scholarly journals The Constitutional Court of Albania and the Challenge for Its Functioning after the Constitutional Reform of 2016

2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 269
Author(s):  
Ismail Tafani ◽  
Ervin Karamuço

This study aims to address the functioning and cooperation of constitutional bodies in the Republic of Albania. It aims to highlight the often-rigid relationship between them for the establishment of constitutional bodies, especially when this process needs to pass through a spirit of cooperation. More specifically, the paper will refer to the lack of functioning of the Constitutional Court in the Republic of Albania. This lack, without question, has brought a problem in the functioning and consolidation of the rule of law in the Republic of Albania. Although the great constitutional reform of 2016, seemed to undertake through non-political constitutional bodies to solve the problems that are often created through bodies of a political nature, this so far has not yielded the expected results. The opposite has happened, the non-political constitutional body, which has a role in the appointment of judges of the Constitutional Court seems to have further fueled the conflict between the constitutional bodies in this process. The Judicial Appointments Council seemed like a finding in the 2016 constitutional reform, but from a body that would avoid disagreements dictated by the past of co-operation of constitutional institutions, it seems to have done the opposite. Sincere cooperation between constitutional bodies in fulfilling their obligations has been lacking in Albania since the advent of political pluralism in the early 1990s, and this has not been achieved even by bodies created specifically for this purpose. In this way, the conflict between the President of the Republic and the Parliament, although perhaps dictated by political motives, has left the Republic of Albania without a functioning Constitutional Court. This paper aims to analyze that the lack of trust between the constitutional bodies of the Republic of Albania remains an obstacle in consolidating the rule of law in this country. It is also intended to analyze that the non-functioning of the Constitutional Court has brought a number of problems for achieving this goal, even to resolve conflicts between constitutional bodies.   Received: 16 December 2020 / Accepted: 18 February 2021 / Published: 5 March 2021

2018 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
pp. 274-313
Author(s):  
Enver Hasani

Kosovo’s Constitutional Court has played a role of paramount importance in the country’s recent history. The author uses a comparative analysis to discuss the role of the Court in light of the work and history of other European constitutional courts. This approach sheds light on the Court’s current role by analyzing Kosovo’s constitutional history, which shows that there has been a radical break with the past. This approach reveals the fact that Kosovo’s current Constitution does not reflect the material culture of the society of Kosovo. This radical break with the past is a result of the country’s tragic history, in which case the fight for constitutionalism means a fight for human dignity. In this battle for constitutionalism, the Court has been given very broad jurisdiction and a role to play in paving the way for Kosovo to move toward Euro-Atlantic integration in all spheres of life. Before reaching this conclusion, the author discusses the specificities of Kosovo’s transition, comparing it with other former communist countries. Among the specific features of constitutionalism in Kosovo are the role and position of the international community in the process of constitution-making and the overall design of constitutional justice in Kosovo. Throughout the article, a conclusion emerges that puts Kosovo’s Constitutional Court at the forefront of the fight for the rule of law and constitutionalism of liberal Western provenance.


Author(s):  
Darinka Piqani

In 2016, the Albanian constitution underwent the most comprehensive constitutional reform since its adoption in 1998. One of the purposes of this reform was to transform the judicial system in Albania in order to detach it from corruption. One of the novelties of the reform was the vetting process of judges and prosecutors at all levels, including judges of the Albanian Constitutional Court. Following termination of mandates of some of the members to the Court, dismissals, and resignations in the context of the vetting process, Albania’s Constitutional Court did not function for more than a year. Although indisputably the constitutional reform and more specifically vetting were designed as a means of guaranteeing the rule of law, it seems that they were contributing factors to the stalemate within the Constitutional Court, thus ultimately undermining the rule of law. This chapter unfolds this paradox in Albania, an EU candidate country.


TEME ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 1419
Author(s):  
Bálint Pásztor

The author of the article analyzes the specificities of the normative control of the law, i.e. the procedure of assessing the constitutionality and legality of the law in the Republic of Serbia, with the aim of detecting historical and legal preconditions of the effective functioning of the rule of law. The historical perspective of the development of the constitutional judiciary in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, as well as the analysis of the experiences of various systems of control of constitutionality and legality, open the contextual, scientific-historical and pragmatic dimensions of understanding. The specificity of the system of normative control is reflected in its triplicity, meaning that three institutes are known that characterize different procedural possibilities (to initiate the process of assessing the constitutionality and legality of general acts). The paper is written in order to point out the dichotomy of the proposal and initiative of the procedure of the assessment of constitutionality and legality, as well as the advantages and disadvantages of the ex officio procedure. Furthermore, the author wanted to point out the essential and procedural differences between the proposal, the initiative and the constitutional complaint, especially analyzing the purpose of retaining the institute of the initiative in the light of the existence of the constitutional complaint and the fact that the initiative does not imply the automation of the initiation of proceedings. The dilemma that the article opens concerns the possibility that in the case of abolishing the initiative as an institution accessible to all, is it possible to preserve the democratic culture and the participation of citizens, furthermore is it possible to abolish the fundamental institutional values and freedoms of a legal state and the rule of law? The paper opens other issues of importance for the establishment of an effective constitutional architecture that concern: the width of the circle of authorized proposers of normative control before the Constitutional Court; the dual role of the constitutional judiciary: on the one hand protection of the Constitution, constitutionality and legality, on the other hand effective protection of human and minority rights and freedoms.


Obiter ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Themba Maseko

The Hyundai-inspired interpretation obliges the courts to interpret, where possible, legislation in conformity with the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. This process involves taking into account the objects and purports of an Act and interpreting its provisions in the manner that complies with the constitutional values. Essentially, it ensures that courts give preference to an interpretation of legislation that is within the parameters of the provisions of the Constitution over the one that is not. However, courts do not apply the Hyundai-inspired interpretation if it cannot be ascribed to the provision of the legislation in question or if it is not reasonably possible for them to do so. Such situations include the Hyundai-inspired interpretation that unduly strains the text, or that obliges the court to read-in too many qualifications. In these situations, the courts have to declare the legislative provision in question unconstitutional and resort to the remedy of reading- in or notional severance. The Hyundai-inspired interpretation is evidenced in quite a number of cases. However, this case note critically dissects the manner in which the Constitutional Court applied it in the case of Democratic Alliance v Speaker of the National Assembly ((CCT86/15) [2016] ZACC 8).It concludes that the manner in which the Constitutional Court applied it, in this case, is inconsistent with the manner in which the Constitutional Court applied it in the case of Abahlali Basemjondolo six years earlier. When interpreting the word “disturbance” which section 1 of the Powers Privileges and Immunities of Parliament and Provincial Legislatures Act (4 of 2004) defined as “any act which interferes with or disrupts or which is likely to interfere with or disrupt the proceedings of Parliament or a House or Committee” and which the High Court had found to be too broad that it had the effect of finding a robust and controversial debate unconstitutional, the Constitutional Court unexpectedly read in too many qualifications to the word “disturbance” in conformity with the Constitution. The reason being, the Constitutional Court, six years earlier, found the approach of reading- in too many qualifications in conformity with the Constitution to be straining the text and to be contrary to the rule of law and the principle of separation of powers in the case of Abahlali Basemjondolo.


Author(s):  
Rósaan Krüger

The rule of law as a foundational constitutional value constrains the exercise of public power but the precise limits of the constraints it sets are not well defined. In Masethla v President of the Republic of South Africa,[1] the majority of the Constitutional Court opted for an interpretation of this value that frees the President from adherence to the demands of procedural fairness when exercising certain constitutional powers. This note will investigate the soundness of that interpretation against the background of theoretical expositions of the rule of law and earlier Constitutional Court judgments.[1]      2008 1 BCLR 1 (CC).


Author(s):  
Mathias Möschel

This contribution analyses the cases in which ordinary German judges have annulled statutes for being unconstitutional and thus exercise what is also known as ‘diffuse constitutionality review’. In the past, this used to be the case under the Weimar Constitution and in West Berlin. However, what is less known is that even today, certain statutes that are deemed to be pre-constitutional or certain legislative provisions from the former GDR can be declared as conflicting with the German Constitution. This contribution argues that such diffuse constitutionality review might also have contributed to a further strengthening of the rule of law in Germany. Ultimately, from a comparative constitutional law perspective, this contribution also provides a more nuanced view of the German model of constitutionality review, which has been traditionally classified as belonging to the centralized ‘European’ or ‘Kelsenian’ model, with a specific constitutional court, the Bundesverfassungsgericht, having the monopoly over such review.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 353-379
Author(s):  
Despan Heryansyah ◽  
Harry Setya Nugraha

This article discusses the relevance of the judicial review decision by the Constitutional Court to the checks and balances system in law legislation in Indonesia. In the framework of checks and balances between state institutions, the existence of the authority of the Constitutional Court to examine laws against the Constitution can be seen as a limitation for the legislators. This is because the discretion of legislators, namely the President and the House of Representatives, in carrying out the legislation function can be limited by the interpretation of the Constitution carried out by the Constitutional Court. This article concludes, the checks and balances mechanism regulated in the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia is realized with the principle of power limited by power. Therefore, the authority and decision of the judicial review by the Constitutional Court is not an intervention on the authority of lawmakers so that it isi assumed to pass the checks and belances principle. The authority and decision of the judicial review by the Constitutional Court actually confirms the manifestation of the principle of power limited by power and affirming the supremacy of the Constitution. Thus, the principle of supremacy of the Constitution in the context of the rule of law places the Constitution as the highest law. Abstrak Artikel ini membahas relevansi putusan uji materi oleh Mahkamah Konstitusi terhadap sistem checks and balances dalam pembentukan hukum berupa undang-undang di Indonesia. Dalam kerangka checks and balances antar lembaga negara, adanya kewenangan Mahkamah Konstitusi menguji undang-undang terhadap Konstitusi dapat dipandang sebagai suatu pembatasan bagi pembentuk undang-undang. Sebab, keleluasaan pembentuk undang-undang, yaitu Presiden dan Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, dalam menjalankan fungsi legislasi bisa dibatasi oleh adanya tafsir Konstitusi yang dilakukan oleh Mahkamah Konstitusi. Artikel ini menyimpulkan, mekanisme checks and balances yang diatur dalam Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945 diwujudkan dengan prinsip kekuasaan dibatasi oleh kekuasaan. Karena itu, kewenangan dan putusan uji materi oleh Mahkamah Konstitusi bukanlah wujud intervensi terhadap kewenangan pembentuk undang-undang dan melampaui prinsip checks and balances. Kewenangan dan putusan uji materi oleh Mahkamah Konstitusi justru menegaskan wujud dari prinsip kekuasaan dibatasi kekuasaan dan meneguhkan supremasi Konstitusi. Demikianlah, prinsip supremasi Konstitusi dalam konteks negara hukum yang menempatkan Konstitusi sebagai hukum tertinggi.


2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 198
Author(s):  
Ani Triwati ◽  
Subaidah Ratna Juita ◽  
Tri Mulyani

<p>Dengan adanya Putusan MK No. 34/PUU-XI/2013, untuk upaya hukum luar biasa yaitu peninjauan kembali dapat dilakukan lebih dari satu kali. Putusan MK yang memperbolehkan upaya hukum luar biasa peninjauan kembali lebih dari satu kali tersebut, berkaitan dengan kepastian hukum dan keadilan. Apabila peninjauan kembali diperbolehkan lebih dari satu kali tetapi tidak ada pembatasan sampai berapa kali maka perkara tersebut tidak akan ada akhirnya, bahwa adanya asas litis finiri oportet (setiap perkara harus ada akhirnya) tidak akan terpenuhi. Beberapa permasalahan yang perlu dibahas adalah apakah dengan adanya Putusan MK No. 34/PUU-XI/2013 dapat memenuhi nilai keadilan dan kepastian hukum. Selanjutnya bagaimana pengaturan mengenai peninjauan kembali sebagai implementasi Putusan MK No. 34/PUU- XI/2013 agar asas kepastian hukum dan asas litis finiri oportet akan terpenuhi. Putusan MK No. 34/PUU- XI/2013, yang menyatakan bahwa Pasal 268 ayat (3) Undang-Undang Nomor 8 Tahun 1981 tentang Hukum Acara Pidana bertentangan dengan Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia tahun 1945 dan tidak mempunyai kekuatan mengikat, dapat memenuhi kepastian hukum tanpa mengabaikan nilai keadilan. Hal ini dapat dilihat dari pihak kepentingan terpidana yang mana dengan diperbolehkannya peninjauan kembali dalam perkara pidana lebih dari satu kali, memberikan kesempatan untuk memperoleh kebenaran materiil dan keadilan sehingga dapat diperoleh kepastian hukum yang berkeadilan bagi terpidana mengenai perkara yang dihadapi. Untuk memenuhi asas litis finiri oportet, perlu dilakukan pengaturan bahwa untuk upaya hukum peninjauan kembali dalam perkara pidana dapat dilakukan dua kali, hal ini dilakukan untuk mencapai kepastian hukum yang berkeadilan. Di satu pihak peninjauan kembali dapat dilakukan lebih dari satu kali untuk mencari kebenaran materiil dan memenuhi nilai keadilan. Di lain pihak adanya pembatasan permohonan peninjauan kembali yang boleh dilakukan dua kali adalah untuk menjamin kepastian hukum, sehingga nilai kemanfaatan, keadilan dan kepastian hukum dapat terpenuhi.</p><p>With the Constitutional Court No. 34 / PUU-XI / 2013, for an extraordinary legal remedy which reconsideration can be done more than once. Constitutional Court ruling that allows an extraordinary legal remedy reconsideration more than once that, with regard to legal certainty and justice. If allowed to review more than one time but there are no restrictions on how many times it is the case there will be no end, that the principle of litis finiri oportet (every case there should be eventually) will not be met. Some issues that need to be addressed is whether the Constitutional Court No. 34 / PUU-XI / 2013 can satisfy the value of justice and legal certainty. Furthermore, how the arrangements regarding the review of the implementation of the Constitutional Court as No. 34 / PUU-X / 2013 that the principle of legal certainty and the principle of litis finiri oportet will be met. Constitutional Court decision No. 34 / PUU-XI / 2013, which states that Article 268 paragraph (3) of Law No. 8 of 1981 on Criminal Procedure is contrary to the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia in 1945 and has no binding force, can meet the legal certainty without ignoring the value of justice. It can be seen from the interests of the convict which the permissibility of judicial review in criminal cases more than once, providing an opportunity to acquire the material truth and justice so as to obtain legal certainty to convict justice regarding the case at hand. To meet the principle of litis finiri oportet, it is necessary that the arrangements for legal remedy reconsideration in criminal cases can be done twice, this is done to achieve a just rule of law. On the one hand, the review can be performed more than once to search for the material truth and fulfill justice values. On the other hand the restrictions on the reconsideration request should be done twice is to ensure legal certainty, so that the value of expediency, justice and the rule of law can be fulfilled.</p>


2020 ◽  
Vol 57 (4) ◽  
pp. 1079-1096
Author(s):  
Nur Çeku ◽  
Haxhi Xhemajli

Considered as a progressive document based on the models of the Western constitutions, the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo has established the legal basis for a functional statethat respects rights and fundamental freedoms while guaranteeing the rule of law. In its provisions, the Constitution has laid down basic principles which serve as the foundation for Kosovo’s constitutional order. In this regard, these constitutional principles have been further enshrined in the provisions of laws that emanate from the Constitution, and also have been established in the institutional mechanisms for its appropriate application. In addition, what played a prominent role in defining these principles was the impact of the Constitutional Court’s case-law. Case-law has reaffirmed in many instances the tremendous importance of constitutional principles in enhancing the rule of law, protecting the rights of minority groups and other members of Kosovo’s society, and the right to freedom of belief and secularism by implementing the most modern European standards in human protection. Hence, this paper analyzess the impact that constitutional principles have had on defining the structure of the state, guaranteeing the rule of law, protection of human rights and establishing Kosovo as a multi-ethnic society. Likewise, it examines the case-law of Kosovo’s Constitutional Court by providing some of the most prominent cases.


2016 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 277
Author(s):  
Busyra Azheri

The provision of the Law Number 40 of 2007 concerning Limited Company on Corporate Social Responsibility has changed the nature of such responsibility from voluntary into mandatory. Similarly, it strengthened welfare state (verzorgings staat) concept as commanded by Article 33 (3) and (4) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. Denaturing of this Corporate Social Responsibility is progressively assured by the Decision of Indonesian Constitutional Court, so that responsibility must be performed as legal responsibility or mandatory.


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