scholarly journals THE NATURE OF NORMATIVE MORAL JUDGMENTS

Adam alemi ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (86) ◽  
pp. 129-135
Author(s):  
Almira Omarova
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Subject Matter ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Significant Part ◽  
Current Debate ◽  
Philosophical Issue ◽  
First Order ◽  
Moral Statement ◽  
The Subject

Moral judgements have been a crucial subject-matter of a discussion in the domain of normativity. Many thinkers argue moral judgments are necessarily action-guiding, which prescribe what one ought to do and what ought to be the case. The moral statement “killing is wrong” is prescriptive and locates in the purview of first-order ethical questions. Moral realists widely accept that moral judgments represent propositions, therefore they are subject to truth and false conditions. Thus, moral conclusions can be derived logically from valid premises. How to derive the conclusion “killing is wrong”? How to justify the statement? What does “wrong” mean in this context? This kind of philosophical issue has been labeled as the second-order questions, which is in the purview of metaethics. This article is devoted to the subject of normativity and the nature of moral judgments advocated by metaethicists David Copp and Ralph Wedgwood. The purpose of this article is to outline the current debate on the nature of normative moral judgments. In conclusion, I shall agree with both Copp and Wedgwoodon two points. One, normative moral judgment can be subject to cognition. Two, there are true and false beliefs about particular moral facts which constitute the significant part of the reality we live in.

scholarly journals “An Erring Conscience is an Absurdity”: The Later Kant on Certainty, Moral Judgment and the Infallibility of Conscience

2019 ◽  
Vol 101 (1) ◽  
pp. 92-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
Franz Knappik ◽  
Erasmus Mayr
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
On Certainty ◽  
First Order ◽  
Major Shift ◽  
Characteristic Features

Abstract This article explores Kant’s view, found in several passages in his late writings on moral philosophy, that the verdicts of conscience are infallible. We argue that Kant’s infallibility claim must be seen in the context of a major shift in Kant’s views on conscience that took place around 1790 and that has not yet been sufficiently appreciated in the literature. This shift led Kant to treat conscience as an exclusively second-order capacity which does not directly evaluate actions, but one’s first-order moral judgments and deliberation. On the basis of this novel interpretation, we develop a new defence of Kant’s infallibility claim that draws on Kant’s account of the characteristic features of specifically moral judgments.

scholarly journals ON THE SUBJECT MATTER OF MORAL PSYCHOLOGY

Reflexio ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 133-140
Author(s):  
I. V. Badiev
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Subject Matter ◽  
Psychological Research ◽  
Individual Variability ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Behavioral Component ◽  
Moral Functioning ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Individual

The article deals with the study of human moral functioning in the framework of neurobiological and psychological research. Presents the views of John. Green and John. Haidt about the nature of moral judgments. Studies of the neurobiological mechanism of moral judgment do not explain their individual variability. This question relates to the subject of psychological research. The psychological concepts of morality of L. Kohlberg and D. Forsythe are compared. It is argued that the concept of ethical positions of Foresight has an advantage, since it considers the individual variability of moral judgments from metaethical positions. The analysis of neurobiological and psychological approaches to morality concluded that they did not represent the behavioral component of moral functioning.

On the Interconnection of a Range and the Second-Order Cluster

2016 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 8-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Графский ◽  
O. Grafskiy
Keyword(s):  
Computer Graphics ◽  
Computational Geometry ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Multimedia Systems ◽  
First Order ◽  
Dual Form ◽  
Eastern State ◽  
The Subject ◽  
General Abstract ◽  
Far Eastern

In accordance with “Specialized sections of affine, projective and computational geometry” syllabus for Master’s degree program in “Multimedia systems and computer graphics” developed at the Far Eastern State Transport University, the subject “Projective theory of the second-order curves” is considered [4; 14; 18]. Both at the sources mentioned and the textbook [11] projective method of the second-order curves formation as a range of the second order and its dual form – a second-order cluster (with regard to well-known theorems and relations, including Pascal and Brianchon theorems) is discernible. However, the graphical interpretations represented at the sources mentioned have general abstract character: to form the secondorder range two projective clusters of the first-order with the corresponding right lines are defined, and to design the second-order range – two projective series with the corresponding points. Techniques of high value can be observed when constructing outlines with the second-order curves; in this case, depending on engineering discriminant values, these curves can be constructed both using Pascal lines and qualities of the engineering discriminant itself, that is paying attention to the fact that tangents to the second-order curves makes the second-order cluster. Naturally, intent arises not to set the corresponding points on projective ranges, but to get them by elaboration, disclosing upon that regularities when constructing different second-order curves (the first aspect of research). The second aspect is in the consider - ation of the particular cases which would have definite secondorder clusters. In this case the task would be to model the secondorder range as a dual form of cluster. Thus it would be possible to get the interconnection of the definite cluster and the second-order cluster.

Moral Severity is Represented as a Domain-General Magnitude

2017 ◽  
Vol 64 (2) ◽  
pp. 142-147 ◽  
Author(s):  
Derek Powell ◽  
Zachary Horne
Keyword(s):  
Response Times ◽  
Distance Effect ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Congruity Effect ◽  
Semantic Congruity ◽  
First Order ◽  
Psychological Theories ◽  
Preliminary Study ◽  
Semantic Congruity Effect

Abstract. The severity of moral violations can vary by degree. For instance, although both are immoral, murder is a more severe violation than lying. Though this point is well established in Ethics and the law, relatively little research has been directed at examining how moral severity is represented psychologically. Most prominent moral psychological theories are aimed at explaining first-order moral judgments and are silent on second-order metaethical judgments, such as comparisons of severity. Here, the relative severity of 20 moral violations was established in a preliminary study. Then, a second group of participants were asked to decide which of two moral violations was more severe for all possible combinations of these 20 violations. Participant’s response times exhibited two signatures of domain-general magnitude comparisons: we observed both a distance effect and a semantic congruity effect. These findings suggest that moral severity is represented in a similar fashion as other continuous magnitudes.

MORALITIES ARE A SIGN-LANGUAGE OF THE AFFECTS

2013 ◽  
Vol 30 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 237-258 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian Leiter
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Sign Language ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Affective Response ◽  
Affective Responses ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Sign Languages ◽  
The Subject

AbstractThis essay offers an interpretation and partial defense of Nietzsche's idea that moralities and moral judgments are “sign-languages” or “symptoms” of our affects, that is, of our emotions or feelings. According to Nietzsche, as I reconstruct his view, moral judgments result from the interaction of two kinds of affective responses: first, a “basic affect” of inclination toward or aversion from certain acts, and then a further affective response (the “meta-affect”) to that basic affect (that is, sometimes we can be either inclined towards or averted from our basic affects). I argue that Nietzsche views basic affects as noncognitive, that is, as identifiable solely by how they feel to the subject who experiences the affect. By contrast, I suggest that meta-affects (I focus on guilt and shame) sometimes incorporate a cognitive component like belief. After showing how this account of moral judgment comports with a reading of Nietzsche's moral philosophy that I have offered in previous work, I conclude by adducing philosophical and empirical psychological reasons for thinking that Nietzsche's account of moral judgment is correct.

Small and Medium Enterprises' Challenges of Accessing Microfinance in Nigeria

2021 ◽  
pp. 1454-1478
Author(s):  
Atsede Woldie ◽  
Uruemuesiri Ubrurhe
Keyword(s):  
Subject Matter ◽  
Growth And Development ◽  
Small And Medium Enterprises ◽  
Technological Development ◽  
Current Debate ◽  
Medium Enterprise ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Employment Generation ◽  
Qualitative Relationship ◽  
Medium Enterprises

Despite the fact that small and medium enterprises have been viewed as a major promoter of technological development and employment generation in Nigeria, the sector has been neglected by successive governments (Gideon, 2015). This has resulted in unpalatable consequences on the economy (Gideon, 2015). The major challenge of the sector is poor funding (Afolabi & Ehinomen, 2015). Consequently, policies and efforts should be geared towards accelerating the growth and development of the sector (Afolabi & Ehinomen, 2015). According to Onwumere, (2000) a lack of funding has been a specific obstacle to investment and growth in the sector. The need to contribute to the current debate, update knowledge on the subject matter and make informed recommendations when implemented will lead to a change in fortune for the small and medium enterprise sector in the Nigerian economy which has informed this study. The chapter sets out to explore the qualitative relationship between small and medium enterprises and banks. Despite the fact that small and medium enterprises have been viewed as a major promoter of technological development and employment generation in Nigeria, the sector has been neglected by successive governments. This has resulted in unpalatable consequences on the economy. The major challenge of the sector is poor funding. Consequently, policies and efforts should be geared towards accelerating the growth and development of the sector. A lack of funding has been a specific obstacle to investment and growth in the sector. The need to contribute to the current debate, update knowledge on the subject matter and make informed recommendations when implemented will lead to a change in fortune for the small and medium enterprise sector in the Nigerian economy which has informed this study. The chapter sets out to explore the qualitative relationship between small and medium enterprises and banks.

scholarly journals The concept of epistemic justification

2002 ◽  
Vol 45 (1-4) ◽  
pp. 7-15
Author(s):  
Ivana Simic
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
Explanatory Power ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Full Account ◽  
First Order ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Knowledge Claims

The thesis of this paper is that there are two distinct notions of epistemic justification, namely, deontological and non-deontological justification that work together in a full account of epistemic justification that is necessary for knowledge. These two notions apply to different beliefs. The non-deontological justification applies to first-order beliefs, while the deontological justification applies to second-order beliefs (metabeliefs). From the external perspective, although a subject, S, needs not to have any metabeliefs that are the subject of the deontological justification in order to be said to know something, yet whenever S claims that she knows something she thereby expresses a meta-belief that is subject to deontological justification. Thus, knowledge claims that one ascribes to oneself or to others are always associated with such metabeliefs and hence with the deontological justification. If successful, this proposal would have explanatory power with respect to the clash between externalist and internalist intuitions in epistemology. It seems that these intuitions have its place and can be reconciled in one complex notion of epistemic justification.

Reconstructing Judgment: Emotion and Moral Judgment

Hypatia ◽  
1993 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 61-83 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kathleen Wallace
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Agent ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
The Subject

A traditional association of judgment with “reason” has drawn upon and reinforced an opposition between reason and emotion. This, in turn, has led to a restricted view of the nature of moral judgment and of the subject as moral agent. The alternative, I suggest, is to abandon the traditional categories and to develop a new theory of judgment. I argue that the theory of judgment developed by Justus Buchler constitutes a robust alternative which does not prejudice the case against emotion. Drawing on this theory I then develop how to conceptualize the ways in which feeling and emotion can be (or be components of) moral judgments.

Small and Medium Enterprises' Challenges of Accessing Microfinance in Nigeria

2017 ◽  
pp. 229-253
Author(s):  
Atsede Woldie ◽  
Uruemuesiri Ubrurhe
Keyword(s):  
Subject Matter ◽  
Growth And Development ◽  
Small And Medium Enterprises ◽  
Technological Development ◽  
Current Debate ◽  
Medium Enterprise ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Employment Generation ◽  
Qualitative Relationship ◽  
Medium Enterprises

Despite the fact that small and medium enterprises have been viewed as a major promoter of technological development and employment generation in Nigeria, the sector has been neglected by successive governments (Gideon, 2015). This has resulted in unpalatable consequences on the economy (Gideon, 2015). The major challenge of the sector is poor funding (Afolabi & Ehinomen, 2015). Consequently, policies and efforts should be geared towards accelerating the growth and development of the sector (Afolabi & Ehinomen, 2015). According to Onwumere, (2000) a lack of funding has been a specific obstacle to investment and growth in the sector. The need to contribute to the current debate, update knowledge on the subject matter and make informed recommendations when implemented will lead to a change in fortune for the small and medium enterprise sector in the Nigerian economy which has informed this study. The chapter sets out to explore the qualitative relationship between small and medium enterprises and banks. Despite the fact that small and medium enterprises have been viewed as a major promoter of technological development and employment generation in Nigeria, the sector has been neglected by successive governments. This has resulted in unpalatable consequences on the economy. The major challenge of the sector is poor funding. Consequently, policies and efforts should be geared towards accelerating the growth and development of the sector. A lack of funding has been a specific obstacle to investment and growth in the sector. The need to contribute to the current debate, update knowledge on the subject matter and make informed recommendations when implemented will lead to a change in fortune for the small and medium enterprise sector in the Nigerian economy which has informed this study. The chapter sets out to explore the qualitative relationship between small and medium enterprises and banks.

Metaethics

Philosophy ◽  
2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex Miller
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Subject Matter ◽  
Moral Realism ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Philosophical Study ◽  
False Response ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Moral Requirements ◽  
Moral Facts

Metaethics can be described as the philosophical study of the nature of moral judgment. It is concerned with such questions as: Do moral judgments express beliefs or rather desires and inclinations? Are moral judgments apt to be assessed in terms of truth and falsity? Do moral sentences have factual meaning? Are any moral judgments true or are they systematically and uniformly false? Is there such a thing as moral knowledge? Are moral judgments less objective than, say, judgments about the shapes and sizes of middle-sized physical objects? Is there a necessary connection between moral judgments and motivation? Are moral requirements requirements of reason? Do moral judgments have a natural or non-natural subject matter? A useful way of starting on metaethics is to distinguish between realist and non-realist views of morality. Moral realists hold that moral judgments express beliefs, and that some of those beliefs are true in virtue of mind-independent moral facts. Opposition to moral realism can take a number of forms. Expressivists deny that moral judgments express beliefs, claiming instead that they express non truth-assessable mental states such as desires or inclinations. Error theorists and (revolutionary) fictionalists claim that moral judgments are systematically false. Response-dependence views of moral judgments allow that moral judgments express beliefs and that at least some of them are true, but hold that they are true in virtue of mind-dependent moral facts. Moral realism itself comes in many varieties: reductionist, non-reductionist, naturalist, non-naturalist, internalist, externalist, analytic, and synthetic.

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