scholarly journals Human genetic engineering and social justice in South Africa: Moltmann and human dignity

2016 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 70 ◽  
Author(s):  
M Kotzé
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Benjamin Gregg

Abstract How might a liberal democratic community best regulate human genetic engineering? Relevant debates widely deploy the usually undefined term “human dignity.” Its indeterminacy in meaning and use renders it useless as a guiding principle. In this article, I reject the human genome as somehow invested with a moral status, a position I call “genetic essentialism.” I explain why a critique of genetic essentialism is not a strawman and argue against defining human rights in terms of genetic essentialism. As an alternative, I propose dignity as the decisional autonomy of future persons, held in trust by the current generation. I show why a future person could be expected to have an interest in decisional autonomy and how popular deliberation, combined with expert medical and bioethical opinion, could generate principled agreement on how the decisional autonomy of future persons might be configured at the point of genetic engineering.


2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Latha Ravjee

In this dissertation I examine of the role of graphic design in the struggle for social justice in South Africa - with specific reference to the concept of human rights. I am motivated by an overwhelming awareness that the Bill of Rights in post-apartheid South Africa exists in striking contrast to the daily struggles for human dignity. In addressing this contradiction I present a historical examination that focuses on the visual impact of the creative combination of images and text to effect socioeconomic and political change. Drawing from Steve Biko’s philosophy of psychological liberation and Paulo Freire’s educational philosophy for critical thinking, I distinguish between propaganda and education. I take the stand that people are not really free if they blindly accept the myths of the established state order and I explore the various ways in which society is misguided by these myths. I argue that unlike graphic design that maintains the status quo and represents the propaganda of the established order, ‘graphic design for social justice’ represents the voice of people’s power against state power. Through this study and practice I conclude that the role of graphic design for social justice in South Africa is to uncover the myths of state power by presenting scenarios that encourage critical thinking, dialogue and open debate about power and the abuse of power in the continued struggle for human dignity. It is intended that this body of work, and the exhibition that results from it, contributes in part to the writing and documentation of a history of South African socio-political graphics.


2020 ◽  
Vol 76 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Karin Sporre

What children learn through their ethics and values education in school is of crucial societal relevance and is directed by school curricula. As curricula vary between countries, an international comparison is of interest. The aim of this study was to compare curricula to reveal variations in how matters of social justice were described in curricular texts, with a special focus on class, gender and race. Curricula from five different contexts were compared: Namibia; South Africa; California State, United States of America; Province of Québec, Canada; and Sweden. This provided the study, originating in Sweden, with crucial comparative material from outside Europe. The studied curricula were systematically searched for the importance and significance of the terms ‘poverty/poor’, ‘gender’, ‘equity’, ‘equality’, ‘justice’, ‘race’, ‘racism’, ‘human dignity/rights’, ‘equal value’ and Ubuntu. Methodologically, this represented a qualitative content analysis approach with a research interest in intersectionality, that is, in how matters of class, gender and race intersect. The study showed considerable variation between the curricular formulations from the five contexts. For example, texts from California and Québec emphasised equality as a general matter and less as one of intersectionality, compared to Namibia and South Africa as well as Sweden. In general, human rights were emphasised, but human dignity less so. For future curricular development towards education as a global common good, matters of social justice, including sustainability, need critical monitoring. The aspects of intersectionality such as class, gender and race are thus crucial, as is the inclusion of an integrated, participatory view on students’ ethical competence.


2017 ◽  
Vol 82 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Johan Beckman

Although the terms “equity” and “social justice” are often used together in phrases such as “equity and social justice”, and although these concepts are clearly related, I will confine my discussion to the concept of “equity”. There are clear signs of a widespread belief that equity can indeed be achieved in education in South Africa if policy can be implemented better and become practice, and if everyone can intensify their efforts in this regard. This belief suggests that equity remains elusive in education in South Africa, despite the fact that innumerable policies have been developed that were assumed to be suitable for addressing some of the more urgent challenges, and enabling education to progress towards the goal of equity. Seemingly uncontested notions exist, among others the notion that equity can be operationally defined, and the idea that laws and policies can be used as levers to turn around a worrisome situation, such as an apparent lack of equity in education. Policymakers, in particular, seem to believe that goals, whose attainment can be measured quantitatively, can be set in regard to equity in education. Some of the assumptions in regard to education and equity are questionable, and possibly even mistaken, and I will examine them in this article. I will argue that merely re-examining the causal relationship between policy and practice in regard to equity in education is not likely to bring equity within reach in education, or through education. Meaningful strides towards equity cannot be made before clarity has been achieved on the meaning and implications of equity. I will argue that a paradigm shift regarding equity needs to precede a rethinking of policy and practice. I propose to develop my argument, which I expect to be eminently contestable, by 1. Seeking to trace the origin and meaning of the concept of “equity”, 2. Examining the apparent general confusion over terminology such as “equality”, “equity”, “redress”, “quality”, “affirmative action”, “(re)distributive justice”, and “social justice” in the educational policy, law and practice literature, 3. Asking questions that could provoke answers that could illuminate the concept; these questions would relate to, among other things, points of departure when thinking about equity, for example • “Is it an aim, a point of departure, or an outcome?” • “Is it measurable, and is there a way in which to measure its achievement?”, and • “Can people, through education, be brought to a place where they will recognise whether they are enjoying equity, or not?”, and 4. Proposing that the ultimate meaning of equity is to remove what impairs people’s inherent human dignity and is therefore untenable, repugnant, and unconscionable in any social sphere (such as education). Although equity is hard to measure (if it can be measured at all), I will argue that it can be sensed when people believe that a previously abhorrent, unconscionable or untenable situation that affected the essence of their human dignity and existence or being negatively has been removed and that it is now possible for them to live their lives in dignity. A change in thinking, or a paradigm shift, needs to take place, where we come to the realisation that we cannot keep on pursuing numerical targets, which, in the final analysis, do not do much to prove that we have moved towards equity. In addition to following obviously needed educational strategies to eliminate inequities, we need to develop a coherent understanding of what would constitute equity in people’s minds, and to consider ways and means to make people aware of such a place, and move them towards it. Equity plays itself out in, and must essentially be achieved in, the sphere of interaction and contact between people, and, as such, it is closely bound up with, among other things, people’s human dignity and social justice. If equity is to be employed to achieve equality, it should be remembered that absolute equality seems impossible, and is, in any case, statistically improbable, given the highly complex multiple sub-contexts from which people come. One should also remember that people do not have a right to equality per se, but rather that they are equal before the law, and that they have the right to equal protection and benefit of the law (Section 9(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996). I cannot provide definitive answers to questions such as “What is equity?”, “How does one achieve equity?”, and “How does one know that equity has been achieved?” I will, however, suggest ways that we can think differently about equity, in which we can get closer to a proper understanding of the concept.


Author(s):  
Thandekile Phulu

In South Africa employees are protected by various pieces of legislation. Section 23 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 provides for a right to fair labour practice. In its preamble the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (hereafter referred to as the LRA) states that the purpose of the Act is to advance economic development, social justice, labour peace and democratisation of the workplace. The LRA also states that one of its objectives is to give effect to and regulate the fundamental rights conferred by section 27 of the Constitution. The Occupational Health and Safety Act as amended by the Occupational Health and Safety Amendment Act 181 of 1993 provides for the health and safety of persons at work and for the health and safety of persons in connection with the use of plant and machinery. The LRA provides for dismissal for incapacity and dismissals for misconduct. It also differentiates between the two. The LRA provides for both substantive and procedural fairness when dismissing an employee for incapacity and misconduct. This paper will examine the rationale behind differentiating between dismissal for drunkenness and dismissal for alcoholism.


1997 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 229-239 ◽  
Author(s):  
Solomon R. Benatar

2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Marelize Isabel Schoeman

This article explores the concept of criminal justice as a formal process in which parties are judged and often adjudged from the paradigmatic perspective of legal guilt versus legal innocence. While this function of a criminal-justice system is important – and indeed necessary – in any ordered society, a society in transition such as South Africa must question the underlying basis of justice. This self-reflection must include an overview questioning whether the criminal-justice system and its rules are serving the community as originally intended or have become a self-serving function of state in which the final pursuit is outcome-driven as opposed to process-driven. The process of reflection must invariably find its genesis in the question: ‘What is justice?’ While this rhetorical phraseology has become trite through overuse, the author submits that the question remains of prime importance when considered contemporarily but viewed through the lens of historical discourse in African philosophy. In essence, the question remains unanswered. Momentum is added to this debate by the recent movement towards a more human rights and restorative approach to justice as well as the increased recognition of traditional legal approaches to criminal justice. This discussion is wide and in order to delimit its scope the author relies on a Socratically influenced method of knowledge-mining to determine the philosophical principles underpinning the justice versus social justice discourse. It is proposed that lessons learned from African philosophies about justice and social justice can be integrated into modern-day justice systems and contribute to an ordered yet socially oriented approach to justice itself.


2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (5) ◽  
pp. 118-137
Author(s):  
Tatiana Vasilieva ◽  

This article explores the evolution of the Supreme Court of Canada’s approach to the application of the concept of human dignity in constitutional equality cases. Traditionally, in human rights cases, this concept serves only to strengthen the argument, to show that the violation affects the person’s intrinsic worth. It is only in Canada and in South Africa that there is experience in applying the concept as a criterion for identifying discrimination. In 1999, in Law v. Canada, the Supreme Court recognized the purpose of Article 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms of 1982 to be the protection of human dignity and stated that discrimination must be established based on assessment of the impact of a program or law on human dignity. However, in 2008, in R. v. Kapp, the Court noted that the application of the concept of human dignity creates difficulties and places an additional burden of prove on the plaintiff. It is no coincidence that victims of discrimination have preferred to seek protection before human rights tribunals and commissions, where the dignity-based test is not used. Subsequently, the Supreme Court of Canada rejected the use of the concept of human dignity as a criterion for identifying discrimination. The unsuccessful experience of applying the concept of human dignity as legal test has demonstrated that not every theoretically correct legal construction is effective in adjudication.


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