scholarly journals The idea of being is not uniquely innate

2017 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 343
Author(s):  
Inge-Bert Täljedal
Keyword(s):  
Fundamental Idea ◽  
Sharp Distinction ◽  
Real Objects ◽  
The One ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Innate Idea

http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2016v20n3p343According to the Italian philosopher Antonio Rosmini (1797-1855), being is an  innate idea that is requisite for contemplating anything. He emphatically claims that it is the one and only innate idea. Rosmini makes a sharp distinction between sensations and perceptions. Perceptions are thought to arise when the undetermined idea of being (tantamount to possibility) is combined with sensations, universals when being is combined with  perceptions. It is argued here that Rosmini’s explanation of the origin of universals does  not work. If the idea of being is regarded as innate, then several others should be similarly  regarded, notably the idea of qualitative identity which is an idea necessary for deriving universals.  Although Rosmini holds that certain properties are necessarily present in real objects  and therefore implicit in the idea of being, the property of being qualitatively identical with  something else is not among those properties. Theological motives may have encouraged  Rosmini to emphasize being as a peculiarly fundamental idea. However, if the idea of being  is more fundamental than other universals, it may be regarded so in virtue of its generality,  not because it has a uniquely innate character.

The Green New Deal

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert C. Hockett
Keyword(s):  
New Deal ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Public Investment ◽  
Climate Science ◽  
Time Frame ◽  
White Paper ◽  
Good News ◽  
Carbon Neutrality ◽  
The One ◽  
In Virtue Of

This white paper lays out the guiding vision behind the Green New Deal Resolution proposed to the U.S. Congress by Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Senator Bill Markey in February of 2019. It explains the senses in which the Green New Deal is 'green' on the one hand, and a new 'New Deal' on the other hand. It also 'makes the case' for a shamelessly ambitious, not a low-ball or slow-walked, Green New Deal agenda. At the core of the paper's argument lies the observation that only a true national mobilization on the scale of those associated with the original New Deal and the Second World War will be up to the task of comprehensively revitalizing the nation's economy, justly growing our middle class, and expeditiously achieving carbon-neutrality within the twelve-year time-frame that climate science tells us we have before reaching an environmental 'tipping point.' But this is actually good news, the paper argues. For, paradoxically, an ambitious Green New Deal also will be the most 'affordable' Green New Deal, in virtue of the enormous productivity, widespread prosperity, and attendant public revenue benefits that large-scale public investment will bring. In effect, the Green New Deal will amount to that very transformative stimulus which the nation has awaited since the crash of 2008 and its debt-deflationary sequel.

La otredad: ¿real o inventada? El caso de las brujas

1999 ◽  
pp. 21-33
Author(s):  
Elia Nathan Bravo
Keyword(s):  
Early Modern ◽  
Social Inequalities ◽  
Strict Sense ◽  
Empirical Content ◽  
Extreme Situation ◽  
Modern Times ◽  
The Witch ◽  
Early Modern Times ◽  
The One ◽  
In Virtue Of

The purpose of this paper is two-fold. On the one hand, it offers a general analysis of stigmas (a person has one when, in virtue of its belonging to a certain group, such as that of women, homosexuals, etc., he or she is subjugated or persecuted). On the other hand, I argue that stigmas are “invented”. More precisely, I claim that they are not descriptive of real inequalities. Rather, they are socially created, or invented in a lax sense, in so far as the real differences to which they refer are socially valued or construed as negative, and used to justify social inequalities (that is, the placing of a person in the lower positions within an economic, cultural, etc., hierarchy), or persecutions. Finally, I argue that in some cases, such as that of the witch persecution of the early modern times, we find the extreme situation in which a stigma was invented in the strict sense of the word, that is, it does not have any empirical content.

scholarly journals What the Tortoise Said to Achilles: Lewis Carroll’s Paradox in Terms of Hilbert Arithmetic

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vasil Penchev
Keyword(s):  
Hidden Variables ◽  
Formal Structure ◽  
Lewis Carroll ◽  
First Order ◽  
Logical Paradox ◽  
Completeness Of Quantum Mechanics ◽  
The One ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
The Liar ◽  
Completeness Theorems

Lewis Carroll, both logician and writer, suggested a logical paradox containing furthermore two connotations (connotations or metaphors are inherent in literature rather than in mathematics or logics). The paradox itself refers to implication demonstrating that an intermediate implication can be always inserted in an implication therefore postponing its ultimate conclusion for the next step and those insertions can be iteratively and indefinitely added ad lib, as if ad infinitum. Both connotations clear up links due to the shared formal structure with other well-known mathematical observations: (1) the paradox of Achilles and the Turtle; (2) the transitivity of the relation of equality. Analogically to (1), one can juxtapose the paradox of the Liar (for Lewis Carroll’s paradox) and that of the arrow (for “Achilles and the Turtle”), i.e. a logical paradox, on the one hand, and an aporia of motion, on the other hand, suggesting a shared formal structure of both, which can be called “ontological”, on which basis “motion” studied by physics and “conclusion” studied by logic can be unified being able to bridge logic and physics philosophically in a Hegelian manner: even more, the bridge can be continued to mathematics in virtue of (2), which forces the equality (for its property of transitivity) of any two quantities to be postponed analogically ad lib and ad infinitum. The paper shows that Hilbert arithmetic underlies naturally Lewis Carroll’s paradox admitting at least three interpretations linked to each other by it: mathematical, physical and logical. Thus, it can be considered as both generalization and solution of his paradox therefore naturally unifying the completeness of quantum mechanics (i.e. the absence of hidden variables) and eventual completeness of mathematics as the same and isomorphic to the completeness of propositional logic in relation to set theory as a first-order logic (in the sense of Gödel (1930)’s completeness theorems).

Existence of State as a Value Problem in Political Realism

2021 ◽  
pp. 5-16
Author(s):  
Sergey A. Kucherenko ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Social Theory ◽  
International System ◽  
Social World ◽  
Value Systems ◽  
Ontological Status ◽  
Political Realism ◽  
A Value ◽  
Real Objects ◽  
The One ◽  
Political Value

The article is focused around ontological status of state in modern political real­ism. It seems that possibility of moral evaluation depends on the existence of the evaluated object. Only the real objects can be fully valuable. The article demon­strates that theoretical abstraction of social world can function as values only by being the ends that have to be fulfilled. The notion of state plays crucial role in re­alist theory, while states themselves are basic units of international system. This puts the state in an ambivalent position. On the one hand realists view state as a mere theoretical abstraction without proper existence. On the other hand state acts as a value in analysis of statesmen motives. The author claims that realism, be­ing an “understanding” social theory, is stuck between scientific and political value systems. This problem is possible to solve by splitting the concept of state (and re­lated notions), based on the context of its usage.

scholarly journals Between Numbers and Images: The Many Meanings of Trigram Gen 艮 in The Early Yijing

2018 ◽  
Vol 72 (4) ◽  
pp. 1133-1193 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Schwartz
Keyword(s):  
Expert Knowledge ◽  
Mutual Interaction ◽  
Warring States Period ◽  
Warring States ◽  
Main Thesis ◽  
Real Objects ◽  
Interpretive System ◽  
The Many ◽  
The One ◽  
Base Text

Abstract This paper examines the images of trigram Gen in the Yijing, with a focus on images in the Shuogua 說卦 commentary. The Shuogua presents images either found in or to be extrapolated from the base text within a structured and highly interpretive system that forms “image programs” for each of the eight trigrams. I argue the Shuogua’s image programs have a defined architecture, and its images are not random lists of words collected without an agenda and devoid of relationships and mutual interaction with others. My main thesis is a high percentage of images in the Changes developed through a simple and direct pictographic method, like the one used in a recently discovered Warring States period divination guidebook called Shifa 筮法 (Method of Milfoil Divination*), that was done by matching the graphic shapes of individual numbers and the overall shapes of numbers in three-line combination to shapes of real objects and logographs. If a diviner could see so many pictographic images in single numbers and sequences of numbers in combination, like what we now see in operation in the Shifa, then we ought to assume that a deeper repository of subjective and innovative images could be observed in number combinations at the multiline, trigram, and hexagram levels. Stated directly, trigram and hexagram diagrams were not pictorially meaningless; numbers produced images, and images produced the words and judgments that form early layers of text. Professional diviners had an expert knowledge of the tradition and Warring States use of the Changes continued to develop and explain image programs for the eight trigrams along these guidelines.

scholarly journals Hume’s Fork and Mixed Mathematics

2017 ◽  
Vol 99 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Matias Slavov
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Epistemic Status ◽  
Causal Relations ◽  
Sharp Distinction ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Pure Mathematics ◽  
Conservation Of Momentum ◽  
The Law ◽  
The One ◽  
Uniformity Principle

Abstract:Given the sharp distinction that follows from Hume’s Fork, the proper epistemic status of propositions of mixed mathematics seems to be a mystery. On the one hand, mathematical propositions concern the relation of ideas. They are intuitive and demonstratively certain. On the other hand, propositions of mixed mathematics, such as in Hume’s own example, the law of conservation of momentum, are also matter of fact propositions. They concern causal relations between species of objects, and, in this sense, they are not intuitive or demonstratively certain, but probable or provable. In this article, I argue that the epistemic status of propositions of mixed mathematics is that of matters of fact. I wish to show that their epistemic status is not a mystery. The reason for this is that the propositions of mixed mathematics are dependent on the Uniformity Principle, unlike the propositions of pure mathematics.

The Nature of Ususfructus

1946 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 159-170
Author(s):  
Kopel Kagan
Keyword(s):  
Great Difficulty ◽  
Roman Law ◽  
Present Position ◽  
Modern Times ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The One ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Right ◽  
Opening Statements ◽  
In Virtue Of

No satisfactory definition of Dominium in Roman Law has yet been achieved. Amongst English writers Austin many years ago found great difficulty in this question while in modern times Professor Buckland has written ‘it is thus difficult to define Dominium precisely.’ Again, Poste, dealing with Gaius' discussion of dominium, says that his opening statements are ‘deplorably confused.’ These examples are enough to indicate the condition, of uncertainty which prevails. In my submission this uncertainty exists mainly because the conception of ususfructus has never yet been explained adequately. Of Possessio it has been said ‘the definition of Possessio to give the results outlined is a matter of great difficulty. No perfectly correct solution may be possible,’ and this statement is generally accepted as a correct assessment of the present position in juristic literature. But here, too, in my opinion, the reason is again connected with usufruct, for the possessio of the usufructuary has not yet been adequately determined. Gaius (2.93) tells us ‘usufructuarius vero usucapere non potest; primuum quod non possidet, sed habet ius utendi et fruendi.’ Ulpian holds that he had possessio in fact (‘Naturaliter videtur possidere is qui usum fructum habet’ D.41.2.12). On this subject Roby says ‘the fructuary was not strictly a possessor and therefore if he was deprived from enjoying he had not a claim to the original interdict de vi but in virtue of his quasi-possessio a special interdict was granted him.’ Austin saw difficulty in the whole problem of possessio. He wrote ‘by Savigny in his treatise on possessio it is remarked that the possessio of a right of usufruct … resembles the possessio of a thing, by the proprietor, or by an adverse possessor exercising rights of property over the thing. And that a disturbance of the one possession resembles the disturbance of the other. Now this must happen for the reason I have already stated:—namely, that the right of usufruct or user, like that of property, is indefinite in point of user. For what is possession (meaning legal possession not mere physical handling of the subject) but the exercise of a right ?’

Two-Tier Moral Codes

1989 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 112-132 ◽  
Author(s):  
Holly M. Smith
Keyword(s):  
Moral Status ◽  
The Other ◽  
Moral Principle ◽  
Moral Code ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Individual Actions ◽  
The One ◽  
In Virtue Of

A moral code consists of principles that assign moral status to individual actions – principles that evaluate acts as right or wrong, prohibited or obligatory, permissible or supererogatory. Many theorists have held that such principles must serve two distinct functions. On the one hand, they serve a theoretical function, insofar as they specify the characteristics in virtue of which acts possess their moral status. On the other hand, they serve a practical function, insofar as they provide an action-guide: a standard by reference to which a person can choose which acts to perform and which not. Although the theoretical and practical functions of moral principles are closely linked, it is not at all obvious that what enables a principle to fill one of these roles automatically equips it to fill the other. In this paper I shall briefly examine some of the reasons why a moral principle might fail to fill its practical role, i.e., be incapable of guiding decisions. I shall then sketch three common responses to this kind of failure, and examine in some detail the adequacy of one of the most popular of these responses.

Political Theory and the Study of Politics: A Report of a Conference

1956 ◽  
Vol 50 (2) ◽  
pp. 475-487 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harry Eckstein
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Political Theory ◽  
Political Science ◽  
Political Thought ◽  
The Other ◽  
Sharp Distinction ◽  
Basic Issue ◽  
Political Inquiry ◽  
The One

The issues which arose during the discussions of the conference fall fairly conveniently into three compartments.First, we obviously had to settle, with reasonable clarity, what we were talking about: what “political philosophy” is, what “political science” is, and whether they are really distinguishable. The basic issue of the conference was to determine the relevance of the one to the study of the other, and if we had decided that they were really the same thing, there would simply have been no problems for us to discuss. On the whole, we felt that a valid, if not necessarily sharp, distinction was to be made between the “philosophical” and the “scientific” approaches to the study of politics and that we were not discussing absurd or tautological issues. We agreed, however, that all types of political inquiry involve the construction of theory, implicit or explicit, and that the title “political theory” has been unjustifiably appropriated by the historians of political thought.

scholarly journals The Inquisition of 1517. Inclosures and Evictions. Part II. Edited from the Lansdowne MS. 1. 153

1893 ◽  
Vol 7 ◽  
pp. 127-292
Author(s):  
I. S. Leadam
Keyword(s):  
Sixteenth Century ◽  
Legal Theory ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Historical Review ◽  
The Other ◽  
Historical Society ◽  
Sharp Distinction ◽  
Legal Security ◽  
The One ◽  
At Will

In the ‘English Historical Review’ for April (1893) Professor Ashley offers some criticisms upon the ‘Introduction to the Inquisition of 1517,’ contributed by me to the ‘Transactions of the Royal Historical Society’ for 1892. One object of that Introduction, it may be remembered, was to disprove the assertion of Professor Ashley that at the time when the evictions for inclosure began, and until ‘towards the end of the period,’ ‘the mass of copyholders’ had no legal security. In my view, the manorial records, the compilations of laws in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the practice of the courts, even the treatises of the jurists when critically scrutinised, led to the conclusion not merely that copyholders enjoyed protection in legal theory, but that their predecessors in title, the villeins, had done so before them. I drew no distinction in this matter between customary tenants and copyholders, as Professor Ashley appears to suppose, but showed that security extended even to villeins by blood, or ‘nativi,’ on custo-mary lands. Professor Ashley's proposition that ‘customary tenants’ and ‘copyholders’ were equivalent terms was never doubted by me, and is irrelevant to my argument. Indeed, it is assumed by me on the very pages to which he refers. ‘Mr. Leadam,’ he says, ‘draws a sharp distinction between “copyholders” on the one side and “tenants at will” on the other—a distinction which one may doubt whether the men of the sixteenth century would have felt so keenly.’ The distinction, as those who turn to the passage will see, is between ‘copyholders,’ used in Fitzherbert's sense as equivalent to customary tenants, who were ‘tenants at will according to the custom of the manor,’ and ‘tenants at will at Common Law.’

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