scholarly journals A Joint Constraint Incentive Mechanism Algorithm Utilizing Coverage and Reputation for Mobile Crowdsensing

Sensors ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (16) ◽  
pp. 4478
Author(s):  
Jing Zhang ◽  
Xiaoxiao Yang ◽  
Xin Feng ◽  
Hongwei Yang ◽  
An Ren

Selection of the optimal users to maximize the quality of the collected sensing data within a certain budget range is a crucial issue that affects the effectiveness of mobile crowdsensing (MCS). The coverage of mobile users (MUs) in a target area is relevant to the accuracy of sensing data. Furthermore, the historical reputation of MUs can reflect their previous behavior. Therefore, this study proposes a coverage and reputation joint constraint incentive mechanism algorithm (CRJC-IMA) based on Stackelberg game theory for MCS. First, the location information and the historical reputation of mobile users are used to select the optimal users, and the information quality requirement will be satisfied consequently. Second, a two-stage Stackelberg game is applied to analyze the sensing level of the mobile users and obtain the optimal incentive mechanism of the server center (SC). The existence of the Nash equilibrium is analyzed and verified on the basis of the optimal response strategy of mobile users. In addition, mobile users will adjust the priority of the tasks in time series to enable the total utility of all their tasks to reach a maximum. Finally, the EM algorithm is used to evaluate the data quality of the task, and the historical reputation of each user will be updated accordingly. Simulation experiments show that the coverage of the CRJC-IMA is higher than that of the CTSIA. The utility of mobile users and SC is higher than that in STD algorithms. Furthermore, the utility of mobile users with the adjusted task priority is greater than that without a priority order.

2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (6) ◽  
pp. 155014772110230
Author(s):  
Xiaoxiao Yang ◽  
Jing Zhang ◽  
Jun Peng ◽  
Lihong Lei

Encouraging a certain number of users to participate in a sensing task continuously for collecting high-quality sensing data under a certain budget is a new challenge in the mobile crowdsensing. The users’ historical reputation reflects their past performance in completing sensing tasks, and users with high historical reputation have outstanding performance in historical tasks. Therefore, this study proposes a reputation constraint incentive mechanism algorithm based on the Stackelberg game to solve the abovementioned problem. First, the user’s historical reputation is applied to select some trusted users for collecting high-quality sensing data. Then, the two-stage Stackelberg game is used to analyze the user’s resource contribution level in the sensing task and the optimal incentive mechanism of the server platform. The existence and uniqueness of Stackelberg equilibrium are verified by determining the user’s optimal response strategy. Finally, two conversion methods of the user’s total payoff are proposed to ensure flexible application of the user’s payoff in the mobile crowdsensing network. Simulation experiments show that the historical reputation of selected trusted users is higher than that of randomly selected users, and the server platform and users have good utility.


2021 ◽  
pp. 102626
Author(s):  
Hamta Sedghani ◽  
Danilo Ardagna ◽  
Mauro Passacantando ◽  
Mina Zolfy Lighvan ◽  
Hadi S. Aghdasi

Author(s):  
I Made Ariya Sanjaya ◽  
Suhono Harso Supangkat ◽  
Jaka Sembiring ◽  
Widya Liana Aji

<p>The growing utilization of smartphones equipped with various sensors to collect and analyze information around us highlights a paradigm called mobile crowdsensing. To motivate citizens’ participation in crowdsensing and compensate them for their resources, it is necessary to incentivize the participants for their sensing service. There are several studies that used the Stackelberg game to model the incentive mechanism, however, those studies did not include a budget constraint for limited budget case. Another challenge is to optimize crowdsourcer (government) profit in conducting crowdsensing under the limited budget then allocates the budget to several regional working units that are responsible for the specific city problems. We propose an incentive mechanism for mobile crowdsensing based on several identified incentive parameters using the Stackelberg game model and applied the MOOP (multi-objective optimization problem) to the incentive model in which the participant reputation is taken into account. The evaluation of the proposed incentive model is performed through simulations. The simulation indicated that the result appropriately corresponds to the theoretical properties of the model.</p>


2019 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 119-133
Author(s):  
Putri Aprilia Isnaini ◽  
Ida Bagus Nyoman Udayana

This writing is done to determine the effect of information quality and service quality on attitudes in the use of application systems with the ease of use of the system as an intervining variable in online transportation services (gojek) in Yogyakarta. The sample in this study is customers who use online motorcycle transportation services in Yogyakarta. The sampling technique uses accidental sampling technique. Data collection is done by distributing online questionnaires through the Goegle form and distributed with social media such as WhatsApp and Instagram on a 1-4 scale to measure 4 indicators. The results of this study show 1) the quality of information affects the ease of use, 2) the quality of service affects the ease of use, 3) the quality of information influences attitudes in use, 4) the quality of services does not affect attitudes in use, and 5) ease of use attitude in use.


2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-31 ◽  
Author(s):  
Diana Effendi

Information Product Approach (IP Approach) is an information management approach. It can be used to manage product information and data quality analysis. IP-Map can be used by organizations to facilitate the management of knowledge in collecting, storing, maintaining, and using the data in an organized. The  process of data management of academic activities in X University has not yet used the IP approach. X University has not given attention to the management of information quality of its. During this time X University just concern to system applications used to support the automation of data management in the process of academic activities. IP-Map that made in this paper can be used as a basis for analyzing the quality of data and information. By the IP-MAP, X University is expected to know which parts of the process that need improvement in the quality of data and information management.   Index term: IP Approach, IP-Map, information quality, data quality. REFERENCES[1] H. Zhu, S. Madnick, Y. Lee, and R. Wang, “Data and Information Quality Research: Its Evolution and Future,” Working Paper, MIT, USA, 2012.[2] Lee, Yang W; at al, Journey To Data Quality, MIT Press: Cambridge, 2006.[3] L. Al-Hakim, Information Quality Management: Theory and Applications. Idea Group Inc (IGI), 2007.[4] “Access : A semiotic information quality framework: development and comparative analysis : Journal ofInformation Technology.” [Online]. Available: http://www.palgravejournals.com/jit/journal/v20/n2/full/2000038a.html. [Accessed: 18-Sep-2015].[5] Effendi, Diana, Pengukuran Dan Perbaikan Kualitas Data Dan Informasi Di Perguruan Tinggi MenggunakanCALDEA Dan EVAMECAL (Studi Kasus X University), Proceeding Seminar Nasional RESASTEK, 2012, pp.TIG.1-TI-G.6.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mina Zibaei ◽  
Reza Khajouei

BACKGROUND In Iran, around 0.05 of population suffer from epilepsy. Poorer health outcomes stem from limited health literacy. The use of mHealth, especially for educating patients in terms of self-care can be very effective. But the important thing is the content that is presented by apps, especially when unreliable or biased information can negatively affect the patient-doctor relationship, causing anxiety or stress. Also, usability of mHealth apps and their impact on behavior change are the other important issues that should be considered. OBJECTIVE The purpose of this study was to assess the quality of Persian language epilepsy-related mobile applications in terms of functionality and quality with a focus on content. METHODS The Persian equivalent of the keywords 'epilepsy' and 'seizure' were searched in the Google Play, Cafe Bazaar and IranApps app stores and the Persian language applications about epilepsy were extracted. These apps were evaluated by two trained reviewers independently using the uMARS scale and DISCERN instrument. Also apps’ prices and the number of installations were assessed. RESULTS A total of 659 applications were retrieved, 78 of which were epilepsy-related. After exclusion of non-Persian language and duplicate apps, there remained 11 relevant apps. The overall mean uMARS score was 2.8 out of 5 while six out of 11 apps (54%) scored higher than 3. The mean figures for the section-specific scores were as follows: engagement 2.2, functionality 4.0, aesthetics 3.3, and information 2.3. The overall DISCERN scores ranged from 26 to 40 out of 80, while the mean score was 34.5. The mean score of reliability was 18.5. CONCLUSIONS This study showed that the overall information quality of the epilepsy apps is poor. The most important missing characteristics of these apps include lack of functionalities for self-care, missing entry date, lack of details about additional sources and inexistence of the risks/benefits of each treatment. The findings suggest that more efforts should be made to develop evidence-based epilepsy-related apps to cover broader domains of self-care and behavioral change techniques.


2014 ◽  
Vol 90 (3) ◽  
pp. 967-985 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlos Corona ◽  
Lin Nan ◽  
Gaoqing Zhang

ABSTRACT We study the interaction between interbank competition and accounting information quality and their effects on banks' risk-taking behavior. We identify an endogenous false-alarm cost that banks incur when forced to sell assets to meet capital requirements. We find that when the interbank competition is less intense, an improvement in the quality of accounting information encourages banks to take more risk. Keeping the banks' investments in loans constant, the provision of high-quality accounting information reduces the false-alarm cost of assets sales and improves the discriminating efficiency of the capital requirement policy. When considering the banks' endogenous investment decisions, however, this improvement in discriminating efficiency causes excessive risk-taking, because banks respond by competing more aggressively in the deposit market, and the increase in deposit costs motivates banks to take more risk. Our paper shows that improving information quality increases risk-taking with mild competition, but has no effect under fierce competition.


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