scholarly journals Dobrowolna sterylizacja. Uwagi de lege lata

2015 ◽  
pp. 57-79
Author(s):  
Justyna Holocher

The matter under discussion refers to the problem of voluntary sterilisation. The speculations contained in the article, are considered with references to the polish and international law. The fundamental argument demonstrated above, resolves itself to the statement that, despite lack of any judicial regulations related to that kind of  operations directly, sterilisation is legal primary, accepted in polish law. That thesis is based on the law principles eg, freedom and right to self-determination. Voluntary sterilisation is a kind of realization the fundamental right of every human being, woman and man, to the possessing or not possessing children responsibly. Moreover, sterilisation can be observed as a realization of right to access to any kind of methods enabling using that procedure. In particular, right to the procreation includes also the possibility of resignation of it, even though, that resignation has a final and irreversible character, and consequences can be qualified as a serious injury in the criminal law definition. As a result, voluntary sterilisation of an adult, responsible and accountable person, realised with her acceptation can not be considered as an illegal operation, apart from th

1994 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 248-261 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Dunn

There are at Least Three Possible Types of View about the justifiability of the use of force by states or private individuals on behalf of other private individuals or groups who are the victims of brutal and gratuitous coercion by another state. The first type of view is that no human being, and a fortiori no state, can be justified in using force under any circumstances and for any purpose, because (and only because) force is an intrinsic evil. This unflinchingly deontological view is generous but practically absurd. The second type of view is that states (or even private individuals) can be, and often arc, justified in using force against the brutally coercive actions of another state when, but only when, the latter is acting outside its own territorial jurisdiction. At least in the case of states what grounds that justification is their entitlement to defend themselves against foreign (as against domestic) aggression, and to defend also any other states with whom they have linked themselves either by standing alliances or by solemn common undertakings to secure each other's safety and sovereignty within the bounds of international law. In the case of private individuals, the corresponding justification would lie in their several personal entitlements to defend themselves as best they can against aggression.


Author(s):  
Luís Duarte d’Almeida

Ongoing discussions among international lawyers on defences in state responsibility have close analogies with debates in two other fields: debates in general legal theory on defeasibility in law, and debates in criminal law theory (and philosophy) on the elements of criminal responsibility. The similarities are not surprising. But it is striking how little cross-fertilization there seems to have been. For jurisprudence and criminal law scholars have developed a number of points and distinctions that international law theorists working on defences should find helpful. This chapter illustrates these claims. Section 2 looks at defences from the point of view of general legal theory, and section 3 does the same from the point of view of criminal law theory, recommending specific solutions to particular problems. Section 4 then shows how these contributions can help to answer some persistent questions surrounding defences in the law of state responsibility.


Author(s):  
Jennifer M. Welsh

This chapter argues for and adopts a constructivist perspective on international law as closely interrelated with international politics and as having regulative, constitutive, and permissive effects. It begins by illustrating how rules that have the status of law are not simply functional solutions to dilemmas of cooperation among states, but also expressions of prevailing conceptions of legitimate action and key resources for practices of justification and legitimation. The chapter then examines law’s role in effecting change—both in the practices and patterns of relations among the key units of the international system (sovereign states) through the law prohibiting the use of force, and in the number of those units over time through the law relating to state recognition. The chapter shows that while international law has made significant contributions to peaceful change—particularly through the gradual delegitimization of wars of conquest and territorial aggrandizement—its understanding of self-determination and its stance toward civil conflict have also helped to preserve a system of states that assumes both the political and territorial legitimacy of sovereign units. In short, international law can also be a force for peaceful, and not so peaceful, continuity.


1973 ◽  
Vol 67 (2) ◽  
pp. 275-305 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas M. Franck ◽  
Nigel S. Rodley

In the Bangladesh crisis, two important objectives of international law appeared to be in conflict: that of peace and that of justice. The former objective is set out in the rules of the U.N. Charter against the use of force by states except in self-defense against an armed attack. The second is found in the provisions of the Charter and in various resolutions, declarations, and covenants pertaining to fundamental human rights and self determination.


2003 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 195-216 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rosa Theofanis

AbstractRes judicata is well-settled as a general principle of international law. But the rules of res judicata in international criminal procedure are undeveloped. Recent cases from the ad hoc criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda have added to the understanding of res judicata in international law - demonstrating the risk that new rules of res judicata will implicitly incorporate either a common-law or civil-law definition of what the "law" is. Analysis of issues considered in recent Tribunal jurisprudence - particularly the questions of review and reconsideration - locates potential hazards in the development of the law and provides guidance for the application of the ICC statute.


1997 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 16-20
Author(s):  
René Lefeber ◽  
David Raič

We agree with André de Hoogh that the Chechens did not possess a right to external self-determination prior to the massive indiscriminate use oi military force by Russia in December 1994. At no point have we argued or suggested otherwise. Hence, up to December 1994, the Chechen claim did indeed not meet the conditions set by paragraph seven of the Friendly Relations Declaration. However, the Friendly Relations Declaration needs to be interpreted in view of usus and opinio iuris. In other words, one has to analyse how this paragraph has developed in customary international law. According to our analysis of the law of self-determination, the emergence of a right to external self-determination depends on two cumulative conditions, viz. 1) the serious and persistent violation of the right to internal self-determination and 2) the exhaustion of all total and international peaceful remedies by the people concerned to effectuate its right to internal self-determination. These conditions must be deemed fulfilled if the parent state seriously and massively violates the fundamental human rights and freedoms – in particular by an arbitrary violation of the right to life – of the persons belonging to the people concerned.


2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (1-4) ◽  
pp. 231-246
Author(s):  
Emily Crawford

In this article, Emily Crawford explores one set of key institutional and legal responses to, and consequences of, the Rwanda genocide – the ictr and the revival of icl that the ictr and the icty heralded. Tracing the development of the concept and institutions of icl, Crawford observes how the case law of the [ad hoc] tribunals, and the ictr in particular, were pivotal in progressively developing the international law of genocide, and the law of non-international armed conflict’.


2017 ◽  
Vol 111 (3) ◽  
pp. 731-738 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jed Odermatt

On December 21, 2016, the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) dismissed an action brought by the Front Polisario challenging a decision of the Council of the European Union (EU) approving the conclusion of an agreement between the European Union and the Kingdom Morocco on the reciprocal liberalization of certain agricultural products. The CJEU held, based on the relevant rules of international law applicable between the EU and Morocco, that the agreement did not apply to the territory of Western Sahara. Apart from its obvious political overtones, the judgment is significant in further developing the CJEU's approach to the law of treaties and the principle of self-determination in international law.


Author(s):  
Anne-Marie Carstens ◽  
Elizabeth Varner

In this introductory chapter, the volume editors observe that despite the increasing recognition of international cultural heritage law as an emerging field, this body of law is comprised largely of a collection of rules developed at and within different intersections in public international law. The chapter outlines how rules for protecting tangible and intangible cultural heritage developed, for example, in the law of armed conflict, international criminal law, international human rights law, and the law of the sea, as well as how States, international organizations, international tribunals, and other actors have contributed to this development. The chapter argues that as a result of this evolutionary background, the scope of international law governing the recognition, protection, or return of cultural heritage law can be illuminated by studying cultural heritage regimes within the context of the intersections in which they have developed.


2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 67
Author(s):  
Jadwiga Pazdan

Form of Legal Act in Private International LawSummaryThe form of a legal act in private international law is usually governed by particular conflict rules. Such provisions define the scope of their application. The aim of conflict rules is to indicate territorial application of different legal systems. That function fixes the approach while determining the way of understanding the notion of a „form” in private international law. The appropriate approach is the autonomic qualification. That is why I admit that the form in private international law is nothing else that the way of submission and incorporation of the declaration of will, being a component of a legal act.According to art. 12 of Polish Act on private international law from 1965 (1965 Act), the form of a legal act is governed by the law proper for that act (the first rule), however, it is sufficient to fulfill the conditions of the law of the country where the legal act is undertaken (the second rule).Lex causa, relevant to the form of a legal act (art. 12 section 1 of 1965 Act), may be indicated not only by means of conflict rules based on objective factors of alien, but also by the choice-of-law clause (if a choice of law is not forbidden). Nevertheless, a choice of law regarding solely the form of a legal act is not acceptable. The choice of law for the form of a legal act cannot be justified by the permissibility of a partial choice of law, which is supposed to be a choice relative to that part of legis causae, which is taken into consideration while determining the conditions required for the form of a particular legal act, on the base of art. 12 section 1 1965 Act. Although, there is no fragment of the legis causae applied in the scope of the form, there is complete lex causae or divided into segments (in the case of a complex or simple choice of law). The form cannot constitute such a segment. It has its own status.The second rule is subsidiary to the first one.The mutual relation of these two rules has subsequent consequences: 1 lex loci actus may be applied only when the conditions of lex causae were not fulfilled;2 the answer to the question if the legis loci actus constitutes the proper law for the form of a legal act is dependent on the fact whether during the performance of the legal act the requirements resulting from that law were fulfilled;3 when the conditions regulated by both lex causae as well as lex loci actus were not fulfilled, it is to lex causae to decide about the consequences (sanctions) of non-fulfillment of the requirements relating to the form;4 lex loci actus cannot be replaced by the Polish law by the virtue of art. 7 of 1965 Act, when the content of the law binding on the territory where the legal action was undertaken cannot be determined;5 the transmission and remission, based on the conflict rules binding in that country where the legal act was undertaken, is not allowed;6 the requirements of legis loci actus are also fulfilled when there are no special requirements relating to the form. The legal act will be valid in such a situation although the requirements relating to the form, resulting of lex causae, were not fulfilled.The place where the legal act is performed understood as the factor of alien in art. 12 section 2 of 1965 Act must be interpreted in the light of autonomic qualification. The decisive role should be granted to the place where an event which brought (or should have brought) to the performance of a legal act had happened while the contractual relation has been formed.De lege ferenda, I am opting for the maintenance of both rules in Polish law, however, their position should be equal. In case of discrepancy of the effects the preference should be granted to those more favorable for the legal act (the solution in favorem negotii).


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