An Evolutionary Science Perspective on Intuition, Rationality, Conflict, and Moral Judgments

2021 ◽  
pp. 49-61
Author(s):  
James M. Honeycutt ◽  
Ryan D. Rasner
Keyword(s):  
Ground State ◽  
Parasympathetic Nervous System ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Road Rage ◽  
Moral Decision Making ◽  
State Laws ◽  
Cognitive Reasoning ◽  
Self Defense ◽  
Evolutionary Science ◽  
Survival Mechanisms

Moral judgments can be the result of cognitive deliberations, which develop with age and socialization. Rationality began in humans with the development of the cerebral cortex. Alternatively, they can be the based-on survival mechanisms emanating in the sympathetic nervous based on innate, survival mechanisms (fight, flight, freeze) and the amygdala. Common examples are road rage (e.g., I was right while the other driver was wrong, cut me off, and could have killed me) and hold-your-ground state laws for self-defense (the victim was justified in killing the intruder, even though the intruder had no weapon when reaching into their coat pocket). Moral decision making can be based on an innate survival mechanism. Those who did this did not survive and were not our ancestors. This chapter reviews the research on signal detection theory, how aggression is favored over conciliation, as cognitive reasoning breaks down. Physiological studies involving the sympathetic and parasympathetic nervous system are reviewed in terms of the amygdala and emotional intelligence.

Framing Morality: How Antecedent-Focused Strategies Can Shape Moral Judgments

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Kappes ◽  
Jay Joseph Van Bavel
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Emotional Reactions ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Decision ◽  
Process Dissociation ◽  
Moral Decision Making ◽  
First Response ◽  
High Conflict

From moral philosophy to programming driverless cars, scholars have long been interested in how to shape moral decision-making. We examine how framing can impact moral judgments either by shaping which emotional reactions are evoked in a situation (antecedent-focused) or by changing how people respond to their emotional reactions (response-focused). In three experiments, we manipulated the framing of a moral decision-making task before participants judged a series of moral dilemmas. Participants encouraged to go “with their first” response beforehand favored emotion-driven judgments on high-conflict moral dilemmas. In contrast, participants who were instructed to give a “thoughtful” response beforehand or who did not receive instructions on how to approach the dilemmas favored reason-driven judgments. There was no difference in response-focused control during moral judgements. Process-dissociation confirmed that people instructed to go with their first response had stronger emotion-driven intuitions than other conditions. Our results suggest that task framing can alter moral intuitions.

scholarly journals On James Sterba’s Refutation of Theistic Arguments to Justify Suffering

Religions ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 64
Author(s):  
Bruce R. Reichenbach
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Recent Book ◽  
Middle Ground ◽  
Moral Decision Making ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Divine Intervention ◽  
Horrendous Evils ◽  
Consistent Application ◽  
Moral Requirements

In his recent book Is a Good God Logically Possible? and article by the same name, James Sterba argued that the existence of significant and horrendous evils, both moral and natural, is incompatible with the existence of God. He advances the discussion by invoking three moral requirements and by creating an analogy with how the just state would address such evils, while protecting significant freedoms and rights to which all are entitled. I respond that his argument has important ambiguities and that consistent application of his moral principles will require that God remove all moral and natural evils. This would deleteriously restrict not only human moral decision making, but also the knowledge necessary to make moral judgments. He replies to this critique by appealing to the possibility of limited divine intervention, to which I rejoin with reasons why his middle ground is not viable.

scholarly journals Famine, Affluence, and Amorality

2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
David Sackris
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
First Person ◽  
Moral Decision ◽  
Moral Decision Making ◽  
Distinct Kind ◽  
Ordinary Case ◽  
Made In ◽  
The Way

I argue that the debate concerning the nature of first-person moral judgment, namely, whether such moral judgments are inherently motivating (internalism) or whether moral judgments can be made in the absence of motivation (externalism), may be founded on a faulty assumption: that moral judgments form a distinct kind that must have some shared, essential features in regards to motivation to act. I argue that there is little reason to suppose that first-person moral judgments form a homogenous class in this respect by considering an ordinary case: student readers of Peter Singer’s “Famine, Affluence, and Morality”. Neither internalists nor externalists can provide a satisfying account as to why our students fail to act in this particular case, but are motivated to act by their moral judgments in most cases. I argue that the inability to provide a satisfying account is rooted in this shared assumption about the nature of moral judgments. Once we consider rejecting the notion that first-person moral decision- making forms a distinct kind in the way it is typically assumed, the internalist/externalist debate may be rendered moot.

scholarly journals Interindividual Differences in the Sensitivity for Consequences, Moral Norms, and Preferences for Inaction: Relating Basic Personality Traits to the CNI Model

2019 ◽  
Vol 46 (7) ◽  
pp. 1013-1026 ◽  
Author(s):  
Meike Kroneisen ◽  
Daniel W. Heck
Keyword(s):  
Personality Traits ◽  
Moral Dilemma ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Multinomial Model ◽  
Moral Norms ◽  
Moral Decision Making ◽  
Interindividual Differences ◽  
General Preference ◽  
High Emotionality ◽  
Measure Sensitivity

Research on moral decision making usually focuses on two ethical principles: the principle of utilitarianism (= morality of an action is determined by its consequences) and the principle of deontology (= morality of an action is valued according to the adherence to moral norms regardless of the consequences). Criticism on traditional moral dilemma research includes the reproach that consequences and norms are confounded in standard paradigms. As a remedy, a multinomial model (the CNI model) was developed to disentangle and measure sensitivity to consequences ( C), sensitivity to moral norms ( N), and general preference for inaction versus action ( I). In two studies, we examined the link of basic personality traits to moral judgments by fitting a hierarchical Bayesian version of the CNI model. As predicted, high Honesty–Humility was selectively associated with sensitivity for norms, whereas high Emotionality was selectively associated with sensitivity for consequences. However, Conscientiousness was not associated with a preference for inaction.

scholarly journals Political Dogma Stroll’s non political moral decision making

2013 ◽  
Vol 19 ◽  
pp. 33-44
Author(s):  
Ibrahim Noorani ◽  
Khurram Shakir ◽  
Muddasir Hussain
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Western Europe ◽  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Preliminary Evidence ◽  
Emotional Reactions ◽  
Affective Responses ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Decision ◽  
Moral Decision Making ◽  
Moral Decisions

Ethical enigma kernelling concerns about actions against concerns about consequences have been dealt by philosophers and psychologists to measure “universal” moral intuitions. Although these enigmas contain no evident political content, we decipher that liberals are more likely than conservatives to be concerned about consequences, whereas conservatives are more likely than liberals to be concerned about actions. This denouement is exhibited in two large, heterogeneous samples and across several different moral dilemmas. In addition, manipulations of dilemma averseness and order of presentation suggest that this political difference is due in part to different sensitivities to emotional reactions in moral decision-making: Conservatives are very much inclined to “go with the gut” and let affective responses guide moral judgments, while liberals are more likely to deliberate about optimal consequences. In this article, extracting a sample from Western Europe, we report evidence that political differences can be found in moral decisions about issues that have no evident political content. In particular, we find that conservatives are more likely than liberals to attend to the action itself when deciding whether something is right or wrong, whereas liberals are more likely than conservatives to attend to the consequences of the action. Further, we report preliminary evidence that this is partly explained by the kernel of truth from the parodies – conservatives are more likely than liberals to “go with the gut” by using their affective responses to guide moral judgment.

Assigning and Empowering Moral Decision Making: Acuna v. Turkish and Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life Jurisprudence in New Jersey

2008 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 193-196
Author(s):  
Carmel Shachar
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
New Jersey ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Medical Information ◽  
Value Of Life ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Medical Community ◽  
Moral Decision Making ◽  
Wrongful Life ◽  
Wrongful Birth

The New Jersey Supreme Court has continually avoided making moral judgments about the value of life and emphasized that such decision making should be the province of the potential parents. Recently, in Acuna v. Turkish, the court elaborated on the limitations of the decision-making right of the potential parents, and its decision demonstrated that New Jersey courts were only willing to require physicians to disclose all relevant medical information, and not moral statements that had not been agreed upon by the state's medical community, people, or legislature. Acuna might be read as a departure from the trend displayed by New Jersey courts in “wrongful birth” and “wrongful life” actions toward empowering potential parents to decide if they want to bring the pregnancy to term. However, the decision actually fits squarely within this trend in that the reluctance to expand the information to which potential parents are entitled from their physicians can be directly tied to the reluctance of the New Jersey Supreme Court to weigh in on the value of life in wrongful birth and wrongful life suits.

Shame or pride?

2014 ◽  
Vol 48 (7/8) ◽  
pp. 1431-1450 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jae-Eun Kim ◽  
Kim K.P. Johnson
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Studies ◽  
Moral Emotions ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Fashion Industry ◽  
Moral Decision Making ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Counterfeit Goods ◽  
Causal Direction ◽  
Self Construal

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the moderating role of individuals’ self-view (interdependent, independent) in the relationship between moral emotions and moral judgments made concerning the purchase of fashion counterfeits. Design/methodology/approach – Based on reviewing the literature on moral decision making, moral emotion and self-construal, we test the hypotheses by two experimental studies. Findings – The results of two studies demonstrated that independents were more likely to judge counterfeits as morally wrong when pride rather than shame was associated with counterfeits or was evoked through an anti-counterfeit campaign. Interdependents were more likely to judge counterfeits as morally wrong when shame rather than pride was evoked through an anti-counterfeit campaign. Research limitations/implications – Results can inform marketing communication campaigns designed to prevent the proliferation of counterfeits in the fashion industry. Originality/value – The contribution of this research is the expansion of prior work on consumers’ purchase of counterfeit goods by the discovery of the causal direction of individuals’ differences in self-view and its impact on moral judgment.

scholarly journals The Doctrine of Double Effect: An Aid in Decision-Making

2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Pavol Dancák
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Medical Ethics ◽  
Thought Experiments ◽  
Double Effect ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Modern World ◽  
Human Society ◽  
Moral Decision Making ◽  
Positive Effects ◽  
Principle Of Double Effect

Human society of the modern world, which is greatly affected by technological and economic advancements, has to address moral problems with a new urgency. In many instances, the decision does not bring only positive effects. Such cases can be found in applied ethics: bio-medical ethics, business ethics, and legal ethics, but also in other areas of human activity, too, most recently,  in debates, concerning the use of autonomous vehicles or autonomous machines in general. This paper aims to describe and explain the principle of ‘double effect’, when solving complicated and, from the perspective of morality, profoundly dilemmatic situations. The principle of double effect was gradually developed as a means of seeking the right moral decisions. It has a firm and respected position within Catholic medical ethics, but also in secular legislation. The paper presents current thought experiments, which clarify moral decision-making in dilemmatic situations. What seems to be a shortcoming here, is that ethical thought experiments are far too abstract. On the one hand, they refine our knowledge, but on the other hand, they are very partial. The  evolution of medical imaging methods, has enabled us to take a closer look at the relationship between the deontological and utilitarian approaches to making moral judgments, but it does not relieve us of our responsibility for the decisions that we have made. The positive side of the principle of double effect, is that it protects us from the slippery slope of utilitarian consequentialism, where the admission of a lesser evil, is only a step away from committing evil in the name of the greater good.

The process of moral distress development: A virtue ethics perspective

2021 ◽  
pp. 096973302110334
Author(s):  
Carolina S Caram ◽  
Elizabeth Peter ◽  
Flávia RS Ramos ◽  
Maria JM Brito
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Moral Distress ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Decision Making ◽  
Moral Competence ◽  
Ethical Perspective ◽  
Theoretical Paper ◽  
New Perspective ◽  
Context Beliefs

This theoretical paper proposes a new perspective to understand the moral distress of nurses more fully, using virtue ethics. Moral distress is a widely studied subject, especially with respect to the determination of its causes and manifestations. Increasing the theoretical depth of previous work using ethical theory, however, can create new possibilities for moral distress to be explored and analyzed. Drawing on more recent work in this field, we explicate the conceptual framework of the process of moral distress in nurses, proposed by Ramos et al., using MacIntyrean virtue ethics. Our analysis considers the experience of moral distress in the context of a practice, enabling the adaptation of this framework using virtue ethics. The adoption of virtue ethics as an ethical perspective broadens the understanding of the complexity of nurses’ experiences of moral distress, since it is impossible to create a ready model that can cover all possibilities. Specifically, we describe how identity, social context, beliefs, and tradition shape moral discomfort, uncertainty, and sensitivity and how virtues inform moral judgments. Individuals, such as nurses, who are involved in a practice have a narrative history and a purpose ( telos) that guide them in every step of the process, especially in moral judgment. It is worth emphasizing that the process described is supported by the formation of moral competence that, if blocked, can lead to moral distress and deprofessionalization. It is expected that nurses seek to achieve the internal good of their practice, which legitimizes their professional practice and supports them in moral decision-making, preventing moral distress.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document