scholarly journals El Derecho ante las emergencias ordinarias. El confuso marco jurídico actual y una propuesta para su ordenación.

Author(s):  
Javier MORENO GARCÍA

LABURPENA: Babes zibileko eskubide tradizionala, larrialdi oso larri eta katastrofikoetara zuzenduta dagoena, oso desberdinak diren larrialdien erregulazioa eta kudeaketa hartzen ari da bere gain. Larrialdi berezi horiek egunez egun gertatzen dira, gizarte baten edo pertsona-talde baten ohiko funtzionamendua aldatu gabe; larrialdi arrunt deritze. Lan honek emaitza horretara eraman duen prozesua deskribatzen du, arau-bilakaera eta Konstituzio Auzitegiaren jurisprudentzia ugaria aztertuz, bai babes zibilari dagokionez, bai larrialdiak arautzen dituzten araudi sektorialei dagokienez. Horren ondoren, proposatzen da babes zibileko eskubideak larrialdi larrienei soilik zuzenduta egon behar duela, aparteko erantzun juridikoa behar duelako, eta ohiko larrialdien aurrean administrazio publiko guztien erantzuna bermatu eta koordinatzera bideratutako diziplina bat eraiki behar dela, argi eta garbi bereizita laguntza-zerbitzua zuzenean ematetik, zeina, alderdi desberdinetan, administrazio sektorialei baitagokie: osasungintza, suhiltzaileak, poliziak edo salbamendua eta erreskatea lehorreko, itsasoko eta aireko eremuetan. Biak, ohiz kanpoko larrialdiak eta larrialdi arruntak, diziplina zabalagoan biltzen dira, zuzenbide konparatu aurreratuenak larrialdiak kudeatzeko eskubide gisa deitzen duen diziplinan, alegia. ABSTRACT: The traditional Law on civil protection aimed at the severe or catastrophic emergencies is taking up the regulation and management of some other different emergencies, those that happen from the day to day without altering the functioning of a society or a group of persons, the so called ordinary emergencies. This work describes the process that has led to this result by means of the analysis of the normative evolution and the rich case law of the Constitutional Court, both with reference to the area of the civil protection and to the sector-specific regulations on emergencies. After that, it is advanced the proposal that the Law on civil protection be exclusively aimed at the most severe emergencies given the extraordinary legal response that require and that a legal discipline is created to ensure and coordinate the response by all public administrations in the face of ordinary emergencies, crearly differentiated from the direct provision of assistance that in their different facets corresponds to sector-specific administrations: health, firemen, police, rescue services in the field of land, sea and air. Both, severe and ordinary emergencies, are assembled in a broader legal branch of study called by the most advanced Comparative law Emergency Management Law. RESUMEN: El tradicional derecho de protección civil, dirigido a las emergencias muy graves y catastróficas, está asumiendo la regulación y gestión de otro tipo de emergencias muy distintas, las que día a día acontecen sin alterar el ordinario funcionamiento de una sociedad o colectivo de personas, denominadas emergencias ordinarias. Este trabajo describe el proceso que ha conducido a este resultado a través del análisis de la evolución normativa y de la abundante jurisprudencia del Tribunal Constitucional, tanto en relación con la materia protección civil, como con las normativas sectoriales que regulan las emergencias. Tras ello, se formula la propuesta de que el derecho de protección civil siga exclusivamente dirigido a las emergencias más graves, dada la extraordinaria respuesta jurídica que requieren, y que se construya una disciplina dedicada a garantizar y coordinar la respuesta de todas las administraciones públicas ante las emergencias ordinarias, claramente diferenciada de la directa prestación del servicio de auxilio que, en sus distintas faceta, compete a las administraciones sectoriales: sanitaria, bomberos, policías o salvamento y rescate en los ámbitos de tierra, mar y aire. Ambas, emergencias extraordinarias y ordinarias, se agrupan en una disciplina más amplia denominada por el derecho comparado más avanzado como derecho de gestión de emergencias.

2021 ◽  
Vol 4(165) ◽  
pp. 159-174
Author(s):  
Katarzyna Dębińska-Domagała

Among the rich and diverse scientific activities conducted by Henryk Cioch, foundation law occupies a special place. This subject matter became the focus of the Professor’s interest since the Law on Foundations came into force. A characteristic feature of his work was a critical and innovative approach to statutory provisions regulating the functioning of the foundation. The whole scientific output of Henryk Cioch allows us to conclude that he postulated the need for a reform of foundation law. The purpose of this article is to analyse the views expressed by Henryk Cioch on the necessity to make the necessary amendments to the existing text of the Law on Foundations. It is, first of all, an indication of those de lege ferenda postulates put forward by the Professor, which have been included either in the hitherto amendments to the Law on Foundations or reflected in the case-law. The analysis contained in this article will focus on the key problems of foundation law, which according to Henryk Cioch were: the concept and types of foundations, the establishment of foundations, the system of foundations and supervision over their activities, transformation and abolition of foundations.


Author(s):  
Pál Sonnevend

AbstractModern constitutionalism is based on the paradigm that courts are inherently entitled and obliged to enforce the constitution of the respective polity. This responsibility of courts also applies in the context of the European Union to both the CJEU and national constitutional courts. The present chapter argues that in the face of constitutional crises the CJEU and the Hungarian Constitutional Court shy away from applying the law as it is to the full. The reasons behind this unwarranted judicial self-restraint are most different: the CJEU aims to avoid conflicts with national constitutional courts whereas the Hungarian Constitutional Court has been facing a legislative power also acting as constitution making power willing to amend the constitution to achieve specific legislative purposes or to undo previous constitutional court decisions. Yet both courts respond to expediencies that do not follow from the law they are called upon to apply. It is argued that rule of law backsliding requires these courts to abandon the unnecessary self-restraint and exploit the means already available.


2004 ◽  
Vol 5 (12) ◽  
pp. 1499-1520 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peer Zumbansen

On 14 October 2004, theBundesverfassungsgericht(BVerfG – German Federal Constitutional Court) voided a decision by theOberlandesgericht(Higher Regional Court) Naumburg, finding a violation of the complainant's rights guaranteed by theGrundgesetz(German Basic Law). The Decision directly addresses both the observation and application of case law from the European Court of Human Rights under the Basic Law's “rule of law provision” in Art. 20.III. While there is a myriad of important aspects with regard to this decision, we may limit ourselves at this point to the introductoryaperçucontained in the holdings of the case. One of them reads as follows:Zur Bindung an Gesetz und Recht (Art. 20 Abs. 3 GG) gehört die Berücksichtigung der Gewährleistungen der Konvention zum Schutze der Menschenrechte und Grundfreiheiten und der Entscheidungen des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte im Rahmen methodisch vertretbarer Gesetzesauslegung. Sowohl die fehlende Auseinandersetzung mit einer Entscheidung des Gerichtshofs als auch deren gegen vorrangiges Recht verstoßende schematische “Vollstreckung” können gegen Grundrechte in Verbindung mit dem Rechtsstaatsprinzip verstoßen


2016 ◽  
Vol 24 ◽  
pp. 14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kerttu Mäger

The paper was written to analyse the enforceability of the judgements of the European Court of Human Rights in Russia, particularly in light of recent amendments to the Law on the Constitutional Court and relevant case law of the Constitutional Court of Russia. Article 46 of the European Convention on Human Rights, obliging member states to execute the judgements of the European Court of Human Rights, does not leave room for ‘cherry-picking’ in enforcing the judgements. However, the Constitutional Court has suggested that Russian authorities should indeed engage in cherry-picking and may refuse to enforce judgements that are not in accordance with the Russian Constitution as interpreted by the Constitutional Court. In December 2015, the Russian parliament amended the Law on the Constitutional Court so as to empower said court to declare judgements of the European Court of Human Rights unenforceable when implementation would be in conflict with the Constitution of Russia. The paper discusses the background of these developments and alternatives for overcoming the conflict between domestic legislation and the instruments of the Council of Europe.


Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 186-193
Author(s):  
Mpho Paulus Bapela ◽  
Phillip Lesetja Monyamane

On the face of it, section 3 of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 (RCMA) does not look ominous. Notwithstanding the plain language of the above provision, there is abundant case law and academic articles dealing with the interpretation and/or application of section 3(1)(b) in particular. A decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) in Mbungela v Mkabi ((820/2018) [2019] ZASCA 134) adds to what is fast becoming a jurisprudence of the salient issues relating to the understanding of paragraph (b) of subsection (1). The issue of the scope of this paragraph has become more relevant in the inquiry into the transfer and/or integration of the bride into the groom’s family pursuant to the conclusion of a lobolo agreement. In his latest academic offering, Manthwa introduces this ongoing Achilles heel of customary marriages by referencing a number of cases and academic opinions; the references serve to justify the relevance of his work in the presence of so much jurisprudence on the topic. It is prudent to highlight also that Bakker provided an insightful criticism of the court a quo in Mkabe v Minister of Home Affairs ((2014/84704) [2016] ZAGPPHC 460). On the whole, it is argued here that the judgment of the SCA is incorrect in a few material respects and that the criticism by Bakker of the court a quo is legally sound and contributes meaningfully to the jurisprudence in this area.As this case note demonstrates, the SCA not only incorrectly interprets and applies the law, but the judgment also unjustifiably departs from precedents relating to the transfer and/or integration of the bride. In effect therefore, it is submitted, the SCA establishes a changeable attitude relating to the transfer and/or integration of the bride. This attitude is symptomatic of an apparent constitutional interpretation that desires a specific outcome almost at any cost. As such, this case note is relevant as it captures the latest instalment of the changing attitude towards the precepts of the transfer and/or integration of the bride. Thus, there is as much a need for continuous monitoring of this revolving door of interpretation and/or application as there is for cases dealing with this aspect. The matter is therefore considered as unsettled and merits ongoing academic discourse.This issue of unsettled law finds resonance in the pronouncements of the Constitutional Court in Bhe v Magistrate, Khayelitsha ([2004] ZACC 17 par 112).In light of the foregoing, the casuistic and often contradictory jurisdiction on the issue of transfer and/or integration of the bride is considered in the context of the constitutional injunction in terms of section 39(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution) and the facts of the case in Mbungela v Mkabi (supra).


Author(s):  
Rosario Mora Alemañy

«Los españoles son iguales ante la ley» (art. 14 CE). La recentísima STC 17/2013 señala que «los extranjeros gozan en España del derecho fundamental derivado del artículo 18.4 CE en las mismas condiciones que los españoles»; pero, como señala el voto particular del Magistrado Pérez Tremps, al que se unen otros tres magistrados, la regulación avalada por el Tribunal Constitucional en esta sentencia «pone de manifiesto una notable limitación del contenido esencial del derecho fundamental a la protección de los datos personales (art. 18.4) que, por afectar sólo a personas de origen extranjero, lleva a la conclusión de que los extranjeros ya no gozan en España del derecho fundamental derivado del artículo 18.4 CE en las mismas condiciones que los españoles». Esta sentencia, pues, invita a precisar el alcance con el que la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Constitucional reconoce la igualdad también para los extranjeros.«Spaniards are equal before the law» (section 14 of the Spanish Constitution). The latest Constitutional Court ruling states that «aliens in Spain have the fundamental right set by section 18.4 of the Spanish Constitution under the same conditions that Spanish citizens». But the dissenting vote of the senior judge Pérez Tremps, joined by other three judges, appoints that the guidelines backed up by the Constitutional Court in this ruling «show a great restriction of the essential subject of the fundamental right about the protection of personal data (section 18.4). Because only alien citizens are affected by this ruling, it is concluded that alien citizens in Spain enjoy no more the fundamental right set by section 18.4 under the same conditions that Spanish citizens». This ruling invites to specify the extent with which Constitutional Court case law acknowledges equality for aliens, too.


Author(s):  
Anahit Manasyan ◽  

The article considers the issues with regard to the direct effect of the Constitution. The topic is presented by analyzing the techniques for proper implementation of the Constitution and ensuring the constitutionality of the law enforcement/judicial practice. Author differentiates the content of the concepts „direct effect” and “direct implementation” of the Constitution, presenting the essence of each of the notions. Techniques for proper implementation of constitutional norms are suggested by the author, analyzing also the implementation priority rules. According to the author implementing legislative provisions in conformity with their constitutionallegal content is another precondition for ensuring the proper application of the Constitution. The law enforcement/judicial practice can become a subject of consideration by the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Armenia if itis not an issue of legitimacy of the mentioned practice, but an issue of constitutionality of the latter, an issue of evaluation of the circumstance whether the legal acts are implemented in conformity with their constitutional-legal content in the frames of the mentioned practice is raised.


2021 ◽  
Vol 138 (3) ◽  
pp. 477-500
Author(s):  
Michael Tsele

This note concerns a controversial issue that has, surprisingly, received limited academic interrogation: whether the Public Protector has the power to instruct the President of South Africa to appoint a commission of inquiry. In this respect, I critique a high court decision which answered the question in the affirmative. I contend that the judgment contradicts prior case law, including Constitutional Court precedent. Thus, I argue that the court misconstrued the law on the President’s powers, particularly when it concluded that those powers are not purely discretionary but entail ‘responsibilities’ which are ‘coupled with a duty’. This reasoning led the court to conclude that the President thus has a constitutional ‘obligation’ to appoint a commission. In summary, I take issue with the court’s conclusion that the Public Protector has the power to instruct the President to appoint a commission of inquiry. I conclude that the decision caused uncertainty on the limitations of the Public Protector’s powers. I further say it is questionable whether the commission, better known as the ‘State Capture’ commission, was established lawfully.


2015 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 100-120 ◽  
Author(s):  
Audrey J. Golden

During the three years in which Gordimer drafted The House Gun (1998), she relied heavily on South African case law, international jurisprudence, and the discerning editorial eye of Nelson Mandela’s lawyer, George Bizos. As such, my reading of The House Gun brings new attention to the novel’s engagement with the reconciliatory efforts of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the juridical work of the South African Constitutional Court to redefine the terms of reconciliation in the country. Through language in a fictional courtroom, Gordimer’s novel turns the process of repair into one that is always immediate and ongoing. It shifts the primarily retributive focus of the law into a reparative and open-ended endeavor. Justice no longer is something that “is done,” Gordimer explains, but rather is a process equally conceived by law and literature. The novel depicts harm in terms of the interpersonal, spatial, and legal fractures it creates. In this way, it expresses reconciliation in the Commission’s language of bridging an injurious past with a present always open to healing.


The publication is dedicated to the Constitutional Court of Ukraine’s decision, which paralyzed the National Agency’s critical activities for preventing corruption and declared unconstitutional criminal liability for knowingly false declarations. The decision caused a considerable resonance, as the declared reasons for its adoption were insufficient to admit that the crucial provisions of the Law ‘On Prevention of Corruption’ regarding electronic asset declaration, financial control, and lifestyle monitoring are entirely unconstitutional. The decision’s circumstances indicate that the judges ignored the apparent conflict of interest and made an unjustified departure from the previous case-law. Simultaneously, the reaction of crucial state bodies to this decision may cause a constitutional crisis rather than rectify the situation. As a way out, it is proposed to amend the legislation in a constitutional manner that would unblock the agency’s activities and, at the same time, lead to greater accountability of the judiciary and the Constitutional Court.


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