scholarly journals Multilevel Governments’ Decision-Making Process and Its Influencing Factors in Watershed Ecological Compensation

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (7) ◽  
pp. 1990 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xin Gao ◽  
Juqin Shen ◽  
Weijun He ◽  
Fuhua Sun ◽  
Zhaofang Zhang ◽  
...  

Transboundary water pollution is a long-standing problem in China, although the Chinese government has been committed to the protection of water resources. Due to the different interests of multilevel governments and the regionalization of management, there is still no unified plan to solve the transboundary water pollution in China. Watershed ecological compensation as a holistic plan to deal with transboundary water pollution is being promoted currently. Taking the South-to-North Water Transfer Project’ eastern route as an example, this paper firstly analyses stakeholders’ strategies and establishes a tripartite game model based on evolutionary game theory. Secondly, by introducing Cobb Douglas production function creatively, the supervision level of the central government is refined into supervisory attitude and supervisory skills. Thirdly, the numerical simulation is used to analyze the sensitivity of influencing factors. The results show that: (1) whether the central government supervises the local governments mainly depends on the benefits of water environment improvement and supervision costs; (2) the initial negotiation plan of the stakeholders has a significant impact on their optimum strategies; (3) the fines imposed by the central government on the local governments have a small impact on the stable state of the system; (4) the higher the eco-compensation fee, the lower their likelihood of cooperation; (5) the central government’s supervisory attitude and supervisory skills have significant effect on the sustainability of the optimum arrangement, even when willingness of upstream and downstream governments to cooperate is low; (6) the initial ecological benefits of downstream governments have no effect on the optimum strategy. Therefore, considering these insights is helpful to improve the watershed ecological compensation mechanism in order to solve transboundary water pollution and achieve the sustainability of water resources.

2003 ◽  
Vol 05 (04) ◽  
pp. 503-521 ◽  
Author(s):  
XU HE ◽  
ZHU TAN ◽  
DAI SHUGUI

China is one of the thirteen countries in the world that lacks water. Rapid economic growth and urbanisation over the past two decades have exerted enormous pressure on China's water resources. The shortage of water resources and serious water pollution have become important factors restraining the sustainable development in the cities. Wastewater reuse has been proven to prevent water pollution and ameliorate the pressure on the water environment. Moreover, wastewater reuse can make up for the lack of funds in wastewater treatment. So, wastewater reuse is a viable choice to realise the sustainable utilisation of water resource in China. There still remain many uncertainties in wastewater reuse. It is strongly recommended that a wastewater reuse policy be pushed forward considering the necessity and the implications to society, the economy and the environment. Strategic environmental assessment (SEA) is seen as an important tool for integrating the environmental factors into decision-making. This paper illustrates a case study for SEA — aimed at Tianjin Wastewater Reuse Policy (TWRP). The process of SEA at the policy level and the related problems are presented within this case study. It provides a good framework for carrying out SEA of waste reuse at the national level. The study will support the Chinese Government in developing a national strategy on urban wastewater reuse through an investigation of the existing situations, evaluation of policy options in different areas, and offering recommendations.


Rural China ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 312-333
Author(s):  
Weigang Gong ◽  
Burak Gürel

This article analyzes the role of the state in the development of capitalist agriculture in contemporary China by focusing on the implementation of the central-government-sponsored National Grain Security Project and Agricultural Industrialization Project in Pingwan county of Hunan province since 2009. It demonstrates that by providing significant (formal and informal) subsidies and transferring large tracts of farmland to large farmers and agribusinesses, the Chinese government has made the capitalist transformation of rice production possible. We stress that in the absence of private property rights, the local governments’ strong control over farmland transactions makes it relatively easy to transfer large tracts quickly, helping agribusinesses and large farmers avoid significant transaction costs they would otherwise have to face under a system of private landownership. The article also shows that existing policies support the transfer of farmland in regions with favorable geographic and climatic conditions over other regions and therefore lack the capacity to significantly decrease regional inequalities.


Water Policy ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-37 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chenyao Xiang ◽  
Jiahong Liu ◽  
Weiwei Shao ◽  
Chao Mei ◽  
Jinjun Zhou

Abstract To deal with the three universal urban water problems – namely storm floods, water pollution and water shortage – China has implemented a comprehensive solution: the Sponge City Construction Project. Sponge cities aim to reduce runoff and pollution, and also to restore downstream ecologies. They combine low impact development methods with grey infrastructures, large-scale flood control projects and rehabilitation. This paper describes Chinese experiences of construction and financing for implementation of sponge cities, which could provide references to other countries for building sustainable, climate-resilient cities and urban water management systems. It illustrates the objectives and methods of the sponge city design and demonstrates the differences in configuration and funding structures in cities of different climates and economic conditions. The total construction area involved in the pilot cities covers 449 km2. The configurations are distinct due to different economic conditions, climates and land forms: a humid district inclines to drainage-efficient approaches and pollution control devices, while a semi-humid district prefers green infrastructures and rainwater reuse facilities. The Chinese government plays an important role in the funding of sponge cities: Chinese central government provided CNY (¥)20.7 billion for the construction of 16 cities during 2015–2017, while the rest came from local governments and non-governmental investors.


2020 ◽  
Vol 50 (6-7) ◽  
pp. 698-705
Author(s):  
Yiran Li ◽  
Yanto Chandra ◽  
Naim Kapucu

The commentary addresses the government’s role in mitigating information asymmetry problems during pandemic crisis response. We use the outbreak of COVID-19 in Wuhan, China, as a case to show the use of social media as a key mechanism in shaping the actions of the central government in its coordination with the local governments during the pandemic response. The Chinese government effectively collaborated with a social media platform to not only create a dedicated channel to allow citizens to post information about the pandemic to accelerate the speed of relief but also mobilize citizens and nonprofit organizations to support government response and recovery efforts. This suggests that social media can provide a venue for the government to not only tackle the information overload but also mitigate the friction among levels of governments.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Yang Gao

<p>This study investigates and explains the shift of the relative priority in China’s energy policy in the 1990s and 2000s. Between 1996 and 2015, the priority of China’s national energy policy had shifted from an emphasis on energy supply security to energy demand efficiency. A central question this study seeks to answer is: what forces led to this shift of policy priority?  To answer the question, this study proposes a multi-layered and cross-sectoral analytical framework based on Historical Institutionalism theory. It focuses on the complex interaction between ideas, institutions and interests to understand the politics of China’s energy policy change. This study establishes a model of policy change as a means of institutional adaptation to manage an emerging mismatch between evolving ideational patterns at the national level, and the persistence of certain interest-seeking behaviour shaped by historically-formulated institutions at the subnational level.  With the introduction of the “Socialist Market Economy” idea in the early 1990s, China began to deepen its reform on two sets of fundamental institution that define China’s state-industry relations and central-local intergovernmental relations. Over time, the reforms profoundly impacted the development of China’s two major energy-based industrial value chains, namely the Coal-Metallurgical Value Chain (CMVC) and the Oil-Petrochemical Value Chain (OPVC), by shaping their asymmetrical institutional connections with Chinese government at central and local levels. At the national level, the 1990s reforms helped to build strong institutional connections between the central government and the OPVC, which greatly contributed to China’s energy security in the 2000s. However, decentralising and marketising most heavy industries allowed interest-seeking local governments to build strong institutional connections with the CMVC, causing the 1990s reforms to produce an unintended consequence of heavy industrialisation that has significantly changed China’s economic structure. Such uncontrolled heavy industrialisation, revealed by the country’s declining energy efficiency in the early 2000s, had increasingly went against a new generation of Chinese top leadership’s “Scientific Development” idea. A major energy policy shift was therefore initiated and utilised by the central government to curb the heavy industrialisation. The central government’s institutional connections with the coal-based heavy industries, especially those in the CMVC, were rebuilt and strengthened.  Overall, this study provides a more sophisticated understanding of how ideas, institutions and interests dynamically interact to produce major policy change in the context of a transitional state.</p>


2013 ◽  
Vol 864-867 ◽  
pp. 1525-1530 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pei Peng ◽  
Jie Zhang

Based on Stakelberg framework,this paper dynamically described the Government's interests by differential game,then made a comprehensive analysis on the equilibrium of cooperation and noncooperation.At last,it holds that cooperation is an effective way to solve the problem of transboundary water pollution, in order to cooperate, central government should take some policies and measures for controlling trans-boundary water pollution .


Author(s):  
Yemei Li ◽  
Yanfei Shan ◽  
Ying Chen

Farmland abandonment has become relatively common in rural China. In the context of food security, the Chinese government has introduced policies for farmland abandonment supervision, but the effect of these policies has proven to be marginal. By constructing an evolutionary game model, our research explores the evolutionary logic during the supervision of farmland abandonment by governments and rural households. The results indicate that low food yield and high opportunity costs are the leading causes of farmland abandonment. The probable punishment administered by the central government for dereliction is a major motivation for the local government to practice farmland abandonment supervision. The low supervision avoidance cost for rural households leads local governments and households to form collaborations to jointly cope with central government supervision. When this occurs, local governments’ supervision of farmland abandonment falls into a trap, as it leads to continued supervision practices that are costly and ineffective. Food security risk comes from the contradictory population and land resources demands. To improve food security while managing these contradictory demands, it is both necessary and feasible for the government to control population growth and focus on farmland protection, whereas it is unnecessary and unfeasible for the government to supervise whether or not farmland should be abandoned.


Daedalus ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 143 (2) ◽  
pp. 170-183 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Fewsmith ◽  
Xiang Gao

China faces major challenges from social instability and general societal disaffection, which have continued to grow even as the economy has developed. In recent years, the Chinese government has tried to address such issues by diverting increasing resources to raising the income of villagers and providing social services to the urban and rural population alike. So why have “mass incidents”–public protests that sometimes turn violent–continued unabated? This article argues that the structure of central-local relations leads local governments to discount the interests of residents on the one hand, and distort central policies to the benefit of the local government on the other. The “party manages the cadres” principle, through which the central government exerts vertical control, prevents horizontal and bottom-up accountability, and thus ends up setting the interests of local cadres against those of local residents. The central government's interest in preserving its own power makes it reluctant to reform the central-local relationship, thus perpetuating crises.


2013 ◽  
Vol 448-453 ◽  
pp. 1217-1225
Author(s):  
Zhi Guo Qi ◽  
An Na Shi

Water resources constraints of Chinas future sustainable development have been the most important strategic issue, so China's sustainable development strategy must be built on the basis of a clear strategy for water resources. Chinese government has begun to pay attention to the comprehensive management of water resources, especially to improve the efficiency of water use and the control of water pollution as an important and urgent task. Rivers flowing through cities are subject to serious water pollution, some even affect the drinking water which is directly related to the sustainable development of urban society and economy and people's quality of life. Urban water pollution has become an urgent problem, the Government is also aware of the urgency of water pollution, the need to develop a pollution control plan, but progress is not satisfactory.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Yang Gao

<p>This study investigates and explains the shift of the relative priority in China’s energy policy in the 1990s and 2000s. Between 1996 and 2015, the priority of China’s national energy policy had shifted from an emphasis on energy supply security to energy demand efficiency. A central question this study seeks to answer is: what forces led to this shift of policy priority?  To answer the question, this study proposes a multi-layered and cross-sectoral analytical framework based on Historical Institutionalism theory. It focuses on the complex interaction between ideas, institutions and interests to understand the politics of China’s energy policy change. This study establishes a model of policy change as a means of institutional adaptation to manage an emerging mismatch between evolving ideational patterns at the national level, and the persistence of certain interest-seeking behaviour shaped by historically-formulated institutions at the subnational level.  With the introduction of the “Socialist Market Economy” idea in the early 1990s, China began to deepen its reform on two sets of fundamental institution that define China’s state-industry relations and central-local intergovernmental relations. Over time, the reforms profoundly impacted the development of China’s two major energy-based industrial value chains, namely the Coal-Metallurgical Value Chain (CMVC) and the Oil-Petrochemical Value Chain (OPVC), by shaping their asymmetrical institutional connections with Chinese government at central and local levels. At the national level, the 1990s reforms helped to build strong institutional connections between the central government and the OPVC, which greatly contributed to China’s energy security in the 2000s. However, decentralising and marketising most heavy industries allowed interest-seeking local governments to build strong institutional connections with the CMVC, causing the 1990s reforms to produce an unintended consequence of heavy industrialisation that has significantly changed China’s economic structure. Such uncontrolled heavy industrialisation, revealed by the country’s declining energy efficiency in the early 2000s, had increasingly went against a new generation of Chinese top leadership’s “Scientific Development” idea. A major energy policy shift was therefore initiated and utilised by the central government to curb the heavy industrialisation. The central government’s institutional connections with the coal-based heavy industries, especially those in the CMVC, were rebuilt and strengthened.  Overall, this study provides a more sophisticated understanding of how ideas, institutions and interests dynamically interact to produce major policy change in the context of a transitional state.</p>


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