scholarly journals RELIGION IN DEBATES ABOUT THE EUROPEAN IDENTITY

2018 ◽  
pp. 27-39
Author(s):  
Ivan Cvitković
Keyword(s):  
Religious Identity ◽  
The Other ◽  
European Identity ◽  
Right Wing ◽  
Left Wing ◽  
Muslim Identity ◽  
Religious Identities ◽  
Religious Symbols ◽  
Religious Cultures ◽  
Identity Problems

A short reflection on the books and publications in which I have already written about religious identities in Europe is presented in the introduction. A situation with religious identities varies from one society to another, from one continent to the other. There are three types of religious identity that dominate in Europe (church, churchless and “distanced“). Have religious identities or their “folklore” aspect become stronger in Bosnia and Herzegovina since the 1990s? Then I come back to the very term and type of identity (acquired, chosen etc.) and their basic sociological characteristics. The importance of self-identification and others’ perception of our identity is discussed. Considering the multiplicity of human identities, there will be elaboration of the place of religion among multiple identities. In what social conditions does religious identity gain significance? What is the correlation between religious identity and family, national and professional identities? What happens if the religious identity is rejected? There will be some elaboration also of the place and the role of religious symbols in identities. What kind of social "game" can these symbols play? The examples of conflicts over religious symbols are provided. In particular, migrations and the religious identity of Europe will be discussed. Migrations lead to establishing more regular contacts between different religious identities. Who does not understand whom: is it that the domicile population does not understand migrants or vice versa? Is the migrants' arrival experienced more as an encounter of different religious cultures than as an encounter of different religious identities? Is the relation of those with the Christian and those with the Muslim identity in fact the central issue in all this matter? Approaching migrants as a "threat" to the "Christian European identity". Who is bothered by the plurality of religious identities in Europe? Above all, conservative consciousness, then right-wing politics growing stronger in Europe and inciting hatred towards the non-Christian, especially towards the Muslim identity. The inability of the left-wing to develop a different, more tolerant model towards migrants. Does this mean that the position of the minority in Europe will become more difficult? Something about the sacrilege and the ways in which it is demonstrated in Europe and in our region. The religious identity in the creeps of criticism and art. How far does the freedom of artistic provocations go? The conclusion will be about whether religious identities lead to their separation from others. How to talk about religious identity of "the other" from the standpoint of a personal worldview and religious identity in a society with multiple religious identities? Are we confident that identity problems will not cause further conflicts and instability in European societies?

Diasporas in Despair, 1560–1700

The Great Sea ◽  
2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Abulafia
Keyword(s):  
Seventeenth Century ◽  
Religious Identity ◽  
The Other ◽  
Religious Identities ◽  
Muslim Population ◽  
Sephardic Jews ◽  
The World ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Mediterranean ◽  
Jewish Descent

Ottoman sultans and Spanish kings, along with their tax officials, took a strong interest in the religious identity of those who crossed the areas of the Mediterranean under their control. Sometimes, in an era marked by the clash of Christian and Muslim empires, the Mediterranean seems to be sharply divided between the two faiths. Yet the Ottomans had long accepted the existence of Christian majorities in many of the lands they ruled, while other groups navigated (metaphorically) between religious identities. The Sephardic Jews have already been encountered, with their astonishing ability to mutate into notionally Christian ‘Portuguese’ when they entered the ports of Mediterranean Spain. This existence suspended between worlds set off its own tensions in the seventeenth century, when many Sephardim acclaimed a deluded Jew of Smyrna as the Messiah. Similar tensions could also be found among the remnants of the Muslim population of Spain. The tragic history of the Moriscos was played out largely away from the Mediterranean Sea between the conversion of the last openly practising Muslims, in 1525, and the final act of their expulsion in 1609; it was their very isolation from the Islamic world that gave these people their distinctive identity, once again suspended between religions. The world inhabited by these Moriscos differed in important respects from that inhabited by the other group of conversos, those of Jewish descent. Although some Moriscos were hauled before the Inquisition, the Spanish authorities at first turned a blind eye to the continued practice of Islam; it was sometimes possible to pay the Crown a ‘service’ that bought exemption from interference by the Inquisition, which was mortified to discover that it could not boost its income by seizing the property of exempt suspects. Many Morisco communities lacked a Christian priest, so the continued practice of the old religion is no great surprise; even in areas where christianization took place, what sometimes emerged was an islamized Christianity, evinced in the remarkable lead tablets of Sacromonte, outside Granada, with their prophecies that ‘the Arabs will be those who aid religion in the last days’ and their mysterious references to a Christian caliph, or successor (to Jesus, not Muhammad).

scholarly journals Politisasi Agama dan Politik Kebencian pada Pemilu Presiden Indonesia 2019

2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-48
Author(s):  
Riki Ronaldo ◽  
Darmaiza Darmaiza
Keyword(s):  
Qualitative Research ◽  
Religious Identity ◽  
Presidential Election ◽  
The Political ◽  
Online Media ◽  
Muslim Identity ◽  
Presidential Candidates ◽  
Political Situation ◽  
Religious Symbols

This study aims to describe the politicization of religious symbols in online media in the decide of presidential and vice presidential candidates in Indonesian election 2019. This study is a descriptive qualitative research with data collection through study document to online media news. This study found that there are two religious symbols that are massively used in determining the presidential and vice presidential candidates for the 2019 election, namely Muslim identity and religious identity. The contested 2019 presidential and vice presidential candidates are the result of the tug-of-war between religious symbols used in the early stages of the 2019 presidential election. At this stage, Muslim identity becomes an offer that is transacted in the determination of the presidential and vice presidential candidates. Likewise with ulama and a number of religious organizations. A series of religious ceremonies such as ijtihad and ijtima is also used as a legitimating medium to raise contestants for the 2019 Presidential Election. Interestingly, the results of ijtihad and ijtima are not static and standard, but dynamic and can change according to the political situation that occurs. This in turn has led to the strengthening of hate politics.

The Message of The Damascus Sermon for Muslim-Christian Relations

2012 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Marten de Vries
Keyword(s):  
Point Of View ◽  
The Other ◽  
Western Society ◽  
Religious Values ◽  
Right Wing ◽  
Left Wing ◽  
Religious People ◽  
To Come ◽  
The One ◽  
Said Nursi

AbstractThe context in which Bediüzzaman Said Nursi wrote the first version of his now famous Damascus sermon was a meeting on a continent and in an age in which Muslims were being forced to reflect on their identity due to negative interaction with non-Muslims.Meanwhile, the relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims have changed drastically. Nonetheless, not only Muslims but also Christians and even Muslims and Christians together in dialogue now have more rather than fewer reasons to be concerned about the question of how they, based on their authentic religious values, can contribute to a good society.Even the mid-20th century Turkish revision of the Damascus sermon is dated. The document does, however, offer a clarifying template that can still be highly beneficial for Muslims and Christians a century later in striving for what is beneficial for themselves and their environment while keeping their own identities in mind.Christians could also acknowledge a great deal in the six ailments and remedies the healer identifies in the “Six Words.” At the same time, it suits the spirit of the age to proceed not only via a set of major resemblances between both religions but also mutatis mutandis in connection with what is typical for each religion. As a Christian, I would like to flesh this out with “hope,” “faithfulness,” “love,” “unity,” “dignity,” and “consultation,” based on my faith, of which Jesus Christ is the centre.The challenge of today’s and tomorrow’s globalised reality that Muslims and Christians have to cope with is, for instance, to formulate a new Purifying paradigm based on the concepts listed by Nursi, designed to be fully respective of the well understood uniqueness of the other. Christian acceptance of Muslims should not depend on the extent to which they are integrated into Western society, nor should Christians be viewed by Muslims as pre-Muslims.This challenge goes further and is more difficult than striving to come to “a common word”: in fact, we will need to understand a variety of words. But if the efforts are crowned with success, this is a more valid way for Muslims and Christians - who together make up the majority of the world’s population - to be a good example for society.From a Christian point of view and that of the 20th century’s disenchantment, Nursi is overly optimistic when he suggests society can be affected by implementing religious values. Religious people and non-religious people alike in the current demographic will continue to co-exist and individually suffer from the cited and notcited maladies, and this was no different in the golden eras of yore.Nevertheless, we can point to signs of hope when we succeed together in resolving the dilemma of right-wing capitalism and liberalism on the one hand and left-wing communism and socialism on the other by means of our own religiously motivated values to allow Christians, Muslims, and others to sample a bit of the future heaven on earth.

What Is Urgent Publishing?

APRIA Journal ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 33-43
Author(s):  
Florian Cramer
Keyword(s):  
Social Media ◽  
The Other ◽  
Right Wing ◽  
Left Wing ◽  
Political Debate ◽  
New Form ◽  
The One ◽  
The Right

Publishing is increasingly being challenged through instantaneous social media publish- ing, even in the fields of scholarship and cultural, philosophical and political debate. Memetic self-publishers, such as the right-wing 'YouTube intellectual' Jordan Peterson and his left-wing counterpart Natalie Wynn, seem to tap into urgent needs that traditional publishing fails to identify and address. Does their practice amount to a new form of urgent publishing? How is it different from non-urgent publishing on the one hand and from propaganda on the other? Which urgencies can be addressed by urgent publishing? What is the role of artists and designers in it?

Ironic humor on social media as participatory boundary work

2018 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 729-749 ◽  
Author(s):  
Noam Gal
Keyword(s):  
Social Media ◽  
Boundary Work ◽  
The Other ◽  
Right Wing ◽  
Left Wing ◽  
Power Structures ◽  
Far Right ◽  
Social Division ◽  
Digital Environments

This article explores the use of irony for boundary work in social media. It suggests that the combination of the polysemy inherent to ironic humor and new decontextualized digital environments entails greater potential for misinterpretation, thus turning humorous interactions into segregating tools. Using the case of left-wing mockery of a far-right-wing group in Israel, I trace the ways in which online irony serves as a means for social consolidation and differentiation. Findings indicate that the combination of medium (Facebook), keying (ironic humor), and content (social divides) works to empower one group and marginalize the other, potentially deepening existing social gaps. In addition, I show how this triangle leads to the construction of a new overarching social division between intellect (associated with left-wingers) and physicality (associated with right-wingers). Finally, I discuss the implications of social divides for our understanding of relations between irony and power structures in digital environments.

Party Competition and the Resilience of Corporatism

2009 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 167-187 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mette Anthonsen ◽  
Johannes Lindvall
Keyword(s):  
The Netherlands ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
Power Sharing ◽  
Party Competition ◽  
The Other ◽  
Right Wing ◽  
Left Wing ◽  
Social Democratic ◽  
Democratic Parties ◽  
Social Democratic Parties

AbstractThis article argues that after the Golden Age of capitalism, corporatist methods of policy-making have come to depend on specific modes of party competition. In contrast to previous studies of corporatism, which have argued that corporatism depends on strong social democratic parties, this article suggests that the competition between well-defined left-wing and right-wing ‘blocs’ has become detrimental to corporatism. In countries with mixed governments or traditions of power-sharing, on the other hand, corporatism thrives. These conclusions are based on a comparison of four traditionally corporatist countries – Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland – from the early 1970s to the late 1990s.

scholarly journals Emotional Dynamics of Right- and Left-wing Political Populism

2018 ◽  
Vol 42 (4) ◽  
pp. 434-454 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mikko Salmela ◽  
Christian von Scheve
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Right Wing ◽  
Left Wing ◽  
Political Strategies ◽  
Opportunity Structures ◽  
Emotional Processes ◽  
Right Wing Populism ◽  
Neoliberal Policies ◽  
The One ◽  
Emotional Dynamics

Emotions are prevalent in the rhetoric of populist politicians and among their electorate. We argue that partially dissimilar emotional processes may be driving right- and left-wing populism. Existing research has associated populism with fear and insecurities experienced in contemporary societies, on the one hand, and with anger, resentment, and hatred, on the other. Yet there are significant differences in the targets of right- and left-wing resentment: A political and economic establishment deemed responsible for austerity politics (left) and political and cultural elites accused of favoring ethnic, religious, and sexual out-groups at the expense of the neglected in-group (right). Referring to partially different emotional opportunity structures and distinct political strategies at exploiting these structures, we suggest that right-wing populism is characterized by repressed shame that transforms fear and insecurity into anger, resentment, and hatred against perceived “enemies” of the precarious self. Left-wing populism, in turn, associates more with acknowledged shame that allows individuals to self-identify as aggrieved and humiliated by neoliberal policies and their advocates. The latter type of shame holds emancipatory potential as it allows individuals to establish bonds with others who feel the same, whereas repressors remain in their shame or seek bonds from repression-mediated defensive anger and hatred.

European Left Populism and Authoritarian Populism

2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 170-186
Author(s):  
Óscar García Agustín
Keyword(s):  
Latin American ◽  
The Other ◽  
Right Wing ◽  
Left Wing ◽  
Authoritarian Populism ◽  
European Public ◽  
Hugo Chavez ◽  
The One ◽  
Latin American Left ◽  
American Left

Abstract The emergence of left populism, mainly in Southern Europe, in the decade of 2010, questioned the impression that populism in Europe was only right-wing oriented. On the other hand, the expansion of populism as a common denomination favored the perception that all populisms were the same, regardless of ideology: a threat to democracy. It explains why many left parties are reluctant towards being labelled as populist. Besides, left-wing populism connected with the one from Latin America one decade before where the tensions between democratization and authoritarianism have been widely discussed. The European public opinion usually relates the Latin American left populist governments with authoritarianism, associated with the situation in Venezuela first with Hugo Chávez and, especially, now with Nicolás Maduro. For this reason, left populism in Europe was made suspicious of being authoritarian.

scholarly journals The Effect of Religion on the Political Identity of Kurdish Youth (with Focus on University Students)

2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Sabah Mofidi ◽  
Somayeh Rahmani
Keyword(s):  
Religious Identity ◽  
Social Factors ◽  
Analytical Methods ◽  
Political Identity ◽  
The Other ◽  
The Political ◽  
Traditional Society ◽  
Political Arena ◽  
Religious Identities ◽  
The Relationship

<em>This article studies the relationship between religion and political identity in Eastern Kurdistan located in Iran. For this purpose, it reviews at first the theoretical debates on social and political identities, the bases of Kurdish individual’s political identity and the situation of religion in Kurdish society as one of them.<strong> </strong>Then,<strong> </strong>the quantitative and analytical methods are used to measure the effect of religion. The results show that religion and religious identity are still important determinants of political identity in Kurdistan that is affected by the situation of society. Because of both the influence of religion in this traditional society and the existence of a totalitarian religious government, the other social factors and identities cannot practically affect the political identity, though they are also important and powerful in the society, especially the Kurdish identity. Hence, the political identity of Kurdish youth is further affected by the government’s politics and policies that reinforce both Iranian and religious identities and prevent the manifestation of the other identities in political arena. </em>

scholarly journals The Inter-Communal Talks and Political Life in Cyprus: 1974-1983

2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 400
Author(s):  
Şevki Kıralp
Keyword(s):  
Central Government ◽  
The Other ◽  
Political Life ◽  
The Political ◽  
Right Wing ◽  
Left Wing ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Greek Cypriot ◽  
Turkish Cypriot ◽  
Regional Governments

<p>This paper conducts historical research on the inter-communal talks and the political life in the two communities of Cyprus from 1974 to 1983. The period covered by the research commenced with the creation of the bi-regional structure on the island in 1974 and ceased with the declaration of Turkish Cypriot Independence in 1983. As this period constitutes an important threshold in the history of Cyprus, it might be argued that observing the political developments it covers is likely to be beneficial for the literature. The research focused on the two communities’ positions in negotiations as well as their elections and political actors. It utilized Turkish, Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot newspapers (and official press releases), political leaders’ memoirs, national archives of USA (NARA) as well as official online documents. Its findings indicate that the two sides could not reach to a settlement mainly due to their disagreements on the authorities of central and regional governments. While the Turkish Cypriot side promoted broader authorities for the regional governments, the Greek Cypriot side favoured broader authorities for the central government. On the other hand, while Turkish Cypriot leader Denktaş had managed to unite the majority of Turkish Cypriot right-wing voters, the Greek Cypriot right-wing was divided among supporters of Makarios and Clerides. On the other hand, while the Greek Cypriot left-wing was in cooperation with Makarios, the Turkish Cypriot left-wing opposed Denktaş’s policies.  </p>

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