scholarly journals SOVIET REPRESSION AGAINST REFUGEE JEWS FROM THE TERRITORY OF POLAND AND CZECH-SLOVAKIA BEFORE AND AT THE BEGINNING OF WORLD WAR II

2021 ◽  
pp. 105-120
Author(s):  
Natalia Kuzovova

Purpose: to analyze a set of documents stored in the funds of the State Archives of Kherson region – cases of repressed refugees from Poland and Czechoslovakia in 1938-1941. Based on historiographical and source studies on this topic, to outline the general grounds for arrest and persecution of refugees by Soviet authorities and to find out why Jews – former citizens of Poland and Czechoslovakia – found themselves in the focus of repression. Research methodology. The main research methods were general and special-historical, as well as methods of archival heuristics and scientific criticism of sources. Scientific novelty. Previously unpublished documents are introduced into scientific circulation: cases of repressed refugees from Poland and Czechoslovakia, analysis of the Soviet government's policy towards Jews who tried to escape from the Nazis in the USSR and the Union Republics in southern Ukraine, including Kherson. The forms of repression applied by the NKVD to refugee Jews are analyzed, and the consequences of such a policy for the German government's policy of genocide in the occupied territories are examined. Conclusions. The study found that the formal reason for the persecution of Jewish refugees was the illegal crossing of the border with the USSR, since the Soviet Union, like many countries in the world, refused to accept Jews fleeing the Nazi persecution. The Soviet government motivated this by the fact that refugee Jews spread mood of defeat and panic, spied for Germany, Britain, and Poland, had anti-Soviet views, and conducted anti-Soviet campaigning. As a result of the arrests and deportations of Jewish refugees, the Jewish population, particularly in southern Ukraine, was unaware of the persecution of Jews in lands occupied by Nazi Germany. In fact, the Jewish refugees sent to the concentration camps, along with the Germans of Ukraine and the Volga region, were the only groups of people thus "evacuated" by the Soviet authorities on ethnic grounds. However, due to the enemy's rapid offensive, refugees who did not fall into the hands of the NKVD shared the tragic fate of Ukrainian Jews during the Holocaust.

2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 447-464
Author(s):  
Fred Lazin

The paper presents an account of the Israeli government’s efforts to absorb and integrate an influx of Jewish immigrants from the Soviet Union and Ethiopia. With fewer than five million persons, Israel accepted 400,000 Jewish refugees between 1989–1992. At the time, the Israeli government discouraged granting of political asylum to tens of thousands of mostly Muslim refugees from East Africa. Furthermore, an Israeli law prevented family reunification of Israeli Arab citizens who married Palestinians living outside of Israel (including the occupied territories). The paper looks at policies designed to provide housing and education to the Russian and Ethiopian immigrants. Israeli absorption policies were not coordinated. Prime Minister Shamir later told the author “Who needed policy? Let them come and we will make policy.” Policies gave preferential treatment to Russian immigrants who had more clout than the Ethiopians. They also had greater social capital. While the national government and the Jewish Agency, an NGO representing world Jewry, set immigration policy, mayors had some input in implementation. One mayor discussed here used absorption of immigrants as a means to foster local economic growth and development. The major finding here is the importance of “political will”. Israeli government officials and much of the Israeli population favoured mass immigration of Jews regardless of where they were from. Israeli leaders want to preserve a Jewish majority among its citizens. With respect to lessons for the EU, the findings here suggest that the successful absorption and acceptance of refugees lies in the attitude of the host country toward immigration. Policies and issues of coordination and implementation are secondary concerns. In the Israeli case despite the lack of adequate resources and lack of coordination absorption of immigrants succeeded.


Slavic Review ◽  
1980 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 44-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ben-Cion Pinchuk

As a result of the Soviet annexation of the Baltic States, eastern Poland, Bessarabia, and Northern Bucovina in 1939-40, the Soviet Union was left with the largest Jewish population in Europe. Given this large population, the fact that the Soviet Union had the greatest number of Jews who survived World War II has aroused the interest of researchers and drawn attention to the role of Soviet policy in the rescue of Jews during the Holocaust. Some of the reasons for the survival of Jews in Soviet-annexed territories seem obvious. In contrast to other European countries, only part of the USSR was occupiéd by German armies. Therefore, Jews could find refuge in the unoccupied regions. This simple and generally sufficient explanation is not the only one which has been offered, however. Some Western scholars have argued that the Soviet government had a specific policy designed to rescue Jews from the danger of annihilation. Soviet propaganda, particularly that aimed at Western audiences, maintained that millions of Jews owed their lives to Soviet rescue operations during the Holocaust.


2020 ◽  
Vol 174 (5) ◽  
pp. 127-131
Author(s):  
A. I. Paltsev

The World War II was and is unforgettable for the Soviet people because it is the Great victory of the Great people. The president of the Russian federation defi ned the attitude of the West to the victory by the next words: “Countries do not stop trying to distort historical truth about the World War II… Russia will answer the truth to attempts to distort the facts about the World War II”. For our people this war is great tragedy and great feat. On the fi rst day of aggression the Soviet government declared: “Our cause is just. The enemy will be defeated. Victory will be ours.” The strength and courage of military commanders, soldiers and officers, who did, everything to ensure that on the night of May 1 the Red Flag hosted above the Reichtag. According to estimates of marshals of the Soviet Union, the role of the Soviet medical scientists, doctors, middle and junior medical workers is invaluable. It were they who returned to service 73.3% of the wounded and 90.6% of the sick, in absolute numbers that were about 17 million people, and 6.7 million people participated in the Berlin operation. Thus, the last point in the war was put by a Soviet soldier, a Soviet officer, returned to service by the Soviet medicine.


2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (XXIV) ◽  
pp. 197-208
Author(s):  
Сергей Линец

This article examines the complex political interrelations between the USSR and Poland just before and during World War II. The innocent hostages of these interstate relations proved to be thousands of Polish citizens. With the beginning of World War II from the territory of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, refugees were displaced to different regions of the Soviet Union and they were later settled there as temporary residents. Some of Poles found themselves in the North-West Caucasus where, as ordered by the Soviet government, they were settled in towns and rural settlements. As the archive documents attest, the local administrations created quite acceptable (given the wartime conditions) circumstances of life for the Polish arrivals. They had the opportunity of getting a job and their families were provided with food, fuel, clothes and footwear. With the end of the war, the Polish citizens received the opportunity to return to their home country at their own free will.


Author(s):  
А.Ф. Агарев ◽  
В.П. Курышкин

Все 1930-е годы Советский Союз прилагал значительные усилия для создания системы коллективной безопасности в Европе и заслона на пути гитлеровской агрессии, но правящие круги Великобритании, Франции и Италии, подписав с Германией позорное Мюнхенское соглашение, свели их на нет. Неудачей закончились и переговоры военных представителей Англии, Франции и СССР, проходившие в Москве в августе 1939 года. Западные партнеры затягивали эти переговоры, одновременно пытаясь за спиной СССР договориться с Берлином. Дальнейшее затягивание бесплодных переговоров грозило нашей стране опасностью оказаться перед угрозой войны с объединенным фронтом западных стран. В своих намерениях создать систему коллективной безопасности в Европе советское правительство столкнулось с саботажем правящих кругов Англии и Франции и было вынуждено дать согласие на приезд в Москву фон Риббентропа для ведения переговоров о заключении Пакта о ненападении. Германский министр, в отличие от англо-французских переговорщиков, имел полномочия для подписания необходимых документов. 23 августа 1939 года он и В. М. Молотов подписали Пакт о ненападении. На принятие такого решения оказала влияние и угроза войны на два фронта: в это время на востоке, в районе реки Халхин-Гол, шли ожесточенные бои, которые могли перерасти в полномасштабную войну с Японией. Договор о ненападении между Германией и СССР дал возможность выиграть время для укрепления обороны страны и ослабил единство агрессивного фашистско-милитаристского блока. С нападением Германии на Польшу и началом Второй мировой войны договор не связан. Не нарушал он и норм международного права. During the 1930s, the Soviet Union did its best to build a collective security system in Europe in order to prevent the spread of the Nazi menace. However, the ruling circles of Great Britain, France and Italy nullified the efforts by signing the ignoble Munich Agreement. The military negotiations between England, France and the USSR that were held in Moscow in August 1939 were a dismal failure. The western partners delayed the negotiations trying to reach an agreement with Berlin behind the back of the Soviet Union. Further delay threatened to put Russia in a position when it had to oppose a united western front. Trying to build a collective security system in Europe, the Soviet government had to handle the sabotage campaign launched by the ruling circles of England and France and had to accept the arrival of the German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop in Moscow to sign a non-aggression pact. Unlike British and French ministers, the German minister was authorised to sign such documents. On 23 August 1939, J. von Ribbentrop and V. M. Molotov signed the non-aggression pact. The decision was taken under a two-front military threat (there were outbursts of fierce fighting near the Khalkhin-Gol river, which could escalate into a full-scale confrontation with Japan. The German-Soviet non-aggression pact gave the USSR a chance to enhance its defence and diminished the aggressive efforts of fascist militarists. The pact cannot be treated as violation of international law. It is in no way related to the German invasion of Poland preceding World War II.


2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-32
Author(s):  
Bohdan Klid

The introductory article to the special issue “Empire, Colonialism, and Famine in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries” begins by pointing to some recent literature on famine theory, where stress has been made on responses of authorities to famine and on the political nature of modern famines. Literature on the connection between imperial policies, colonial rule, and famines is also briefly discussed. The Soviet Union is treated as an empire in the essay, and some of the literature on this question is also surveyed. The article then offers summaries of and highlights from essays in this volume that resulted from papers presented at two conferences on the theme “Empires and Famines in Comparative Historical Perspective,” held in 2016 in Toronto and in 2017 in Kyiv. These include papers on famine and food policies during World War II in occupied Ukraine and Moldova. Essays on famines in Soviet Ukraine, British-ruled Ireland, and British-ruled Bengal, India, are summarized as well as an essay on Raphaël Lemkin’s views on genocide and famine and an essay that looked at minorities in Mao’s China during the 1958-62 famine. The essay concludes with the observation that the investigation of imperial policies, colonial rule, and famine should be pursued further, especially in the case of the Soviet Union where this line of research is just beginning.


2017 ◽  
Vol 17 ◽  
Author(s):  
Десислава [Desislava] Найденова [Naĭdenova]

“In the name of Cyril and Methodius”: The Cyrillo-Methodian idea and the socialist propagandaThe paper aims to describe and analyze the dynamics of transformation undergone by the symbolism of the Cyrillo-Methodian oeuvre in the socialist propaganda in Bulgaria. The work and lives of the two saints represent the different national paradigms and state priorities before and after 1944. In the years from 1878 to 1944, St. Cyril and Methodius became a symbol of Bulgarian national identity. They were used in political propaganda to justify the Bulgarian territorial claims in the Balkans in an attempt to achieve the national ideal. On the contrary, after the socialist propaganda during the years of World War II, the Cyrillo-Methodian work became a symbol of Slavic unity and solidarity with the Soviet Union. The idea of Cyril and Methodius as a symbol of internationalism and fraternal unity of the Slavic peoples was developed by socialist propaganda in the years after 1944 and has in fact dominated the scientific interpretations of their work from that time on.The paper is based on unpublished communist addresses from the feast of St. Cyril and Methodius in 1942 and 1943 and other documents from the Central State Archives in Sofia and the Scientific Archives of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences. „W imię Cyryla i Metodego”. Idea cyrylometodejska i propaganda socjalistyczna Celem artykułu są opis i analiza dynamiki transformacji symboliki misji cyrylometodejskiego w propagandzie socjalistycznej w Bułgarii. Dzieło i życie śś. Cyryla i Metodego wpisują się w różne paradygmaty narodowe i priorytety państwowe przed i po roku 1944. W okresie od 1878 do 1944 roku stali się oni symbolem bułgarskiej tożsamości narodowej. Ich figury są używane w propagandzie politycznej, aby uzasadnić bułgarskie pretensje terytorialne na Bałkanach w dążeniu do osiągniecia narodowego ideału. Natomiast w wyniku propagandy socjalistycznej w czasie II wojny światowej dzieło Braci Sołuńskich staje się symbolem Słowiańszczyzny i solidarności ze Związkiem Radzieckim. Idea cyrylometodejska jako symbol internacjonalizmu i braterskiej jedności z narodami słowiańskimi zostaje rozwinięta w propagandzie socjalistycznej po 1944 roku. Dominuje ona też w interpretacjach naukowych z tego okresu.Artykuł powstał w oparciu o niepublikowane przemowy komunistyczne z okazji święta śś. Cyryla i Metodego w roku 1942 i 1943 oraz inne dokumenty z Centralnego Archiwum Państwowego w Sofii i Archiwum Naukowego Bułgarskiej Akademii Nauk.


Refuge ◽  
1998 ◽  
pp. 43-48
Author(s):  
Boris Kovalev

Based on documents for the Russian archives, which in the early 1990s became open to the researchers, the author gives an account of the problem of collaborating with Nazi Germany in the USSR during World War II. He discusses the role of special punitive detachments, formed from the local populations in the occupied territories, in assisting Nazis in their policy of terror and genocide. A brief history of the infamous 667th punitive battalion, "Shelon, " and some of its members serves as an illustrative example. The author also explains why so many Nazi collaborators from the former Soviet Union managed to escape punishment and settle in the Western countries, Canada and the United States in particular, and also traces the history of some of them.


Author(s):  
Benjamin Tromly

During the height of the Cold War in the 1950s, the United States government unleashed covert operations intended to weaken the Soviet Union. As part of these efforts, the CIA undertook support of Russian exiles, populations uprooted either during World War II or by the Russian Revolution decades before. No one seemed better prepared to fight in the American secret war against communism than the uprooted Russians, whom the CIA directed to carry out propaganda, espionage, and subversion operations from their home base in West Germany. Yet the American engagement of Russian exiles had unpredictable outcomes. Drawing on recently declassified and previously untapped sources, Cold War Exiles and the CIA examines how the CIA’s Russian operations became entangled with the internal struggles of Russia abroad and also the espionage wars of the superpowers in divided Germany. What resulted was a transnational political sphere involving different groups of Russian exiles, American and German anti-communists, and spies operating on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Inadvertently, CIA’s patronage of Russian exiles forged a complex sub-front in the wider Cold War, demonstrating the ways in which the hostilities of the Cold War played out in ancillary conflicts involving proxies and non-state actors.


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