scholarly journals STRUKTUR KEPEMILIKAN, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, DAN AGENCY COST

2018 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Tyara Dwi Putri
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Agency Cost ◽  
Expense Ratio

Penelitian ini menguji pengaruh struktur kepemilikan, struktur modal, dan corporate governance terhadap agency cost pada perusahaan yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia. Jenis data dalam penelitian ini adalah data panel. Struktur kepemilikan diukur dengan kepemilikan saham oleh pihak manajemen dan pihak institusional. Corporate governance diukur dengan jumlah dewan direksi dan persentase komisaris independen. Proksi untuk agency cost adalah expense ratio. Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa kepemilikan institusional dan jumlah dewan direksi mampu menurunkan agency cost perusahaan.

scholarly journals STRUKTUR KEPEMILIKAN, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, AGENCY COST, DAN KINERJA PERUSAHAAN

2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Tyara Dwi Putri
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Agency Cost ◽  
Return On Equity ◽  
Expense Ratio

Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menganalisis pengaruh struktur kepemilikan, corporate governance, agency cost, terhadap kinerja perusahaan. Sampel yang digunakan adalah sebanyak 20 perusahaan keluarga yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia periode 2016-2018. Struktur kepemilikan diukur dengan kepemilikan saham oleh pihak keluarga. Corporate governance diukur dengan jumlah dewan direksi dan persentase komisaris independen. Proksi untuk agency cost adalah asset utilization dan expense ratio. Kinerja perusahaan diukur dengan Return on Equity (ROE). Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa kepemilikan keluarga dan direksi tidak berpengaruh terhadap kinerja perusahaan. Sedangkan, komisaris independen, asset utilization dan expense ratio berpengaruh terhadap kinerja perusahaan.

scholarly journals Corporate governance, ownership structure and agency costs: evidence from Sri Lanka

2021 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 121
Author(s):  
Pratheepkanth Puwanenthiren ◽  
Balaputhiran Sathasivam ◽  
Velnampy Thirunavukarasu
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Sri Lanka ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Financial Management ◽  
Agency Costs ◽  
Agency Cost ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Expense Ratio ◽  
Structure And Agency ◽  
Asset Turnover

<p>The purpose of this paper is to examine the link between corporate governance, ownership structure and agency cost in Sri Lanka. The present study uses the regression model to analyse data for a sample of 150 firms listed in the Colombo Stock Exchange (CSE) for the financial years 2014 to 2018.  The empirical results show statistically significant and positive associations between board size, CEO duality, managerial ownership and agency cost proxies (i.e., asset turnover and expense ratio). The results also show a positive and significant relationship between the independent directors and asset turnover (though statistically insignificant with expense ratio), suggesting that, entrenched independent directors employ lower conflict of interest  in order to reduce the agency cost. Nonetheless, ownership concentration, was statistically insignificantly associated with agency costs, this paper provides support for such a view in Sri Lankan context. This study contributes to the literature on the on the association between corporate governance, ownership structure and agency costs. The findings may be useful for financial managers, investors, financial management consultants, and other stakeholders.</p>

scholarly journals Investor Protection and Agency Theory in Corporate Governance in Pakistan

2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 12-21
Author(s):  
Imtiaz Ahmed Khan ◽  
Altaf Hussain Abro ◽  
Farooque Ahmed Leghari
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Agency Theory ◽  
Agency Cost ◽  
Corporate Structure ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Private Benefits ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Global Trend ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Very High

The paper discusses the minority shareholders’ protection under the quantumof agency cost in corporate governance in Pakistan. The agency theory statesthat in most of the cases, the controlling shareholders and the topmanagement are normally involved in expropriating the funds of the company.This phenomenon increases the agency cost. The agency cost is directlyproportional to the cost of functioning of the company. In other words, theagency cost is inversely proportional to the profit of the company. Accordingto the agency theory, if the agency cost is decreased, the profit for investorincreases. The Pakistani corporate sector is dominated by the businessfamilies, the state and an opportunity to get the private benefits at the cost ofother stakeholders. There are the different mechanisms as discussed andapplied around the world to minimize the agency cost so as to make companyfinancially strong and better profit for the investors. In Pakistan, the agencycost is very high. Hence, there is a need to revamp the corporate governancemechanism to reduce the agency cost in order to provide a better protection tominority shareholders in a particular in the context of the global trend keepingin the view of the nature of corporate structure in Pakistan.

scholarly journals Agency costs and corporate governance mechanisms in Indian state-owned companies and privately owned companies - A panel data analysis

2014 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 8-17
Author(s):  
Stuart Locke ◽  
Geeta Duppati
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Agency Costs ◽  
Panel Data Analysis ◽  
Agency Cost ◽  
Open Market ◽  
Public Companies ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Government ◽  
Suitable Reference ◽  
The Impact

This paper explores the impact of corporate governance reforms and changing ownership patterns of core public sector enterprises. A number of reforms were introduced by the Government of India in 1991, and intensified in 2004 with the aim of improving efficiency and financial performance across state owned enterprises. The core state enterprises provide a unique opportunity to consider two aspects of the reforms. First, did the reforms have an impact, and second, is there a distinguishable difference between wholly government owned and partially-public shareholding enterprises? The public listed companies provide a suitable reference point for comparison. A comprehensive dataset of 123 SOEs and matching listed public companies for 10 years was collected for the study. A regression approach is adopted with agency cost as the dependant variable and several corporation-specific governance variables. Size and industry are the independent variables. The findings of the study indicate that the agency costs for mixed ownership models tend to be lower than those of the concentrated state-owned firms because they operate in an open market with the market facing the regulatory framework of a competitive environment.

Corporate Governance, State Ownership and Firm Performance: An Empirical Study of State-Owned Enterprises in Indonesia

2018 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 26-32
Author(s):  
Chermian Eforis
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Agency Cost ◽  
Positive Influence ◽  
Jel Classification ◽  
State Ownership ◽  
Company Performance ◽  
Return On Assets ◽  
Good Corporate Governance ◽  
Negative Effect

Objective - The purpose of this research is to determine the effect of good corporate governance (GCG) on Indonesia's SOEs and the influence of state ownership on company performance. Methodology/Technique - This study examines State Owned Enterprises in Indonesia that were listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange between 2011 and 2015. Findings - The empirical results show that GCG and state ownership both have a positive influence on the company's financial performance (in this case, Return On Assets). However, the percentage of state ownership has a negative effect on the relationship between Good Corporate Governance and Return On Assets. Novelty - One agency cost is monitoring expenditure by the principal. Privatization is one way to improve the performance of SOEs. Privatization is believed to improve the performance of SOEs, as a result of increased supervision of the performance of SOEs in Indonesia. Type of Paper: Empirical Keywords: State Owned Enterprises; Good Corporate Governance; State Ownership; Return On Assets; Indonesia. JEL Classification: G32, H70, G34.

CSR's Capability as a Conflict's Resolution to Enhance a Firm's Value in Indonesia

2019 ◽  
pp. 722-739
Author(s):  
Nila Tristiarini
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Corporate Social Responsibility ◽  
Positive Result ◽  
Cost Reduction ◽  
Agency Cost ◽  
Moderate Correlation ◽  
Research Outcomes ◽  
Governance Quality ◽  
Corporate Governance Quality ◽  
Corporate Social

The purpose of this research is to analyse the part of agency cost reduction, firm's corporate governance quality in its relation with corporate social responsibility (CSR), and firm's value. The sample used in this research are firms that have CSR information disclose in their annual company's report and firms that are joining corporate governance ranking conducted by The Indonesian Institute for Corporate Governance (IICG) publicized as CGPI (Corporate Governance Perception Index) year 2006-2012. The research outcomes demonstrate that CSR produces a direct positive result to firm's value. It also demonstrates that agency cost reduction has a role as an intermediary between CSR and firm's value. Other outcomes demonstrate that firm's corporate governance quality do not moderate correlation between CSR and agency cost reduction.

Corporate governance and dividend policy in Sri Lankan firms: a data triangulation approach

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 543-560
Author(s):  
H. Kent Baker ◽  
Narayanage Jayantha Dewasiri ◽  
Sandaram P. Premaratne ◽  
Weerakoon Yatiwelle Koralalage
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Dividend Policy ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Agency Cost ◽  
Free Cash Flow ◽  
Sri Lankan ◽  
Survey Analysis ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Market Data ◽  
Content Type

Purpose This paper aims to investigate the relation between corporate governance and dividend policy in Sri Lankan firms. Design/methodology/approach The data set consists of market data using 1,608 firm-year observations from 201 firms listed on the Colombo Stock Exchange and survey-based data from 151 respondents from the same 201 firms. The authors use data triangulation to examine the two approaches. Findings The analysis of the market data reveals that a significantly positive relation between corporate governance on both the propensity to pay dividends and dividend payout. Survey analysis confirms these findings. Triangulated evidence supports the outcome model of dividends, free cash flow and agency cost theories. Practical implications The findings are useful not only for management in developing suitable corporate governance practices and dividend policies for their firms but also for shareholders in evaluating both existing and new investments. Future researchers should investigate the same phenomenon in other contexts using triangulation approaches to confirm their findings. Originality/value This study is the first to use governance indices both in terms of survey and market-based data to examine the relation between corporate governance and dividend policy.

Shariah monitoring, agency cost and fund performance in Malaysian mutual funds

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (5) ◽  
pp. 945-972
Author(s):  
Mohd Fikri Sofi ◽  
M.H. Yahya
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Mutual Funds ◽  
Agency Costs ◽  
Fund Performance ◽  
Agency Cost ◽  
Advisory Panel ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Shariah Governance

Purpose This paper aims to examine the effect of Shariah Advisory Panel (SAP) on both the level of agency cost and fund performance against conventional corporate governance, within corporate and Shariah governance settings, between Shariah and conventional mutual fund (CMF), in an emerging economy of Malaysia during the period 2008-2015. Design/methodology/approach Panel data regression is appropriately used within corporate governance research because of empirical issues of unobserved heterogeneity effects to avoid spurious evidence. The secondary data of 172 CMFs and 80 Shariah mutual funds are gathered hand-collected from annual reports and master prospectuses for the purpose of analysis between the period 2008 and 2015, generating 2,016 fund-year observations. Findings SAP is found to have a positive effect on agency costs. Consequently, it leads to empirical evidence that substantiates a negative and marginally significant association with fund performance when designated by accounting measure. Thus, the Shariah monitoring proxy is not a good mechanism for controlling agency costs inconsistent with performance maximizing (agency cost minimizing) outcomes. Research limitations/implications The unique data set of mutual funds used in this research may restrict the generalization of the findings unless mentioned and explained specifically the data characteristics. The single proxy for Shariah monitoring could be better off by having a list of different measures. Practical implications The paper highlights and suggests a consistent improvement in regulation that could be performed by policymakers pertaining to the non-trivial additional cost of implying Shariah governance. Originality/value This paper provides empirical evidence of the SAP effects from the view of a more complex monitoring structure in consequence of having an additional layer of governance, devoting on the trade-off between benefit and cost to shareholders.

Does Corporate Philanthropy Increase Firm Value? The Moderating Role of Corporate Governance

2015 ◽  
Vol 57 (4) ◽  
pp. 599-635 ◽  
Author(s):  
Weichieh Su ◽  
Steve Sauerwald
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Corporate Philanthropy ◽  
Agency Cost ◽  
Outside Directors ◽  
Financial Benefit ◽  
Ceo Tenure ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Moderating Role

The link between corporate philanthropy and firm value has been controversial. On one hand, corporate philanthropy is often criticized as an agency cost because it may serve narrow managerial self-interests. On the other hand, corporate philanthropy may enhance firm value because it improves the relationships between firms and their stakeholders. In this study, we argue that this controversy is contingent upon whether corporate governance mechanisms can stimulate the financial benefit of corporate philanthropy. Based on a sample of U.S. firms from 1996 to 2003, we find that CEO long-term pay positively moderates the relationship between corporate philanthropy and firm value while multiboard outside directors negatively moderate this relationship. Contrary to our expectations, we find that the relationship between corporate philanthropy and firm value enhances as CEO tenure increases. Our findings show that corporate governance plays an important moderating role in the relationship between corporate philanthropy and firm value.

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