scholarly journals O Caráter a priori das Estruturas Necessárias ao Conhecimento, Construídas segundo a Epistemologia Genética

Author(s):  
Vicente Eduardo Ribeiro Marçal ◽  
Ricardo Pereira Tassinari
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  

Neste artigo, discutimos a questão do caráter a priori das estruturas necessárias ao conhe-cimento, segundo a Epistemologia Genética, centrando-nos, em especial, na noção de espaço. Nesse sentido: estabelecemos algumas relações entre a Epistemologia Genética de Jean Piaget e a Filosofia Crítica de Immanuel Kant; discutimos a noção de a priori, segundo Kant, em especial, em relação à noção de espaço; e, em seguida, discutimos a construção da noção de espaço pelo sujeito epistêmico, segundo a Epistemologia Genética, centrando-nos no Período Sensório-Motor. Concluímos que, na Epistemologia Genética, o espaço é ainda pensado como forma a priori dos fenômenos, no sentido de que a noção de espaço é quem organiza espacialmente os dados da percepção, sendo, pois condição da percepção; que a noção de espaço não é diretamente abstraída da experiência, mas construída pelo sujeito epistêmico na sua interação com o meio, em termos de estruturação de seu sistema de esquemas de ação; esta análise leva a noção de a priori construído, que, após sua construção, tem as características do a priori, como concebido por Kant.

2021 ◽  
Vol 31 (9999) ◽  
pp. 137-150
Author(s):  
Aivaras Stepukonis ◽  

The article explores a special mode of the human mind outlined in the writings of Max Scheler under the notion of the functionalization of essential (a priori) knowledge. While the concept of a priori was given its profound elaboration in the writings of Immanuel Kant, Scheler applies it with a number of significant modifications. Along with the a priori of objective reality, which is the mind’s first step in grasping the autonomous world, Scheler comes to posit a species of a priori that is subjective. A person’s exposure to an objective essence exercises a special kind of influence on that person’s mind: what was once an objective a priori is appropriated as a subjective a priori, the thing thought becomes a “form” or pattern of thinking, the thing liked becomes a “form” or manner of liking. “Functionalization” characterizes precisely the mind’s ability to transmute the essential knowledge of autonomous reality into subjective a priori forms of knowing and anticipating that reality. This transmutation unfolds on three intuitive planes: that of meaning which is known, that of value which is perceived or apprehended, and that of existence which is encountered in the resistance of objects to the will of the percipient.


2016 ◽  
Vol 64 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dina Emundts

AbstractThis paper suggests an understanding of the concept of “Gewissen” (conscience) according to which Gewissen is best understood as a receptivity to moral principles that corresponds to certain moral feelings. In the first part of the paper this suggestion is spelled out and alternatives to it are discussed. As is shown in the second part, this suggestion goes back to the thought of Immanuel Kant, but it can be developed even if one does not follow Kant in his understanding of the categorical imperative as an a priori principle. However, if one does not follow Kant with respect to the status of the categorical imperative, there are some interesting consequences for our understanding of conscience and especially for our understanding of its relation to knowledge and certainty. These consequences are discussed in the third part of this paper.


Author(s):  
Diandra Dal Sent MACHADO (UFRGS)
Keyword(s):  

O presente artigo apresenta as influências de Jean-Jacques Rousseau e de Immanuel Kant sobre o pensamento de Jean Piaget. No campo epistêmico, o posicionamento de Piaget diz respeito, sobretudo, à defesa da ideia de que o ser humano se constrói como sujeito cognoscente, isto é, como alguém capaz de conhecer. Ele propõe que existe um desenvolvimento do sujeito cognoscente e esse desenvolvimento está atrelado ao movimento de interação. Neste artigo, defende-se a Epistemologia Genética de Piaget como um kantismo evolutivo, ao passo que propõe o sujeito como capaz de modificar suas estruturas cognitivas conforme sua própria atividade. Nesse mesmo sentido, faz-se também a defesa de que o kantismo evolutivo de Piaget só se fez possível como herdeiro do pensamento de Rousseau, sobretudo quanto à ideia de desenvolvimento da razão.


2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 76-87
Author(s):  
Muhammad R. Nirasma
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  

Sistem filsafat Immanuel Kant, terutama epistemologinya, berusaha untuk menjembatani pertentangan antara rasionalisme dan empirisisme. Strategi yang diambil oleh Kant, adalah membuktikan bahwa pengetahuan manusia sudah senantiasa menyintesiskan unsur a priori dan a posteriori dari pengetahuan. Salah satu implikasi ontologis dari sistem berpikir ini adalah perceraian antara fenomena dan noumena. Yang pertama menjadi objek pengetahuan, sementara yang kedua menjadi objek etika. Noumena, sebagai entitas yang tak terjamah pengetahuan, kerap dipandang sebagai suaka bagi metafisika di dalam filsafat Kant. Tulisan ini berusaha untuk membuktikan tafsiran yang sebaliknya; bahwa noumena sama sekali bukan entitas metafisis, melainkan dunia yang sepenuhnya empiris—pengalaman inderawi murni yang mendahului pengetahuan.


2018 ◽  
Vol 67 ◽  
pp. 41-60
Author(s):  
Andrés Buriticá

En este texto se presenta una propuesta sobre cómo comprender la cognición off-line o no situada a partir de la noción de esquema corporal. Se expone qué es un esquema corporal y cómo, a partir de Jean Piaget, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Shaun Gallagher e Immanuel Kant, se puede ofrecer una noción de esquema corporal o esquema sensoriomotriz desde la cual marcar una ruta de investigación que permita responder a una crítica al enfoque enactivo de la mente, a saber, si este enfoque sostiene que la cognición es situada, ¿cómo puede el enactivismo dar cuenta de los casos de la cognición que no es situada?


Semiotica ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 (227) ◽  
pp. 273-315 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard L. Lanigan

AbstractThe article consists of a brief biographical account of Immanuel Kant’s life and career, followed by a discussion of his basic philosophy, and a brief discussion of his pivotal point in the history of Rhetoric and Communicology. A major figure in the European Enlightenment period of Philosophy, hisCollected Writingswere first published in 1900 constituting 29 volumes. He wrote three major works that are foundational to the development of Western philosophy and the human sciences. Often just referred to as the “ThreeCritiques” informally, the First, the Second, and the Third. These are respectively:The Critique of Pure Reasonfocused on issues in logic, The Critique of Practical Reasonrelating ethical guidelines, andThe Critique of Judgmentexploring issues of aesthetics. He is most famous for his philosophy of transcendental idealism. This version of idealism argues that in logic statements areanalytic(subject and predicate are the same; no new information) orsynthetic(predicate differs from the subject; new information is constituted). He further argues that statements area priori(before experience) ora posteriori(a result of experience). Models of rhetoric (tropic logic), phenomenological methodology, and the contemporary Perspectives Model of interpersonal communicology are included as the Kantian legacy in the US. Notes provide a guide to edition and philological issues in the Kantian corpus, especially for the hermeneutics ofVorstellung(‘presentation’) versusDarstellung(‘representation’).


1999 ◽  
Vol 25 ◽  
pp. 99-125 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Larrimore

Wir dürfen aber den Untergang eines Weltgebäudes nicht als einen wahren Verlust der Natur bedauren. Sie beweiset ihren Reichthum in einer Art von Verschwendung … Der Mensch, der das Meisterstück der Schöpfung zu sein scheint, ist selbst von diesem Gesetze nicht ausgenommen.Immanuel Kant was an early and influential theorist on race. What place a theory of race could have within his system is, however, far from clear. Empirical knowledge about human diversity seems not to be the kind of thing that may find its way into morally acceptable maxims. Kant's understanding of the a priori nature of the moral seems to prevent any account or theory of human difference from leading to prejudice or discrimination. On the other hand, Kant defends race it-self as an a priori concept, and the specific content of his anthropology seems to justify the exclusion of non-whites from moral concern in a new and dangerous way.


2016 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 83-84
Author(s):  
Basia Nikiforova

Michel Foucault in the text “Of Other Spaces: Utopias and Heterotopias” wrote that “the present epoch will perhaps be above all the epoch of space”. Space, place, and territories are social productions. Territory is a polysemic concept. Place is “events” created by territories, fluid areas of control produced by territorial negotiation (horizontal dynamics) and negotiations between places (vertical dynamics). Space produces places and is produced by places. Moreover, space, place and territories can be seen as the waves of territorialization and deterritorialization in an endless process. It is a form of seizure in the world, an a priori for Immanuel Kant, an ontological need for Martin Heidegger. Territory is a space, governed by a set of rules, named “code”. Territorialization is then synonymous of a certain codification, or the symbolical organization of space. Places are created by territorializational dynamics. They are the sum of “events”. The place and its territory is not “natural”, but it is a cultural artifact, a social product linked to desire, power and identity. The changes of the functions of places (what Foucault called heterotopy) are an important subject of contemporary studies. There are also many new temporary uses of these spaces and different emerging functions, including new forms of control, access, surveillance, new forms of openness and closeness (passwords, access profiles, etc.). Informational territory creates new heterotopias, new functions for places and a redefinition of social and communicational practices. It is not the end of a concrete place and its territory, but rather, a new meaning, sense, and a function for these spaces. The contemporary meaning of place and space has a visible tendency in creating ambivalence of sacrum and profanum, which means the secularization of the sacred and the sacralization of the secular. One of the sides of this tendency is sacralizing market and marketing the sacral. At the same time space has become a powerful tool of the ideological mobilization of people. The case which is analyzed in some articles in this issue of non-places (factories, department stores, sport complexes, etc.) is an example of absence of cultural references, its denial of a place. Also, the cases of textile factory Drobė and supermarket Prisma which are found in the above-mentioned papers are good examples of a situation when one version of the non-place was changed by another. Place is an essential dimension of human activity and existence. The place and territory are requirements for such a kind of human activity as subsidiarity, struggle for human rights, relation to Others, public experiences, personal and collective identification (“subjective” aspects of the object of identification) including some new aspects of gender, arts, performance in various contexts, the images and dreams about planning environment, borders disappearance and strengthening, the realization of the biopolitical mechanism. At the same time, the borders of a place are particularly revealing a line and a space for a social research, especially in the present era of a growing globalization. Border is a place where “past” and “future” are permanently clashed. On the borders of different places there is no inherently determinated relationship between the past, the present, and the future. Foucault’s idea corresponds with our understanding of space over time and contests the traditional notion of linear time, asserting that concepts of time have been understood in various ways, under varying historical circumstances. A closer analysis of the concept of space and all form of human activity there, is a central focus for contemporary social and humanitarian studies.


Philosophy ◽  
2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lara Denis

The ethical theory of Immanuel Kant (b. 1724–d. 1804) exerted a powerful influence on the subsequent history of philosophy and continues to be a dominant approach to ethics, rivaling consequentialism and virtue ethics. Kant’s ethical thought continues to be studied in itself, as a part of his critical system of philosophy, in its historical context, and in relation to particular practical questions. Kant’s writings and lectures display the influence of the Stoics, Rousseau, Crusius, Wolff, Hutcheson, Hume, and others; Fichte, Hegel, Nietzsche, Bradley, Greene, Habermas, and Rawls are among the many philosophers whose moral philosophies can be read (in part) as responses to Kant. Salient foundational features of Kant’s ethics include: its a priori method, its conception of the will as autonomous, its categorical imperative, its theory of freedom, and its account of moral motivation. Kant maintained that foundational moral principles must be a priori, not based on observation or experience. Kant takes the moral law to be legislated by the will to itself. Unlike holy beings, human beings experience morality as a constraint upon our wills. For us, the moral law is a categorical imperative. All ethical duties are ultimately grounded in this supreme moral principle. If we are bound to obey the moral law, we must be capable of doing so; Kant holds that, even assuming causal determinism in the phenomenal world, morality reveals our (noumenal) freedom to us. Kant attributes moral worth only to action done from duty (i.e., from respect for the law), not from inclination. Significant aspects of Kant’s fully developed ethical theory include its rich theory of virtue and the virtues, its taxonomy of duties (which include duties to oneself as well as to others), its distinctive conceptions of the highest good and human evil, and its connections with Kant’s philosophies of history, religion, and human nature. Many of Kant’s own discussions of particular duties, virtues, and vices are controversial. For example, Kant appears to condemn all lies as violations of a duty to oneself. This entry focuses on Kant’s ethics rather than Kantian ethics more broadly. Despite that, it includes a number of pieces that apply, extend, or revise Kant’s ethics in some ways, as well as interpretations of Kant’s ethics that some commentators may object stray too far from Kant’s own stated views. Kant’s political philosophy is discussed only peripherally here, save for the section on the Doctrine of Right of the Metaphysics of Morals.


2021 ◽  
Vol 23 ◽  
pp. 156-177
Author(s):  
Marsonet Michele

In the philosophical inquiry adopted by logical empiricists, analysis of scientific language becomes something similar to a metaphysical endeavor which is meant to establish the bounds of sense, and this stance may be easily traced back to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. On the other hand, the analytic tradition transferred this conception to the analysis of ordinary language, and this move, eventually, was able to restore the confidence of many philosophers in their own work. After all they were doing something important and worthwhile, that is to say, something no one else was doing, since linguists are certainly concerned with language, but from quite a different point of view. At this point we may well ask ourselves: What is wrong with this kind of approach, given the present crisis of the analytic tradition and the growing success of the so-called postanalytic thought? At first sight it looks perfectly legitimate and, moreover, it produced important results, as anybody can verify just reading the masterpieces of contemporary analytic philosophy. To answer the question: What is wrong?, we must first of all take into account language itself and check what it is meant to be within the analytic tradition. This will give our question a clear answer. We have to verify, furthermore, what kind of knowledge philosophy needs to be equipped with if it wants to preserve its autonomy. The logical positivists clearly claimed in their program that there is no synthetic a priori knowledge such as the one envisioned by Immanuel Kant. There is, however, an analytic and a priori knowledge which is supplied by mathematics and logic alone. Within this field, the techniques of contemporary formal logic are exalted because they allow us to build artificial languages which - at least theoretically - eliminate the ambiguities of everyday speech.


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