North Atlantic Treaty Organization towards the war in Syria 2011-2015

2021 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 265-284
Author(s):  
Jakub Olchowski
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
International Organizations ◽  
North Atlantic ◽  
North Atlantic Treaty Organization ◽  
International Organization ◽  
The North ◽  
International Environment ◽  
Religious Factor ◽  
Syrian Conflict ◽  
The Cold War

The conflict in Syria that started in 2011 has quickly evolved from a local uprising inspired by the events of the so-called “Arab Spring” into a multidimensional and complicated conflict of a civil war character, with many diverse participants and a very significant religious factor apart from political and socioeconomic reasons. Furthermore, the conflict has become internationalized: more and more external parties have gotten involved in it with a view to furthering or safeguarding their own interests. A vast majority of these actors were states (as far as legal entities are concerned). In the context of their activity, operations of non-state entities, such as international organizations, were rather limited and focused on social and humanitarian issues. This also pertains to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Evolving from a typical defensive alliance towards a security organization and, since the end of the Cold War, consistently operating outside the area covered by the Treaty (understood as the territories of member states), NATO as an autonomous entity has not taken any consistent, coordinated, or decisive actions during the first years of the Syrian conflict. This is due to both the specific features of this international organization and the determinants of the international environment with their dynamics.

NATO's persistence after the cold war

1996 ◽  
Vol 50 (3) ◽  
pp. 445-475 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert B. McCalla
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
North Atlantic ◽  
International Security ◽  
North Atlantic Treaty Organization ◽  
Alliance Formation ◽  
The North ◽  
Security Institution ◽  
Organizational Theories ◽  
The North Atlantic ◽  
The Cold War

Neorealist theories help explain alliance formation and longevity but have trouble explaining why the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) continues to exist after the cold war. Organizational theories further our understanding by noting that organizations have strong survival instincts, yet NATO survives only as long as its members wish it to. To understand NATO's persistence after the cold war, we must turn to international institutionalist theories to explain why, contrary to neorealist expectations, NATO remains the key international security institution for its members. International institutionalist theories add the conception of NATO as part of a broad multilevel and multi-issue relationship among member states, and this broader context is necessary to explain NATO's persistence.

Soviet Atomic Blackmail and the North Atlantic Alliance

1957 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 307-328 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans Speier
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
North Atlantic ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Atomic Weapons ◽  
The North ◽  
The North Atlantic ◽  
Future War ◽  
The Cold War

The uncertainty about whether atomic weapons will be used in future war, whether local or general, lends itself to political exploitation in the cold war. The efficiency of nuclear weapons in wartime, and their resulting threat-value in either war- or peacetime, constitute their political-military worth. In peacetime, the threat-value of weapons can be exploited in many ways: by an ultimatum, by authoritative or inspired statements on capabilities or intentions, by studied disclosures of new weapons at ceremonial occasions, by means of maneuvers, redeployments of forces, or by so-called demonstrations.

Beyond the Cold War Chessboard

Worldview ◽  
1974 ◽  
Vol 17 (6) ◽  
pp. 21-22
Author(s):  
John W. Holmes
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Cold War ◽  
North Atlantic ◽  
North American ◽  
The Other ◽  
The North ◽  
Common Interests ◽  
The North Atlantic ◽  
The Cold War

The problem in judging M. Servan-Schreiber's message is that he reaches some sound conclusions on the basis of dubious premises, from which he derives recommendations which could be disastrous.There may be some satisfaction in seeing a Frenchman concerned with le défi, russe instead of le défi américain, but his interpretation of one is as crude as was his interpretation of the other. The shock of revelation that there are common interests of the Atlantic countries in economic as well as strategic matters is understandably more startling to a Frenchman than to others. It was all set out in 1949 in Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty and was restated eloquently in 1973 by Mr. Kissinger. But last spring European leaders were included to see the latter as a self-interested plea from a weak United States to a prosperous Europe. The North American countries were reminded that their role in Europe was simply to defend it on request.

Power, Preferences, or Ideas? Explaining West Germany's Armaments Strategy, 1955–1972

2013 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 55-103 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael H. Creswell ◽  
Dieter H. Kollmer
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
International Relations ◽  
North Atlantic ◽  
Federal Republic Of Germany ◽  
The North ◽  
Depth Analysis ◽  
Procurement Strategy ◽  
Weapons Procurement ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Procurement Strategies

Which major theory of international relations—neorealism, liberalism, or constructivism—best explains states' weapons procurement strategies? This article addresses that question by examining the case of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) during the Cold War. Through an in-depth analysis of the FRG's armaments strategy from the time the country was admitted into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1955 until the early 1970s, the article demonstrates that although ideas and external security concerns did play a role, economic concerns won out more often than not. IR scholars must therefore account for a variety of factors when attempting to explain the FRG's weapons procurement strategy during this period. Neorealism, liberalism, and constructivism are useful in thinking about West Germany's purchases of weapons, but none of the three theories is adequate on its own.

nato, International Organizations and Functional Immunity

2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 211-254
Author(s):  
Daniël M. Grütters
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
International Organizations ◽  
North Atlantic ◽  
International Organization ◽  
Access To Justice ◽  
Military Operations ◽  
Legal Personality ◽  
The North ◽  
Functional Immunity ◽  
The North Atlantic

The development of international law vis-à-vis international organizations has been limited and not seen an evolution of mechanisms to settle conflicts involving international organizations. In a world in which the role and importance of international organizations continues to grow, their opaque status under international law is a problem. This article discusses the position of the North Atlantic treaty Organization (‘nato’) as an international organization under international law within the context of military operations. If nato has a distinct legal personality and relevant conduct can be attributed to it, it could face potential claims. In this article I will argue that the procedural bar of functional immunity is limiting claimants from bringing such claims, not only impeding access to justice for individual claimants, but also obstructing the development of the position of international organizations under international law, and that the scope and operation of functional immunity should therefore be limited.

An Institutionalist Reinterpretation of Cold War Alliance Systems: Insights for Alliance Theory

2003 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 341-362 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kirsten Rafferty
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Comparative Analysis ◽  
Southeast Asia ◽  
North Atlantic ◽  
North Atlantic Treaty Organization ◽  
Economic Stability ◽  
The North ◽  
The North Atlantic ◽  
Alliance Theory ◽  
Strategic Context

This article formulates a model of alliance persistence and evolution to account for two aspects of behaviour that are largely neglected by traditional alliance theory. It argues that states that encounter common threats to military and nonmilitary interests (like political and economic stability) are likely to institutionalize their military pacts. This process raises material and normative obstacles to exiting the alliance, even as the performance of the alliance falters or the strategic context undergoes fundamental changes. The article tests several of the model's hypotheses by engaging in a comparative analysis of two Cold War alliance systems: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization.

Spiritual Rearmament

2021 ◽  
pp. 212-237
Author(s):  
James D. Strasburg
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
North Atlantic ◽  
American Politics ◽  
Spiritual Leadership ◽  
North Atlantic Treaty Organization ◽  
Free Enterprise ◽  
Third Way ◽  
American Military ◽  
The North ◽  
The North Atlantic

This chapter documents evangelical Protestant efforts to “spiritually rearm” Germany and Europe in an era of Cold War militarization. These spiritual efforts complemented a vast increase in American military capabilities during the early 1950s, as well as West Germany’s entry into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The evangelical pursuit of Europe’s “spiritual rearmament” signaled the rising prominence of Protestant evangelicals in American politics and diplomacy. Vying for spiritual leadership of their nation, Protestant evangelicals prepared to spread across the globe a gospel of faith, freedom, and free enterprise. In response to Cold War rearmament campaigns, a growing number of American ecumenists began to adopt Europe’s “third way” theology.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bastian Giegerich
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
North Atlantic ◽  
North Atlantic Treaty Organization ◽  
The Political ◽  
Post Cold War ◽  
The North ◽  
Strategic Direction ◽  
The North Atlantic ◽  
Operational Activities ◽  
Out Of Area

NATO, founded as a collective defence alliance, has spent most of the post-cold-war period transforming itself into a security management organization. Its ability to adapt has been the basis of NATO’s continued relevance. At the same time, NATO’s adjustments in functional and geographic scope have triggered debate about its strategic direction and the political and military requirements necessary to fulfil current and future roles. This chapter will assess NATO’s evolution by concentrating on the bargaining processes among member states that shaped the direction of NATO’s strategic guidelines and its out-of-area operational activities. The objective is to trace the extent to which a common strategic outlook has emerged among the European members of NATO.

The War Scare That Wasn't: Able Archer 83 and the Myths of the Second Cold War

2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 86-118
Author(s):  
Simon Miles
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
North Atlantic ◽  
Nuclear War ◽  
Post Exercise ◽  
Warsaw Pact ◽  
The North ◽  
The North Atlantic ◽  
The Stability ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
New Evidence

Did the Cold War of the 1980s nearly turn hot? Much has been made of the November 1983 Able Archer 83 command-post exercise, which is often described as having nearly precipitated a nuclear war when paranoid Warsaw Pact policymakers suspected that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was using the exercise to launch a preemptive nuclear strike. This article challenges that narrative, using new evidence from the archives of the former Warsaw Pact countries. It shows that the much-touted intelligence effort to assess Western intentions and capabilities, Project RYaN, which supposedly triggered fears of a surprise attack, was nowhere near operational at the time of Able Archer 83. It also presents an account of the Pact's sanguine observations of Able Archer 83. In doing so, it advances key debates in the historiography of the late Cold War pertaining to the stability and durability of the nuclear peace.

NATO Enlargement and the Problem of Value Complexity

2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 146-174
Author(s):  
James Goldgeier
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
North Atlantic ◽  
Recent Literature ◽  
Bill Clinton ◽  
German Reunification ◽  
Policy Problem ◽  
The North ◽  
Nato Enlargement ◽  
Russian President ◽  
The Cold War

Some of the recent literature on negotiations at the end of the Cold War regarding German reunification and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has deflected attention from an important policy problem that arose during subsequent deliberations about whether to enlarge the membership of NATO. Newly released U.S. and Russian archival materials highlight this problem very clearly, namely, how leaders manage tradeoffs and uncertainty. Pursuing one set of interests can harm the achievement of other interests. At times, policies take a while to form, adding to uncertainty in relations between countries. This article highlights the ways U.S. President Bill Clinton and his top advisers convinced themselves that they could both enlarge NATO and keep Russia on a Western-oriented track, despite Russian President Boris Yeltsin's repeated warnings to the contrary.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document