scholarly journals Is Imagination Fundamental? on the Issue of the Genesis of Subjectivity

Based on the issue of the genesis of subjectivity, the authors of the article turn to the Hegelian model, which captures the two-sided and fundamentally changeable nature of the relationship between subject and object. The article substantiates the idea that imagination, being considered outside of the context of psychologization or reduction of it only to the reproductive aspect, is a source of binary differences fundamental to philosophical thought. Following Hegel’s dialectical method, the authors note that the presence of the image already indicates the difference between the two dimensions of consciousness and knowledge. The image expresses the primary truth of substance and, at the same time, the way it is subjectively given. There is a differentiation of the subjective moment of Being with the realization of fantasy. All formations of Spirit are interpretations of the figurative series, primal scenes, the analog of which was studied by classical psychoanalysis. From this perspective, the genesis of such subjective modes as consciousness, self-consciousness and mind inevitably includes symbolization, interpretation of the "Self" images, cognizing, willing and acting in various situations and contexts. The study of the concepts developed by Hegel, Kennouche, Verene and Merleau-Ponty allows concluding about two arguments in favor of the fundamentality of imagination. This refers, on the one hand, to subjective imagination that generates meanings and the need for their interpretation and, on the other hand, to the initial form of synthesis, on the basis of which, the subject and object of cognition, formations of consciousness and types of knowledge characteristic of them are further distinguished. The image, being the first meeting of the concrete and universal, is capable of setting the plot of one or another form of subjectivity.

1981 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 44-46 ◽  
Author(s):  
D.P. Fourie

It is increasingly realized that hypnosis may be seen from an interpersonal point of view, meaning that it forms part of the relationship between the hypnotist and the subject. From this premise it follows that what goes on in the relationship prior to hypnosis probably has an influence on the hypnosis. Certain of these prior occurences can then be seen as waking suggestionns (however implicitly given) that the subject should behave in a certain way with regard to the subsequent hypnosis. A study was conducted to test the hypothesis that waking suggestions regarding post-hypnotic amnesia are effective. Eighteen female subjects were randomly divided into two groups. The groups listened to a tape-recorded talk on hypnosis in which for the one group amnesia for the subsequent hypnotic experience and for the other group no such amnesia was suggested. Thereafter the Stanford Hypnotic Susceptibility Scale was administered to all subjects. Only the interrogation part of the amnesia item of the scale was administered. The subjects to whom post-hypnotic amnesia was suggested tended to score lower on the amnesia item than the other subjects, as was expected, but the difference between the mean amnesia scores of the two groups was not significant.


1980 ◽  
Vol 25 (5) ◽  
pp. 381-385
Author(s):  
Jean-Charles Crombez

The questionnaire on continuing education by the Canadian Psychiatric Association's Council on Education and Professional Liaison, sent in 1978 to all Canadian psychiatrists, raises in the author's mind, in spite of his participation in its establishment, the question of the philosophy behind it. Indeed, seeing signs of a greater problem, he identifies the need for two studies, one dealing with the “object”, the other with the “relationship”. Not elaborating on the first one (description of patients and techniques) which is well known, he describes the second as the knowledge and significance of the encounter (that of two persons inevitably and structurally linked). This “area of relations” paradoxically given too little value in the teaching of psychiatry, is more analogical than logical, more intuitive than deductive, more perceptual than intellectual, and more multifactorial than linear. Yet, this dimension of the encounter (whether individual, familial, group or co-therapy) should take place in conjunction with the objective approach, but the latter occurs alone too often. In order to give to this field of relationship a scientific status of its own, and to reintroduce the techniques instead of using them as guard-rails, proper techniques or methods should be employed or developed if necessary. This includes on the one hand the learning of different levels of awareness and the widening of our perceptual, sensorial, intuitive and analogical capacities. (This would allow for an experience of the fundamental relationship between fields that are apart symptom-wise: dream and awakening, physical and psychic, interior and exterior, fantasy and reality, representations and objects, and so on.) On the other hand this leads us to increase our capacity to listen, to abandon ourselves and to get involved, and to “conceive” a presence within the relationship. Finally, there is this learning of how to observe oneself in a situation, of how to look at what is going on within the encounter (and it is in that very position and this very questioning that the concept of neutrality can be understood, not in the legendary phlegm of impenetrability). This can be done within an “experiential” teaching: for the therapist this means the experience and the study of his own involvement, either with a patient or in groups. Another method is supervision, not as “super”-vision but rather as “inter-discovery” and not as control but rather as “ex-pression.” Working in small groups with colleagues where one can enquire about others’ experiences without any normative goal and with an open attitude is desirable. Another tool would be professional meetings, but not in their current form which is not adapted to the field of the relationship. And so on. The author sees a fundamental necessity for these two fields of the “object” and the “relationship” to be taught conjointly, and neither one nor the other to be excluded from the psychiatrist's training; which is not the case at present. The “field of the object” implies an effort at objectifying, defining variables, causes, using experimental methodology, and a more quantitative analysis. The “field of the relationship” implies positions that are often opposed to this. This contradiction seems necessary and inevitable within every person. One tendency is to make ourselves believe that we avoid this contradiction by pretending to total objectivity: that of scientific psychiatry and clear logic. Finally the author returns to the questionnaire that, precisely in its form, is too uniquely meant for an objective teaching: teaching of diagnoses, illnesses, chart controls, patient controls, teaching through questionnaires, case presentations, putting emphasis on articles or textbooks. This proposed method is adapted for teaching persons considered as entities; and learning techniques considered as reified tools. This is exactly the classical stream of university courses and specialty examinations. This reinforces the illusion. There is also the danger, via the “credit” game, that it will strengthen the already strong tendency to mere objectifying of the subject, of the therapist and of science; that it will privilege a normative vision; and discredit certain essential and humanistic dimensions.


The magnetic and other related properties of neodymium sulphate have been the subject of numerous investigations in recent years, but there is still a remarkable conflict of evidence on all the essential points. The two available determinations of the susceptibility of the powdered salt at low temperatures, those of Gorter and de Haas (1931) from 290 to 14° K and of Selwood (1933) from 343 to 83° K both fit the expression X ( T + 45) = constant over the range of temperature common to both, but the constants are not the same and the susceptibilities at room temperature differ by 11%. The fact that the two sets of results can be converted the one into the other by multiplying throughout by a constant factor suggested that the difference in the observed susceptibilities was due to some error of calibration. It could, however, also be due to the different purity of the samples examined though the explanation of the occurrence of the constant factor is then by no means obvious. From their analysis of the absorption spectrum of crystals of neodymium sulphate octahydrate Spedding and others (1937) conclude that the crystalline field around the Nd+++ ion is predominantly cubic in character since they find three energy levels at 0, 77 and 260 cm. -1 .* Calculations of the susceptibility from these levels reproduce Selwood’s value at room temperature but give no agreement with the observations-at other temperatures. On the other hand, Penney and Schlapp (1932) have shown that Gorter and de Haas’s results fit well on the curve calculated for a crystalline field of cubic symmetry and such a strength that the resultant three levels lie at 0, 238 and 834 cm. -1 , an overall spacing almost three times as great as Spedding’s.


Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Darren Subramanien

There is no assumption of marriage in South African law in consequence of cohabitation regardless of the duration of the relationship. Our law does not give automatic rights to partners in a cohabitation relationship. If one of the parties dies without leaving a will for instance, the domestic partner is not legally entitled to inherit or to claim maintenance from the deceased’s estate. An aggrieved party would have to go to court to show that the parties were partners in a “universal partnership” and that the one party owes something to the other. The question that often arises is whether any mechanisms exist for the division of assets accumulated in a cohabitation situation on separation of the parties. If parties have cohabited and they can prove that a tacit universal partnership exists between them, all property of such apartnership is deemed to be jointly owned by the parties and debts are the joint liability of the parties. The issue as to whether a tacit universal partnership extends beyond commercial undertakings and whether the contribution by each party must be confined to profit-making has been the subject of much debate by our courts but has finally been decided by the court in the cases of Ponelat v Schrepfer (2012 (1) SA 206 (SCA)) and Butters v Mncora (181/2011) [2012] ZASCA 29 (28 March 2012)).


Author(s):  
Pau Conde Arroyo

Este artículo trata de problematizar la definición taxonómica de Testo yonqui desde una óptica literaria que atiende a su faceta narrativa para dilucidar los cauces por los que se manifiesta en tanto que ensayo queer. Dicha problematización es abordada desde dos lugares: por un lado, desde la propia obra, atendiendo a las autodefiniciones presentes en el texto, que son examinadas a partir del marco teórico de la autobiografía; y, por otro lado, desde la recepción crítica de Testo yonqui. En último lugar, a la luz de lo anterior, se exponen una serie de tensiones relativas a la relación entre narración, referente y representación en la propuesta experimental del principio autocobaya.   This article aims to question the taxonomical definition of Testo Junkie from a literary perspective that considers its narrative aspect in order to elucidate the ways in which it can be regarded as a queer essay. Such questioning is approached from two angles: on the one hand, from the work itself, examining the self-definitions found in the text, which are studied on the basis of the theoretical framework of autobiography; and, on the other hand, from Testo Junkie’s critic reception. Lastly, the principle of the auto-guinea pig is also explored, in reference to the series of tensions arising from the relationship between narration, referent and representation.


TECHNOLOGOS ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 88-98
Author(s):  
Tcyrlina Yana

This article pursues dual purpose. On the one hand, the author analyzes the general and the most important in the technical being since only therewith it is possible to conceptualize the sphere of technical objects and to determine the place of technics with respect to the art. So the article is devoted to new ontological opportunity of the technics’ entity perception by its connection with art. This relationship we consider in the context of “technological revolution” in the art. Moreover, it has been tried to be revealed possible mechanisms of technics emancipation with the help of the art and to be shown that technology can emancipate the art using both artistic techniques and inartistic technological processes. On the other hand, the aim of our article is to provide with a presentation of some onto technological key ideas, along with some conceptual approaches (for example, Levis Brуant’s onto-cartography) which we can distinguish by their further connection with the modern art. Conception of ontology in the terms of technics by all means has become the urgent task for philosophy, and one of the ways to solve this task is to investigate the relationship between ontology and technics. The author of the article argues that the confrontation between nature and technology is an illusion. We tried to complete this argument combining the ontology of nature and of technology in one concept – the concept of machine. Recently most works of art have become technological objects revealing the problem of “technical” art. In the article it is proposed the analysis of some modern works of art and is demonstrated that “the nature” and technics cannot be no more opposed and differentiated since one gives birth to another. Moreover, it is existed only techno-nature and its production (in the difference of repetition and creation) is the final question of techno-art.


2021 ◽  
Vol 258 ◽  
pp. 07033
Author(s):  
Vladimir N. Panferov ◽  
Svetlana A. Bezgodova ◽  
Anastasia V. Miklyaeva

The article presents the results of studying the personal maturity of adolescents aged 13-17 (n=1078) who are infantilized in intergenerational relationships (on the model of relations with parents and teachers). Empirical data were collected with the use of the Self-Assessment Scale of Personal Maturity, as well as the modified Dembo-Rubinstein Self-Assessment Diagnostic Method, which measured the actual self-assessment of adolescents’ adulthood, as well as reflected assessments of their own adulthood from the parents’ and teachers’ positions. Infantilization in intergenerational relationships was assessed by comparing the self-assessment of adulthood and the reflected assessments of parents and teachers. The results show that the relationships between adolescents, on the one hand, and parents and teachers, on the other hand, are characterized by a tendency to infantilization. Obvious infantilization is found in about 10 % of cases. Infantilization in intergenerational relationships affects, first of all, the regulatory maturity of adolescents, and its influence differs depending on who is the subject of infantilization: in the case of infantilization by parents, the regulatory maturity of adolescents decreases as they grow up, while in the case of infantilization by teachers it increases. In general, infantilization in relations with parents has more intense negative impact on the formation of personal maturity in adolescence, in comparison with infantilization on the part of teachers.


2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 1129-1147 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ciril Bosch-Rosa ◽  
Thomas Meissner

Abstract Experiments involving games have two dimensions of difficulty for subjects in the laboratory. One is understanding the rules and structure of the game and the other is forming beliefs about the behavior of other players. Typically, these two dimensions cannot be disentangled as belief formation crucially depends on the understanding of the game. We present the one-player guessing game, a variation of the two-player guessing game (Grosskopf and Nagel 2008), which turns an otherwise strategic game into an individual decision-making task. The results show that a majority of subjects fail to understand the structure of the game. Moreover, subjects with a better understanding of the structure of the game form more accurate beliefs of other player’s choices, and also better-respond to these beliefs.


Religions ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 135
Author(s):  
Mădălina Guzun

The otherness of the other, considered as foreignness, is deeply intertwined with the problem of translation and with the one of morality. How can the two of them be brought together based on the work of Emmanuel Levinas? The main question which leads my analysis is the following: does morality limit itself to the relationship with another person or does it concern society in its entirety? In the thought of Levinas, ethics is placed on the side of the dual relationship with the other, while the presence of the third institutes the realm of politics. At first glance, the two dimensions contradict each other, for the first one is characterized by infinity, overabundance, and love, while the second one comports a dimension of finitude, measure, symmetry, and justice. Yet these two domains always exist contemporaneously, each of them needing the limitation brought by its counterpart. How is their relationship to be thought? I will argue that the answer can be found within the domain of translation, understood as an essential asymmetry that is both harmonic and disruptive.


2021 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 223-239
Author(s):  
Avron Kulak

Abstract This study is dedicated to exploring the ways in which Kierkegaard provides a criterion for thinking about the principles of plurality when, in the context of distinguishing between Socrates and Christ, between different conceptions of difference—between those that support the difference of the other and those that do not—he writes that, just as no one must separate what God has joined, so no one must join what God has separated. When Kierkegaard then makes central to faith the incommensurability of single individuals, he indicates that the inviolable singularity of self and other is the one principle that can be true for all—that can be plural—since it is the one principle that is inclusive of all. In my paper I argue through Kierkegaard that the relationship between the singular and the plural embraces the paradox of absolute difference, the paradox of difference as absolute: the single individual exists only by standing in absolute relation to all others as absolute; the plural exists only insofar as it involves the commitment to the singular standard that, as absolute, preserves the difference of all.


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