scholarly journals Better out than in: why barriers to exit matter for competition law and policy

2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 42-46
Author(s):  
Matthew Johnson

The issue of barriers to exit has been neglected by competition authorities and by competition policy research. This is somewhat surprising as it is a topic which goes to the heart of why competition policy exists; if barriers to exit prevent or delay inefficient firms from leaving the market, then the normal competitive process of driving up market efficiency is hampered. This in turn reduces the benefits to other, more efficient firms, and to customers in terms of lower prices, better quality, etc. This article explores the reasons why, despite the importance of barriers to exit in the economic framework that underpins competition policy, very few competition authority decisions discuss the issue. It considers the approach to barriers to exit in different types of competition investigation, such as merger assessment, Article 101 and 102 TFEU cases, and State aid. The article also considers the scope for cross-disciplinary research and collaboration, such as in the design of insolvency or bankruptcy laws.

Author(s):  
Eleanor M. Fox ◽  
Mor Bakhoum

This chapter explores the core and limits of competition law and policy in terms of the values of inclusive development and poverty alleviation in sub-Saharan Africa. A pro-outsider, pro-inclusive development antitrust policy would value a free and open marketplace without privilege or favor. This perspective is especially critical for African nations and market players without economic power and especially for those populations in societies ruled by a few privileged families or firms, or by autocrats. Pro-outsider competition policy may be implemented not only through competition law enforcement of manageable rules and standards but also through advocacy by the competition authority with partners such as the World Bank, and collaboration with neighbors. The elements of good policy form an interdependent virtuous circle.


Author(s):  
Louis Kaplow

Throughout the world, the rule against price fixing is competition law's most important and least controversial prohibition. Yet there is far less consensus than meets the eye on what constitutes price fixing, and prevalent understandings conflict with the teachings of oligopoly theory that supposedly underlie modern competition policy. This book offers a fresh, in-depth exploration of competition law's horizontal agreement requirement, presents a systematic analysis of how best to address the problem of coordinated oligopolistic price elevation, and compares the resulting direct approach to the orthodox prohibition. The book elaborates the relevant benefits and costs of potential solutions, investigates how coordinated price elevation is best detected in light of the error costs associated with different types of proof, and examines appropriate sanctions. Existing literature devotes remarkably little attention to these key subjects and instead concerns itself with limiting penalties to certain sorts of interfirm communications. Challenging conventional wisdom, the book shows how this circumscribed view is less well grounded in the statutes, principles, and precedents of competition law than is a more direct, functional proscription. More important, by comparison to the communications-based prohibition, the book explains how the direct approach targets situations that involve both greater social harm and less risk of chilling desirable behavior—and is also easier to apply.


This book presents a new stage in the contributions of the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) to the development of Competition Law and policy. These countries have significant influence in their respective regions and in the world. The changing global environment means greater political and economic role for the BRICS and other emerging countries. BRICS countries are expected to contribute nearly half of all global gross domestic product growth by 2020. For more than a century, the path of Competition Law has been defined by the developed and industrialized countries of the world. Much later, developing countries and emerging economies came on the scene. They experience many of the old competition problems, but they also experience new problems, and experience even the old problems differently. Where are the fora to talk about Competition Law and policy fit for developing and emerging economies? The contributors in this book are well-known academic and practising economists and lawyers from both developed and developing countries. The chapters begin with a brief introduction of the topic, followed by a critical discussion and a conclusion. Accordingly, each chapter is organized around a central argument made by its author(s) in relation to the issue or case study discussed. These arguments are thoughtful, precise, and very different from each another. Each chapter is written to be a valuable freestanding contribution to our collective wisdom. The set of case studies as a whole helps to build a collection of different perspectives on competition policy.


2019 ◽  
pp. 413-440 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Francis

The development of international systems for the coordination and constraint of competition law and policy offers a complex blend of rewards and costs. In this chapter, I evaluate the promises and problems of this endeavor in the realms of government procurement, antitrust, and the regulation of state-owned enterprises, and outline some options for internationalization in this area and some of their respective implications. I argue that, in a field dominated by deep conflicts of value and interest, real progress will require creativity and pluralism in the forms and tools of internationalization. I emphasize the importance of regionalism as a complement to multilateralism and bilateralism; frameworks of contingent cooperation as a complement to traditional treaties and networks; and a mixed strategy of linkage to, and separation from, international trade to ensure that jurisdictions are able to pursue their shared goals.


Author(s):  
Nigel Foster

This chapter discusses EU competition law. It covers the basic outline of EU competition policy; Article 101 TFEU; Article 101(2) TFEU and the consequence of a breach; Article 101(3) TFEU exemptions; Article 102 TFEU and the abuse of a dominant position; the relationship between Arts 101 and 102 TFEU; the enforcement of EU competition law; conflict of EU and national law, state aid; and EU merger control.


Equilibrium ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-89
Author(s):  
Mateusz Błachucki ◽  
Rafał Stankiewicz

The paper addresses the issue of legal issues of competition policy during the economic crisis. During the economic crisis public authorities are forced to redefine the aims of public policies and harmonize them. The paper aims at identifying spheres, where competition policy is limited by other public policies. First, the problem of crisis cartels and their admissibility under competition law is discussed. It is followed by the presentation of the exemptions to the general prohibition of anticompetitive mergers. Last but not least, the temporary framework for state aid in the UE is presented. It has been argued that during the economic crisis public authorities use peculiar legal instruments of competition policy to address problems arising from the crisis. Whenever it is possible reference to the case law is made in order to present the application of presented problems in practice.


2021 ◽  
pp. 588-612
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey

Oligopoly exists where a few firms between them supply all or most of the goods or services on a market without any of them having a clear ascendancy over the others. The purpose of this chapter is to examine whether oligopoly presents a particular problem for competition policy and, if so, how that problem should be overcome. The chapter discusses the theory of oligopolistic interdependence and how oligopolies can lead to a well-known problem for competition law and policy: oligopolists are able, by virtue of the characteristics of the market, to behave in a parallel manner and to derive benefits from their collective market power without, or without necessarily, entering into an agreement or concerted practice of the kind generally prohibited by competition law. This phenomenon is known in economics as ‘tacit collusion’ and is the result of each firm’s individual and rational response to market conditions. The chapter identifies possible ways of dealing with the ‘oligopoly problem’, before considering the extent to which Articles 101 and 102 can be used to address that problem. The chapter also discusses UK law and, in particular, the possible use of the market investigations to address market failure that may arise in oligopolies.


2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 78-88
Author(s):  
Noel Beale ◽  
Paschalis Lois

The Trade and Cooperation Agreement broadly sets out the nature of the relationship contemplated between UK and EU competition law and policy following Brexit. The question is whether the UK will capitalize on its newfound discretion to deviate its competition policy from the EU in the future. This article considers some of the potential new directions that might be taken within the UK's competition law landscape, specifically in relation to merger control, antitrust and subsidy control. It explores some of the problems and opportunities created in the wake of Brexit, as well as the legal and practical ramifications of future divergences between UK and EU competition policy. Furthermore, it considers how the Competition and Markets Authority may fare in enforcing new policy, as well as its potential interactions with regimes both within and outside the EU.


2016 ◽  
Vol 61 (4) ◽  
pp. 494-497
Author(s):  
Peter C. Carstensen

The relationship between law including competition policy and the goal of advancing innovation and entrepreneurship is complex. Bert Foer’s chapter identifies the many ways that competition law and policy directly and indirectly can affect positively or negatively the advancement of that goal. The comment seeks to highlight that range and complexity by using the categories from the traditional I-O Paradigm to show where and how antitrust law and policies it seeks to advance can be used to shape the conditions, structure, and conduct in markets to facilitate outcomes that will advance the public interest in innovation and entrepreneurship.


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