The Rule of Law Paradox in the 2016 Constitutional Amendments in Albania

Author(s):  
Darinka Piqani

In 2016, the Albanian constitution underwent the most comprehensive constitutional reform since its adoption in 1998. One of the purposes of this reform was to transform the judicial system in Albania in order to detach it from corruption. One of the novelties of the reform was the vetting process of judges and prosecutors at all levels, including judges of the Albanian Constitutional Court. Following termination of mandates of some of the members to the Court, dismissals, and resignations in the context of the vetting process, Albania’s Constitutional Court did not function for more than a year. Although indisputably the constitutional reform and more specifically vetting were designed as a means of guaranteeing the rule of law, it seems that they were contributing factors to the stalemate within the Constitutional Court, thus ultimately undermining the rule of law. This chapter unfolds this paradox in Albania, an EU candidate country.

ICL Journal ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Yaniv Roznai

AbstractCan a constitutional norm be unconstitutional? This idea seems, at first sight as a self-contradiction. Unconstitutionality is commonly referred to those ordinary laws, inferior to the constitution, which violate it. Constitutional norms, in contrast, carry an equal normative status as the constitution itself and other constitutional provisions. The question of unconstitutional constitutional norms recently arose in the Czech Republic. On 10 September 2009, the Czech Constitutional Court declared Constitutional Act no 195/2009 Coll, on Shortening the Fifth Term of Office of the Chamber of Deputies to be unconstitutional. The Czech Constitutional Court held that the constitutional act was an individual, specific decision and retroactive, thus violating the unamendability provision (Art 9(2)) in the Constitution, which prohibits amendments to the essential requirement for a democratic state governed by the rule of law. This article analyses the Czech Constitutional Court’s decision in a broader comparative and theoretical perspective and focuses, mainly, on four issues: first, the Czech Constitutional Court’s authority to substantively review constitutional norms; second, the appropriate standard of review when exercising judicial review of constitutional norms; third, the ‘individual, specific’ character of the constitutional act; and fourth, its alleged retroactive application. The article claims that while the Czech Constitutional Court was generally correct in claiming an authority to substantively review even constitutional norms, this was not the appropriate case in which to annul a constitutional act.


2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 269
Author(s):  
Ismail Tafani ◽  
Ervin Karamuço

This study aims to address the functioning and cooperation of constitutional bodies in the Republic of Albania. It aims to highlight the often-rigid relationship between them for the establishment of constitutional bodies, especially when this process needs to pass through a spirit of cooperation. More specifically, the paper will refer to the lack of functioning of the Constitutional Court in the Republic of Albania. This lack, without question, has brought a problem in the functioning and consolidation of the rule of law in the Republic of Albania. Although the great constitutional reform of 2016, seemed to undertake through non-political constitutional bodies to solve the problems that are often created through bodies of a political nature, this so far has not yielded the expected results. The opposite has happened, the non-political constitutional body, which has a role in the appointment of judges of the Constitutional Court seems to have further fueled the conflict between the constitutional bodies in this process. The Judicial Appointments Council seemed like a finding in the 2016 constitutional reform, but from a body that would avoid disagreements dictated by the past of co-operation of constitutional institutions, it seems to have done the opposite. Sincere cooperation between constitutional bodies in fulfilling their obligations has been lacking in Albania since the advent of political pluralism in the early 1990s, and this has not been achieved even by bodies created specifically for this purpose. In this way, the conflict between the President of the Republic and the Parliament, although perhaps dictated by political motives, has left the Republic of Albania without a functioning Constitutional Court. This paper aims to analyze that the lack of trust between the constitutional bodies of the Republic of Albania remains an obstacle in consolidating the rule of law in this country. It is also intended to analyze that the non-functioning of the Constitutional Court has brought a number of problems for achieving this goal, even to resolve conflicts between constitutional bodies.   Received: 16 December 2020 / Accepted: 18 February 2021 / Published: 5 March 2021


Author(s):  
Zulkarnain Ridlwan ◽  
Ade Arif Firmansyah

An independent judicial power is very important as one of the main characteristics of the rule of law, therefore its position must be maintained in Indonesia. The purpose of this paper confirms that any attempt to intervene in the authority of the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court in the justice system, including intervention from the President, must be considered an unconstitutional act and violates the ideals of the Indonesian rule of law. A review of the President's position in the statutory regulations found the fact that there was still a gap in the infiltration of the President's power over judicial authority. Specifically in two cases, the first relates to the ambivalence of the prosecutor's position that is not as firm as the Police. Second, the constitutional judge selection model. The need to re-arrange the mechanism for selecting constitutional judges derived from the President's proposal so that it can be more aligned with efforts to distance the President's power from the power of the judiciary. In addition to the recommendations to the formers to reorganize the two potential infiltrations, this paper also recommends the institutionalization of public petitions based on Mark Tushnet's ideas about populist constitutional law. The existence of a public petition institution becomes a forum for gathering input and advice in law enforcement and justice. The opening of the President to accept public petitions makes it easier for the people to submit law enforcement issues which, in a sense of people's justice, must be addressed.


2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-104
Author(s):  
Rustam Magun Pikahulan

Abstract: The Plato's conception of the rule of law states that good governance is based on good law. The organization also spreads to the world of Supreme Court justices, the election caused a decadence to the institutional status of the House of Representatives as a people's representative in the government whose implementation was not in line with the decision of the Constitutional Court. Based on the decision of the Constitutional Court No.27/PUU-XI/2013 explains that the House of Representatives no longer has the authority to conduct due diligence and suitability (elect) to prospective Supreme Judges proposed by the Judicial Commission. The House of Representatives can only approve or disapprove candidates for Supreme Court Justices that have been submitted by the Judicial Commission. In addition, the proportion of proposed Supreme Court Justices from the judicial commission to the House of Representatives (DPR) has changed, whereas previously the Judicial Commission had to propose 3 (three) of each vacancy for the Justices, now it is only one of each vacant for Supreme Court Judges. by the Supreme Court. The House of Representatives no longer has the authority to conduct due diligence and suitability (elect) to prospective Supreme Judges proposed by the Judicial Commission. The House of Representatives can only "approve" or "disagree" the Supreme Judge candidates nominated by the Judicial Commission.


2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-100
Author(s):  
Andraž Teršek

Abstract The central objective of the post-socialist European countries which are also Member States of the EU and Council of Europe, as proclaimed and enshrined in their constitutions before their official independence, is the establishment of a democracy based on the rule of law and effective legal protection of fundamental human rights and freedoms. In this article the author explains what, in his opinion, is the main problem and why these goals are still not sufficiently achieved: the ruthless simplification of the understanding of the social function and functioning of constitutional courts, which is narrow, rigid and holistically focused primarily or exclusively on the question of whether the judges of these courts are “left or right” in purely daily-political sense, and consequently, whether constitutional court decisions are taken (described, understood) as either “left or right” in purely and shallow daily-party-political sense/manner. With nothing else between and no other foundation. The author describes such rhetoric, this kind of superficial labeling/marking, such an approach towards constitutional law-making as a matter of unbearable and unthinking simplicity, and introduces the term A Populist Monster. The reasons that have led to the problem of this kind of populism and its devastating effects on the quality and development of constitutional democracy and the rule of law are analyzed clearly and critically.


Author(s):  
Lyudmyla Bogachova ◽  

The article defines the concept of the principle of the rule of law both in the narrow and broad sense. In the narrow sense, the principle of the rule of law is understood as the rule of law over legislation, and in the broad sense - as the rule of law over the state, state arbitrariness. Different approaches to disclosing the content of the principle of the rule of law in national and European legal doctrines are systematized. The lack of a single generally accepted concept of the principle of "rule of law" is emphasized. The decisions of the European Court of Human Rights are analyzed; attention is focused on their interpretation of the rule of law. The realization of the principle of the rule of law, primarily presupposes the domination of inalienable and inviolable human rights and freedoms over the political power of the state, and also requires quality laws and observance of the principle of legal certainty. The interpretation of the principle of the rule of law in the decisions of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine is considered. The CCU emphasizes that the rule of law is first and foremost the "rule of law in society"; characterizes the principle, linking it to the ideas of social justice, freedom and equality, without which it is impossible to imagine true human development and existence. The Constitutional Court calls justice as one of the basic principles of law, which is crucial in defining it as a regulator of social relations, one of the universal dimensions of law. Examples of application of the rule of law in the practice of the Supreme Court of Ukraine are given. Judges not only make a formal reference to the rule of law, but also try to analyze and disclose the content of its constituent elements (requirements) within a specific legal case. The main problems that hinder the effective implementation and realization of the rule of law in judicial practice are identified, namely - the lack of proper regulation and official interpretation; low quality of laws and legislative process; excessive number of conflicting laws; low level of legal awareness and legal culture of Ukrainian society, and early stage of civil society development in Ukraine. It is concluded that the rule of law is a principle whose main content is expressed in the following aspects: ensuring the rule of law over political power; subordination of state institutions to the needs of human rights protection and ensuring their implementation; priority of these rights over all other values of democratic, social, and legal state; preventing the manifestation of arbitrariness of state power, as well as ensuring compliance with the requirements of justice.


2018 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
pp. 274-313
Author(s):  
Enver Hasani

Kosovo’s Constitutional Court has played a role of paramount importance in the country’s recent history. The author uses a comparative analysis to discuss the role of the Court in light of the work and history of other European constitutional courts. This approach sheds light on the Court’s current role by analyzing Kosovo’s constitutional history, which shows that there has been a radical break with the past. This approach reveals the fact that Kosovo’s current Constitution does not reflect the material culture of the society of Kosovo. This radical break with the past is a result of the country’s tragic history, in which case the fight for constitutionalism means a fight for human dignity. In this battle for constitutionalism, the Court has been given very broad jurisdiction and a role to play in paving the way for Kosovo to move toward Euro-Atlantic integration in all spheres of life. Before reaching this conclusion, the author discusses the specificities of Kosovo’s transition, comparing it with other former communist countries. Among the specific features of constitutionalism in Kosovo are the role and position of the international community in the process of constitution-making and the overall design of constitutional justice in Kosovo. Throughout the article, a conclusion emerges that puts Kosovo’s Constitutional Court at the forefront of the fight for the rule of law and constitutionalism of liberal Western provenance.


Author(s):  
Egidijus Küris

Western legal tradition gave the birth to the concept of the rule of law. Legal theory and constitutional justice significantly contributed to the crystallisation of its standards and to moving into the direction of the common concept of the rule of law. The European Court of Human Rights uses this concept as an interpretative tool, the extension of which is the quality of the law doctrine, which encompasses concrete requirements for the law under examination in this Court, such as prospectivity of law, its foreseeability, clarity etc. The author of the article, former judge of the Lithuanian Constitutional Court and currently the judge of the European Court of Human Rights, examines how the latter court has gradually intensified (not always consistently) its reliance on the rule of law as a general principle, inherent in all the Articles of the European Convention on Human Rights, to the extent that in some of its judgments it concentrates not anymore on the factual situation of an individual applicant, but, first and foremost, on the examination of the quality of the law. The trend is that, having found the quality of the applicable law to be insufficient, the Court considers that the mere existence of contested legislation amounts to an unjustifiable interference into a respective right and finds a violation of respective provisions of the Convention. This is an indication of the Court’s progressing self-approximation to constitutional courts, which are called to exercise abstract norm-control.La tradición occidental alumbró la noción del Estado de Derecho. La teoría del Derecho y la Justicia Constitucional han contribuido decisivamente a la cristalización de sus estándares, ayudando a conformar un acervo común en torno al mismo. El Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos emplea la noción de Estado de Derecho como una herramienta interpretativa, fundamentalmente centrada en la doctrina de la calidad de la ley, que implica requisitos concretos que exige el Tribunal tales como la claridad, la previsibilidad, y la certeza en la redacción y aplicación de la norma. El autor, en la actualidad Juez del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos y anterior Magistrado del Tribunal Constitucional de Lituania, examina cómo el primero ha intensificado gradualmente (no siempre de forma igual de consistente) su confianza en el Estado de Derecho como principio general, inherente a todos los preceptos que forman el Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos, hasta el punto de que en algunas de sus resoluciones se concentra no tanto en la situación de hecho del demandante individual sino, sobre todo y ante todo, en el examen de esa calidad de la ley. La tendencia del Tribunal es a considerar que, si observa que la ley no goza de calidad suficiente, la mera existencia de la legislación discutida supone una interferencia injustificable dentro del derecho en cuestión y declara la violación del precepto correspondiente del Convenio. Esto implica el acercamiento progresivo del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos a los Tribunales Constitucionales, quienes tienen encargado el control en abstracto de la norma legal.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-34
Author(s):  
Olalekan Moyosore Lalude ◽  
Ayodeji Fatehinse

Economic justice is the expression of the effective distribution of economic goods. This could be realized through judicial mechanisms.   Effective judicial systems are the platform on which economic justice can be actualized. There is a positive connection between economic justice and an effective judicial system, and this is usually measured by the rule of law and the level of its regard.  The paper argued that one of the established dysfunctional characteristics of developing nations is the failure of their judicial system to deliver economic justice and the inability of the state to coordinate the integrity of its institutions. This paper employed a qualitative approach in its exploration of the issues. It engaged content analysis in the processing of the arguments it advanced. The paper argued that the resolution of economic justice and other institutional considerations could help in economic growth, especially in Nigeria. The paper concluded by suggesting that judicial structure must be strengthened in order to derive the capacity needed to realize economic justice in Nigeria.


2001 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 167-171
Author(s):  
Mohammad Fadel

This work grew out of a series of lectures that were delivered over atwo-year period between 1996 and 1998 at the Centre of Islamic andMiddle Eastern Law (CIMEL) at the School of Oriental and AfricanStudies (SOAS), University of London, on the genera] subject of the rule oflaw in the Middle East and Islamic countries. Subsequently, materials wereadded dealing particularly with issues relating to human rights law. Thecontributors to this work are a combination of legal academics, human rights activists, lawyers and judges, who hale from various countries in theArab world, Iran, the United States, Great Britain and Germany.There are a total of fourteen separate chapters, of varying length andquality. The book is not lengthy - including notes and authors’ biographies,it is 180 pages long. The average length of each chapter is between ten andfifteen pages. Despite the diversity of countries surveyed, all the essays areconcerned with generic questions regarding the rule of law, whether in atheoretical sense, viz., whether the notion that legitimate governmentalaction is limited to those acts that are deemed lawful by a pre-existing setor rules, or in a practical sense, viz., assuming that the formal legal regimeof a given state recognizes the rule of law in a theoretical sense, whetherthe coercive apparatus of the state in fact recognizes legal limitations onits conduct.Perhaps the most interesting (it is certainly the most lengthy, at 35 pages),and most important, essay in this work is the very fiit one, authored byAdel Omar Sherif, an Egyptian judge, wherein the author provides a digestof the landmark decisions of the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court.While the work can be criticized for taking on the appearance of a meresurvey of decisions, without taking a critical perspective to the Court’sprecedents, it is nonetheless a very valuable contribution for those lawyersand scholars who cannot read Arabic but nonetheless wish to gain insightinto Egypt’s legal culture. The modest task of relating the decisions ofEgypt’s Supreme Constitutional Court is especially important given thecliches regarding the absence of effective judicial institutions in the Arabworld. Sherifs contribution effectively dispels that myth. His article revealsthe Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court to be a vibrant institution thattakes its constitutional duties seriously, and discharges those duties withintegrity, and when it finds that the government has acted unlawfully, it willstrike down the offensive legislation, or rule against the government ...


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document