scholarly journals Education In The Arab Gulf States and the Arab World

2001 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 172-175
Author(s):  
Zeinab Ibrahim

Education In The Arab Gulf States And The Arab World: An AnnotatedBibliography is divided into six parts. Each part contains between one toten chapters according to the topic. In the preface, the author mentions thatshe includes all references found in US libraries and the Libraryof Congress and does not include references from Arab countries. Shealso mentions that she was "selective" in her choices of what to includeand what not. For example, literature from the social sciences thatcontained a lot of stereotyping and biased information about Islam, Arabsand Arab society in general was excluded. Unpublished works alsowere not included. The author then describes her method of listing thebibliography: when there was literature available on the Arab world ingeneral, she included that, and then she would list the seven Gulf States inalphabetical order. If there were no references for a country, then thecountry is not mentioned and she jumps to the next country in that order.Part One contains only one chapter, which is the introduction. ElSannbarypresents an historical overview of the Gulf States, which is herfocus: Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UnitedArab Emirates. A map of the region is presented on page four. She surveysthe history and the present conditions of the seven states economically,politically and educationally. The rest of the chapter includes a one-pagesummary on all the topics, which are mainly the chapters that follow.Part Two comes under the heading "General Background andResources", and consists of three chapters. Chapter Two, "Context ofEducation", contains 165 entries. It starts with the Arab World (entry 1-52)followed by Bahrain (52-60), Iraq (61-76), Kuwait (77-95), Oman (96-102), Qatar (103-108), Saudi Arabia (109-154), and the United ArabEmirates, (155-165). This is the system followed throughout the wholebook. When there is no literature available on a country, it is notmentioned. Chapter Three, "Bibliographies and References", starts withgeneral references (166- 215), and then is followed by Iraq (216), Kuwait(217), Oman (218-2190, Qatar (220-223), United Arab Emirates (224)and finally educational references (225-259). Chapter Four, "Religion andEducation," lists 120 entries (260-380) ...

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nasar Alwahaibi ◽  
Muna Al Maskari ◽  
Buthaina Al Dhahli ◽  
Halima Al Issaei ◽  
Samiya Al-Jaaidi ◽  
...  

Abstract Aim: Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) has infected almost every country worldwide, including all 22 Arab countries. We have been following the COVID-19 pandemic in all Arab countries since it started. In this review, we aimed to assess the prevalence of COVID-19 in the Arab world for twelve months and to compare these findings with other most affected countries. Methods: World Health Organization, Worldometer and Ministries of Health websites were used to search for COVID-19 data in all Arab countries. The period was from February 2020 to February 2021. The data was analyzed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) software version 23. Results: The median age in all Arab countries was 26.25. As of March 01, 2021, the total confirmed cases of COVID-19 in all Arab countries were 4,259,756. Iraq, Morocco, Jordan, United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia (SA) have the highest reported cases with, 695,489, 483,766, 391,090, 390,453 and 377,383, respectively. The total number of deaths were 72,950 cases and were dominant in Iraq, followed by Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and SA with 13,406, 10736, 8637, 8022 and 6494, respectively. In comparison with the topmost affected countries, the data obtained from COVID-19 confirmed cases showed that Arab countries are ranked fourth after USA, India, and Brazil. In terms of total deaths per million, Arab countries come in the second last, before India, with only 165 cases. Conclusion: The number of confirmed and death cases among all Arab countries trigger vital worries about morbidity and mortality of COVID-19, respectively. However, younger population in the Arab world may contribute to the less death cases of COVID-19 in comparison with the topmost affected countries.


2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (7) ◽  
pp. 92 ◽  
Author(s):  
Saleem A. Salih Al-Dulaimi ◽  
Mohammad Kamal ◽  
Dalal Mahmoud Elsayed

Iran-Gulf relations are a confusing maze of complexities and contradictions. Iran’s voracious aspirations have been manifest in more than one act and place. The 1979 Revolution created a pervasive atmosphere of anxiety and fear in the Gulf region of that revolution’s ideological expansion into the Gulf states, especially those countries in which Shiites form important parts of their societies. In the Iran-Iraq war 1980, on the other hand, the Arab Gulf states supported Iraq against Iran as it was a proxy war to protect the Arab Gulf states, and Saddam Hussein, nevertheless, ended up occupying Kuwait in 1990. And then the Iranian-Gulf relations took a new turn at the time of both presidents Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami, who adopted an open approach to the Gulf countries. However, those relations worsened when Ahmadinejad came to power as he started to export the revolutionary thought to the Gulf countries and extended the Iranian influence to Iraq after 2003, to Syria in the aftermath of the revolution that erupted in Syria in 2011 and to the Gulf Cooperation Council states, especially in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain. All this comes at the expense of the Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia, which is keen to maintain its influential role in the face of Iranian encroachment in Syria, through the support of the Syrian revolution, which seeks to overthrow Iran's ally in Damascus, Bashar al-Assad. Therefore, this study is trying to find an answer to this question: how has sectarian conflict in Syria impacted the Iranian-Gulf relations?


Author(s):  
Eleonora Ardemagni

Despite national differences, the military has usually presented a lack of political role and agency in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Kuwait, and Oman. This development has occurred because state formation in these nations has been mainly driven by energy revenues and external security provision. The primary task of the armed forces, especially between the 1950s and the 1970s, was rulers’ protection and regime security; for the monarchies, keeping the armies small and detached from political power was a coup-proofing strategy. As a result, researchers used to stress the dependency linkage between tribal armies and royal families, underlining the prominence of kinship loyalties (for upper echelons) and foreign manpower (for lower ones) in political–military relations. But as in a prism, these militaries reveal three coexistent faces—praetorian, neopatrimonial, and performative—with one prevailing on the others depending on the time frame. In fact, starting from the 1990s, the gradual processes of state consolidation and modernization have fostered the expansion of the military sector in the Arab Gulf states, maximizing the neopatrimonial dimension of the military. Defense procurement burgeoned, with an emphasis on hard power, as the agreements with the United States and Western allies to establish defense pacts, troop stationing, and military facilities. In the context of state transformation, the 2010s represent a turning point for the militaries that showed a rising performative dimension, especially in the UAE, and, to a lesser extent, Qatar—performative because of greater operative performances and also because of the ability to influence nation-building. Arab Gulf states’ national strategies acquired a military shape, reflecting in some cases military-driven foreign policies. Autonomy and self-reliance became national guiding stars and military reform was no longer a taboo for Emirati, Qatari, and Kuwaiti rulers. In fact, this is now functional in the improvement of military capabilities through know-how transfer, local expertise, and forms of social mobilization (as conscription, parades, exhibitions, and official rhetoric). In this sense, Oman played a vanguard role in the 1970s as the first-ever example of a performative army in the Gulf monarchies. In the performative armies of the 2010s, soldiers embody a renewed model of post-oil citizenship, based on sacrifice, duty, and national pride. As a matter of fact, the 2015 unprecedented military intervention in Yemen has turned into a watershed for Gulf militaries’ tasks and capabilities (especially for the UAE). Therefore, the military has gradually become a tool of nation-building and governments have been betting on militarized nationalism to forge a sense of shared belonging, identity, and patriotism. In times of rising Middle Eastern arms races and multidimensional threats, the military dimension has been redrawing civil–military relations, especially in the UAE and Qatar, thus offering a new research agenda for future studies on the Arab Gulf states’ militaries.


2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Osama Marzouk

This work represents a short statistical survey of the ABET accreditation in the 22 Arab countries. The data about ABET accreditation are last-updated on October 1, 2017. We found that there are 11 Arab countries with ABET-accredited programs, totaling 358 programs. These programs are mostly at the bachelor level, and are housed in 62 institutions of higher education. In a descending order of the number of ABET accredited programs they have, these countries are: (1) Saudi Arabia, (2) United Arab Emirates, (3) Lebanon, (4) Kuwait, (5) Egypt, (6) Jordan, (7) Bahrain, (8 and 9) Palestine and Qatar, (10) Oman, and (11) Morocco. Only Saudi Arabia has ABET-accredited programs at the master’s level. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are the only countries in the list that have ABET-accredited programs at the associate (diploma, 2-year) level. To account for the large variation of population for the considered countries, a relative scale for comparisons is introduced on a per-capita basis, and we calculated it utilizing the United Nations population data of July 1, 2015. We found that the ABET capita index varies from 4.91 (Bahrain) to 0.05 (Morocco) for the considered 11 Arab countries


2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-6 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anastasia Samara ◽  
Pernille Tanggaard Andersen ◽  
Arja R. Aro

This debate paper focuses on available strategies, policies, and challenges of health promotion for combating obesity in the Arab Gulf states (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar). The paper focuses on the abovementioned countries due to their similarity on many aspects and because of their alarming obesity rates that are on the rise and keep increasing. The paper argues that there are significant efforts to be made in sectors such as policies, intersectoral work, primary healthcare, health promotion strategies development, and qualified personnel for health promotion and health education. Among the six states, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and to a degree Oman have shown some development with regard to the implementation and evaluation of obesity-related health promotion policies, and thus other Arab Gulf countries could be inspired by existing good practices and move from good intentions to using their available wealth to invest in the implementation and evaluation of published policies and strategies. All Arab Gulf countries are in need of more qualified personnel and the development of infrastructure that can help tackle the growing obesity challenge that such countries are experiencing.


2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 113-133
Author(s):  
Seungah S. Lee

This paper explores the dynamics between globalization and local culture in analyzing how higher education (HE) has expanded in Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) through internationalization. It contends that HE expands through internationalization in part because these Arab Gulf states use higher education institutions (HEIs) to legitimate themselves and gain prominence as internationally competitive societies in a globalized world. At the same time, however, these Arab Gulf states face push back from their more conservative, traditional constituents who criticize the state for “Westernizing” education. Hence, these states simultaneously pursue anti-liberal practices in public HEIs to manage state–society relations, enabling them to maintain both national and global legitimacy. This effort to balance what appears to be two competing interests creates a “dual higher education system.”


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