Kuhn, Carnap, and logical empiricism

Abstract The main thesis of this paper is that Pap’s The Functional A Priori in Physical Theory and Cassirer’s Determinism and Indeterminism in Modern Physics may be conceived as two kindred accounts of a late Neo-Kantian philosophy of science. They elucidate and clarify each other mutually by elaborating conceptual possibilities and pointing out affinities of neo-Kantian ideas with other currents of 20th century’s philosophy of science, namely, pragmatism, conventionalism, and logical empiricism. Taking into account these facts, it seems not too far fetched to conjecture that under more favorable circumstances Pap could have served as a mediator between the “analytic” and “continental” tradition thereby overcoming the dogmatic dualism of these two philosophical currents that has characterized philosophy in the second half the 20th century.

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Points of convergence between logical empiricism and inductive metaphysics: Hans Reichenbach and Erich Becher in comparison

Synthese ◽

10.1007/s11229-021-03280-8 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Ansgar Seide

Keyword(s):

20Th Century ◽

19Th Century ◽

Vienna Circle ◽

External World ◽

Logical Empiricism ◽

Natural Sciences ◽

Early 20Th Century ◽

Late 19Th Century ◽

Hans Reichenbach

AbstractIn this paper, I take a closer look at Hans Reichenbach’s relation to metaphysics and work out some interesting parallels between his account and that of the proponents of inductive metaphysics, a tradition that emerged in the mid- and late 19th century and the early 20th century in Germany. It is in particular Hans Reichenbach’s conception of the relation between the natural sciences and metaphysics, as displayed in his treatment of the question of the existence of the external world, that shows some very interesting similarities with inductive metaphysics. By a comparison with the position of the inductive metaphysician Erich Becher and his handling of the problem of realism, I work out the parallels between Reichenbach’s program and inductive metaphysics. I come to the conclusion that while there are certainly some respects in which Reichenbach’s logical empiricism is closer to the positions of the representatives of the Vienna Circle, it turns out that with regard to his views on metaphysics there is a greater affinity with the program of inductive metaphysics.

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Beyond Logical Empiricism

Dialogue ◽

10.1017/s0012217300050022 ◽

1971 ◽

Vol 10 (2) ◽

pp. 223-242 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

William R. Shea

Keyword(s):

Philosophy Of Science ◽

Theoretical Language ◽

Scientific Discourse ◽

Logical Empiricism ◽

Logical Positivism ◽

Thomas Kuhn ◽

Logical Positivist ◽

Suitable Alternative ◽

Logical Empiricist ◽

Paul Feyerabend

The mainstream of the philosophy of science in the second quarter of this century—the so-called “logical empiricist” or “logical positivist” movement—assumed that theoretical language in science is parasitic upon observation language and can be eliminated from scientific discourse by disinterpretation and formalization, or by explicit definition in or reduction to observational language. But several fashionable views now place the onus on believers in an observation language to show how such a language is meaningful in the absence of a theory.In the present paper, I propose to show why logical positivism failed to do justice to the basic empirical and logical problems of philosophy of science. I also wish to consider why the drastic reaction, typified by Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend, fails t o provide a suitable alternative, and to suggest that the radical approaches of recent writers such as Mary Hesse and Dudley Shapere hold out a genuine promise of dealing effectively with the central tasks that face the philosopher of science today.

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Bertolt Brecht, Logical Empiricism, and Social Behaviourism

The Modern Language Review ◽

10.2307/3733255 ◽

1995 ◽

Vol 90 (1) ◽

pp. 83

Author(s):

Steve Giles

Keyword(s):

Bertolt Brecht ◽

Logical Empiricism

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Jargon, Bullshit, sinnlos

Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie ◽

10.1515/dzph-2021-0054 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 69 (4) ◽

pp. 646-660

Author(s):

Max Beck

Keyword(s):

Critical Theory ◽

Logical Empiricism ◽

Social Conditions ◽

The Other ◽

Social Content ◽

Relevant Today ◽

Other Hand ◽

Personal Approach ◽

The 1960S ◽

Theological Language

Abstract Theodor W. Adorno’s Jargon of Authenticity (1964) is one of the bestknown, but also most controversial works of Critical Theory. Many philosophers, writers and editorialists have attacked the text in recent decades and accused Adorno of cultivating his own “jargon”. In his book, Adorno develops a critique of metaphysical and theological language, which he observed in Germany from the 1920s up to the 1960s. In my paper, I argue that the mode of critique Adorno deploys is still relevant today, even if its object has largely disappeared. This becomes clear in comparison to the language criticism of the analytical tradition, namely logical empiricism or Harry G. Frankfurt’s critique of “bullshit,” which are comparably more widespread today in academic debates. While Adorno examines linguistic expressions in terms of their social content and places them in a historical constellation, the critique of “bullshit” following Frankfurt remains constrained to a personal approach. In the language criticism of logical empiricism, on the other hand, the possibility of understanding linguistic phenomena as expressions of social conditions is still present. From this comparison, much can be learned for an up-to-date language criticism.

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