This chapter exemplifies both the strengths and shortcomings of Beijing’s orchestration approach. It begins by describing how Yunnan province officials utilized Beijing’s support for expanding economic ties in ways that exacerbated the pernicious effects of gambling, logging, and illicit mining in Myanmar’s loosely governed border regions. The second case covers a policy initiative designed to advance multiple interests at modest cost: China’s opium substitution program. The initiative succeeded economically, as Chinese firms earned profits while securing a foothold in Myanmar’s agricultural sector. Yet it failed to stem opium production, instead exacerbating popular distrust of China and feeding instability across the border region. The final case reveals similar problems with several controversial Chinese infrastructure projects in Myanmar. Overall, moral hazard problems, policy stretching, and enterprise malfeasance all proved far more severe in Myanmar than in North Korea or Europe. I conclude by evaluating Beijing’s responses to these challenges.
