mumy
Keyword(s):  
Public Finance ◽  
Political Philosophy ◽  
The Other ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Minimal State ◽  
Entitlement Theory ◽  
Moral Boundaries ◽  
The Veil ◽  
Legitimate State

In the first half of the 1970s, two books appeared which have subsequently been regarded as major works in political philosophy: John Rawls's A Theory of Justice (1971), and Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974). Economists have devoted a considerable amount of ink to commentary, pro and con, on A Theory of Justice; and it is getting to be a rare public finance textbook that does not, in its discussion of governmental redistribution, describe the Kantian contract made behind the veil of ignorance. On the other hand, while Nozick has not exactly been ignored, economists have not joined the debate over Anarchy, State, and Utopia with the same gusto. When economists have joined the debate, their concern has been, more often than not, with Nozick's entitlement theory of distributive justice, as is the case with Varian (1975) and Sen (1977). What is largely missing, then, is any economic analysis of the processes that give rise to Nozick's morally legitimate state, which he calls the minimal state, and the characteristics and likely activities of the minimal state within the moral boundaries set by Nozick, his assertions to the contrary notwithstanding.

scholarly journals John Rawls’s Concept of Justice as Fairness

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 179
Author(s):  
Edor J. Edor
Keyword(s):  
Original Position ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
Traditional Conception ◽  
Justice As Fairness ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
The Veil

John Rawls's theory of Justice is one of the most influential conceptions of justice. Scholars have continued to study it to understand the principles in the formation and to further frame it in the context of contemporary situations. This paper contributes to the ongoing discussion by presenting Rawls’ concept of “justice as fairness” as it evolved from the traditional conception of justice to the modern-shift in the concept. The paper also examines Rawls’s concept of justice as fairness, and it focuses on analyzing or studying the concept of justice as fairness in terms of the principles used in its formulations. Several criticisms developed by political philosophers to critique the idea were examined. In conclusion, it was argued that Rawls's invention of the veil-of-ignorance for the original position has affected the theory negatively.

Sprawiedliwość jako racjonalność

Etyka ◽  
1981 ◽  
Vol 19 ◽  
pp. 111-132
Author(s):  
Hanna Buczyńska-Garewicz
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
The Veil

The article deals with John Rawls’ theory of justice. The principal categories of Rawls’ book are analysed; especially the “veil of ignorance” and the principles of justice. Author’s attention is focused on some philosophical aspects of the concept of justice. The question of grounding of the idea of justice is analysed. Rawls’ theory is criticized for its lack of explanation in which way the idea of justice is given: is it a primordial experience or a result of the rational calculus?

scholarly journals La introducción del liberalismo inglés en Barcelona: "Lo bello y lo sublime", de Manuel Casamada

STUDIUM ◽  
2018 ◽  
pp. 85-110
Author(s):  
Ignasi Roviró Alemany
Keyword(s):  
Nineteenth Century ◽  
Key Words ◽  
Edmund Burke ◽  
Early Nineteenth Century ◽  
The Real ◽  
The Sublime ◽  
Palabras Clave ◽  
Hugh Blair ◽  
Sublime Aesthetic ◽  
Real Academia

Resumen A principios del siglo xixlos literatos de la capital de España estaban divididos en dos facciones: una progresista y otra conservadora. Estas posiciones ideológicas contaminaron la literatura. Los progresistas utilizaron como bandera un texto retórico del predicador escocés Hugo Blair (1718-1800); los conservadores, un texto del esteta francés Charles Batteux (1713-1780). El uso de Blair representó también una vía más de introducción del pensamiento liberal inglés y la divulgación de Edmund Burke, de especial interés para la oposición entre lo bello y lo sublime. Hasta ese momento, los conceptos de lo bello y lo sublime se entendían como conceptos encadenados. En Barcelona, la influencia de Blair se ve en la obra del fraile liberal Manuel Casamada (1772-1841) y en el discurso, inédito, que pronunció en la Real Academia de Buenas Letras de Barcelona (1837), que ha sido incluido, transcrito y anotado, en este artículo. Palabras clave: Hugo Blair, Manuel Casamada, bello, sublime, estética   Abstract In early nineteenth century, the writers of the capital of Spain were divided into two factions: one conservative and one progressive. These ideological positions were transferred to literature. The progressives used as flag a rhetorical text of the Scottish preacher Hugh Blair (1718-1800), the conservatives, a text of the French esthete Charles Batteux (1713-1780). Blair’s use represents one route of introduction of liberal English thought and the popularization of Edmund Burke, work of particular interest to the opposition between the beautiful and the sublime. Until then, the concepts of beauty and the sublime understood as linked concepts. In Catalonia, Blair's influence is seen in the work of the Liberal priest Manuel Casamada (1772-1841) and in the speech, unedited, who spoke at the Real Acadèmia de Bones Lletres de Barcelona(1837), which has been included, transcribed and annotated, in this article. Key words: Hugh Blair, Manuel Casamada, beautiful, sublime, aesthetic

Rawls, Risk, and the Maximin Principle

2020 ◽  
pp. 149-154
Author(s):  
Barbara H. Fried
Keyword(s):  
Rational Choice ◽  
Utility Functions ◽  
Original Position ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Uncertainty Aversion ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Individual Preferences ◽  
Maximin Principle ◽  
The Veil

In A Theory of Justice, Rawls acknowledged that rational choice behind the veil of ignorance would generally yield average utilitarianism—John Harsanyi’s conclusion fifteen years earlier. The question is, why would it yield a different conclusion in the Original Position? If, as Rawls assumed, the representative person would be infinitely risk averse in those unique circumstances, utility functions would reflect that preference in the relative weights assigned to different outcomes, yielding Rawls’s maximin solution. In short, Rawls’s disagreement with utilitarians is an empirical dispute about individual preferences and nothing more. Rawls believed the disagreement was more fundamental, because of two erroneous assumptions about standard utility functions: that they reflect peoples’ psychological attitudes toward risk-taking rather than their preferences over a range of outcomes, that they would ignore the transitory disutility of uncertainty aversion in calculating expected utilities.

Methodenfragen der Gerechtigkeitstheorie

1979 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Arend Kulenkampff
Keyword(s):  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Original Position ◽  
Empirical Knowledge ◽  
Rational Decision ◽  
Basic Principles ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Methodological Problems ◽  
The Veil ◽  
To Come

AbstractThe purpose of this paper is the clarification of some methodological problems concerning Rawls’ theory of justice. The first part seeks to make more precise Tugendhat’s distinction between 1st-person-theory and 3rd-person-theory. Rawls’ theory fulfills all criteria for 1st-person-theories. In the second part Rawl’s coherence model for the justification of norms („reflective equilibrium“) is critically analyzed and opposed to the hypothetical decision which individuals are to make in the original position (contract model). It is shown that the conception of reflective equilibrium is in various aspects mistaken. In conclusion a problem is indicated which Rawls has not satisfactorily resolved: The veil of ignorance is supposed to guarantee that the decision for the basic principles of social justice is unanimous. Nevertheless it would appear that the individuals in the original position either have too little empirical knowledge in order to make a rational decision, or they have too much knowledge in order to come to an unanimous decision. The veil of ignorance is either too fine or not fine enough.

scholarly journals Normes internationales de justice et globalisation de l’ethique

2005 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Cathérine Audard
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Key Words ◽  
Global Justice ◽  
International System ◽  
International Norms ◽  
Key Words Ethics

O artigo procura mostrar que sem uma comunidade civil democratizante de justificação, em lugar do atual sistema internacional, as normas da justiça global não passam de uma ficção, uma mera expressão do imperialismo cultural e político, um instrumento de controle e dominação dos povos em escala mundial, segundo um modelo colonizador ampliado que torna as declarações dos direitos humanos inoperantes. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Direitos humanos. Ética. Habermas. Justiça global. Normas internacionais. Rawls. ABSTRACT The article seeks to show that without a civil, democratizing community of justification, replacing the current international system, the norms of global justice remain a fiction, a mere expression of cultural and political imperialism, an instrument of control and domination of the peoples worldwide, according to an enlarged colonizing model which render the declarations of human rights inoperative. KEY WORDS – Ethics. Global justice. Habermas. Human rights. International norms. Rawls.

Global Justice and Natural Resources

2019 ◽  
pp. 45-61
Author(s):  
Megan Blomfield
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Natural Resources ◽  
Global Justice ◽  
Equal Division ◽  
Simple Argument ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Common Ownership ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Joint Ownership ◽  
Egalitarian Justice

This chapter starts by looking at what natural resources are and their place in a theory of justice. It identifies two forms that claims to natural resources tend to take: general claims and particular claims. General claims are then used to formulate a simple argument to show that natural resources are appropriate objects of egalitarian justice, because they are the subject of equal original claims. There follows a discussion of how best to understand Equal Original Claims, in terms of four understandings of original ownership that are common to Western political philosophy: No Ownership, Joint Ownership, Equal Division, and Common Ownership. No Ownership and Joint Ownership are dismissed on the basis that they are incompatible with Equal Original Claims, leaving Equal Division and Common Ownership as the two remaining contenders.

E Pluribus Unum

1977 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 49-70
Author(s):  
D. A. Lloyd Thomas
Keyword(s):  
Original Position ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Primary Goods ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
The Veil ◽  
Conception Of The Good ◽  
Recent Version ◽  
Liberal Thought

One tradition of liberal thought is committed to showing on the basis of an individualistic conception of what is good that it is reasonable for all persons to accept certain common principles. The most recent version of this enterprise is to be found in Professor John Rawls's A Theory of Justice. Rawls has to show that persons in the ‘original position’, with plans of life which will turn out to be different, though equally rational, when the ‘veil of ignorance’ has been lifted, nevertheless have reason to accept common principles of justice. One might have expected divergent views about the best principles of justice to adopt, considering that the rationality of choices is related to desires, and that parties in the original position may have different desires. Rawls meets this problem by introducing the ‘primary goods’: those things it is rational to want whatever else one wants. By employing this ‘thin’ theory of the good in the original position, Rawls attempts to show that the choices of all parties will converge upon his two principles of justice. Each individual's ‘full’ conception of the good may then be developed within the constraints imposed by the principles of justice.

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