scholarly journals The effects of psychosocial stress on intergroup resource allocation

2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Schweda ◽  
Nadira Sophie Faber ◽  
Molly J. Crockett ◽  
Tobias Kalenscher
Keyword(s):  
Social Preferences ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Opposite Pattern ◽  
Physiological Factors ◽  
Prosocial Motives ◽  
Tend And Befriend ◽  
Stress Changes ◽  
Effects Of Stress ◽  
Other Regarding ◽  
Fight Or Flight

AbstractStress changes our social behavior. Traditionally, stress has been associated with “fight-or-flight” – the tendency to attack an aggressor, or escape the stressor. But stress may also promote the opposite pattern, i.e., “tend-and-befriend” – increased prosociality toward others. It is currently unclear which situational or physiological factors promote one or the other. Here, we hypothesized that stress stimulates both tendencies, but that fight-or-flight is primarily directed against a potentially hostile outgroup, moderated by rapid-acting catecholamines, while tend-and-befriend is mainly shown towards a supportive ingroup, regulated by cortisol. To test this hypothesis, we measured stress-related neurohormonal modulators and sex hormones in male and female participants who were exposed to a psychosocial stressor, and subsequently played an intergroup social dilemma game in which they could reveal prosocial motives towards an ingroup (ingroup-love) and hostility towards an outgroup (outgroup-hate). We found no significant effects of stress on social preferences, but stress-related heart-rate increases predicted outgroup-hostile behavior. Furthermore, when controlling for testosterone, cortisol was associated with increased ingroup-love. Other-regarding behavior was overall higher in male than female participants. Our mixed results are of interest to scholars of the effects of stress on prosocial and aggressive behavior, but call for refinement in future replications.

scholarly journals Give and Let Give: Alternative Mechanisms Based on Voluntary Contributions

Games ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip D. Grech
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Social Preferences ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Social Optimum ◽  
New Family ◽  
The Social ◽  
Collective Action Problems ◽  
Common Group ◽  
Vantage Points ◽  
Other Regarding

We propose a new family of mechanisms, whereby players may give more or less directly to one another. A cornerstone case is the regular linear public goods mechanism (LPGM), where all contribute into a single common group account, the total amount of which is then distributed equally among players. We show that with sufficiently (yet not necessarily fully) pro-social preferences, the social optimum can be reached in Nash equilibrium in all social dilemma situations described by our mechanisms (including the LPGM). In addition, for a given heterogeneity of pro-social preferences, we help to identify which specific mechanisms perform best in terms of incentivizing giving. Our results are therefore relevant from two vantage points. One, they provide proper rational choice benchmarks based on Nash equilibrium under the assumption of other-regarding preferences. Two, they provide arguments in favor of re-structuring many collective action problems currently implemented as LPGMs when it is feasible to gain some information concerning who has concern for whom.

Self-Interested Giving: The Relationship Between Conditional Gifts, Charitable Donations, and Donor Self-Interestedness

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Chao ◽  
Geoffrey Fisher
Keyword(s):  
Decision Analysis ◽  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Laboratory Experiments ◽  
Self Report ◽  
Negative Effects ◽  
Charitable Donations ◽  
Prosocial Motives ◽  
The Gift ◽  
Other Regarding ◽  
The Relationship

Nonprofits regularly use conditional “thank you” gifts to entice prospective donors to give, yet experimental evidence suggests that their effects are mixed in practice. This paper uses multiple laboratory experiments to test when and why thank you gifts vary in effectiveness. First, we demonstrate that although gifts often increase donations to charities that donors did not rate highly, many of the same gifts had no effects or negative effects for charities that prospective donors already liked. We replicate these findings in a second experiment that uses a different range of charity and gift options as well as different measures of participant perceptions of a charity. We also find that making gifts optional, as is common in fundraising campaigns, does not eliminate these negative gift effects. In additional experiments, we directly test for donor motives using self-report and priming experiments. We find that thank you gifts increase (decrease) the weight that donors place on self-interested (prosocial) motives, leading to changes in donation patterns. Altogether, our results suggest that practitioners may find gifts more useful when appealing to donors not already familiar with or favorably inclined to their charity, such as during donor acquisition campaigns. They may be less useful when appealing to recent donors or others who already favor the charity, in part because the gift may activate mindsets or norms that emphasize self-interested motives instead of more prosocial, other-regarding motives. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, decision analysis.

Inference for cumulative risk model under step-stress experiments and its application in nanocrystalline data

2022 ◽  
pp. 1748006X2110726
Author(s):  
Yihong Qiao ◽  
Wenhao Gui
Keyword(s):  
Maximum Likelihood ◽  
Risk Model ◽  
Cumulative Risk ◽  
Point Estimates ◽  
Informative Prior ◽  
Stress Changes ◽  
Cumulative Risk Model ◽  
Lag Period ◽  
Effects Of Stress ◽  
Highest Posterior Density

With the popularity of step-stress accelerated life testing, researchers are exploring more possibilities for models that relate the life distributions under different stress levels. Cumulative risk model assumes that the effects of stress changes have a lag period before they are fully observed, which guarantees the continuity of the hazard rate function. This paper studies the cumulative risk model for Lomax distribution with step-stress experiments. For maximum likelihood estimation, Newton-Rapson method is adopted to get point estimates. Meanwhile, the asymptotic normality of the maximum likelihood estimator is used to obtain asymptotic confidence intervals. For Bayesian estimation, point estimates and highest posterior density credible intervals under squared error loss function with informative prior and non-informative prior are derived using Metropolis-Hastings method and Metropolis-Hastings within Gibbs algorithm. To evaluate the effects of stress change time and the length of lag period, as well as the performance of different methods, numerical simulations are conducted. Then a real nanocrystalline data set is analyzed.

scholarly journals The Intuition of Punishment: A Study of Fairness Preferences and Cognitive Ability

Games ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Markus Seier
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Ability ◽  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Test Results ◽  
Cognitive Reflection Test ◽  
Cognitive Reflection ◽  
Other Regarding

Can differences in cognitive reflection explain other-regarding behavior? To test this, I use the three-item Cognitive Reflection Task to classify individuals as intuitive or reflective and correlate this measure with choices in three games that each subject participates in. The main sample consists of 236 individuals who completed the dictator game, ultimatum game and a third-party punishment task. Subjects afterwards completed the three-item Cognitive Reflection Test. Results showed that intuitive individuals acted more prosocially in all social dilemma tasks. These individuals were more likely to serve as a norm enforcer and third-party punish a selfish act in the dictator game. Reflective individuals were found more likely to act consistently in a self-interested manner across the three games.

scholarly journals The effects of stress on social preferences are sexually dimorphic in prairie voles.

1996 ◽  
Vol 93 (21) ◽  
pp. 11980-11984 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. C. DeVries ◽  
M. B. DeVries ◽  
S. E. Taymans ◽  
C. S. Carter
Keyword(s):  
Social Preferences ◽  
Sexually Dimorphic ◽  
Prairie Voles ◽  
Effects Of Stress

scholarly journals Inventory and Pricing Decisions Under Wholesale Price Contract with Social Preferences

2016 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 68-86 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shuren Liu ◽  
Huina Chen ◽  
Lili Chen
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Preferences ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Price Setting ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Other Regarding ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Other Regarding Preferences

AbstractThis paper introduces the other-regarding preferences coefficients and studies the impact of social preferences on supply chain performance in the price-setting newsvendor setting. It is assumed that the stochastic demand is multiplicative. The manufacturer and retailer play a Stackelberg game. We analyze the impact of the decision-maker’s social preferences on the manufacturer’s optimal wholesale price, the retailer’s optimal retail price and order quantity, the supply chain member’s profits and utilities, and the supply chain system’s profits and utilities under three different cases that only the retailer, only the manufacturer and both are with social preferences. We show that a manufacturer, as a leader, should find a spiteful retailer, while a retailer, as a follower, should find a manufacturer with generous liability, to improve the entire supply chain. Finally, numerical examples are given to illustrate these results.

Preference or paradigm? Bonobos show no evidence of other-regard in the standard prosocial choice task

Behaviour ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 152 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 521-544 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jingzhi Tan ◽  
Suzy Kwetuenda ◽  
Brian Hare
Keyword(s):  
Social Control ◽  
Social Preferences ◽  
Human Subjects ◽  
Choice Task ◽  
The Other ◽  
Current Standard ◽  
Cognitive Differences ◽  
Other Regarding ◽  
Other Regarding Preferences ◽  
Social Biases

Bonobos are the only ape species, other than humans, that have demonstrated prosocial behaviors toward groupmates and strangers. However, bonobos have not been tested in the most frequently used test of prosociality in animals. The current study tested the other-regarding preferences of bonobos in two experiments using the prosocial choice task. In the first experiment subjects preferred a food option that would benefit both themselves and another bonobo. This preference was likely the result of a location bias developed in the pretest since they showed the same preference in the non-social control condition within test sessions. A second experiment was designed to help subjects overcome this bias that might interfere with their social choices. Bonobos again did not prefer to choose the prosocial option. However, results suggest constraints of this paradigm in revealing social preferences. In discussing our results we consider why bonobos show robust prosocial preferences in other paradigms but not here. While others have suggested that such contradictory results might suggest interesting motivational or cognitive differences between humans and non-humans, we propose that the current ‘standard’ paradigm has failed validation due to three methodological constraints. Across the dozens of studies completed few have demonstrated that non-human subjects understand the causal properties of the apparatus, non-social biases quickly develop in inadequately counterbalanced pretests that typically explain subjects’ choices in the test, and even human children found this choice task too cognitively demanding to consistently show prosocial preferences. We suggest it is time to consider switching to a variety of more powerful and valid measures.

THE EFFECT OF SOCIAL PREFERENCES ON THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION IN PUBLIC GOOD GAMES

2014 ◽  
Vol 17 (03n04) ◽  
pp. 1450015
Author(s):  
MARCO A. JANSSEN ◽  
MILES MANNING ◽  
OYITA UDIANI
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Social Preferences ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Pure Strategy ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Behavioral Experiments ◽  
Strategy Model ◽  
Group Members ◽  
Pure Strategies ◽  
Other Regarding

Human societies are unique in the level of cooperation among non-kin. Evolutionary models explaining this behavior typically assume pure strategies of cooperation and defection. Behavioral experiments, however, demonstrate that humans are typically conditional co-operators who have other-regarding preferences. Building on existing models on the evolution of cooperation and costly punishment, we use a utilitarian formulation of agent decision making to explore conditions that support the emergence of cooperative behavior. Our results indicate that cooperation levels are significantly lower for larger groups in contrast to the original pure strategy model. Here, defection behavior not only diminishes the public good, but also affects the expectations of group members leading conditional co-operators to change their strategies. Hence defection has a more damaging effect when decisions are based on expectations and not only pure strategies.

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