scholarly journals Give and Let Give: Alternative Mechanisms Based on Voluntary Contributions

Games ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip D. Grech
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Social Preferences ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Social Optimum ◽  
New Family ◽  
The Social ◽  
Collective Action Problems ◽  
Common Group ◽  
Vantage Points ◽  
Other Regarding

We propose a new family of mechanisms, whereby players may give more or less directly to one another. A cornerstone case is the regular linear public goods mechanism (LPGM), where all contribute into a single common group account, the total amount of which is then distributed equally among players. We show that with sufficiently (yet not necessarily fully) pro-social preferences, the social optimum can be reached in Nash equilibrium in all social dilemma situations described by our mechanisms (including the LPGM). In addition, for a given heterogeneity of pro-social preferences, we help to identify which specific mechanisms perform best in terms of incentivizing giving. Our results are therefore relevant from two vantage points. One, they provide proper rational choice benchmarks based on Nash equilibrium under the assumption of other-regarding preferences. Two, they provide arguments in favor of re-structuring many collective action problems currently implemented as LPGMs when it is feasible to gain some information concerning who has concern for whom.

Cooperation in a Dynamic Fishing Game: A Framed Field Experiment

2015 ◽  
Vol 105 (5) ◽  
pp. 408-413 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles N. Noussair ◽  
Daan van Soest ◽  
Jan Stoop
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Field Experiment ◽  
Strong Support ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Renewable Resource ◽  
Resource Extraction ◽  
Recreational Fishing ◽  
Social Optimum ◽  
The Social ◽  
Maximum Extraction

We derive a dynamic theoretical model of renewable resource extraction. In the social optimum, maximum extraction occurs in the last period only, while in the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, the resource is depleted immediately. The predictions are tested in a field experiment conducted at a recreational fishing pond. The subjects, experienced recreational fishermen, face a dynamic social dilemma, in which they risk depletion of the resource by overfishing. We find strong support for the Nash equilibrium. Fishermen exert as much effort in the last period as in preceding periods, and effort is independent of the stock of fish.

scholarly journals The effects of psychosocial stress on intergroup resource allocation

2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Schweda ◽  
Nadira Sophie Faber ◽  
Molly J. Crockett ◽  
Tobias Kalenscher
Keyword(s):  
Social Preferences ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Opposite Pattern ◽  
Physiological Factors ◽  
Prosocial Motives ◽  
Tend And Befriend ◽  
Stress Changes ◽  
Effects Of Stress ◽  
Other Regarding ◽  
Fight Or Flight

AbstractStress changes our social behavior. Traditionally, stress has been associated with “fight-or-flight” – the tendency to attack an aggressor, or escape the stressor. But stress may also promote the opposite pattern, i.e., “tend-and-befriend” – increased prosociality toward others. It is currently unclear which situational or physiological factors promote one or the other. Here, we hypothesized that stress stimulates both tendencies, but that fight-or-flight is primarily directed against a potentially hostile outgroup, moderated by rapid-acting catecholamines, while tend-and-befriend is mainly shown towards a supportive ingroup, regulated by cortisol. To test this hypothesis, we measured stress-related neurohormonal modulators and sex hormones in male and female participants who were exposed to a psychosocial stressor, and subsequently played an intergroup social dilemma game in which they could reveal prosocial motives towards an ingroup (ingroup-love) and hostility towards an outgroup (outgroup-hate). We found no significant effects of stress on social preferences, but stress-related heart-rate increases predicted outgroup-hostile behavior. Furthermore, when controlling for testosterone, cortisol was associated with increased ingroup-love. Other-regarding behavior was overall higher in male than female participants. Our mixed results are of interest to scholars of the effects of stress on prosocial and aggressive behavior, but call for refinement in future replications.

scholarly journals Social Sampling: Children track social choices to reason about status hierarchies

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Isobel Azani Heck ◽  
Tamar Kushnir ◽  
Katherine Kinzler
Keyword(s):  
Social Preferences ◽  
Social Groups ◽  
Social Selection ◽  
Object Selection ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Status ◽  
Common Group ◽  
Unselected Group ◽  
Rare Group ◽  
Selection Of

We tested whether preschool-aged children (N = 280) track an agents’ choices of individuals from novel social groups (i.e., social choices) to infer an agent’s social preferences and the social status of the groups. Across experiments, children saw a box containing two groups (red and blue toy cats). In Experiment 1, children were randomly assigned to Social Selection in which items were described as “friends” or to Object Selection in which items were described as “toys.” Within each selection type, the agent selected five items from either a numerically common group (82% of box; selections appearing random) or a numerically rare group (18% of box; selections violating random sampling). After watching these selections, children were asked who the agent would play with among three individuals: one from the selected group, one from the unselected group, or one from a novel group. Only participants who viewed Social Selection of a numerically rare group predicted that the agent would select an individual from that group in the future. These participants also said an individual from the selected group was the “leader.” Subsequent experiments further probed the Social Selection findings. Children’s reasoning depended on the agent actively selecting the “friends” (Experiment 2) and children thought a member of the rare selected group was the “leader” but not the “helper” (Experiment 3). These results illustrate that children track an agent’s positive social choices to reason about that agent’s social preferences and to infer the status (likelihood of being a “leader”) of novel social groups.

scholarly journals Selfishness Level of Strategic Games

2014 ◽  
Vol 49 ◽  
pp. 207-240 ◽  
Author(s):  
K. R. Apt ◽  
G. Schaefer
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Price Of Anarchy ◽  
Congestion Games ◽  
Price Of Stability ◽  
Social Optimum ◽  
Potential Game ◽  
Strategic Games ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Impact

We introduce a new measure of the discrepancy in strategic games between the social welfare in a Nash equilibrium and in a social optimum, that we call selfishness level. It is the smallest fraction of the social welfare that needs to be offered to each player to achieve that a social optimum is realized in a pure Nash equilibrium. The selfishness level is unrelated to the price of stability and the price of anarchy and is invariant under positive linear transformations of the payoff functions. Also, it naturally applies to other solution concepts and other forms of games. We study the selfishness level of several well-known strategic games. This allows us to quantify the implicit tension within a game between players' individual interests and the impact of their decisions on the society as a whole. Our analyses reveal that the selfishness level often provides a deeper understanding of the characteristics of the underlying game that influence the players' willingness to cooperate. In particular, the selfishness level of finite ordinal potential games is finite, while that of weakly acyclic games can be infinite. We derive explicit bounds on the selfishness level of fair cost sharing games and linear congestion games, which depend on specific parameters of the underlying game but are independent of the number of players. Further, we show that the selfishness level of the $n$-players Prisoner's Dilemma is c/(b(n-1)-c), where b and c are the benefit and cost for cooperation, respectively, that of the n-players public goods game is (1-c/n)/(c-1), where c is the public good multiplier, and that of the Traveler's Dilemma game is (b-1)/2, where b is the bonus. Finally, the selfishness level of Cournot competition (an example of an infinite ordinal potential game), Tragedy of the Commons, and Bertrand competition is infinite.

scholarly journals Localized prosocial preferences, public goods, and common-pool resources

2018 ◽  
Vol 116 (12) ◽  
pp. 5305-5310 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew R. Tilman ◽  
Avinash K. Dixit ◽  
Simon A. Levin
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Concave Function ◽  
Social Optimum ◽  
Public Inputs ◽  
The Social ◽  
Special Cases ◽  
Collective Action Problems ◽  
Private And Public ◽  
Individual Contributions ◽  
Public Bads

The presence of prosocial preferences is thought to reduce significantly the difficulty of solving societal collective action problems such as providing public goods (or reducing public bads). However, prosociality is often limited to members of an in-group. We present a general theoretical model where society is split into subgroups and people care more about the welfare of others in their own subgroup than they do about those in out-groups. Individual contributions to the public good spill over and benefit members in each group to different degrees. We then consider special cases of our general model under which we can examine the consequences of localized prosociality for the economic outcomes of society as a whole. We ask to what extent prosociality closes the welfare gap between the Nash equilibrium without prosociality and the social optimum. The answer depends on whether private and public inputs are good or poor substitutes in producing final output. Critically, the degree to which this welfare gap closes is a concave function of the level of prosociality in the case of poor substitutes, so even low levels of prosociality can lead to social welfare near the social optimum.

scholarly journals A game theoretic approach reveals that discretizing clinical information can reduce antibiotic misuse

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Maya Diamant ◽  
Shoham Baruch ◽  
Eias Kassem ◽  
Khitam Muhsen ◽  
Dov Samet ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Antibiotic Prescription ◽  
Clinical Information ◽  
Social Optimum ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Game Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Optimal Output ◽  
The Social ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach

AbstractThe overuse of antibiotics is exacerbating the antibiotic resistance crisis. Since this problem is a classic common-goods dilemma, it naturally lends itself to a game-theoretic analysis. Hence, we designed a model wherein physicians weigh whether antibiotics should be prescribed, given that antibiotic usage depletes its future effectiveness. The physicians’ decisions rely on the probability of a bacterial infection before definitive laboratory results are available. We show that the physicians’ equilibrium decision rule of antibiotic prescription is not socially optimal. However, we prove that discretizing the information provided to physicians can mitigate the gap between their equilibrium decisions and the social optimum of antibiotic prescription. Despite this problem’s complexity, the effectiveness of the discretization solely depends on the type of information available to the physician to determine the nature of infection. This is demonstrated on theoretic distributions and a clinical dataset. Our results provide a game-theory based guide for optimal output of current and future decision support systems of antibiotic prescription.

scholarly journals Ethical dilemmas are really important to potential adopters of autonomous vehicles

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tripat Gill
Keyword(s):  
Autonomous Vehicles ◽  
Ethical Issues ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Innovation Adoption ◽  
Preliminary Evidence ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Early Adopters ◽  
The Social ◽  
Legal And Ethical Issues ◽  
Theoretical Standpoint

AbstractThe ethical dilemma (ED) of whether autonomous vehicles (AVs) should protect the passengers or pedestrians when harm is unavoidable has been widely researched and debated. Several behavioral scientists have sought public opinion on this issue, based on the premise that EDs are critical to resolve for AV adoption. However, many scholars and industry participants have downplayed the importance of these edge cases. Policy makers also advocate a focus on higher level ethical principles rather than on a specific solution to EDs. But conspicuously absent from this debate is the view of the consumers or potential adopters, who will be instrumental to the success of AVs. The current research investigated this issue both from a theoretical standpoint and through empirical research. The literature on innovation adoption and risk perception suggests that EDs will be heavily weighted by potential adopters of AVs. Two studies conducted with a broad sample of consumers verified this assertion. The results from these studies showed that people associated EDs with the highest risk and considered EDs as the most important issue to address as compared to the other technical, legal and ethical issues facing AVs. As such, EDs need to be addressed to ensure robustness in the design of AVs and to assure consumers of the safety of this promising technology. Some preliminary evidence is provided about interventions to resolve the social dilemma in EDs and about the ethical preferences of prospective early adopters of AVs.

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