scholarly journals EVOLUTIONARY GAME ANALYSIS FOR RENT-SEEKING BEHAVIOR SUPERVISION OF MAJOR INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS BASED ON PROSPECT THEORY

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Lelin Lv ◽  
Huimin Li Li ◽  
Zhuofu Wang ◽  
Chengyi Zhang ◽  
Ran Qiao
Keyword(s):  
Prospect Theory ◽  
Cognitive Bias ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Stable State ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Infrastructure Projects ◽  
Supervision System ◽  
Seeking Behavior ◽  
Game Players ◽  
Dynamics Simulations

Major infrastructure projects (MIPs) possess significant strategic positions in the national economy and social development. However, recently, the rent-seeking behavior between supervision units and project contractors has intensified in project construction. This paper aims to study the behavior decision-making of stakeholders in rent-seeking behavior supervision system of MIPs. In the complex and uncertain environment of MIPs, game players have cognitive bias and value perception preference. Therefore, this study introduced prospect theory and constructed the perceived return matrix and evolutionary game model of MIP rent-seeking behavior supervision among project owners, supervision units, and project contractors. From the perspective of risk perception theory, the reasons for the behavioral tendencies of game participants and the conditions for the steady state of strategy selection were explored through system dynamics simulations. The results showed that the stable state of the optimal strategy in the rent-seeking behavior supervision system of MIPs is related to the cognitive bias of the game players and is influenced by the level of regulation cost, the intensity of punishment and the size of accident losses. The contribution of this study lies in providing theoretical basis and decision support for constructing a long-term preventive mechanism for rent-seeking activities in MIPs.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game of Government Subsidy Strategy for Prefabricated Buildings Based on Prospect Theory

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Yu Liu ◽  
Dong Cai ◽  
Chunxiang Guo ◽  
Haizhen Huang
Keyword(s):  
Prospect Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Stable State ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Environmental Benefits ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Long Run ◽  
The Government ◽  
Prefabricated Building

Based on the prospect theory, this paper establishes an evolutionary game model of government and construction units for the problem of poor subsidy construction of government-subsidized construction units and uses the replication dynamic equation to analyse the strategic choice of evolutionary games. The research shows that the evolutionary game system of the construction unit and the government cannot meet the government incentives, and the construction unit also adopts the stable state of the prefabricated building. In the long run, the government subsidy cannot determine whether or not the construction unit will adopt the prefabricated building, and it is the construction cost of the prefabricated building that determines. Therefore, the government's work should shift from subsidies to targeted incentives forconstruction units to reduce the cost of construction of prefabricated buildings. The unit levies an environmental tax and appropriately restricts the income from the traditional cast-in-place construction units, and, on the other hand, it increases the popularization of low-carbon and environmental protection of the fabricated buildings, so that more consumers can recognize the environmental benefits brought by the assembled buildings. It provides a reference for the government to promote the development of prefabricated buildings.

Evolutionary game analysis of information sharing by institutional investors

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Hua Li ◽  
Qingqing Lou ◽  
Qiubai Sun ◽  
Bowen Li
Keyword(s):  
Information Sharing ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Information Exchange ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Stable State ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Relationship Network ◽  
The Relationship

In order to solve the conflict of interests of institutional investors, this paper uses evolutionary game model. From the point of view of information sharing, this paper discusses four different situations. Only when the sum of risk and cost is less than the penalty of free riding, the evolution of institutional investors will eventually incline to the stable state of information sharing. That is, the phenomenon of hugging. The research shows that the institutional investors are not independent of each other, but the relationship network of institutional investors for the purpose of information exchange. The content of this paper enriches the research on information sharing of institutional investors.

Efficient rents 1 rent-seeking behavior in the long-run

Public Choice ◽  
1985 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 227-246 ◽  
Author(s):  
William J. Corcoran ◽  
Gordon V. Karels
Keyword(s):  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Seeking Behavior

CORRUPTION AS A RISK FACTOR OF LIMITING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ECONOMY

2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (11) ◽  
pp. 77-83
Author(s):  
Larisa V. Tcerkasevich ◽  
◽  
Evgeny A. Makarenko ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Risk Factor ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Power Structures ◽  
Russian Economy ◽  
Seeking Behavior ◽  
Business Corruption

The article is devoted to the problem of the corruption component in the Russian economy. Considered and structured modern forms of contradictions in the interaction between business and power structures. The phenomenon of rent-oriented behavior of power state structures and how this phenomenon affects the modern factors of exploitation of a person by a person is considered in detail. The main features of corruption relations and the mechanisms of functioning of the practices of business corruption in modern Russia are systematized. Conclusions are drawn from the analysis of scientific sources on the essence and characteristics of rent-seeking behavior of economic entities in terms of the corruption component.

scholarly journals The Applications and Complexity Analysis Based on Network Embedding Behaviors under Evolutionary Game Framework

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-23
Author(s):  
Xin Su ◽  
Hui Zhang ◽  
Shubing Guo
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Repeated Games ◽  
Complexity Analysis ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Biological Evolution ◽  
Stable State ◽  
Network Embedding ◽  
Convergence Process ◽  
Investment Cost ◽  
Embedding Strategy

In this paper, we use the dynamic mechanism of biological evolution to simulate the enterprises’ bounded rational game. We construct game models of network embedding behaviors of horizontal and vertical enterprises in supply chain, explain the repeated games of random pairs of enterprises by replication dynamic differential equations, study the characteristics and evolution trend of this flow, conduct simulation experiments, clarify the evolution direction and law of network embedding strategy selection of supply chain enterprises, and discuss the stable state of evolutionary game and its dynamic convergence process. The results show that the probability of supply chain enterprises choosing a network embedding strategy is related to the enterprises’ special assets investment cost, cooperation cost, network income, and cooperation benefits. Supply chain enterprises should reduce the special assets investment cost and cooperation cost, maximize network income and cooperation income, narrow the gap between the extra-cooperation profit and the current cooperation profit, and restrain them from violating cooperation contracts or taking opportunistic actions.

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