Pakistan’s ‘Mainstreaming’ Jihadis

2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 51-73
Author(s):  
Vinay Kaura ◽  
Aparna Pande

The emergence of the religious right-wing as a formidable political force in Pakistan seems to be an outcome of direct and indirect patronage of the dominant military over the years. Ever since the creation of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan in 1947, the military establishment has formed a quasi alliance with the conservative religious elements who define a strongly Islamic identity for the country. The alliance has provided Islamism with regional perspectives and encouraged it to exploit the concept of jihad. This trend found its most obvious manifestation through the Afghan War. Due to the centrality of Islam in Pakistan’s national identity, secular leaders and groups find it extremely difficult to create a national consensus against groups that describe themselves as soldiers of Islam. Using two case studies, the article argues that political survival of both the military and the radical Islamist parties is based on their tacit understanding. It contends that without de-radicalisation of jihadis, the efforts to ‘mainstream’ them through the electoral process have huge implications for Pakistan’s political system as well as for prospects of regional peace.

2021 ◽  
pp. 003802292110510
Author(s):  
Hassan Javid

Historically, despite the tremendous influence exerted by Islam on public life, religious parties and organisations have historically failed to do well at the ballot box, receiving an average of only 6% of votes cast in elections since the 1980s. Focusing on the case of the Tehreek-i-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP), a new Barelvi political party and social movement that has campaigned on the emotive issue of blasphemy since being formed in 2015, this article argues that the clientelistic, patronage-based nature of democratic politics in Punjab, coupled with factionalism and competition within the religious right, continues to play a role in limiting the electoral prospects of religious parties. Nonetheless, as was seen in the General Elections of 2018 in which the TLP outperformed expectations, there are particular circumstances in which the religious parties are able to make electoral breakthroughs. While the TLP was able to make effective use of populist rhetoric to garner some genuine support for itself, this article argues that the organisations sustained campaign of protests over the issue of blasphemy fed into broader efforts by the military establishment and opposition political parties to destabilise and weaken the government of the PML-N prior to the 2018 elections.


2018 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 238-252 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ajay Darshan Behera

Pakistan’s general elections held in July 2018 led to the smooth transition of power for the second time from one elected government to another. However, the elections were marred by serious allegations of manipulation of the electoral process by the military. The results were on predicted lines—a hung assembly in which the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) emerged with the highest seats. While Imran Khan’s political journey has been a remarkable one, he inherits a country, which has become difficult to govern and faces a very difficult economic situation. Pakistan’s second successful democratic transition shows clear signs of the emergence of a political system in which the military may just be happy with a form of guided democracy—a formal democratic structure maintained and legitimized by elections. Even if Imran Khan has come to power as a result of the manipulation by the military establishment, he cannot be taken for granted in the civil–military equation.


2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-73
Author(s):  
Zahid Shahab Ahmed

Soon after its declaration as an Islamic Republic in 1956, Islamists have experienced numerous ups and downs in Pakistan. Islamists not only try to maintain the status quo of the Islamic state but also endeavour to expand the scope of sharia. Despite insignificant achievements in elections, Islamists have mostly been able to dictate civilian and military governments in matters of national identity. One of the greatest challenges for the promotion of pluralism is the Islamists’ anti-secular narrative, which holds significant backing from both the civil and the military elites. The goal of this paper is to analyse such narrative with reference to Pakistan’s continuous struggle for national identity. ‘The analyses propose that anti-secular voices are occupying centre stage in Pakistan, leaving little room for diverse opinions. Anti-secular groups use violence as a tool to silence any opposition against their ideology for Pakistan, which is evident by regular attacks on not only the religious minorities but also the moderate or liberal Muslim thinkers. The conflict over national identity between extremists and moderates is also one of the main causes of rising violent extremism in Pakistan.  


2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-73
Author(s):  
Zahid Shahab Ahmed

AbstractSoon after its declaration as an Islamic Republic in 1956, Islamists have experienced numerous ups and downs in Pakistan. Islamists not only try to maintain the status quo of the Islamic state but also endeavour to expand the scope ofsharia. Despite insignificant achievements in elections, Islamists have mostly been able to dictate civilian and military governments in matters of national identity. One of the greatest challenges for the promotion of pluralism is the Islamists’ anti-secular narrative, which holds significant backing from both the civil and the military elites. The goal of this paper is to analyse such narrative with reference to Pakistan’s continuous struggle for national identity. ‘The analyses propose that anti-secular voices are occupying centre stage in Pakistan, leaving little room for diverse opinions. Anti-secular groups use violence as a tool to silence any opposition against their ideology for Pakistan, which is evident by regular attacks on not only the religious minorities but also the moderate or liberal Muslim thinkers. The conflict over national identity between extremists and moderates is also one of the main causes of rising violent extremism in Pakistan.


2018 ◽  
Vol 130 (4) ◽  
pp. 141-156
Author(s):  
Corneliu C. Simuț

In December 1989, Communism died in Romania—if not as mentality, it surely met its demise as a political system which had dominated almost every aspect of life in the country for over four decades. Thus, at least in theory, an ideological vacuum was created and concrete steps towards filling it with different values and convictions were supposed to be taken as early as possible. The Romanian Eastern Orthodox Church seized the opportunity and initiated a series of measures which eventually created a distinct perception about what culture, ethnicity, and religion were supposed to mean for whoever identified himself as Romanian. This paper investigates these ideological attempts to decontaminate Romania of its former Communist mentalities by resorting to the concept of ecodomy seen as ‘constructive process’ and the way it can be applied to how the Romanian Eastern Orthodox Church dealt with culture, ethnicity, and religion. In the end, it will be demonstrated that while decommunistization was supposed to be constructive and positive, it proved to be so only for the Romanians whose national identity was defined by their adherence to the Romanian Eastern Orthodox Church and its perspective on culture, ethnicity, and religion. For all other Romanian citizens, however, decommunistization was a process of ‘negative ecodomy’ because their cultural ideas, ethnic origin, or religious convictions were perceived as non-Romanian and non-Orthodox. In attempting to reach decommunistization therefore, the Romanian majority still tends to be xenophobic and even anti-Muslim, as plainly demonstrated by the Bucharest mosque scandal which rocked the country in the summer of 2015.


2012 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 681-698 ◽  
Author(s):  
MARCUS M. PAYK

While it is well known that German conservative intellectuals were skeptical or indifferent to the Federal Republic of Germany established in 1949 and to its democratic founding principles, this essay shifts attention to a specific mode of right-wing acceptance of the new order. Focusing on Hans Zehrer, a renowned journalist and notorious opponent of democracy in the Weimar Republic, I will demonstrate how right-wing intellectuals interpreted West Germany's political system as a post-liberal order after the “end of politics”. But this vision of transcending societal and intellectual conflicts in a meta-politics was neither entirely new nor simply raked up from the late 1920s but reshaped to fit the postwar sociopolitical context. The essay illuminates several intellectual connections between Weimar-era neoconservatism and the specific conservative consensus formed after 1949, but it also explores personnel continuities within a network of right-wing journalists as well as continuities in the field of journalistic style.


1999 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 233-249 ◽  
Author(s):  
JOHN McHUGH

This is a study of a successful parliamentary campaign led throughout the 1920s by a small group of backbench Labour MPs aimed at abolishing the military death penalty for the offences of cowardice and desertion. It was sustained in the face of opposition from the military establishment, the Conservatives, and finally the House of Lords. The campaigners used the opportunity afforded by the requirement on government to pass, annually, an Army Bill, to challenge the military establishment's insistence that a capital penalty was essential to the maintenance of army discipline. Despite the unwillingness of the 1924 Labour government to confront the military on this issue, the reformers persevered, securing some minor, incremental reform before the coming of the second Labour government in 1929. The new government was prevailed upon by backbench pressure to authorize a free vote in the Commons which approved the abolition of the capital penalty for cowardice and desertion in the Army Act of 1930.


2009 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 129-152 ◽  
Author(s):  
Boubacar N'Diaye

ABSTRACTThe 3 August 2005 military coup was Mauritania's best opportunity to turn the page on decades of the deposed quasi-military regime's destructive politics. This article critically analyses relevant aspects of the transition that ensued in the context of the prevailing models of military withdrawal from politics in Africa. It also examines the challenges that Mauritania's short-lived Third Republic faced. It argues that the transition process did not escape the well-known African military junta leader's proclivity to manipulate transitions to fulfil suddenly awakened self-seeking political ambitions, in violation of solemn promises. While there was no old-fashioned ballot stuffing to decide electoral outcomes, Mauritania's junta leader and his lieutenants spared no effort to keep the military very much involved in politics, and to perpetuate a strong sense of entitlement to political power. Originally designed as an ingenious ‘delayed self-succession’ of sorts, in the end, another coup aborted Mauritania's democratisation process and threw its institutions in a tailspin. This only exacerbated the challenges that have saddled Mauritania's political system and society for decades – unhealthy civil-military relations, a dismal ‘human rights deficit’, terrorism, and a neo-patrimonial, disastrously mismanaged economy.


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