scholarly journals ‘When the Animals Came’: The Genesis and Writing of an Ecotheological Poem, with Commentary

Religions ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (7) ◽  
pp. 487
Author(s):  
Hilary Davies

This article traces the genesis and composition of my poetic sequence, ‘When the Animals Came’ including as illustration of the poetic process a section from Part IV, ‘Spring’ with commentary. In order to understand the culture, art and religious beliefs of Paleolithic society, extensive research was needed, both at prehistoric sites, and in the archaeological literature, which I discuss; writing this poem also led me to re-assess how deeply and anciently faith is linked to our place in nature. Thus, the compositional process afforded me a new understanding of the complex relationship between humankind, environment and spiritual belief. Paleolithic culture engaged all three directly, seeing them as interdependent; this has considerable relevance to modern ecological concerns. My poem is an attempt to show creatively how such engagement constitutes part of our identity as human beings.

Philosophy ◽  
1973 ◽  
Vol 48 (186) ◽  
pp. 363-379
Author(s):  
A. C. Ewing

Philosophers have not been sceptical only about metaphysics or religious beliefs. There are a great number of other beliefs generally held which they have had at least as much difficulty in justifying, and in the present article I ask questions as to the right philosophical attitude to these beliefs in cases where to our everyday thought they seem so obvious as to be a matter of the most ordinary common sense. A vast number of propositions go beyond what is merely empirical and cannot be seen to be logically necessary but are still believed by everybody in their daily life. Into this class fall propositions about physical things, other human minds and even propositions about one's own past experiences based on memory, for we are not now ‘observing’ our past. The phenomenalist does not escape the difficulty about physical things, for he reduces physical object propositions, in so far as true, not merely to propositions about his own actual experience but to propositions about the experiences of other human beings in general under certain conditions, and he cannot either observe or logically prove what the experiences of other people are or what even his own would be under conditions which have not yet been fulfilled. What is the philosopher to say about such propositions? Even Moore, who insisted so strongly that we knew them, admitted that we did not know how we knew them. The claim which a religious man makes to a justified belief that is neither a matter of purely empirical perception nor formally provable is indeed by no means peculiar to the religious. It is made de facto by everybody in his senses, whether or not he realizes that he is doing so. There is indeed a difference: while everyone believes in the existence of other human beings and in the possibility of making some probable predictions about the future from the past, not everybody holds religious beliefs, and although this does not necessarily invalidate the claim it obviously weakens it.


2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-105
Author(s):  
Nicholas J. Frederick ◽  
Joseph M. Spencer

Abstract In a 1978 study, Krister Stendahl traced the use of Johannine theology in the Book of Mormon’s most central narrative: the climactic story of the resurrected Jesus visiting the ancient Americas. According to Stendahl, the reproduction of the Sermon on the Mount with occasional slight variations suggests an attempt at deliberately recasting the Matthean text as a Johannine sermon. Building on Stendahl’s work, this essay looks at the use of John earlier in the Book of Mormon, in a narrative presented as having occurred almost a century before the time of Jesus. In an inventive reworking of the narrative of John 11, the story of the raising of Lazarus, the Book of Mormon suggests that it bears a much more complex relationship to the Johannine theology than its unhesitant embrace at the book’s climax indicates. Broad parallels and unmistakable allusions together make clear that the Book of Mormon narrative means to re-present the story from John 11. But the parallels and allusions are woven with alterations to the basic structure of the Johannine narrative. As in John 11, the reworked narrative focuses on the story of two men, one of them apparently dead, and two women, both attached to the (supposedly) dead man. But the figure who serves as the clear parallel to Jesus is unstable in the Book of Mormon narrative: at first a Christian missionary, but then a non-Christian and racially other slave woman, and finally a non-Christian and racially other queen. But still more striking, in many ways, is the fashion in which the Book of Mormon narrative recasts the Lazarus story in a pre-Christian setting, before human beings are asked to confront the Johannine mystery of God in the flesh. Consequently, although the Book of Mormon narrative uses the basic structure and many borrowed phrases from John 11, it recasts the meaning of this structure and these phrases by raising questions about the meaning of belief before the arrival of the Messiah. The Book of Mormon thereby embraces the Johannine theology of a realized eschatology while nonetheless outlining a distinct pre-Christian epistemology focused on trusting prophetic messengers who anticipate eschatology.


Author(s):  
William P. Alston

The main philosophical interest in religious language is in the understanding of what purport to be statements about God. Can they really be what they seem to be – claims to say something true about a divine reality? There are several reasons for denying this. The most prominent of these stems from the verifiability criterion of meaning, according to which an utterance can be a statement that is objectively true or false only if it is possible to verify or falsify it empirically. It is claimed that this is not possible for talk about God. However, the verifiability criterion itself has been severely criticized. Moreover, many religious beliefs do have implications that are, in principle, empirically testable, though not conclusively. If one is moved to reject the idea that statements about God are what they seem to be, they can be taken as expressions of feelings and attitudes, and/or as guides to a life orientation. To be sure, religious utterances can have these functions even if they are also genuine statements of fact. If one believes there to be genuine true-or-false statements about God, there are still problems as to how to understand them. We can focus on the construal of the predicates of such statements – for example, ‘made the heavens and the earth’ and ‘commissioned Moses to lead the Israelites out of Egypt’. There is a serious problem here because of two basic features of the situation. First, the terms we apply to God got their meaning from their application to creatures, particularly human beings. Second, God is so radically different from us that it seems that these terms cannot have the same meaning in the two uses. One possibility here is that all these terms are used metaphorically when applied to God, which obviously often happens (‘The Lord is my shepherd’). But are there some terms that can be literally true of God? This may be the case if some abstract aspect of the creaturely meaning of a term can be literally applied to God. For example, if one aspect of the meaning of ‘makes’ when applied to one of us is ‘brings about some state of affairs by an act of will’, the term ‘makes’ with that particular meaning might be truly applied to God.


Author(s):  
Claudia Márquez Pemartín

The metaphysical concepts of act and potency that are central to the Thomistic tradition can help us solve the problem of understanding pain, sorrow and grief. Human beings, as natural creatures, are composed of act and potency. If rightly understood, these concepts can give a rational explanation to the reality of pain-without having recourse to religious beliefs-by accepting it as a natural derivation of our natural limits.


Author(s):  
Lynne Rudder Baker

Dennett’s has recently attempted to break the “spell” that prevents people from submitting their religious beliefs and practices to scientific investigation. But what spell is being broken? Religion is not a unified phenomenon. By supposing that it is, Dennett is led to adopt an implausible mimetic theory of religious belief, and to mistakenly assume that the presence of a Hyperactive Agency Detection Device would impugn religious belief. More troublingly, although religious beliefs and practices should be studied scientifically, it would be a mistake to treat science as the exclusive arbiter of reality. Dennett makes human beings (persons) seem like aggregates of parts. Such a view seems to have no room for human dignity, except as artifacts of an intentional stance. A plausible theory of human dignity would take people to be ontologically significant unities, who, on my view, have first-person perspectives essentially.


Author(s):  
Mark Baker ◽  
Dean Zimmerman

This chapter focuses on a gap in existing cognitive scientific explanations of religion: although they may explain various religious beliefs, they are weak at explaining religious experiences—including the very perception-like experiences that believers often take as grounding their belief in God. The account argues that cognitive science of religion (CSR) to date provides neither the full-blown concept of a deity nor dedicated cognitive resources for arriving at the perception of one. The gap is not inevitable, however: it is shown how certain religious experiences could indeed qualify as direct perceptions of God, on a traditional model of perception. Moreover, one can explain how humans acquired the conceptual and computational resources to perceive supernatural beings by supposing that human beings have actually interacted with such beings in evolutionarily significant ways throughout history. The chapter closes with some epistemic implications of looking at CSR in this “reformed” way.


Religions ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (5) ◽  
pp. 341
Author(s):  
Stephanie C. Boddie ◽  
Jerry Z. Park

In this article, we propose more research attention to an important dimension of social life that bears considerably on the racial patterns of the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic: religion. Drawing from recent insights into the complex relationship between religious affiliation and other intersecting social identities (namely race, gender and class), we argue that understanding the racial inequities of COVID-19 requires consideration of the religious beliefs, participation and the collective resources of racial minorities. We suggest that religion can simultaneously offer a salve for vulnerable communities during this outbreak and can exacerbate the spread of the disease without solving the problem of insufficient access to care. We describe how religion helps and hurts during these turbulent times.


KALAM ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 165
Author(s):  
Ahmad Izzan

The attitude of religious tolerance is an attitude that should be embedded in everyday life and is an empirical reality that must be created on the authority of human beings who have a different religion. Differences in religion is born of a natural process by the will of God. For that plurality is sunnatullah unavoidable. The purpose of this paper is to determine the depth of the concept of religious tolerance that is contained in the Qur'an. As for the verses studied is about pluralism relating to religious tolerance, respect for diversity Syari'ah every religious community, religious freedom, prohibition of intervention in the affairs of other religious beliefs, and cooperation among religions. In doing research on inter-religious tolerance can conclude several things, first to foster the values of tolerance within the framework of religious diversity in fostering religion in general is substantive adhesive used for the harmony of inter-religious relations. Second, in the realm of interpretation differences and diverse religions generate a view that shari'ah of the Prophet Muhammad. is a compilation of the Shari'ah-shari'ah of the Prophet before. Hence the presence of the Shari'ah Prophet Muhammad not deny them, but to collect it into a single solid in one religion (Deen al-Wahid).


Author(s):  
Ruth Boeker

This book offers a new perspective on John Locke’s account of persons and personal identity by considering it within the context of his broader philosophical project and the philosophical debates of his day. Ruth Boeker’s interpretation emphasizes the importance of the moral and religious dimensions of his view. She argues that taking seriously Locke’s general approach to questions of identity over time, means that his account of personhood should be considered separately from his account of personal identity over time. On this basis, Boeker argues that Locke endorses a moral account of personhood, according to which persons are subjects of accountability, and that his particular thinking about moral accountability explains why he regards sameness of consciousness as necessary for personal identity over time. Moreover, she shows that Locke’s religious beliefs in an afterlife and a last judgement make it attractive to distinguish between the ideas of persons, human beings, and substances, and to defend a consciousness-based account of personal identity. In contrast to some neo-Lockean views about personal identity, she argues that Locke’s account of personal identity is not psychological per se, but rather his underlying moral, religious, metaphysical, and epistemic background beliefs are relevant for understanding why he argues for a consciousness-based account of personal identity. Taking his underlying background beliefs into consideration not only sheds light on why many of his early critics do not adopt Locke’s view, but also shows why his view cannot be as easily dismissed as some of his critics assume.


2021 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
pp. 175
Author(s):  
Yasmin Iles-Caven ◽  
Steven Gregory ◽  
Iain Bickerstaffe ◽  
Kate Northstone ◽  
Jean Golding

There are few studies that chart the ways in which the religious beliefs and practices of parents and their offspring vary over time. Even fewer can relate this to aspects of their physical and mental health or distinguish the different facets of the environment that may have influenced the development or loss of religious/spiritual belief and behaviours over time. This paper describes the recent data collection in the Avon Longitudinal Study of Parents and Children (ALSPAC) on the beliefs and behaviours of the study parents some 27-28 years after the first measures were collected. Questions that were previously administered to the mother and her partner on religion, spirituality, behaviours, and beliefs (RSBB) were repeated for the fourth time, together with enhanced data on RSBB. The new data are described and compared with previous responses. The most notable difference between the 9 year and the 2020 sweep was the increase of professed non-believers in both the mothers (17.5% vs 29.8%) and partners (31.9% vs. 45.3%). As expected, on each occasion study partners were less likely to acknowledge RSBB compared to the study mothers. In the latest sweep, respondents were less likely to be unsure if they believed and more likely to not believe. Responses to “Do you believe in God or a divine power?” in mothers ranged from 49.9% stating ‘yes’ antenatally to 43.5% doing so in 2020; 14.9% vs 29.8% for ‘no’ and 35.2% to 26.6% for ‘not sure’. For partners, the corresponding figures are: ‘yes’ 37.0% vs. 30.0%; ‘no’ 28.6% vs. 45.3% and ‘not sure’ 34.5% vs. 24.6%. We plan to undertake detailed analyses of the antecedents and consequences of RBSS. All data are available for use by interested researchers.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document