competency in a narrow field of practical legal method and practical reason. Then, a philosophical argument will be appreciated, considered, evaluated and either accepted or rejected. This is not a theoretical text designed to discuss in detail the importance of a range of legal doctrines such as precedent and the crucial importance of case authority. Other texts deal with these pivotal matters and students must also carefully study these. Further, this is not a book that critiques itself or engages in a post-modern reminder that what we know and see is only a chosen, constructed fragment of what may be the truth. Although self-critique is a valid enterprise, a fragmentary understanding of ‘the whole’ is all that can ever be grasped. This is a ‘how to do’ text; a practical manual. As such, it concerns itself primarily with the issues set out below: How to … (a) develop an awareness of the importance of understanding the influence and power of language; (b) read and understand texts talking about the law; (c) read and understand texts of law (law cases; legislation (in the form of primary legislation or secondary, statutory instruments, bye-laws, etc), European Community legislation (in the form of regulations, directives)); (d) identify, construct and evaluate legal arguments; (e) use texts about the law and texts of the law to construct arguments to produce plausible solutions to problems (real or hypothetical, in the form of essays, case studies, questions, practical problems); (f) make comprehensible the interrelationships between cases and statutes, disputes and legal rules, primary and secondary texts; (g) search for intertextual pathways to lay bare the first steps in argument identification; (h) identify the relationship of the text being read to those texts produced before or after it; (i) write legal essays and answer problem questions; (j) deal with European influence on English law. The chapters are intended to be read, initially, in order as material in earlier chapters will be used to reinforce points made later. Indeed, all the chapters are leading to the final two chapters which concentrate on piecing together a range of skills and offering solutions to legal problems. See Figure 1.1, below, which details the structure of the book. There is often more than one solution to a legal problem. Judges make choices when attempting to apply the law. The study of law is about critiquing the choices made, as well as critiquing the rules themselves. However, individual chapters can also be looked at in isolation by readers seeking to understand specific issues such as how to read a law report (Chapter 4) or how to begin to construct an argument (Chapter 7). The material in this book has been used by access to law students, LLB students and at Masters level to explain and reinforce connections between texts in the construction of argument to non-law students beginning study of law subjects.

2012 ◽  
pp. 16-16

9 SUMMARY This chapter has been concerned with introducing, in some depth, common law/ case law, the second major source of English legal rules discussed in this book. The role of the judiciary in the development of English law has become apparent as the chapter has progressed. This chapter has also indicated the central importance of a careful dissection of the law reports to ensure that the correct aspects of the case are correctly summarised for a case note and further use. Taken together with Chapter 3, the foundations of an indispensable ‘how to’ approach have been laid. It is now appropriate in the next chapter to place this foundation in its European context looking at the law relating to European human rights and fundamental freedoms and the law relating to the European Community. In Chapter 9, three sources of English law (legislation, case law and European Community law) are further developed by being brought together in a case study. 4.10 FURTHER READING As already mentioned in Chapter 3, if you are a law student the ground covered by this chapter will also be covered in English legal system courses and constitutional or public law courses. Coverage of reading cases can be found in the following excellent texts relating to both the theoretical and practical aspects of legal method. • Sychin, C, Legal Method, 1999, London: Sweet & Maxwell, Chapters 7 and 8. • Twining, W and Miers, D, How To Do Things With Rules, 4th edn, 1999, London: Butterworths, Chapters 7 and 8.

2012 ◽  
pp. 126-126

Legal Studies ◽  
1983 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 315-333 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. R. Harris

There is no agreed definition of socio-legal studies: some use the term broadly to cover the study of law in its social context, but I prefer to use it to refer to the study of the law and legal institutions from the perspectives of the social sciences (viz all the social sciences – not only sociology). The last decade has seen many developments in this enterprise. Many younger academic lawyers became dissatisfied with the traditional type of legal scholarship, which concentrated on the internal consistency of the law and the inter-relationship of different legal rules. They showed great interest in studying the realities of the law in action, the social effects of law and the relationship of law to wider questions of social structure, and naturally turned to the social sciences for assistance.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-29
Author(s):  
Jette Steen Knudsen ◽  
Jeremy Moon

We investigate the relationship of corporate social responsibility (CSR) (often assumed to reflect corporate voluntarism) and government (often assumed to reflect coercion). We distinguish two broad perspectives on the CSR and government relationship: the dichotomous (i.e., government and CSR are / should be independent of one another) and the related (i.e., government and CSR are / should be interconnected). Using typologies of CSR public policy and of CSR and the law, we present an integrated framework for corporate discretion for engagement with public policy for CSR. We make four related contributions. First, we explain the dichotomous and the related perspectives with reference to their various assumptions and analyses. Second, we demonstrate that public policy for CSR and corporate discretion coexist and interact. Specifically, we show, third, that public policy for CSR can inform and stimulate corporate discretion and, fourth, that corporations have discretion for CSR, particularly as to how corporations engage with such policy.


Author(s):  
James Gordley

‘Classical’ contract law was built on a substantive premise about contract law and two premises about legal method. The substantive premise was voluntaristic: the business of contract law is to enforce the will or choice of the parties. The first methodological premise was positivistic: the law is found, implicitly or explicitly, in the decisions of common law judges. The second methodological premise was conceptualistic: the law should be stated in general formulas which can be tested by their coherence. Finally, ‘classical’ contract law reflected an attitude about how best to steer a course — as every legal system must — between strict rules and equitable considerations. Since the early twentieth century, classical contract law has been breaking down. Allegiance to its premises has weakened as has the preference for rigor. At the same time, scholars have found classical law to be inconsistent even in its own terms. Nevertheless, much of it has remained in place faute de mieux while contemporary jurists have tried to see what is really at stake in particular legal problems. This article describes their work.


Author(s):  
W. F. Foster

The relationship of state sovereignty and the jurisdiction of international tribunals presents one of the main problems in the law of international adjudication. Submission to the jurisdiction of a tribunal implies a partial surrender of sovereignty. The extent of the surrender may be said to be proportionate to the degree of discretion open to the tribunal concerned when deciding a case submitted to it. The present study will deal with an important aspect of this judicial freedom of determination, namely, the extent to which the World Court can seek to discover the facts and circumstances of a dispute independently of the evidence and information brought before it voluntarily by the parties.


Author(s):  
Cathleen Kaveny

This chapter grapples with the evolving and sometimes contradictory ways in which Paul Ramsey approaches secular law in his efforts to work out the relationship of love and justice. Over the course of three decades, Ramsey moves from treating the law as a rich locus of insight on the concrete requirements of that relationship, to viewing the law a more or less neutral field ripe for the application of Christian norms, to depicting law as the menacing subject of a hostile takeover by secular liberal values. The chapter contends that this last stage is a harbinger of the legal strategy used by socially conservative culture warriors in later decades. It also argues that Ramsey never fully confronts the question of how law should respond to the phenomenon of human sinfulness.


2014 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul R. McCuistion ◽  
Colin Warner ◽  
Francois P. Viljoen

This article maintained that the historicity of Jesus’ baptism was intended to flesh out the righteousness of God that was well-documented in the Hebrew Scriptures. Furthermore, the historical event initiated the ontological emphasis on the relationship of baptism to righteousness. To support this proposal, this article focused on Matthew’s fulfilment statement in Matthew 3:15. Looking specifically at this verse within its context, the article examines what Matthew may have intended for his community to grasp regarding the Christian tradition of righteousness. The article is divided into four sections that are intended to examine Matthew’s intentions. Firstly, the immediate context is examined, showing the influences and setting for the fulfilment statement. The following section explores the fulfilment statement within this context. The third section uncovers some of the theological traditions in Paul and the church fathers. Finally, the baptismal statement of Matthew 3:15 will be tied directly to the relationship of the law and righteousness in Matthew’s ἦλθον statement of Matthew 5:17. Hierdie artikel betoog dat die historiese waarheid van Jesus se doop bedoel was om die geregtigheid van God, wat volledig uiteengesit is in die Hebreeuse Bybel, te versterk. Verder het die historiese gebeurtenis die ontologiese klem op die verhouding van die doop tot geregtigheid geïnisieer. Om hierdie voorstel te ondersteun, fokus hierdie artikel op Matteus se verklaring van verwesenliking (Mat 3:15). Deur spesifiek na hierdie vers binne sy konteks te kyk, ondersoek die artikel wat Matteus moontlik beplan het sodat sy gemeenskap die Christelike tradisie van geregtigheid kon begryp. Die artikel is in vier afdelings verdeel om sodoende Matteus se bedoelings te ondersoek. Eerstens word die onmiddellike konteks ondersoek wat die invloede en agtergrond van die verklaring van die verwesenliking uitwys. In die volgende afdeling word die verklaring van die verwesenliking in hierdie konteks verken. In die derde afdeling word ’n paar van die teologiese tradisies van Paulus en die kerkvaders aan die lig gebring. Ten slotte is die doopverklaring van Matteus 3:15 regstreeks aan die verhouding van reg en geregtigheid in Mattheus se ἦλθον verklaring van Matteus 5:17 gekoppel.


2000 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-58 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bryant G. Garth

Celebrations of the career of Willard Hurst tend to concentrate, quite understandably, on his scholarship in legal history. Most of those who now read and comment on his works are professional legal historians, and they tend to read and define Hurst according to that professional identification. This article takes a different approach, concentrating on Hurst's own role in the more general politics of legal scholarship. Hurst was not content with making a mark in legal history. He sought to challenge the legal establishment. We see the legacy of his efforts in the development of the field of law and social science, institutionalized in the mid 1960s in the Law and Society Association (LSA). Therefore, my focus is on the sociology and politics of scholarship rather than on intellectual history. I will not examine the relationship of Hurst's particular works to those who came before or after him, nor will I go through the exercise of suggesting what was good or lasting or useful about his work for present purposes.


In a footnote to my paper entitled “ The Law of Distribution where one of the Phases possesses Mechanical Rigidity," I attempted to show how the results obtained by Professor Trouton for the absorption of water vapour by cotton could be reconciled with those obtained by me in the case of similar systems, such as carbon dioxide and amorphous carbon. As the apparatus I had employed in the investigation referred to was particularly suited to the accurate measurement of low pressures, I obtained Professor Trouton’s permission to repeat his work, and to investigate the relationship of pressure and concentration for the systems water-cotton and water-wool at the temperature of melting ice. I was particularly anxious to redetermine the lower portions of the curves, for as in Professor Trouton’s experiments the material was dried at the air temperature, it appeared probable that it contained water at the commencement of the experiment, and that the true origin of his curves lay further to the left than the results appeared to show. If this were the case, the true curve representing equilibrium in the system water-cotton might closely resemble those representing equilibrium in the system carbon dioxide and amorphous carbon.


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