Rosenzweig, Franz (1886–1929)

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Myriam Bienenstock
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Personal Identity ◽  
Common Ground ◽  
German Idealism ◽  
The Other ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Franz Rosenzweig ◽  
Standard Work ◽  
I And Thou ◽  
New Thinking

An outstanding Hegel scholar – his Hegel und der Staat (Hegel and the State) (1920) remains a standard work on Hegel’s political philosophy – Franz Rosenzweig elaborated, in Der Stern der Erlösung (The Star of Redemption) (1921) and several articles – notably, his 1925 article ‘Das neue Denken’ (’The New Thinking’) – a philosophy of revelation that breaks with the systematic and rationalistic premises of German Idealism. The nisus of Rosenzweig’s New Thinking was formulated as early as 1917, in a letter containing the germ (Urzelle) of Der Stern: ‘after reason, ‘‘philosophical reason’’, has absorbed everything in itself’, Rosenzweig writes, ‘after it has proclaimed its sole existence, man suddenly discovers that he is still here, although he was digested long ago…. I am still here, I – plain, private subject, with first and last name, I – dust and ashes…. Individuum ineffabile triumphans’. How can this be? The human being, Rosenzweig explains, can acquire personal identity as an individual only through the call, that is, the revelation of the Other: God – but also, some other human being. Dialogue, communication in language, comes to the fore in this philosophy, developed around the same time as Martin Buber’s Ich und Du (I and Thou) (1923). Often treated as a common ground and basis for understanding between Jews and Christians, Der Stern der Erlösung is a major source of inspiration for such contemporary philosophers as Lévinas and is widely regarded as a masterpiece of Jewish philosophy.

Personal Identity and the Idea of a Human Being

1991 ◽  
Vol 29 ◽  
pp. 127-142
Author(s):  
Geoffrey Madell
Keyword(s):  
Personal Identity ◽  
Natural Kind ◽  
The Body ◽  
The Other ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Personal Approach ◽  
Third Person ◽  
The One ◽  
The Mind

The central fact about the problem of personal identity is that it is a problem posed by an apparent dichotomy: the dichotomy between the objective, third-person viewpoint on the one hand and the subjective perspective provided by the first-person viewpoint on the other. Everyone understands that the mind/body problem is precisely the problem of what to do about another apparent dichotomy, the duality comprising states of consciousness on the one hand and physical states of the body on the other. By contrast, contemporary discussions of the problem of personal identity generally display little or no recognition of the divide which to my mind is at the heart of the problem. As a consequence, there has been a relentlessly third-personal approach to the issue, and the consequent proposal of solutions which stand no chance at all of working. I think the idea that the problem is to be clarified by an appeal to the idea of a human being is the latest manifestation of this mistaken approach. I am thinking in particular of the claim that what ought to govern our thinking on this issue is the fact that human beings constitute a natural kind, and that standard members of this kind can be said to have some sort of essence. Related to this is the idea that ‘person’, while not itself a natural kind term, is not a notion which can be framed in entire independence of this natural kind.

scholarly journals Saying no (to a story): personal identity and negativity

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tereza Matějčková
Keyword(s):  
Personal Identity ◽  
Narrative Identity ◽  
German Idealism ◽  
The Self ◽  
Birth Certificates ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Narrative Self ◽  
Phenomenological Tradition ◽  
The Core ◽  
The Way

AbstractThe concept of narrativity and narrative identity has two birth certificates: it is linked to the phenomenological tradition—beginning with Arendt’s “political phenomenology” —and to the tradition of German Idealism gradually slipping into existentialism. In this article, the author focuses on the latter tradition that helped to pave the way of the concept of narrative self. Key among the thinkers of Classical German Idealism has been Hegel, often considered the philosophical storyteller. Yet the author argues that Hegel’s concept of narrativity is not exclusively applied to the self and has hardly any role in the constitution of consciousness. This is the reason why Hegel (rather than thinkers who place the core of personal identity into narrativity) has the means to formulate a more convincing concept of the self and personal identity. The author does not deny that narrativity is seminal, both for leading a life as a human being and as a concrete person; however, originally consciousness and self-hood are born out of negativity. One enacts one’s selfhood, once one realizes that one has to interrupt narrativity, step in, refuse to live by it, or just ordinarily rephrase it consciously and by this appropriate it.

Is God Redeemable?

2021 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 153-167
Author(s):  
Hans-Christoph Askani
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Mutual Relationship ◽  
Franz Rosenzweig ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The World ◽  
The One

Abstract We might suggest two possible ways of understanding our question: Can God be redeemed? and: Must God be redeemed? In both cases the question sounds blasphemous. But following the movement that Franz Rosenzweig develops in The Star of Redemption, I suggest that the living relation initiated by God, as God created the world and as God revealed himself to the human being, would be an abstract construction if, on the one hand, the human being and the world did not need each other in order to become what they are and what they could be, and if, on the other hand, God was not implicated in this mutual relationship.

Personhood

2018 ◽  
pp. 334-343
Author(s):  
René Rosfort
Keyword(s):  
Mental Health ◽  
Health Care ◽  
Mental Health Care ◽  
Personal Identity ◽  
The Other ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Vital Importance ◽  
Phenomenological Psychopathology

Personhood plays a fundamental, but obscure role in contemporary mental health care. The notion is of vital importance to phenomenological psychopathology because it articulates the interplay of autonomy and heteronomy, self and otherness, at work in mental suffering. The complexity of personhood is connected with the circumstance that to be a person is both a fact and a norm. To see every human being (ourselves as well as the other) as a person is a normative task that is rooted in the fact that a human being is an individual being who experiences herself as a unique and irreplaceable person. This experience of being a person is more than a sense of selfhood. It involves an otherness (e.g. body, world, other people) that is constitutive of our personal identity. Narrative explorations of the fragility of personal identity can help us to make sense of mental suffering.

scholarly journals RUSSIAN, JEWISH OR HUMAN? JEWISH MYSTICAL THOUGHT IN THE POETRY OF BULAT SHALVOVICH OKUDZHAVA

Porównania ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Katarzyna Anna Kornacka-Sareło
Keyword(s):  
Distinctive Feature ◽  
Emmanuel Levinas ◽  
Martin Buber ◽  
The Other ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Philosophical Approach ◽  
Franz Rosenzweig ◽  
Jewish Mysticism ◽  
The World ◽  
Literary Output

While looking at the literary output of Bulat Shalvovich Okudzhava from the perspective of imagology, one can see that the image of “the Other” in the poems of the Russian bard was created, paradoxically, just by this “Other”, and it was not constructed by the images (imagines) intrinsically present in the consciousness of the ethnocentric “Self” or “The Same”. In other words, in the case of Okudzhava’s poetry, the image of “the Other” stands on the basis of some ideas of Jewish mystics and the ones of Jewish philosophers of dialogue (Martin Buber, Franz Rosenzweig and Emmanuel Lévinas). Therefore, the aim of this article was to present the motifs stemming from Jewish mysticism in the poems-songs by Okudzhava which, as it seems, influenced theological, anthropological and ethical views of the bard. The distinctive feature of Okudzhava’s philosophical approach is perceiving every person, regardless of their ethnic or cultural origin, as a being responsible for themselves in the process of constituting themselves in their humanity. The same person is also responsible for other people, for the world of nature, and even for an impersonal and non-anthropomorphic godhead who does not intervene in human affairs. Therefore, Okudzhava – similarly to Jewish mystics – regards the human being as a co-creator of reality, obliged to perform ethically positive acts and respect an old Kabbalistic postulate tikkun ha-olam - “to mend the world”.

scholarly journals Love at the right time. The recognition of others in Franz Rosenzweig

2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 481-496
Author(s):  
García Belmonte
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Franz Rosenzweig ◽  
New Thinking ◽  
Love Of Neighbor ◽  
The One ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Relationship

In this article we delve into the conception of love for neighbor present in The Star of Redemption. Rosenzweig?s New Thinking is in praise of life, despite pain, and by virtue of love. Becoming oneself passes through the relationship with the other. Love of neighbor is born from the recognition of the other as close and representative of all humanity. This love requires going beyond the ?-isms? that separate us; it involves getting closer to the other without denying him or her (or even oneself), but recognizing them as different. But how do we know who we should love at every moment? Prayer, Rosenzweig would say, is the one that enlightens our neighbors matured for love.

scholarly journals The Role of Time in the Theory of Narrative Identity in the Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur

2021 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 483-494
Author(s):  
Michał Kumorek
Keyword(s):  
Personal Identity ◽  
Narrative Identity ◽  
The Other ◽  
Human Being ◽  
The Core ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
New Models ◽  
Changes Over Time ◽  
Over Time

Time has a very important function in considering the identity of a person. It is the factor that brings identity into question. The core of the problem is the question of whether the person is the same as he or she was at another time. The problem of personal identity was one of the most important issues in Paul Ricoeurs philosophy. He considers this problem in the context of time and notes that traditional models of identity as sameness and as selfhood have been entangled in various aporias. He, therefore, proposes two new models of identity that are related in different ways to temporality: character and promise. Character is a model that changes over time through the acquisition or loss of various traits. The promise, on the other hand, is a model that resists the pressure of time attempts to keep a given word. In this way, these two different models create the framework for Ricoeur's concept of narrative identity. In this concept, time enables the development of action in a story. It allows the action to turn around, but it also allows the human being to look at the story of his or her life. Character and promise are models that allow the human being to look at his or her life as a certain temporal entity that is constantly threatened by unforeseen accidents and events but also constantly absorbs them and, through to time, gives the possibility of retrospection leading to synthesis. This synthesis allows us to look at a single life as a whole, belonging to the same person endowed with the character and challenge of keeping a promise.

scholarly journals The White Creole in Jean Rhys’s Wide Sargasso Sea : A Woman in Passage

2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 88-110
Author(s):  
Imen Mzoughi
Keyword(s):  
Personal Identity ◽  
Jean Rhys ◽  
Broad Sense ◽  
The Other ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Sargasso Sea ◽  
Wide Sargasso Sea ◽  
To Come

Abstract Studies on Jean Rhys have been fragmentary concentrating on one or two aspects of Rhys’s thematic concern with the alienation of the white creole without laying emphasis on Rhys’s exploration of the Creole’s identity. There has been no attempt to examine if the creole has to struggle harder and more than whites and blacks to come to terms with her personal identity until now. The answer is affirmative because the creole is a composite human being. Indeed, the white creole is the ‘fruit’ of a mixed union. Born into miscegenation, hybridity and creolization, the creole is physically, linguistically, socially and religiously a diverse human being. Within the scope of this paper, the term identity is used in a broad sense. The creole’s personal identity refers to the different identities the Creole can have at different times and in different circumstances. Correspondingly, she must negotiate the white and black elements of her identity. The Creole must deal with the complexity of her identity through a web of tangled relationships with both whites and blacks. Read from this light, the personal identity of the creole is not “either/ or,” but reluctantly “both/ and.” In various ways, the creole is an ‘Everyman.’ The Creole undergoes an awareness, and is eventually, redefined through the image of the ‘other.’ Indeed, her jump toward her black friend Tia reflects Rhys’s basic concern for a Caribbean society in which assimilation and personal identity must blend in a single humane goal, that is, to co-exist beyond the lines of race, gender, class and sex in order to avoid annihilation.

Locke on Personal Identity

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Galen Strawson ◽  
Galen Strawson
Keyword(s):  
Personal Identity ◽  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Contemporary Philosophy ◽  
Fundamental Point ◽  
Legal Term ◽  
Word Consciousness ◽  
History Of

John Locke's theory of personal identity underlies all modern discussion of the nature of persons and selves—yet it is widely thought to be wrong. This book argues that in fact it is Locke's critics who are wrong, and that the famous objections to his theory are invalid. Indeed, far from refuting Locke, they illustrate his fundamental point. The book argues that the root error is to take Locke's use of the word “person” as merely a term for a standard persisting thing, like “human being.” In actuality, Locke uses “person” primarily as a forensic or legal term geared specifically to questions about praise and blame, punishment and reward. This point is familiar to some philosophers, but its full consequences have not been worked out, partly because of a further error about what Locke means by the word “consciousness.” When Locke claims that your personal identity is a matter of the actions that you are conscious of, he means the actions that you experience as your own in some fundamental and immediate manner. Clearly and vigorously argued, this is an important contribution both to the history of philosophy and to the contemporary philosophy of personal identity.

The Hierophanic Facets of the Seraphic Hymns

Trictrac ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Petru Adrian Danciu
Keyword(s):  
Mutual Recognition ◽  
The Other ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Material World ◽  
Face To Face ◽  
The People ◽  
Musical History ◽  
The Face ◽  
The One

Starting from the cry of the seraphim in Isaiahʹ s prophecy, this article aims to follow the rhythm of the sacred harmony, transcending the symbols of the angelic world and of the divine names, to get to the face to face meeting between man and God, just as the seraphim, reflecting their existence, stand face to face. The finality of the sacred harmony is that, during the search for God inside the human being, He reveals Himself, which is the reason for the affirmation of “I Am that I Am.” Through its hypnotic cyclicality, the profane temporality has its own musicality. Its purpose is to incubate the unsuspected potencies of the beings “caught” in the material world. Due to the fact that it belongs to the aeonic time, the divine music will exceed in harmony the mechanical musicality of profane time, dilating and temporarily cancelling it. Isaiah is witness to such revelation offering access to the heavenly concert. He is witness to divine harmonies produced by two divine singers, whose musical history is presented in our article. The seraphim accompanied the chosen people after their exodus from Egypt. The cultic use of the trumpet is related to the characteristics and behaviour of the seraphim. The seraphic music does not belong to the Creator, but its lyrics speak about the presence of the Creator in two realities, a spiritual and a material one. Only the transcendence of the divine names that are sung/cried affirms a unique reality: God. The chant-cry is a divine invocation with a double aim. On the one hand, the angels and the people affirm God’s presence and call His name and, on the other, the Creator affirms His presence through the angels or in man, the one who is His image and His likeness. The divine music does not only create, it is also a means of communion, implementing the relation of man to God and, thus, God’s connection with man. It is a relation in which both filiation and paternity disappear inside the harmony of the mutual recognition produced by music, a reality much older than Adam’s language.

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