Collective action, rational choice, and gang delinquency

Author(s):  
Ross L. Matsueda ◽  
Charles C. Lanfear
1987 ◽  
Vol 81 (2) ◽  
pp. 557-564 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Klosko ◽  
Edward N. Muller ◽  
Karl Dieter Opp

Why does it happen that ordinary people can come to participate in rebellious collective action? In the June 1986 issue of this Review, Edward N. Muller and Karl-Dieter Opp argued a public-goods model to account for why rational citizens may become rebels. They offered empirical data drawn from samples in New York City and Hamburg, Germany in support of the public-goods model. George Kolsko takes issue with the rationale of Muller and Opp, arguing that their public-goods model is not a rational-choice explanation of rebellious collective action. In response, Muller and Opp clarify their theory and further elaborate its assumptions.


1970 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
pp. 93-117
Author(s):  
Christopher Bertram ◽  
Alan Carling

Right-wing critics have long used the theory of rational choice to pour scorn on the Marxist theory of revolution, because, they say, free-rider considerations will deter any rational self-interested worker from engaging in revolutionary action. This contention poses an especial problem for Analytical Marxists, who also utilise rational choice models to understand the micro-foundations of collective action. It turns out, however, that if the worker’s decision to join a collective action is conceived more realistically, not as a once-for-all commitment, but as a recurrent process affected continuously by the actions of others, then a much richer repertoire of outcomes begins to appear within the theory – matching those found in history itself. This paper develops simple models of collective action that display this broader range of possibilities. These include convergence to a stable level of collective engagement, oscillation over time between different levels of engagement, and truly chaotic behaviour, in which levels of engagement are never repeated.


Author(s):  
Carole Jean Uhlaner

Models that embed people in social groups provide solutions to the paradox of voting. This chapter summarizes several approaches that use group identities and loyalties to generate substantial turnout even within rational choice models of participation (whether voting or collective action more broadly). One theoretical move introduces leaders acting instrumentally to mobilize individuals who belong to some group, thereby integrating the individual citizen’s consumption term into an instrumental calculus. Other, complementary, theoretical developments introduce relational goods, which exist only with interaction among specific people, as part of the mobilizing arsenal, or more generally develop relational motivations for collective action. The chapter briefly discusses some empirical findings, notably including experiments that show that shame, pride, and digital social networks increase turnout, and argues that these results provide support for the social embeddedness models.


1995 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-36 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kay Lehman Schlozman ◽  
Sidney Verba ◽  
Henry E. Brady

Political participation has long been a puzzle for political science analysis. The logic of collective action suggests that activity to achieve collective goals is irrational; yet citizens are active. In this article, we approach the subject from the point of view of political activists, using survey data to consider their own interpretations of why they took part. The data show that participants recall many gratifications from their activity and that the patterns differ substantially across modes of participation. These rewards tend to be ‘political’ in that activists cite both civic gratifications and the desire to achieve collective goals more frequently than would be expected on the basis of rational choice approaches. The variations among acts with respect to the nature of the retrospective interpretations of the rewards they provide – in conjunction with open-ended responses about the issues behind activity – lend credence to respondents' accounts. The results call into question the applicability of narrow rational choice approaches to political activity.


1982 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 412-434 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Hechter ◽  
Debra Friedman ◽  
Malka Appelbaum

This article presents a theory to explain the frequency of ethnic collective action. Based on rational choice premises, it represents an alternative to currently popular structural theories. We demonstrate why an individual will not necessarily join a collective action even if its end is beneficial to him, and why collective action does not always occur among the most seriously disadvantaged ethnic groups. The strength of ethnically based organizations is held to be an especially powerful determinant of the likelihood of ethnic collective action.


Author(s):  
Kira D. Jumet

This chapter introduces the argument, situates the study in the theoretical literature, and outlines the path of the book. The chapter introduces key definitions and concepts, such as revolution, social movements, and rebellions. The chapter also demonstrates that individual decisions to protest are affected by structural factors and that emotions affect how people make decisions. By explaining the relationship between structural factors and rational choice decision-making, this chapter sets the stage for how political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes intersected with emotions to influence individuals’ decisions to either engage or not engage in collective action during the Egyptian Revolution.


Author(s):  
Keith Dowding ◽  
Patrick Dunleavy ◽  
Desmond King ◽  
Helen Margetts

This chapter applies Dowding’s analysis of power to the community power debate. It demonstrates the importance of the collective action problem to our understanding of power in society, showing that both pluralists and their radical critics misinterpret power in society by ignoring collective action problems. It demonstrates the nature of luck and systematic luck in the power structure.


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