The US-North Korea Agreed Framework

2012 ◽  
pp. 77-92
Keyword(s):  
North Korea ◽  
The Us ◽  
Agreed Framework

Negotiating the Cold War: The United States and the Two Koreas

2000 ◽  
Vol 9 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 85-105
Author(s):  
Steven Hugh Lee
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
North Korea ◽  
The United States ◽  
Republic Of Korea ◽  
Republic Of China ◽  
South Korean ◽  
Agreed Framework ◽  
Peace Settlement ◽  
The Republic ◽  
The Cold War

AbstractSince December 1997, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Republic of Korea (ROK), and the United States have met in a series of talks aimed at promoting peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and in the region. According to a November 1998 U.S. Department of Defense report, the discussions have created a “diplomatic venue for reducing tensions and ultimately replacing the Armistice Agreement with a permanent peace settlement.”1 Amidst the tragic human suffering which has occurred in North Korea, there have been some encouraging developments on the peninsula. The 1994 Agreed Framework between the United States and North Korea placed international controls on North Korea’s atomic energy program and cautiously anticipated the normalization of U.S.-DPRK relations. Since assuming power in early 1998, South Korean President Kim Dae Jung has vigorously pursued a policy of engagement with P’yo¨ngyang, known as the “sunshine policy.” Over the past decade, North Korea has also reoriented its foreign policy. In the early 1990s, the regime’s social and economic crisis led to a rethinking of its autarkic economic system. By early 1994, the state had created new free trade zones and relatively open foreign investment laws.2 By complying with the Agreed Framework, the DPRK has also shown a willingness to work with the international community on sensitive issues affecting its internal sovereignty and ability to project power beyond its borders.

What's new in the "new" US course towards the DPRK?

2021 ◽  
pp. 16
Author(s):  
Alexander Zhebin
Keyword(s):  
North Korea ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
The United States ◽  
Negotiation Process ◽  
Republic Of Korea ◽  
Us Economy ◽  
The Us ◽  
Nuclear Problem ◽  
The Republic ◽  
Taiwan Straits

The article analyzes the prospects for US-North Korean and inter-Korean relations, taking into account the completed policy review of the new US administration towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), as well as the results of the President of the Republic of Korea Moon Jae-in’s trip to Washington in May 2021 and his talks with US President Joe Biden. It is concluded that the “new" course proposed by the United States in relation to the DPRK will not lead to a solution to the nuclear problem of the Korean Peninsula and will interfere with the normalization of inter-Korean relations. During his visit to the US President Moon failed to obtain the US consent on ROK more “independent policy” toward North Korea. In spite of lavish investments into US economy and other concessions, Seoul was forced to promise to coordinate his approaches to the DPRK with US and Japan and support US position on Taiwan straits and South China Sea. The author argues that in the current conditions, the introduction of a regime of arms limitation and arms control in Korea should be a necessary stage on the way to complete denuclearization of the peninsula. The transition to a such method of the settlement of the nuclear problem could lead to the resumption of the negotiation process, mutual concessions, including reductions in the level of military-political confrontation, partial or large-scale lifting of economic sanctions in exchange for North Korea's restrictions of its nuclear weapon and missile systems.

Friendship in Chinese International Relations

2020 ◽  
Vol 53 (4) ◽  
pp. 177-199
Author(s):  
Chih-Yu Shih
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
International Relations ◽  
North Korea ◽  
Foreign Policy Analysis ◽  
The Us ◽  
Scope Of Application ◽  
Tributary System ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Chinese Diplomacy ◽  
Contemporary Chinese

Confucian friendship adds to the literature on friendship distance sensibilities and aims to maintain and even reinforce the Confucian ethical order, whereas contemporary international politics fails to provide any clear ethical order. The use of friendship and the concomitant creation of a friendly role by China indicate an intended move away from the improper order, including the tributary system, the Cold War, imperialism, and socialism. Confucian friendship continues to constitute contemporary Chinese diplomacy under the circumstance of indeterminate distance sensibilities. It highlights the relevance of the prior relations that are perceived to have constituted friendship. This article explores several illustrative practices of a Confucian typology of friendly international relations, divided into four kinds of friendship, according to (1) the strength of prior relations and (2) the asymmetry of capacity, including the policies toward Russia, North Korea, and Vietnam, among others. Such a Confucian friendship framework additionally alludes to foreign policy analysis in general. The US policies for China and North Korea are examples that indicate this wide scope of application.

Korea: divided nation, divided allegiances

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jude Woodward
Keyword(s):  
South Korea ◽  
North Korea ◽  
Economic Benefit ◽  
Mutual Economic ◽  
Economic Miracle ◽  
South Korean ◽  
Close Proximity ◽  
The Us ◽  
Post War ◽  
North And South

This chapter looks at South Korea’s response to the US ‘pivot’. It takes stock of the post-war division of the peninsula and its consequences for the international alignment of both North and South. It considers how the ‘economic miracle’ in South Korea led to growing competition with Japan and greater synergies with China. It looks at the degree to which North Korea threatens stability in the region, and to what extent its demonisation justifies a major US presence in close proximity to China. The chapter discusses whether resurgent China is seen as a threat to South Korean interests or chiefly viewed through the prism of mutual economic benefit; and contrasts alleged concerns about China with those provoked by Japan. It concludes that while South Korea has continued to step up its military collaboration with the US, it has not become a cheerleader for pushing back against China and has not signed up to a US strategy to contain China.

North Korea in 2017

Asian Survey ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gi-Wook Shin ◽  
Rennie J. Moon
Keyword(s):  
North Korea ◽  
Nuclear Test ◽  
Ballistic Missile ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
Korean Society ◽  
The Us ◽  
Heated Debate ◽  
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

Kim Jong Un continued to consolidate his power through personnel changes, and North Korean society saw increasing consumerism, along with signs of growing inequality. The economy did well through early 2017 but the subsequent effects of sanctions remained uncertain. North Korea conducted its first test of an intercontinental ballistic missile and its sixth nuclear test, triggering heated debate in the US and elsewhere about how to respond. Kim clearly is not going to give up working on weapons of mass destruction.

Taiwan will benefit from US-China friction

2018 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
North Korea ◽  
State Department ◽  
The State ◽  
Military Cooperation ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Opening Ceremony ◽  
Us Military ◽  
The Us ◽  
Us Government ◽  
At Home

Significance Taiwan-US relations got a symbolic boost when the US government opened a new 250-million-dollar institute to house the de facto embassy in Taipei, Taiwan's capital, on June 12. President Tsai Ing-wen, and a US delegation that included representatives from Congress and the State Department, attended the opening ceremony. It may have received greater attention and perhaps higher-ranking US representation had the first US-North Korea summit not been scheduled for the same day. Impacts Taiwan's president will be constrained from improving China ties by anti-China sentiment at home. More businesses could come under Chinese pressure as cross-Strait relations deteriorate further. Taiwan-US military cooperation will prompt more aggressive Chinese efforts to diminish Taiwan's standing and increase military intimidation.

US Congress will leave Trump nuclear authority intact

2017 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Relations ◽  
North Korea ◽  
Political Leadership ◽  
Nuclear Deterrence ◽  
Nuclear War ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Us Congress ◽  
North East ◽  
The Us ◽  
Carry Over

Significance The standoff with North Korea has led the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to hold a hearing on the president’s authority to order a nuclear first strike. This is the first such formal examination of the executive branch’s nuclear prerogatives and procedures by Congress since 1976. Meanwhile, President Donald Trump’s administration is planning on upgrades to the US arsenal to boost Washington’s ability to wage a nuclear war and has raised the spectre of nuclear conflict with North Korea in its public remarks. Impacts The probable US deployment of new tactical nuclear weapons will not carry over to delegating attack authority to commanders in a crisis. Chinese and Russian anti-access/area-denial systems may trigger more US reliance on nuclear deterrence in the Baltics and North-east Asia. Improved weapons technology convincing policymakers that first strikes are prudent pose greater risks than unbalanced political leadership.

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