Beyond Logical Empiricism

Dialogue ◽  
1971 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 223-242 ◽  
Author(s):  
William R. Shea
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Theoretical Language ◽  
Scientific Discourse ◽  
Logical Empiricism ◽  
Logical Positivism ◽  
Thomas Kuhn ◽  
Logical Positivist ◽  
Suitable Alternative ◽  
Logical Empiricist ◽  
Paul Feyerabend

The mainstream of the philosophy of science in the second quarter of this century—the so-called “logical empiricist” or “logical positivist” movement—assumed that theoretical language in science is parasitic upon observation language and can be eliminated from scientific discourse by disinterpretation and formalization, or by explicit definition in or reduction to observational language. But several fashionable views now place the onus on believers in an observation language to show how such a language is meaningful in the absence of a theory.In the present paper, I propose to show why logical positivism failed to do justice to the basic empirical and logical problems of philosophy of science. I also wish to consider why the drastic reaction, typified by Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend, fails t o provide a suitable alternative, and to suggest that the radical approaches of recent writers such as Mary Hesse and Dudley Shapere hold out a genuine promise of dealing effectively with the central tasks that face the philosopher of science today.

Logical positivism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Friedman
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
National Socialism ◽  
Vienna Circle ◽  
Logical Empiricism ◽  
Logical Positivism ◽  
Scientific Philosophy ◽  
The Usa ◽  
Mathematical Techniques ◽  
English Speaking World ◽  
The University

Logical positivism (logical empiricism, neo-positivism) originated in Austria and Germany in the 1920s. Inspired by late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century revolutions in logic, mathematics and mathematical physics, it aimed to create a similarly revolutionary scientific philosophy purged of the endless controversies of traditional metaphysics. Its most important representatives were members of the Vienna Circle who gathered around Moritz Schlick at the University of Vienna (including Rudolf Carnap, Herbert Feigl, Kurt Gödel, Hans Hahn, Karl Menger, Otto Neurath and Friedrich Waismann) and those of the Society for Empirical Philosophy who gathered around Hans Reichenbach at the University of Berlin (including Walter Dubislav, Kurt Grelling and Carl Hempel). Although not officially members of either group, the Austrian philosophers Ludwig Wittgenstein and Karl Popper were, at least for a time, closely associated with logical positivism. The logical positivist movement reached its apogee in Europe in the years 1928–34, but the rise of National Socialism in 1933 marked the effective end of this phase. Thereafter, however, many of its most important representatives emigrated to the USA. Here logical positivism found a receptive audience among such pragmatically, empirically and logically minded American philosophers as Charles Morris, Ernest Nagel and W.V. Quine. Thus transplanted to the English-speaking world of ‘analytic’ philosophy it exerted a tremendous influence – particularly in philosophy of science and the application of logical and mathematical techniques to philosophical problems more generally. This influence began to wane around 1960, with the rise of a pragmatic form of naturalism due to Quine and a historical-sociological approach to the philosophy of science due mainly to Thomas Kuhn. Both of these later trends, however, developed in explicit reaction to the philosophy of logical positivism and thereby attest to its enduring significance.

The philosophy of science of logical positivism

2007 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-56
Author(s):  
Svetozar Sindjelic
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Theoretical Framework ◽  
Logical Empiricism ◽  
Logical Positivism

The aim of this paper is to present and discuss the main points of the philosophy of science of logical positivism, its theoretical framework, as well as its basic philosophical implications. Besides, the author tries to sketch the logical positivists' retreat to a more moderate logical empiricism and, especially, its consequences for their philosophy of science.

scholarly journals Two Kindred Neo-Kantian Philosophies of Science: Pap’s The A Priori in Physical Theory and Cassirer’s Determinism and Indeterminism in Modern Physics

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Mormann
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
20Th Century ◽  
Physical Theory ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Logical Empiricism ◽  
Main Thesis ◽  
Modern Physics ◽  
Continental Tradition ◽  
Determinism And Indeterminism ◽  
Kantian Philosophy

Abstract The main thesis of this paper is that Pap’s The Functional A Priori in Physical Theory and Cassirer’s Determinism and Indeterminism in Modern Physics may be conceived as two kindred accounts of a late Neo-Kantian philosophy of science. They elucidate and clarify each other mutually by elaborating conceptual possibilities and pointing out affinities of neo-Kantian ideas with other currents of 20th century’s philosophy of science, namely, pragmatism, conventionalism, and logical empiricism. Taking into account these facts, it seems not too far fetched to conjecture that under more favorable circumstances Pap could have served as a mediator between the “analytic” and “continental” tradition thereby overcoming the dogmatic dualism of these two philosophical currents that has characterized philosophy in the second half the 20th century.

Mechanisms and Mechanical Philosophy

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stuart Glennan
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Mechanistic Explanation ◽  
Logical Empiricist ◽  
Mechanical Philosophy ◽  
The Past ◽  
Actual Content ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Practice Of Science

The past twenty years have seen a resurgence of philosophical interest in mechanisms, an interest that has been driven both by concerns with the logical empiricist tradition and by the sense that a philosophy of science that attends to mechanisms will be more successful than traditional alternatives in illuminating the actual content and practice of science. In this chapter, the author surveys some of the topics discussed by the so-called new mechanists. These include the nature of mechanisms themselves, how mechanisms are discovered and represented via models, the debate over the norms of mechanistic explanation, and the relationship between mechanisms and causation.

Toothless Tiger or Roaring Lion? A Surrejoinder to Underwager and Wakefield

1992 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 295-298 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clinton E. Arnold
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Ontological Status ◽  
Logical Positivist ◽  
The New Testament ◽  
Primary Means ◽  
Remaining Capacity ◽  
Evil Spirits ◽  
New Form ◽  
Present Role

Arnold focuses on three issues in his response to Underwager and Wakefield. (a) He recognizes the clarification of their understanding of the ontological status of Satan, but takes exception to their accusation that he understands the philosophy of science exclusively in logical positivist terms. On the contrary, he points out that it is Underwager and Wakefield who have a restricted understanding of the role of worldview in relationship to the issue of evil spirits. (b) Arnold once again suggests that Underwager and Wakefield's understanding of the present role of Satan is triumphalistic and far too restricted. He especially takes issue with their contention that Satan's only remaining capacity is to lie. Arnold also stresses the responsibility of believers to actualize their new identity in Christ as the primary means of resisting the influence of Satan. (c) Finally, Arnold contends that he is presenting the New Testament concept of freedom and thereby is certainly not leading people to a new form of legalism as Underwager and Wakefield charge.

Later Empiricism and Logical Positivism

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Skorupski
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Vienna Circle ◽  
Logical Empiricism ◽  
Logical Positivism ◽  
Radical Empiricism ◽  
Modern Period ◽  
The 1950S ◽  
Late Modern

The empiricist approaches to mathematics discussed in this article belong to an era of philosophy which we can begin to see as a whole. It stretches from Kant's Critiques of the 1780s to the twentieth-century analytic movements which ended, broadly speaking, in the 1950s—in and largely as a result of the work of Quine. Seeing this period historically is by no means saying that its ideas are dead; it just helps in understanding the ideas. That applies to the two versions of empiricism that were most prominent in this late modern period: the radical empiricism of Mill and the “logical” empiricism associated with the Vienna Circle positivism of the late 1920s and early 1930s. Mill and the logical positivists shared the empiricist doctrine that no informative proposition is a priori.

scholarly journals APROXIMACIÓN EPISTEMOLÓGICA AL CONCEPTO DE CIENCIA: UNA PROPUESTA BÁSICA A PARTIR DE KUHN, POPPER, LAKATOS Y FEYERABEND

Andamios ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 4 (8) ◽  
pp. 185 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leonarda García Jiménez
Keyword(s):  
Thomas Kuhn ◽  
Imre Lakatos ◽  
Paul Feyerabend

En el siguiente artículo, se propone una aproximación al concepto de ciencia, aproximación que resulta valedera para el ámbito de lo social, históricamente menos desarrollado que el natural. Es probable que esta situación se deba, en parte, al menor grado de consenso que los científicos sociales han alcanzado en cuestiones epistemológicas fundamentales. Por ello, es el objetivo principal de este artículo desarrollar una propuesta básica para esbozar una definición conceptual genérica a partir de los su- puestos defendidos por algunos filósofos de la ciencia, concretamente, por Karl R. Popper, Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos y Paul Feyerabend.

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