scholarly journals The concept of epistemic justification

2002 ◽  
Vol 45 (1-4) ◽  
pp. 7-15
Author(s):  
Ivana Simic

The thesis of this paper is that there are two distinct notions of epistemic justification, namely, deontological and non-deontological justification that work together in a full account of epistemic justification that is necessary for knowledge. These two notions apply to different beliefs. The non-deontological justification applies to first-order beliefs, while the deontological justification applies to second-order beliefs (metabeliefs). From the external perspective, although a subject, S, needs not to have any metabeliefs that are the subject of the deontological justification in order to be said to know something, yet whenever S claims that she knows something she thereby expresses a meta-belief that is subject to deontological justification. Thus, knowledge claims that one ascribes to oneself or to others are always associated with such metabeliefs and hence with the deontological justification. If successful, this proposal would have explanatory power with respect to the clash between externalist and internalist intuitions in epistemology. It seems that these intuitions have its place and can be reconciled in one complex notion of epistemic justification.

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mikhail Sokolov

Why do scholars pay attention to some works, and recognize the influence of their authors, but not others? The Mertonian approach suggests that scholars search for information instrumental in producing their knowledge claims and reward authors for making important contributions. The critical sociology of science approach explains recognition (e.g. in the form of citing) as rhetorical practices that strengthen one’s credibility. Both models fail to explain why academics sometimes ignore apparently relevant sources or how groups of scholars turn into bubbles, censoring information about findings made outside of them. According to the theoretical model suggested in this paper, what governs information search is not first-order relevance (what individual academics considers relevant), but second-order awareness (what they know their audiences are aware of). In this model, the search for information is mostly governed by the necessity to make successful claims of novelty – to present findings that are new to one’s audience. Individuals easily disregard findings their audiences are unaware of. Institutionally organized audiences thus serve as enforcers of information search, and their members may tacitly collaborate in maintaining unawareness of intellectual developments outside of their common attention space In the empirical part of the paper, we use the example of post-Soviet sociology to test the predictions following from this model: (1) that scarcity of enforcement results in an overall shrinking of individuals’ attention spaces, and in their attaining idiosyncratic configurations; (2) that when borders of audiences cross-cut legitimate classifications, attention spaces are shaped by the former, rather than the latter; (3) that as a reaction to such cross-cutting, new classifications are introduced, legitimizing existing inattention.


2016 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 8-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Графский ◽  
O. Grafskiy

In accordance with “Specialized sections of affine, projective and computational geometry” syllabus for Master’s degree program in “Multimedia systems and computer graphics” developed at the Far Eastern State Transport University, the subject “Projective theory of the second-order curves” is considered [4; 14; 18]. Both at the sources mentioned and the textbook [11] projective method of the second-order curves formation as a range of the second order and its dual form – a second-order cluster (with regard to well-known theorems and relations, including Pascal and Brianchon theorems) is discernible. However, the graphical interpretations represented at the sources mentioned have general abstract character: to form the secondorder range two projective clusters of the first-order with the corresponding right lines are defined, and to design the second-order range – two projective series with the corresponding points. Techniques of high value can be observed when constructing outlines with the second-order curves; in this case, depending on engineering discriminant values, these curves can be constructed both using Pascal lines and qualities of the engineering discriminant itself, that is paying attention to the fact that tangents to the second-order curves makes the second-order cluster. Naturally, intent arises not to set the corresponding points on projective ranges, but to get them by elaboration, disclosing upon that regularities when constructing different second-order curves (the first aspect of research). The second aspect is in the consider - ation of the particular cases which would have definite secondorder clusters. In this case the task would be to model the secondorder range as a dual form of cluster. Thus it would be possible to get the interconnection of the definite cluster and the second-order cluster.


Adam alemi ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (86) ◽  
pp. 129-135
Author(s):  
Almira Omarova

Moral judgements have been a crucial subject-matter of a discussion in the domain of normativity. Many thinkers argue moral judgments are necessarily action-guiding, which prescribe what one ought to do and what ought to be the case. The moral statement “killing is wrong” is prescriptive and locates in the purview of first-order ethical questions. Moral realists widely accept that moral judgments represent propositions, therefore they are subject to truth and false conditions. Thus, moral conclusions can be derived logically from valid premises. How to derive the conclusion “killing is wrong”? How to justify the statement? What does “wrong” mean in this context? This kind of philosophical issue has been labeled as the second-order questions, which is in the purview of metaethics. This article is devoted to the subject of normativity and the nature of moral judgments advocated by metaethicists David Copp and Ralph Wedgwood. The purpose of this article is to outline the current debate on the nature of normative moral judgments. In conclusion, I shall agree with both Copp and Wedgwoodon two points. One, normative moral judgment can be subject to cognition. Two, there are true and false beliefs about particular moral facts which constitute the significant part of the reality we live in.


1997 ◽  
Vol 36 (04/05) ◽  
pp. 315-318 ◽  
Author(s):  
K. Momose ◽  
K. Komiya ◽  
A. Uchiyama

Abstract:The relationship between chromatically modulated stimuli and visual evoked potentials (VEPs) was considered. VEPs of normal subjects elicited by chromatically modulated stimuli were measured under several color adaptations, and their binary kernels were estimated. Up to the second-order, binary kernels obtained from VEPs were so characteristic that the VEP-chromatic modulation system showed second-order nonlinearity. First-order binary kernels depended on the color of the stimulus and adaptation, whereas second-order kernels showed almost no difference. This result indicates that the waveforms of first-order binary kernels reflect perceived color (hue). This supports the suggestion that kernels of VEPs include color responses, and could be used as a probe with which to examine the color visual system.


2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 17-30
Author(s):  
Kelly James Clark

In Branden Thornhill-Miller and Peter Millican’s challenging and provocative essay, we hear a considerably longer, more scholarly and less melodic rendition of John Lennon’s catchy tune—without religion, or at least without first-order supernaturalisms (the kinds of religion we find in the world), there’d be significantly less intra-group violence. First-order supernaturalist beliefs, as defined by Thornhill-Miller and Peter Millican (hereafter M&M), are “beliefs that claim unique authority for some particular religious tradition in preference to all others” (3). According to M&M, first-order supernaturalist beliefs are exclusivist, dogmatic, empirically unsupported, and irrational. Moreover, again according to M&M, we have perfectly natural explanations of the causes that underlie such beliefs (they seem to conceive of such natural explanations as debunking explanations). They then make a case for second-order supernaturalism, “which maintains that the universe in general, and the religious sensitivities of humanity in particular, have been formed by supernatural powers working through natural processes” (3). Second-order supernaturalism is a kind of theism, more closely akin to deism than, say, Christianity or Buddhism. It is, as such, universal (according to contemporary psychology of religion), empirically supported (according to philosophy in the form of the Fine-Tuning Argument), and beneficial (and so justified pragmatically). With respect to its pragmatic value, second-order supernaturalism, according to M&M, gets the good(s) of religion (cooperation, trust, etc) without its bad(s) (conflict and violence). Second-order supernaturalism is thus rational (and possibly true) and inconducive to violence. In this paper, I will examine just one small but important part of M&M’s argument: the claim that (first-order) religion is a primary motivator of violence and that its elimination would eliminate or curtail a great deal of violence in the world. Imagine, they say, no religion, too.Janusz Salamon offers a friendly extension or clarification of M&M’s second-order theism, one that I think, with emendations, has promise. He argues that the core of first-order religions, the belief that Ultimate Reality is the Ultimate Good (agatheism), is rational (agreeing that their particular claims are not) and, if widely conceded and endorsed by adherents of first-order religions, would reduce conflict in the world.While I favor the virtue of intellectual humility endorsed in both papers, I will argue contra M&M that (a) belief in first-order religion is not a primary motivator of conflict and violence (and so eliminating first-order religion won’t reduce violence). Second, partly contra Salamon, who I think is half right (but not half wrong), I will argue that (b) the religious resources for compassion can and should come from within both the particular (often exclusivist) and the universal (agatheistic) aspects of religious beliefs. Finally, I will argue that (c) both are guilty, as I am, of the philosopher’s obsession with belief. 


GEOgraphia ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 10 (19) ◽  
pp. 103
Author(s):  
Alexandre Domingues Ribas ◽  
Antonio Carlos Vitte

Resumo: Há um relativo depauperamento no tocante ao nosso conhecimento a respeito da relação entre a filosofia kantiana e a constituição da geografia moderna e, conseqüentemente, científica. Esta relação, quando abordada, o é - vezes sem conta - de modo oblíquo ou tangencial, isto é, ela resta quase que exclusivamente confinada ao ato de noticiar que Kant ofereceu, por aproximadamente quatro décadas, cursos de Geografia Física em Königsberg, ou que ele foi o primeiro filósofo a inserir esta disciplina na Universidade, antes mesmo da criação da cátedra de Geografia em Berlim, em 1820, por Karl Ritter. Não ultrapassar a pueril divulgação deste ato em si mesma só nos faz jogar uma cortina sobre a ausência de um discernimento maior acerca do tributo de Kant àfundamentação epistêmica da geografia moderna e científica. Abrir umafrincha nesta cortina denota, necessariamente, elucidar o papel e o lugardo “Curso de Geografia Física” no corpus da filosofia transcendental kantiana. Assim sendo, partimos da conjectura de que a “Geografia Física” continuamente se mostrou, a Kant, como um conhecimento portador de um desmedido sentido filosófico, já que ela lhe denotava a própria possibilidade de empiricização de sua filosofia. Logo, a Geografia Física seria, para Kant, o embasamento empírico de suas reflexões filosóficas, pois ela lhe comunicava a empiricidade da invenção do mundo; ela lhe outorgava a construção metafísica da “superfície da Terra”. Destarte, da mesma maneira que a Geografia, em sua superfície geral, conferiu uma espécie de atributo científico à validação do empírico da Modernidade (desde os idos do século XVI), a Geografia Física apresentou-se como o sustentáculo empírico da reflexão filosófica kantiana acerca da “metafísica da natureza” e da “metafísica do mundo”.THE COURSE OF PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY OF IMMANUEL KANT(1724-1804): CONTRIBUTION FOR THE GEOGRAPHICALSCIENCE HISTORY AND EPISTEMOLOGYAbstract: There is a relative weakness about our knowledge concerningKant philosophy and the constitution of modern geography and,consequently, scientific geography. That relation, whenever studied,happens – several times – in an oblique or tangential way, what means thatit lies almost exclusively confined in the act of notifying that Kant offered,for approximately four decades, “Physical Geography” courses inKonigsberg, or that he was the first philosopher teaching the subject at anyCollege, even before the creation of Geography chair in Berlin, in 1820, byKarl Ritter. Not overcoming the early spread of that act itself only made usthrow a curtain over the absence of a major understanding about Kant’stribute to epistemic justification of modern and scientific geography. Toopen a breach in this curtain indicates, necessarily, to lighten the role andplace of Physical Geography Course inside Kantian transcendentalphilosophy. So, we began from the conjecture that Physical Geography hasalways shown, by Kant, as a knowledge carrier of an unmeasuredphilosophic sense, once it showed the possibility of empiricization of hisphilosophy. Therefore, a Physical Geography would be, for Kant, theempirics basis of his philosophic thoughts, because it communicates theempiria of the world invention; it has made him to build metaphysically the“Earth’s surface”. In the same way, Geography, in its general surface, hasgiven a particular tribute to the empiric validation of Modernity (since the16th century), Physical Geography introduced itself as an empiric basis toKantian philosophical reflection about “nature’s metaphysics” and the“world metaphysics” as well.Keywords: History and Epistemology of Geography, Physical Geography,Cosmology, Kantian Transcendental Philosophy, Nature.


2009 ◽  
Vol 74 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dennis N. Kevill ◽  
Byoung-Chun Park ◽  
Jin Burm Kyong

The kinetics of nucleophilic substitution reactions of 1-(phenoxycarbonyl)pyridinium ions, prepared with the essentially non-nucleophilic/non-basic fluoroborate as the counterion, have been studied using up to 1.60 M methanol in acetonitrile as solvent and under solvolytic conditions in 2,2,2-trifluoroethan-1-ol (TFE) and its mixtures with water. Under the non- solvolytic conditions, the parent and three pyridine-ring-substituted derivatives were studied. Both second-order (first-order in methanol) and third-order (second-order in methanol) kinetic contributions were observed. In the solvolysis studies, since solvent ionizing power values were almost constant over the range of aqueous TFE studied, a Grunwald–Winstein equation treatment of the specific rates of solvolysis for the parent and the 4-methoxy derivative could be carried out in terms of variations in solvent nucleophilicity, and an appreciable sensitivity to changes in solvent nucleophilicity was found.


Author(s):  
Uriah Kriegel

Brentano’s theory of judgment serves as a springboard for his conception of reality, indeed for his ontology. It does so, indirectly, by inspiring a very specific metaontology. To a first approximation, ontology is concerned with what exists, metaontology with what it means to say that something exists. So understood, metaontology has been dominated by three views: (i) existence as a substantive first-order property that some things have and some do not, (ii) existence as a formal first-order property that everything has, and (iii) existence as a second-order property of existents’ distinctive properties. Brentano offers a fourth and completely different approach to existence talk, however, one which falls naturally out of his theory of judgment. The purpose of this chapter is to present and motivate Brentano’s approach.


Author(s):  
Tim Button ◽  
Sean Walsh

In this chapter, the focus shifts from numbers to sets. Again, no first-order set theory can hope to get anywhere near categoricity, but Zermelo famously proved the quasi-categoricity of second-order set theory. As in the previous chapter, we must ask who is entitled to invoke full second-order logic. That question is as subtle as before, and raises the same problem for moderate modelists. However, the quasi-categorical nature of Zermelo's Theorem gives rise to some specific questions concerning the aims of axiomatic set theories. Given the status of Zermelo's Theorem in the philosophy of set theory, we include a stand-alone proof of this theorem. We also prove a similar quasi-categoricity for Scott-Potter set theory, a theory which axiomatises the idea of an arbitrary stage of the iterative hierarchy.


Author(s):  
Huineng Wang ◽  
Yanfeng Guo ◽  
Yungang Fu ◽  
Dan Li

This study introduces the opinion of the corrugation hierarchy to develop the second-order corrugation paperboard, and explore the deformation characteristics, yield strength, and energy absorbing capacity under out-of-plane static evenly compression loading by experimental and analytical approaches. On the basis of the inclined-straight strut elements of corrugation unit and plastic hinge lines, the yield and crushing strengths of corrugation unit were analyzed. This study shows that as the compressive stress increases, the second-order corrugation core layer is firstly crushed, and the first-order corrugation structures gradually compacted until the failure of entire structure. The corrugation type has an obvious influence on the yield strength of the corrugation sandwich panel, and the yield strength of B-flute corrugation sandwich panel is wholly higher than that of the C-flute structure. At the same compression rate, the flute type has a significant impact on energy absorption, and the C-flute second-order corrugation sandwich panel has better bearing capacity than the B-flute structure. The second-order corrugation sandwich panel has a better bearing capacity than the first-order structure. The static compression rate has little effect on the yield strength and deformation mode. However, with the increase of the static compression rate, the corrugation sandwich panel has a better cushioning energy absorption and material utilization rate.


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