Conclusion: Partisan Competition and Democratic Stability

2019 ◽  
pp. 217-232 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas F. Remington
Author(s):  
Maurizio Ferrera

Wars have had a clearly recognizable impact on Italy’s social policy since unification. The independence and early colonial wars prompted the introduction of veteran benefits and other forms of state compensation. The two world wars marked key turning points, creating the conditions for introducing compulsory social insurance and then extending its scope and coverage. The pronatalist policies introduced by Fascism were in their turn closely linked to the regime’s war mobilization strategy. In comparative perspective, a distinctive feature of Italian developments was the elaboration of very ambitious and comprehensive reform plans after both world wars, largely motivated by the wish to forge broad cross-class coalitions and safeguard democratic stability. Even if initially unsuccessful, such plans left an ideational legacy which contributed to inspire welfare state developments well throughout the so-called Golden Age.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-25
Author(s):  
David Delfs Erbo Andersen

Abstract Theories connecting meritocracy and democratic stability are heavily understudied, and there are few attempts to empirically disentangle the potential mechanisms. This article proposes a novel explanation, emphasizing that bureaucratic impartiality and effectiveness provide separate shields that stabilize democracies. Impartiality protects the opposition from unlawful discrimination, which raises support for democracy among the (potential) losers of elections and reduces the incentives to rebel or stage coups d’état, whereas effectiveness serves incumbent policies, which raises support among the (potential) winners and reduces the likelihood of incumbent takeovers. I find support for these propositions in comparative-historical analyses of a few paradigmatic cases—interwar Finland, Czechoslovakia, and Germany—with similar levels of economic development, imperial-autocratic legacies, and meritocratic types of administration but different regime outcomes. The results show that both impartial and effective bureaucratic behavior rather than meritocratic recruitment norms as such are important stabilizers of democracy. Yet they emphasize the importance of bureaucratic effectiveness in raising the perception that votes count to change outcomes on the ground and thus that democracy makes a difference. I argue that this should have a wider significance for the study of contemporary processes of democratic recession.


2017 ◽  
Vol 66 (2) ◽  
pp. 442-458 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthoula Malkopoulou ◽  
Ludvig Norman

Militant democracy relies on the idea that democracies ought to defend themselves from anti-democratic forces by constitutionalising repressive measures. We offer a criticism of this view by highlighting the exclusionary elitism on which militant democracy is built. In doing this, we consider two competing models of democratic self-defence: the procedural and the social. We suggest that the procedural model, while avoiding the exclusionary and other pitfalls of militant democracy, is detached from socio-political realities and fails to offer a comprehensive vision of democratic stability. The largely neglected social model of democratic self defence avoids this problem; it combines proceduralism’s commitment to dissensus with a social-democratic logic in the design of democratic constitutions. We argue in favour of such a social democratic self-defence and further develop this model around the guiding principle of political and social non-domination.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (11) ◽  
pp. 5808
Author(s):  
Fabricio Casarejos ◽  
Carlos Rufin ◽  
Ivan Engel

The main objective of this article is to propose a new concept of Regenerative Democracy for envisioning and fostering flourishing societies. In pursuing this goal, this study is structured in three research strands, as follows: (i) the proposition of a cohesive set of indices for assessing global democracy and its historical crisis, stability, and transitioning regimes; (ii) an evaluation of empirical correlations and interdependencies between global sustainability and democracy; and (iii) the proposition of a new concept of Regenerative Democracy and its respective system dynamics modeling archetype for portraying societal transitions and their respective patterns of behavior over time. The overall results and discussion of this study indicate an empirical trend of democratic instability, comprising a decline in quality distribution among democratic states and an increasing risk of socio-ecological degeneration. These results also reveal a highly interdependent relationship between historical achievements of essential societal needs and global democratic stability and consolidation. Finally, flourishing societies relies on social equity, political participation, intergenerational justice and solidarity, long-term thinking, and synergistic relationships between societies and Earth’s life-giving systems.


2011 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 239-253 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vedran Džihić ◽  
Dieter Segert

State weakness is one of the main obstacles for democratic stability. Yet under certain circumstances even a mere electoral democracy may gain stable support from the citizenry. Mere electoral democracy is best understood as a regime of elite governance endowed by a certain support from the citizens but without any ambition of the ruling elite to increase the quality of democratic rule. This article explores the historical reasons of this specific type of political regime in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia. Departing from the empirical examples from the Western Balkans, the article comes to some rather general conclusions about the concept and sequence of democratization: Conducting elections too early may produce serious challenges to sustainable democratization. The general population’s primary interest mostly lies in the stabilization of state apparatus and its ability to produce common goods rather than in the fast establishment of electoral democracy and formal democratic institutions. For a better understanding of the real level of specific course and paths of democratic “consolidation,” the democracy rankings like Nations in Transit and Bertelsmann should focus on in-depth analyses of the main actors’ political and economic practices.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 85-111
Author(s):  
Hatice Rümeysa Dursun

Despite being shaken by the Arab Spring, authoritarian structures still exist in the regions of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Th is situation highlights the importance of studying the continuity of authoritarian structures more comprehensively. In addition to approaches that reduce authoritarianism to intra-state factors, literature has developed over the last decade emphasizing the importance of international factors. This literature in particular emphasizes the politics, economics, and diplomacy established by the West and that ties are effective in the continuity of authoritarianism in non-Western countries. This study attempts to explain Ben Ali’s period and the continuity of authoritarianism in Tunisia in the context of this developing new literature. Although Tunisia underwent a relatively positive transformation process after the Arab Spring, Ben Ali’s authoritarian rule was supported by the West as a model of an economic miracle and democratic stability; this administration managed to survive for 23 years. The study’s main argument can be expressed as follows: While the economic liberalization process imposed on Tunis by Western actors caused an increase in socio-economic inequalities, the instrumentalization of democracy by the West again served to suppress civil and political freedoms. Instead of focusing on the obstacles and opportunities in front of the transition to democracy in the post-Arab Spring period, examining theinternational factors influencing the continuity of authoritarianism in the Ben Ali period will shed light on how authoritarian structures still survive in MENA.


2013 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 32-47 ◽  
Author(s):  
Snigdha Dewal ◽  
Jack A. Goldstone ◽  
Michael Volpe

Drawing on the literatures on elite transitions, factionalism and the new institutionalism, this paper hypothesizes that the stability of partially democratic and emerging democratic regimes is dependent on the willingness of elites to make credible commitments to cooperate and comply with democratic rules. That willingness (or lack thereof) can be signaled by the presence of cooperative or conflict-precipitating events and actions in the periods around elections. We identify and analyze a variety of intra-elite interactions and demonstrate that conflict-precipitating events significantly increase the odds of a democratic retreat in the months before or just after an election, while cooperative events can balance them and prevent retreat. Using event data collected from 40 low- and middle-income countries for two-year periods around national elections between 1991 and 2007 we show that the imbalance of conflict-precipitating over cooperative events is far greater in cases of retreat from democracy. Furthermore, international intervention and pressure had a negative relationship with democratic stability. A logistic regression model accurately identified democratic retreat in 79 percent of the cases examined. Factor analysis revealed several common patterns of intra-elite conflict that can lead to democratic retreat, or conversely, patterns of cooperative events that bolster democratic consolidation. Finally, the data strongly argues for a model of democratic development that depends on open-ended elite maneuvering and the emergence of elite agreements, rather than a model where strong prior institutional constraints determine elite actions.


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