Metaethics

Philosophy ◽  
2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex Miller
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Subject Matter ◽  
Moral Realism ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Philosophical Study ◽  
False Response ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Moral Requirements ◽  
Moral Facts

Metaethics can be described as the philosophical study of the nature of moral judgment. It is concerned with such questions as: Do moral judgments express beliefs or rather desires and inclinations? Are moral judgments apt to be assessed in terms of truth and falsity? Do moral sentences have factual meaning? Are any moral judgments true or are they systematically and uniformly false? Is there such a thing as moral knowledge? Are moral judgments less objective than, say, judgments about the shapes and sizes of middle-sized physical objects? Is there a necessary connection between moral judgments and motivation? Are moral requirements requirements of reason? Do moral judgments have a natural or non-natural subject matter? A useful way of starting on metaethics is to distinguish between realist and non-realist views of morality. Moral realists hold that moral judgments express beliefs, and that some of those beliefs are true in virtue of mind-independent moral facts. Opposition to moral realism can take a number of forms. Expressivists deny that moral judgments express beliefs, claiming instead that they express non truth-assessable mental states such as desires or inclinations. Error theorists and (revolutionary) fictionalists claim that moral judgments are systematically false. Response-dependence views of moral judgments allow that moral judgments express beliefs and that at least some of them are true, but hold that they are true in virtue of mind-dependent moral facts. Moral realism itself comes in many varieties: reductionist, non-reductionist, naturalist, non-naturalist, internalist, externalist, analytic, and synthetic.

scholarly journals Précis of Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence

2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 397-402
Author(s):  
Jonas Olson
Keyword(s):  
Moral Realism ◽  
Error Theory ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
Moral Error Theory ◽  
Ontological Question ◽  
Moral Error ◽  
Contemporary Perspective ◽  
Moral Facts

Moral error theorists and moral realists agree about several disputed metaethical issues. They typically agree that ordinary moral judgments are beliefs and that ordinary moral utterances purport to refer to moral facts. But they disagree on the crucial ontological question of whether there are any moral facts. Moral error theorists hold that there are not and that, as a consequence, ordinary moral beliefs are systematically mistaken and ordinary moral judgments uniformly untrue. Perhaps because of its kinship with moral realism, moral error theory is often considered the most notorious of moral scepticisms. While the view has been widely discussed, it has had relatively few defenders. Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence (henceforth met) examines the view from a historical as well as a contemporary perspective, and purports to respond to some of its most prominent challenges. This précis is a brief summary of the book’s content.

Representing and Caring that Pain is Bad

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin Marshall
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Realism ◽  
Moral Motivation ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Perception ◽  
Partial Analysis ◽  
Judgment Internalism ◽  
Present View

This chapter extends Compassionate Moral Realism with an eye towards the issue of judgment internalism, that is, whether moral representation is necessarily connected to motivation. The challenges of giving a uniform account of the cognitive and motivational aspects of moral judgment are illustrated, and the possibility of a non-uniform, pluralist view is considered. After noting Compassionate Moral Realism’s compatibility with judgment pluralism, accounts are offered of both emotionally hot and emotionally cool moral judgments, using Chapter 12’s partial analysis of objective badness. In each case, a necessary connection to moral motivation is identified. For emotionally cool judgments, an agent who is not motivated is epistemically lacking by a standard that she acknowledges in that very judgment. Finally, it is explained how the present view can offer an attractive understanding of moral perception, as understood by Lawrence Blum and others.

scholarly journals Moral Dynamics: Grounding Moral Judgment in Intuitive Physics and Intuitive Psychology

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Felix Sosa ◽  
Tomer David Ullman ◽  
Joshua Tenenbaum ◽  
Samuel J. Gershman ◽  
Tobias Gerstenberg
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Visual Stimuli ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Visual Features ◽  
Dynamic Interactions ◽  
Fine Grained ◽  
Intuitive Physics ◽  
Intuitive Theory

When holding others morally responsible, we care about what they did, and what they thought. Traditionally, research in moral psychology has relied on vignette studies, in which a protagonist's actions and thoughts are explicitly communicated. While this research has revealed what variables are important for moral judgment, such as actions and intentions, it is limited in providing a more detailed understanding of exactly how these variables affect moral judgment. Using dynamic visual stimuli that allow for a more fine-grained experimental control, recent studies have proposed a direct mapping from visual features to moral judgments. We embrace the use of visual stimuli in moral psychology, but question the plausibility of a feature-based theory of moral judgment. We propose that the connection from visual features to moral judgments is mediated by an inference about what the observed action reveals about the agent's mental states, and what causal role the agent's action played in bringing about the outcome. We present a computational model that formalizes moral judgments of agents in visual scenes as computations over an intuitive theory of physics combined with an intuitive theory of mind. We test the model's quantitative predictions in three experiments across a wide variety of dynamic interactions between agent and patient.

scholarly journals On the way to eliminating theoretical difficulties of sociology of morality

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 252-262
Author(s):  
A. A. Sanzhenakov
Keyword(s):  
Social Relations ◽  
Moral Realism ◽  
Social Space ◽  
Scientific Discipline ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Sociological Research ◽  
Sociology Of Morality ◽  
Moral Qualities ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Moral Facts

The article aims at presenting theoretical difficulties of sociology of morality and possible ways to overcome them. The importance of this issue is determined by the necessity of the scientific study of moral elements of the contemporary society in order to prevent its dehumanization. Sociology of morality focuses on the empirical study of various moral phenomena (justice, duty, conscience) in the social space. At the first stage of such a study, sociologists conduct observations and collect data, and at the second stage, they generalize moral facts to identify moral patterns. In sociology, morality is considered as an element of society; therefore, it is not analyzed by itself but within a system of social relations. One of the difficulties of such studies is the ambivalent nature of morality, i.e. its existence in both public and individual consciousness: if sociologists ignore the individual mode of morality, they misrepresent the content of moral facts. Another reason for theoretical difficulties in the study of morality is that sociologists use outdated ideas about the nature of moral truths and researchers impartiality - moral judgments are considered as not being true or false, and the researcher should ignore his value attitudes when collecting and analyzing data. The elimination of these difficulties can lead to the loss of the sociological research specifics and to the merger of sociology and moral philosophy. Representatives of the new sociology of morality have to reform this field but ensure its status of an independent scientific discipline. One of the ways to solve this task is to use ideas of analytic philosophy, in particular, of moral realism that defines moral qualities as qualities of real things, and moral truths as having the same status as scientific truths.

MORAL JUDGMENT OF PRESCHOOL KUWAITI CHILDREN

2002 ◽  
Vol 30 (6) ◽  
pp. 539-545
Author(s):  
Fatima Nazar ◽  
Kamiar Kouzekanani
Keyword(s):  
Preschool Children ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Realism ◽  
Two Dimensions ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Socialization Process ◽  
Kuwaiti Children

This study examined the moral judgment of 108 Kuwaiti preschool children. The children were tested on two dimensions of Piaget's moral theory, namely moral realism and justice. Four stories patterned after Piaget's work were used to assess the children's moral judgment. Two stories dealt with moral realism, and two other stories dealt with the issue of justice. Results suggest that the children in this present study are well advanced in their moral judgments in terms of equality and justice, as contrasted with Piaget's original findings. The results of the present study were interpreted in the light of previous research, as well as with regard to the socialization process of children.

scholarly journals THE NATURE OF NORMATIVE MORAL JUDGMENTS

Adam alemi ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (86) ◽  
pp. 129-135
Author(s):  
Almira Omarova
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Subject Matter ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Significant Part ◽  
Current Debate ◽  
Philosophical Issue ◽  
First Order ◽  
Moral Statement ◽  
The Subject

Moral judgements have been a crucial subject-matter of a discussion in the domain of normativity. Many thinkers argue moral judgments are necessarily action-guiding, which prescribe what one ought to do and what ought to be the case. The moral statement “killing is wrong” is prescriptive and locates in the purview of first-order ethical questions. Moral realists widely accept that moral judgments represent propositions, therefore they are subject to truth and false conditions. Thus, moral conclusions can be derived logically from valid premises. How to derive the conclusion “killing is wrong”? How to justify the statement? What does “wrong” mean in this context? This kind of philosophical issue has been labeled as the second-order questions, which is in the purview of metaethics. This article is devoted to the subject of normativity and the nature of moral judgments advocated by metaethicists David Copp and Ralph Wedgwood. The purpose of this article is to outline the current debate on the nature of normative moral judgments. In conclusion, I shall agree with both Copp and Wedgwoodon two points. One, normative moral judgment can be subject to cognition. Two, there are true and false beliefs about particular moral facts which constitute the significant part of the reality we live in.

scholarly journals ON THE SUBJECT MATTER OF MORAL PSYCHOLOGY

Reflexio ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 133-140
Author(s):  
I. V. Badiev
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Subject Matter ◽  
Psychological Research ◽  
Individual Variability ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Behavioral Component ◽  
Moral Functioning ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Individual

The article deals with the study of human moral functioning in the framework of neurobiological and psychological research. Presents the views of John. Green and John. Haidt about the nature of moral judgments. Studies of the neurobiological mechanism of moral judgment do not explain their individual variability. This question relates to the subject of psychological research. The psychological concepts of morality of L. Kohlberg and D. Forsythe are compared. It is argued that the concept of ethical positions of Foresight has an advantage, since it considers the individual variability of moral judgments from metaethical positions. The analysis of neurobiological and psychological approaches to morality concluded that they did not represent the behavioral component of moral functioning.

scholarly journals Prospects for Moral Success Theory

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Emma Susan Wood
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Error Theory ◽  
Ideal Observer ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Practical Reasons ◽  
Moral Error Theory ◽  
Positive Account ◽  
Moral Error ◽  
External Reasons ◽  
Moral Facts

<p>In this thesis, I will argue that the existence of moral facts does not rely on the existence of a reason for action, and that moral facts can be made sense of in other ways. My thesis is both a reply to a type of moral error theory that has been advanced by Richard Joyce and John Mackie, and an account of the truthmakers of moral judgments.  The argument for error theory that I respond to is roughly as follows: moral judgments are judgments about external practical reasons. But external reasons do not exist, and so no moral judgment is ever true. In the first part of my thesis, I will argue in favour of the latter premise of the error theorist’s argument, but against the former: external reasons do not exist, but moral judgments are not committed to them.  In the second half of my thesis I build up a positive account of what moral judgments involve. If moral judgments are not judgments about reasons, then what are moral judgments about? I develop the widely supported idea that moral judgments are judgments that are based on welfarist considerations, and attempt to give this idea a more precise formulation than what has been previously offered. From this account, I go on to develop an account of the truthmakers of moral judgments. The account I end up with is an ideal observer theory that I believe makes sense of a broad range of intuitions about morality.  My hope is that this thesis will be of interest to others who feel the pull of moral error theory, but would prefer to see moral success theory vindicated.</p>

scholarly journals Prospects for Moral Success Theory

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Emma Susan Wood
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Error Theory ◽  
Ideal Observer ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Practical Reasons ◽  
Moral Error Theory ◽  
Positive Account ◽  
Moral Error ◽  
External Reasons ◽  
Moral Facts

<p>In this thesis, I will argue that the existence of moral facts does not rely on the existence of a reason for action, and that moral facts can be made sense of in other ways. My thesis is both a reply to a type of moral error theory that has been advanced by Richard Joyce and John Mackie, and an account of the truthmakers of moral judgments.  The argument for error theory that I respond to is roughly as follows: moral judgments are judgments about external practical reasons. But external reasons do not exist, and so no moral judgment is ever true. In the first part of my thesis, I will argue in favour of the latter premise of the error theorist’s argument, but against the former: external reasons do not exist, but moral judgments are not committed to them.  In the second half of my thesis I build up a positive account of what moral judgments involve. If moral judgments are not judgments about reasons, then what are moral judgments about? I develop the widely supported idea that moral judgments are judgments that are based on welfarist considerations, and attempt to give this idea a more precise formulation than what has been previously offered. From this account, I go on to develop an account of the truthmakers of moral judgments. The account I end up with is an ideal observer theory that I believe makes sense of a broad range of intuitions about morality.  My hope is that this thesis will be of interest to others who feel the pull of moral error theory, but would prefer to see moral success theory vindicated.</p>

MUST MORALITY MOTIVATE?

2002 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-35 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Practical Rationality ◽  
The State ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Michael Smith ◽  
Moral Requirements

Internalism – here the view that moral judgments entail motivation – is often taken to support non-cognitivism about morality. However, Michael Smith has defended a variety of it in combination with a cognitivist account of morality. Despite the eminence of Smith’s contribution, his case in favour of internalism is flawed. I distinguish several internalist positions and argue that Smith’s version, unlike standard ones, expresses a view about, not the nature of the state one is in when one makes a moral judgment, but the norms of practical rationality. I then defend the externalist appeal to the possibility of amoralism. Such an appeal need not beg the question against internalism and can in any case be backed up by independent considerations. Moreover, neither of Smith’s two main arguments in favour of internalism – the reliable connection argument and the appeal to rationalism about moral requirements – are sound. Having shored up the case for externalism and dismissed Smith’s case against it, I end the essay with a suggestion as to why many philosophers have been attracted to internalism even though the theory turns out to be ill-founded.

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