scholarly journals Ways to solve agency problems in corporate structures with using accounting information: non-institutional aspects

2019 ◽  
pp. 145-151
Author(s):  
Vasyl Tsaruk
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Agency Problem ◽  
Accounting Information ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Accounting System ◽  
Governance System ◽  
Opportunistic Behaviour ◽  
Logical Method ◽  
The Moment

Purpose. The aim of the article is to analyse and substantiate the ways to solve the consequences of an agency problem in corporate structures based on the use of accounting information. Methodology of the research. The theoretical basis of the research is the scientific works of domestic and foreign scientists on the problems of accounting information formation in the issues of solving agency problems in corporate structures. The following methods are used to achieve the goal of the study: general scientific methods (abstraction, comparison, generalization, analysis, synthesis) – to know the basic elements of accounting information; critical analysis and systematic approach – when disclosing the characteristics of the main elements of solving an agency problem in corporate structures; abstract and logical method – to formulate the conclusions of the study. Findings. The types of opportunistic behaviour regarding the moment of contracting according to agency theory are substantiated. The role of accounting information at the pre-contractual stage of activity of corporate structures is determined. The features of understanding of accounting as one of the basic elements of the corporate governance system, which allows to minimize the consequences of an agency problem, are revealed. The role of accounting information at the post-contracting stage of corporate structures activity is determined. Originality. The possibility of using accounting information for the implementation of opportunistic behaviour by agents in the activity of corporate structures is substantiated. The ability of the accounting system to counteract the hidden intentions that agents may have after contracting has been identified. A matrix classification of approaches to solving the consequences of agency problems in corporate structures has been developed. Practical value. Implementation of the components of accounting information proposed in the study will allow to substantiate the role of accounting information in the application of each of the selected approaches to solving the consequences of the agency problem in corporate structures. Key words: corporate governance; agency problem; adverse selection; moral hazard; accounting information.

Agency problem in management as a challenge for the corporation accounting system

2019 ◽  
pp. 103-115
Author(s):  
Vasyl Tsaruk
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Institutional Theory ◽  
Agency Theory ◽  
Agency Problem ◽  
Corporate Management ◽  
Accounting System ◽  
Corporate Structure ◽  
Governance System ◽  
Advantages And Disadvantages ◽  
Corporate Governance System

Introduction. Corporate governance, as a basis for ensuring the efficient use of corporate resources, can be built on a range of models that have both advantages and disadvantages. Neo-institutional theory, in particular its separate component is agency theory. It is one of the theories that allows to substantiate the reasons for the decline in the quality of implemented corporate governance systems and to formulate ways to improve it, in particular, taking into account the role of accounting in ensuring the effectiveness of their functioning. Purpose. The aim of the article is to monitor essence and peculiarities of manifestation of agency problem in corporate governance and substantiation of place of accounting in its solution. Methods. The range of research methods related to the solution of the agent problem in the corporate governance system is applied. Dialectical method of cognition and the systematic approach to the interpretation of corporate governance, the monographic method for monitoring the positions of scientists in the sphere of solving the agent problem, the abstract and logical method for theoretical generalizations and formulation conclusions are used in the research. Results. The necessity of accounting development in solving the agency problem in corporate management is substantiated. The peculiarities of the development of neo-institutional theory as a theoretical basis of corporate governance are revealed. The necessity to study agency theory as a means of solving problems in corporate governance is substantiated. The essence of agency problem in corporate structures is revealed and the causes of its occurrence are identified. The theoretical principles of agency problem in corporate structures are highlighted. Cases of manifestation of agency problem in corporate structures are analyzed. The basic directions of improvement of the accounting system of the corporate structure with the purpose of minimizing consequences of occurrence of agency problem are highlighted. Discussion. It is advisable to focus on optimizing specific elements of the corporate accounting system in further research in order to avoid agency issues in the corporate governance system.

scholarly journals Stewardship theory: is board accountability necessary?

2017 ◽  
Vol 59 (6) ◽  
pp. 1292-1314 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Keay
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Agency Theory ◽  
Design Methodology ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Stewardship Theory ◽  
Content Type ◽  
General Terms ◽  
Practical Implications

Purpose The purpose of the paper is to demonstrate that notwithstanding the fact that stewardship theory embraces things like trust of directors, their professionalism, loyalty and willingness to be concerned for the interests of others, as well as rejecting the foundations of classic agency problems that are asserted by agency theory, board accountability is as relevant to stewardship theory as it is to agency theory. Design/methodology/approach The paper applies the theory underlying board accountability in corporate governance, which is so often applied both in the corporate governance literature and in practice with agency theory in mind, to stewardship theory. Findings While the idea of accountability of boards is generally associated with an explanation and conceptualisation of the role and behaviour of directors as agents within classic agency theory, the paper demonstrates that board accountability is a necessary part of board life even if the role of directors is explained and conceptualised in terms of stewardship theory. Practical implications The paper suggests some accountability mechanisms that might be employed in a stewardship approach. Originality/value While many authors have talked in general terms about board accountability and its importance, this is the first paper that has engaged in a substantial study that links board accountability directly with stewardship theory, and to establish that accountability is necessary.

scholarly journals The role of the external auditor in corporate governance: The case of companies listed in the NYSE Euronext Lisbon

2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 38-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
José Manuel Bernardo Vaz Ferreira
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Multiple Regression ◽  
Direct Relationship ◽  
Logistic Models ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Securities Market ◽  
External Auditors ◽  
External Auditor ◽  
Economic Crimes

This study investigates the effects of the presence of the external auditor on corporate governance in Portugal, in the way listed companies are managed, based on the verification of compliance with the corporate governance regulations of the Securities Market Commission, as well as the transparency of information and the reduction of agency problems, fraud and economic crimes. By comparing government reports of companies listed on NYSE Euronext Lisbon, during several periods and with surveys conducted in the 1st half of 2013 in Portugal to the external auditors responsible for the majority of the legal certification of accounts of companies during 2007 to 2011, a significant direct relationship in the fulfillment of the recommendations of corporate governance and its verification by the external auditor is concluded. Based on multiple regression and multinomial logistic models, it is concluded that a greater involvement of the ROC in complying with corporate governance recommendations, allows for greater transparency of information and a reduction of agency problems, fraud and economic crimes

Valences of the Corporate Governance in the Process of Accounting Reporting

2019 ◽  
pp. 145-166 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tatiana Dănescu ◽  
Mihaela Prozan
Keyword(s):  
Risk Factors ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Risk Management ◽  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Global Economy ◽  
Accounting Information ◽  
Reliable Information ◽  
Professional Organizations ◽  
Prospective Risk

In the context of the issues that the global economy is facing, one of the main concerns of the regulative authorities, of the professional organizations, and of entities was and still is identifying the risk factors that affect the systems of corporative governance and the systems and processes through which the supply of reliable information in the decision-making process is insured. Another concern is identifying reliable solutions for insuring the implementation of a proactive and prospective risk management that makes a mark on the utility of the information presented and communicated to the targeted users, especially through accounting reporting. Hence, through the necessity of insuring the transparency and the utility of accounting information, in this chapter, the role of corporate governance, in improving the process of accounting reporting and as a consequence of the value of accounting information, will be synthetically presented.

Corporate governance mechanisms and corporate investments: evidence from India

2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Samridhi Suman ◽  
Shveta Singh
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Dynamic Model ◽  
Capital Expenditure ◽  
Agency Problem ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Static Model ◽  
Capital Expenditures ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Empire Building ◽  
The Impact

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to empirically investigate the influence of corporate governance variables relating to the board of directors, audit and ownership on the agency problems that inflict a firm's investments in capital and research and development (R&D) expenditures. This study posits that the R&D investments are inflicted by the agency problem of “quiet life” whereas “empire-building” agency problem affects capital expenditure decisions.Design/methodology/ approachThis study analyses the investment behaviour of non-financial and non-utility firms listed on NIFTY 200 from FY 2009 to FY 2018 using a static and dynamic model.FindingsThe results from the static model suggest that ownership concentration mitigates the agency problem of the “quiet life” that affects R&D expenditures. However, no corporate governance attribute has a significant impact on R&D investments under the assumption of the dynamic model. In respect of capital expenditures, the analysis of static model yields that audits by large auditor firms and usage of non-audit services ameliorate the agency problem of “empire-building”. The results from the dynamic model show that independent boards worsen it. They also continue to provide empirical evidence in favour of large auditors.Originality/valueThis paper contributes to the literature on the corporate governance-investment association by simultaneously examining the impact of multiple corporate governance attributes on the agency problems of “quiet life” and “empire-building” that affect R&D and capital expenditures, respectively, in a static and dynamic context for a sample of Indian firms.

The Role of Finance and Corporate Governance in National Systems of Innovation

2007 ◽  
Vol 28 (10) ◽  
pp. 1461-1481 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Tylecote
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Three Dimensions ◽  
Governance System ◽  
Systems Of Innovation ◽  
Governance Systems ◽  
Variation Patterns ◽  
Technological Advantage ◽  
Corporate Governance System ◽  
National Systems

Firms are central actors in innovation, and their actions are much affected by their corporate governance and the finance available. Thus a country's finance and corporate governance system is a key element of its national system of innovation. The technological regimes of sectors (and sub-sectors) vary in ways that affect the demands innovation makes on the financial and corporate governance system. Finance and corporate governance systems (FCGSs) vary among countries in their ability to meet these demands. By setting three dimensions of regime variation alongside the three corresponding dimensions of FCGS variation, patterns of relative and absolute technological advantage among economies can be largely explained — particularly when the focus is on nationality of firm rather than location of activity.

scholarly journals Assessing the Impact of Corporate Governance on Non-Performing Loans: Empirical Analysis of the Listed Commercial Banks of Pakistan

2019 ◽  
Vol IV (III) ◽  
pp. 188-196
Author(s):  
Ihtesham Khan ◽  
Muhammad Ilyas ◽  
Shehzad Khan
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Banking Industry ◽  
Annual Reports ◽  
Governance System ◽  
Nonperforming Loans ◽  
Time Period ◽  
Corporate Governance System ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Code Compliance

Financial crisis shows the ambiguous role of the corporate governance system. Hence, the main purpose of this paper is to assess the impact of corporate governance on Non-performing loans of the banking industry of Pakistan. The time period selected from 2006 to 2016 and source of data is annual reports of respective banks and the World Bank. In order to explain the relationship between the governance system and non-performing loans used descriptive, correlational and panel data analyses. The results revealed a negative and significant effect of corporate governance on nonperforming loans of sample firms of the study. Therefore, suggested for the banking industry of Pakistan to implement and make sure their reports according to corporate governance code compliance to control non-performing loans.

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