scholarly journals Regulating genetic engineering guided by human dignity, not genetic essentialism

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Benjamin Gregg

Abstract How might a liberal democratic community best regulate human genetic engineering? Relevant debates widely deploy the usually undefined term “human dignity.” Its indeterminacy in meaning and use renders it useless as a guiding principle. In this article, I reject the human genome as somehow invested with a moral status, a position I call “genetic essentialism.” I explain why a critique of genetic essentialism is not a strawman and argue against defining human rights in terms of genetic essentialism. As an alternative, I propose dignity as the decisional autonomy of future persons, held in trust by the current generation. I show why a future person could be expected to have an interest in decisional autonomy and how popular deliberation, combined with expert medical and bioethical opinion, could generate principled agreement on how the decisional autonomy of future persons might be configured at the point of genetic engineering.

Author(s):  
John Tasioulas

This chapter investigates whether or not human rights are grounded in human dignity. Starting from an interest-based account of human rights, it rejects two objections to that account that have been pressed in the name of human dignity: the deontological and the personhood objections. More positively, it contends that human dignity is the equal moral status possessed by all human beings simply in virtue of their possession of a human nature, and that so understood, it has an essential role to play in grounding human rights, but that it can only play this role in tandem with universal human interests. In particular, human dignity is central to explaining both why humans can possess rights and why these rights are resistant to trade-offs. The chapter concludes with some reflections on the implications of this view for whether each and every human being possesses all of the standard human rights.


2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 301
Author(s):  
Manitza Kotzé

In this article, the concept of “liberal democracy” and its implications for biotechnology such as human genetic engineering will be examined. Liberal democracy is characterised by a number of features, some of which has extensive repercussions on biotechnology, especially concepts such as the equal protection of human rights, civil rights, civil liberties, political freedom for all people and autonomy and libertarianism. Advocates of human genetic engineering for purposes other than the healing of genetically transmitted diseases often appeal to these features in the quest for its legalisation. I will examine whether the attributes of liberal democracy would indeed justify the use of this type of biotechnology and if yes, what a possible theological response would be, drawing on the political theology of Jürgen Moltmann.


2012 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 4-25 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manuel Toscano

In this paper I argue that the idea of human dignity has a precise and philosophically relevant sense. Following recent works, we can find some important clues in the long history of the term. Traditionally, dignity conveys the idea of a high and honourable position in a hierarchical order, either in society or in nature. At first glance, nothing may seem more contrary to the contemporary conception of human dignity, especially in regard to human rights. However, an account of dignity as high rank provides an illuminating perspective on the role it plays in the egalitarian discourse of human rights. In order to preserve that relational sense regarding human dignity, we can use the notion of moral status, to which some moral philosophers have paid attention in recent years. I explore the possibilities of the idea of moral status to better understand the idea of human dignity and its close relationship with human rights.


Author(s):  
Julian Rivers

Underlying the practice of the protection of freedom of religion in constitutional and human rights law is a debate about the justifications for such protection. Many of the arguments which have been offered during the emergence of the liberal democratic tradition from the seventeenth century onwards are instrumental or theological in nature. By contrast, modern justifications tend to be ‘dignitarian’ in character—non-instrumental and non-theological. Yet they struggle to identify religion as a sufficiently broad liberty-grounding good, or they dissolve freedom of religion into other rights of conscience, expression and association. In general, such dignitarian justifications fail to ground the practice of legally protected religious liberty in liberal democratic political traditions. One fundamental reason for this may lie in the anti-religious tendency of an emerging postmodern conception of human dignity.


2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mateus Miguel Oliveira

Human genetic engineering can be considered as one of the great transformations brought about by the discoveries of genetics. The possibility of modifying the human genome or carrying out investigations and changes in the hereditary genetic heritage, reveals, simultaneously, promises and dilemmas that go beyond private life, affecting Human Rights. So, based on conflicts of interest related to genetic manipulation techniques, philosophy was sought, especially with the theoretical contribution of Michael Sandel, through a brief bibliographic review, the justifications about support or opposition in proceeding with engineering. Genetics, aiming to understand the positions and interests, to find the best ethical answer to this ambivalence.


2015 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 227-241
Author(s):  
Mirko Pecaric

This paper explores recent notions in public administration, which are intertwined and addressed to the administration of public affairs. On this basis it demonstrates that content of legal system is filled through the static legal principles and rules, but they receive their real content through the informal practices and conditions of the human mind. The paper concludes that discussed notions could have only one name, because they all are the synonyms of reciprocal relation between the human dignity and efficient administration.


2020 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 13-36
Author(s):  
Wojciech Szczerba

This article aims to examine how the concept of Imago Dei can serve as a symbol for the broadly understood idea of religious inclusion and human dignity. The article explores the concept of Imago Dei primarily from a protological perspective, analyzing its usage in biblical writings, theological tradition and modern philosophy. The substantial, relational and functional—which three usages of the concept can be found in the inclusive theology of Gregory of Nyssa—are analyzed in this article. Arguably, in the context of religious inclusion, the relational angle of Imago Dei seems to be the most important. Similarly contemporary Protestant theologian, Jürgen Moltmann states in his book, God in the Creation, that the “relational” concept of Imago Dei underscores the fundamental dignity of every person. In his book, God for Secular Society, Moltmann states that properly understood human rights should include democratic relationships between people, cooperation between societies, concern for the environment in which people live, and responsibility for future generations. From these perspectives, the concept of Imago Dei can be utilized as a symbol indicating the dignity of every person and human community, but also a symbol against any types of racism, nationalism or xenophobia.


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