Research for Trans-Boundary Water Pollution Cooperation

2013 ◽  
Vol 864-867 ◽  
pp. 1525-1530 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pei Peng ◽  
Jie Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Water Pollution ◽  
Differential Game ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Comprehensive Analysis ◽  
Transboundary Water ◽  
Policies And Measures

Based on Stakelberg framework,this paper dynamically described the Government's interests by differential game,then made a comprehensive analysis on the equilibrium of cooperation and noncooperation.At last,it holds that cooperation is an effective way to solve the problem of transboundary water pollution, in order to cooperate, central government should take some policies and measures for controlling trans-boundary water pollution .

scholarly journals Multilevel Governments’ Decision-Making Process and Its Influencing Factors in Watershed Ecological Compensation

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (7) ◽  
pp. 1990 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xin Gao ◽  
Juqin Shen ◽  
Weijun He ◽  
Fuhua Sun ◽  
Zhaofang Zhang ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Water Pollution ◽  
Water Resources ◽  
Influencing Factors ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Stable State ◽  
Chinese Government ◽  
Transboundary Water ◽  
Ecological Compensation ◽  
Supervisory Skills

Transboundary water pollution is a long-standing problem in China, although the Chinese government has been committed to the protection of water resources. Due to the different interests of multilevel governments and the regionalization of management, there is still no unified plan to solve the transboundary water pollution in China. Watershed ecological compensation as a holistic plan to deal with transboundary water pollution is being promoted currently. Taking the South-to-North Water Transfer Project’ eastern route as an example, this paper firstly analyses stakeholders’ strategies and establishes a tripartite game model based on evolutionary game theory. Secondly, by introducing Cobb Douglas production function creatively, the supervision level of the central government is refined into supervisory attitude and supervisory skills. Thirdly, the numerical simulation is used to analyze the sensitivity of influencing factors. The results show that: (1) whether the central government supervises the local governments mainly depends on the benefits of water environment improvement and supervision costs; (2) the initial negotiation plan of the stakeholders has a significant impact on their optimum strategies; (3) the fines imposed by the central government on the local governments have a small impact on the stable state of the system; (4) the higher the eco-compensation fee, the lower their likelihood of cooperation; (5) the central government’s supervisory attitude and supervisory skills have significant effect on the sustainability of the optimum arrangement, even when willingness of upstream and downstream governments to cooperate is low; (6) the initial ecological benefits of downstream governments have no effect on the optimum strategy. Therefore, considering these insights is helpful to improve the watershed ecological compensation mechanism in order to solve transboundary water pollution and achieve the sustainability of water resources.

scholarly journals Research on the method of responsibility division of transboundary water pollution

2021 ◽  
Vol 676 (1) ◽  
pp. 012017
Author(s):  
Ma Yanqiong ◽  
Liang Manchun ◽  
Zhao Qilin ◽  
Xu Gang ◽  
Li Mei ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Water Pollution ◽  
Transboundary Water

scholarly journals Simulation of the Transboundary Water Quality Transfer Effect in the Mainstream of the Yellow River

Water ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (8) ◽  
pp. 974 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xuan Zhang ◽  
Jungang Luo ◽  
Jin Zhao ◽  
Jiancang Xie ◽  
Li Yan ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Water Pollution ◽  
Water Quality ◽  
Water Consumption ◽  
Inner Mongolia ◽  
Yellow River ◽  
Transfer Effect ◽  
Simulation System ◽  
The Yellow River ◽  
Transboundary Water ◽  
Technical Problems

In order to not only solve the technical problems of quantifying the degree and range of the effect that is caused by the water quality of upstream on that of downstream portions of a river, and of dividing the responsibility of transboundary water pollution, but also to tackle the difficulty in adapting to dynamic changes of the traditional water quality model in terms of practical application, pollutant discharge and water consumption were taken as the main influence factors to build the transboundary water quality transfer effect model. Supported by a comprehensive integration platform, the transboundary water quality transfer effect simulation system of the Yellow River mainstream was constructed. The simulation results show that the concentration decreases exponentially along the range. Gansu, Ningxia, and Inner Mongolia had a more significant effect of exceeding standard water consumption on pollution, while Ningxia, Inner Mongolia, Shaanxi, and Shanxi had a more distinct contribution to the over standard pollution discharge effect. The proposed model and simulation system can provide new methods and instruction for quantifying the degree and range of transboundary water pollution, as well as dividing the responsibility for water environment compensation.

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