Military Rule, Islamism and Democracy in Pakistan

2004 ◽  
Vol 58 (2) ◽  
pp. 195-209 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vali Nasr

Pakistan's politics has been shaped by the dynamics of civilian-military relations and Islamism's relation to the state. This has created an ongoing negotiation for power in which the military, civilian politicians, and Islamist forces have individually and in alliance with one another vied for control of Pakistan's politics. General Pervez Musharraf's regime has been no exception to this trend. As its claim to secular military rule proved untenable, it has turned to rely on Islamist forces to manage civilian-military relations.

2011 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 169-186 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chiang Bo-wei

Abstract From 1949, Quemoy became the battlefront between the warring Nationalists and Communists as well as the frontline between Cold War nations. Under military rule, social and ideological control suppressed the community power of traditional clans and severed their connection with fellow countrymen living abroad. For 43 long years up until 1992, Quemoy was transformed from an open hometown of the Chinese diaspora into a closed battlefield and forbidden zone. During the war period, most of the Quemoy diasporic Chinese paid close attention to the state of their hometown including the security of their family members and property. In the early 1950s, they tried to keep themselves informed of the situation in Quemoy through any available medium and build up a new channel of remittances. Furthermore, as formal visits of the overseas Chinese were an important symbol of legitimacy for the KMT, Quemoy emigrants had been invited by the military authority to visit their hometown since 1950. This was in fact the only channel for the Chinese diaspora to go home. Using official files, newspapers and records of oral histories, this article analyzes the relationship between the Chinese diaspora and the battlefield, Quemoy, and takes a look at the interactions between family and clan members of the Chinese diaspora during 1949-1960s. It is a discussion of a special intermittence and continuity of local history.


2009 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 129-152 ◽  
Author(s):  
Boubacar N'Diaye

ABSTRACTThe 3 August 2005 military coup was Mauritania's best opportunity to turn the page on decades of the deposed quasi-military regime's destructive politics. This article critically analyses relevant aspects of the transition that ensued in the context of the prevailing models of military withdrawal from politics in Africa. It also examines the challenges that Mauritania's short-lived Third Republic faced. It argues that the transition process did not escape the well-known African military junta leader's proclivity to manipulate transitions to fulfil suddenly awakened self-seeking political ambitions, in violation of solemn promises. While there was no old-fashioned ballot stuffing to decide electoral outcomes, Mauritania's junta leader and his lieutenants spared no effort to keep the military very much involved in politics, and to perpetuate a strong sense of entitlement to political power. Originally designed as an ingenious ‘delayed self-succession’ of sorts, in the end, another coup aborted Mauritania's democratisation process and threw its institutions in a tailspin. This only exacerbated the challenges that have saddled Mauritania's political system and society for decades – unhealthy civil-military relations, a dismal ‘human rights deficit’, terrorism, and a neo-patrimonial, disastrously mismanaged economy.


Author(s):  
Paul E. Lenze, Jr.

Algeria is a state in the Maghreb that has been dominated by military rule for the majority of its existence. The National People’s Army (ANP) used nationalism to justify its intervention into politics while ensuring that withdrawal would occur only if national identity were protected. Algeria, similar to other Middle Eastern states, underwent historical trajectories influenced by colonialism, the Cold War, and post-9/11 politics; briefly experimented with democracy; and as a result, experienced the military as the dominant institution in the state. The resignation of Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika after 20 years of rule in April 2019, following six weeks of popular protest, has raised questions as to whether democratization is possible. Algeria’s history of military involvement in politics, the strength of the military as an institution, and its cooperative links with domestic elites and international actors portend the endurance of authoritarianism for the foreseeable future.


Ensemble ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 117-122
Author(s):  
Soham DasGupta ◽  

India played an active role in the liberation war of Bangladesh in 1971. The relation between the two countries remained cordial in the initial years but it soon soured with the coup d’etat of 1975. This also marked the rise of the anti-Indian elements in the Bangladeshi politics. This article makes a brief survey of anti- Indian elements that has remained a part and parcel of the political fabric of Bangladesh since 1971. It also looks into the ways in which the anti-India stance has been instrumental in garnering popular support to hold on to political power. The article begins with the background of the creation of Bangladesh and India’s active role in it which was followed by the friendship treaty signed between the two countries. Then it moves to the changing scenario following the coup d’état of 1975 which marked the visible changes within the polity of Bangladesh. The nature of nationalism underwent change moving from secularism to a religious character which found expression in the policies of the state. The military rule most often found it convenient to use the anti-Indian stance in order to please the fundamentalist elements of the country in its bid to garner popular support. The issues of water sharing, refugees and issues of fomenting possible insurgency with active support of India were highlighted. Even after the restoration of democracy, the anti-Indian factions remained active in opposing the government of Sheikh Hasina’s foreign policy with regard to India. Radical religious factions, who had throughout opposed the liberation war, still play a major role in fanning the anti-Indian sentiments in Bangladeshi politics.


Author(s):  
Ozan O. Varol

Balanced civil-military relations emerge from synergy. In this case synergy refers to civilians setting aside their ideological differences, working together to build credible democratic institutions, and constructing a viable alternative to military rule. If the civilians themselves are divided on the future democratic trajectory of the nation or the military’s exit from politics, the military may more easily exploit these divisions. Instead of trying for a quick power grab, civilians in an emerging democracy must shun any antidemocratic alternatives, including military interventions, to political rule. The more effective the civilian politicians are in constructing a stable, robust democracy, the less likely power vacuums and military interventions will occur. If political parties have a real chance to compete and win in the electoral marketplace, they are more likely to play the democratic game rather than violate its rules and resort to tanks and guns to oust their opponents.


Subject The impact of the failed July coup on civilian-military relations. Significance The psychological impacts of the attempted coup across political life cannot be understated; it has far-reaching implications for the political, bureaucratic and even ideological structures of the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK). In the aftermath of the attempted putsch, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is more determined than ever to alter the civilian-military machinery of government in Turkey radically. Impacts The purge and radical reforms will bring into question the TSK's operational and strategic reliability for Western partners. A permanently weakened TSK would ease the way for constitutional reforms strengthening Erdogan's grip on the state. It will take years to rebuild the confidence and prestige the military has lost among broad swathes of Turkish society. Any criticism of the TSK reforms, domestically or from abroad, will meet the authorities' fierce condemnation.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vito D'Orazio

Sometimes states repress political campaigns harshly, and sometimes they do not. Why? I argue that military cooperation with liberal democracies constrains the state from using severe forms of repression against opposition campaigns. Liberal democracies face costs for human rights violations by their friends, and are likely to coerce the military from repressive actions. Such interconnectedness also socializes the military with democratic militaries that have strong norms against the use of widespread and excessive repression. However, the military is not the only repressing agency, and therefore this constraint does not act to prevent repression but rather to limit its severity. This theory is tested using the NAVCO data and a new, latent measure of military cooperation. I find that military cooperation with liberal democracies does not prevent the state from repressing opposition movements, but it does limit the severity. This finding provides evidence of one benefit to expanding multinational security cooperation initiatives involving liberal democracies.


Author(s):  
Peter White

International conflict—war, crises, international disputes, and rivalries between states—has a clear influence on the military’s role in politics and vice versa. Given that the military is the primary instrument for defending the state from conventional military threats, international conflict has been an early focus of the civil–military relations literature. Generally, very high levels of involvement in politics—for example, coups, military rule, military officers in high-level government positions—are associated with a greater propensity to initiate international conflict on the part of states. However, there is disagreement as to the reasons for this pattern—for example, preferences for aggression on the part of a politically active military, diversionary incentives for a coup-threatened civilian leader, or institutional pathologies brought on by shared civil–military power are all proffered as possible explanations. Politically active militaries tend to do poorly in conflict. There are two reasons for this. The first is the dysfunction endemic in a military that splits its time between politics and proficiency in arms—as opposed to one that specializes in defense. The second reason is that when the politically active military poses a risk of coup to the political leadership of the state, the latter will often engage in such “coup-proofing” practices as purges, onerous command and control measures, the reshuffling of commanders, and the build-up of security organizations intended to offset the military. These measures not only make it harder for the military to stage a coup, they also make it harder for the military to defend the state. Although military involvement in politics makes “acute” conflict—war, militarized disputes, or crises—more likely, these types of international conflict tend to lead to reduced levels of political involvement by the military. War or a crisis can make a coup more difficult as the military is moved away from the centers of political power. International conflict—especially when it goes poorly—also can lead to reform and professionalization within the military, which decreases the appetite for political involvement. At the same time, indicators of a more severe “chronic” threat environment—hostile neighbors, unfavorable geography, or long-standing international rivalries—can make military intrusions into politics more likely.


Author(s):  
Smruti S. Pattanaik

In any nascent democracy, the military as an organized force is a dominant factor in politics. The nature of the relationship between different institutions, especially in fledgling democracies, decides the position of the military in the state. Compared to the political parties, the military is a cohesive force with a command structure that ensures orders are dutifully implemented. Often the military becomes part of contested politics and remains a dominant factor in countries that were previously under military rule. This could be for two reasons. First, their regime remains a reference point and is often compared to democratic regimes thereby creating a legitimacy factor. Second, the military is seen as savior and often portrayed as a fall-back option if a civilian system of governance is not able to deliver. Though many argue that military regimes are a thing of the past and their role is in fact in decline, this may not be true. Military institutions have adapted to change and the nature of their interactions with civilian groups has undergone a shift. However, use of coercion by military authority does not explain military dominance. Much is determined by the structural factors within which both the civil and military agents operate. In some cases, the military’s preserve is not only ensuring state “sovereignty” and its territorial integrity but also preventing a political catastrophe from happening during political transition. They are often referred to as guardians of the state. Study of civil–military relations in South Asia tends to follow a narrative that synthesizes and combines the structural and agency-related issues. Agency, however, is a dominant factor that waits for structurally enabling factors to contemplate a military takeover. In South Asia, and particularly in Bangladesh, any study of civil–military relations within the theoretical framework of a structure-agency divide is inadequate. Challenges in studying the structure-agency divide can be attributed to the larger-than-life image of the military agency. Military agents as actors, their political motives appear to be more important than the societal structure that influences decision. Social class, macroeconomic situations, the society-governing class interface, and lopsided institutional developments also shape the role of agencies (civil and military) and determine the balance of power. Absence of coup does not imply “civilian control,” but rather the civilian government’s ability to decide on posting, promoting, and shaping the vision of the military regarding threat perception determines the extent of civilian control over the military. Political culture, agreement within the society on political structure, institutional checks and balances, and political socialization are important aspects of state structure that acts a constraint on Agency’s action.


Author(s):  
Ian Taylor

Since the 1960s, there have been more than 200 coups—extra-constitutional or forced changes in government—in Africa, with around half of them being successful. The period between the 1960s and 1990s was characterized by Cold War machinations, economic crises, and the growing de-legitimization of many post-colonial regimes. The majority of coups were followed by the formation of some type of military government, but after this diverse outcomes resulted. ‘The military in African politics’ outlines the nature of military rule and why there were so many coups. The fragility of the state and its tenuous hold on legitimacy, accentuated by the behaviour of those in power, is of critical importance.


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