scholarly journals A Living Spatial Movement of Relation. Reconceptualising Ricœur’s Oneself as Another and Heidegger’s Being and Time

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 111-132
Author(s):  
Paul Downes

Beyond the disparate and mainly fleeting references to life in Ricoeur’s Oneself as Another, whether as life as power, living well and with others, or as Ricoeur’s attempt to develop a concept of embodied subjectivity as flesh, which is presumably living flesh, not dead flesh, a further and arguably primordial life principle needs emphasis, namely, living space. Ricoeur’s recognition of the vital significance of space primordiality, as a pivotal dimension that is even prior to language, offers a significant conceptual leap in Ricoeur’s later work, Oneself as Another. Ricoeur’s proposed ontology of the flesh is one dimension towards expression of an authentic phenomenology of spatiality, though not necessarily the only one. Building upon but going beyond Ricoeur, the article explores concentric and diametric spatial interplay in relation to the early Heidegger’s existential spatiality, Angst and care, as candidate living spatial movements. This proposed primordial spatial discourse re-examines Ricoeur’s conatus as power to act, and his quest for a structure of relation to the other that is not closure, separation, or diametric opposition.

Author(s):  
David M. Wittman

Galilean relativity is a useful description of nature at low speed. Galileo found that the vertical component of a projectile’s velocity evolves independently of its horizontal component. In a frame that moves horizontally along with the projectile, for example, the projectile appears to go straight up and down exactly as if it had been launched vertically. The laws of motion in one dimension are independent of any motion in the other dimensions. This leads to the idea that the laws of motion (and all other laws of physics) are equally valid in any inertial frame: the principle of relativity. This principle implies that no inertial frame can be considered “really stationary” or “really moving.” There is no absolute standard of velocity (contrast this with acceleration where Newton’s first law provides an absolute standard). We discuss some apparent counterexamples in everyday experience, and show how everyday experience can be misleading.


2008 ◽  
Vol 45 (03) ◽  
pp. 879-887 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nader Ebrahimi

Nanosystems are devices that are in the size range of a billionth of a meter (1 x 10-9) and therefore are built necessarily from individual atoms. The one-dimensional nanosystems or linear nanosystems cover all the nanosized systems which possess one dimension that exceeds the other two dimensions, i.e. extension over one dimension is predominant over the other two dimensions. Here only two of the dimensions have to be on the nanoscale (less than 100 nanometers). In this paper we consider the structural relationship between a linear nanosystem and its atoms acting as components of the nanosystem. Using such information, we then assess the nanosystem's limiting reliability which is, of course, probabilistic in nature. We consider the linear nanosystem at a fixed moment of time, say the present moment, and we assume that the present state of the linear nanosystem depends only on the present states of its atoms.


1999 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 535-559
Author(s):  
Alice Bee Kasakoff

Imagine a fourfold table in which one dimension is “present versus past” and the other “exotic versus home.” Traditionally, social and cultural anthropology’s domain has been the exotic’s present and history’s domain the home’s past. A third box, the home’s present, has been occupied by sociology, while the fourth, the exotic’s past, has usually been the province of anthropologists too because other disciplines—with the exception, perhaps, of ethnohistorians—are usually even less interested in exotic peoples’ past than in their present. These domains are now in flux. I argue, in what follows, that only when the oversimplified ideas about time and space that have created them are seriously questioned will anthropology find a secure “place” in social science history.


2008 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 273-291
Author(s):  
Milotka Molnar-Sivc

Although the question of relationship between basic concepts of traditional ontology and central concepts of fundamental ontology is not a topic which is systematically dealt with in Being and Time, it is obvious that some of the theses which are crucial not only for Heidegger's interpretation of philosophical tradition, but also for the whole project of fundamental ontology, concern this 'conceptual scheme'. In fact, the backbone of Heidegger's critical confrontation with dominant philosophical conceptions is the question of relationship between the concept of 'substance' and the concept of 'Being', i.e. the discussion of philosophical doctrines in which 'Being' is reduced to 'substance'. Besides this context, which concerns the ontological problematics in the strict sense, it is possible to show that the refutation of the basic categories of traditional ontology is an issue which has a decisive role in more concrete phases of the realization of the project of fundamental ontology. This is especially confirmed in Heidegger's discussion of the concept of 'Being-There'. The interpretation of Heidegger's treatment of the relationship between the concepts of 'Being-there', 'existence' and 'existentials' on the one hand, and the concepts of 'substance', 'essence' and 'categories' on the other, shows that one of Heidegger's basic theses is that a transformation of concepts of traditional ontology is necessary for an appropriate understanding of human being.


2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Ana Inés Renta Davids ◽  
Manel Fandos-Garrido ◽  
José Miguel Jiménez-González ◽  
Ángel Pío González-Soto

<p>The study draws on findings from a survey of adults in non-formal continuing education under the professional training for employment framework in Spain. Quantitative analysis was carried out to a sample of 425 respondents from three different educational providers. Firstly, a factor analysis was conducted to fourteen motives for participation items. A two-dimension model of motivation to participate was identified: one dimension oriented towards job-improvement and the other dimension oriented towards learning. Secondly, a variance analysis was conducted according to demographics variables. Results showed significant statistical differences in the first dimension according to demographic variables. This might indicates an instrumental motivation in participation in work-related training among different groups who try to cope with different types of drawbacks.</p>


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer Lauren Ray ◽  
Peter Mende-Siedlecki ◽  
Ana P. Gantman ◽  
Jay Joseph Van Bavel

Over the past few decades, two-factor models of social cognition have emerged as the dominant framework for understanding impression formation. Despite the differences in the labels, there is wide agreement that one dimension reflects sociability potential, and the other, competence. One way in which the various two-factor models do clearly differ, however, is in the way the dimensions incorporate or produce evaluations of morality. Aristotle saw morality as the most important basis on which to form positive evaluations, because competence and sociability could only be virtuous, sincere, and trustworthy if expressed through a moral character. This chapter highlights research demonstrating the unique and possibly primary role of morality in social cognition. We clarify the dynamic, interactive, and conjoint effects of morality on social perception, and argue morality, competence, and sociability are three influential and interactive dimensions of social perception.


1973 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 807-810 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wendell J. Goesling

A color-form sorting task was given to 40 institutionalized male retardates divided into two groups equated in mental age. Part I, a preference test, required that 8 stimulus figures, varying in color (red or green) and form (triangle or square), be sorted into 2 bins each marked by a comparison stimulus-figure resembling test stimuli on only one dimension. In Part II, stimuli were again presented but with the instructions to shift the basis of categorization. The procedure with both groups differed only in the method of stimulus presentation; one group received 8 figures simultaneously, the other successively. Retardates in general preferred color to form in categorization and ability to shift dimensions is facilitated by successive presentation.


2002 ◽  
Vol 2 (Special) ◽  
pp. 578-595
Author(s):  
N. Konno

In this paper we consider limit theorems, symmetry of distribution, and absorption problems for two types of one-dimensional quantum random walks determined by $2 \times 2$ unitary matrices using our PQRS method. The one type was introduced by Gudder in 1988, and the other type was studied intensively by Ambainis et al. in 2001. The difference between both types of quantum random walks is also clarified.


Author(s):  
Rodolphe De Koninck

To better understand, on the one hand, the remarkable and largely commendable transformation that Singapore has undergone over the last century and, on the other hand, its vulnerability, answers should be sought to the following two questions. Does not the relentless overhaul of Singaporean living space, nearly always considered as a fait accompli, yet always subject to being revised by the state, lead to territorial alienation among the city state’s citizens and permanent residents? Just as classical Athens and even classical Rome came to depend on a constant and everincreasing supply of foreign labour, Singapore has reached a point where its dependence on a modern and imported form of lumpenproletariat has become apparently irreversible. Is this sustainable?


2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 363-375 ◽  
Author(s):  
Micah Lott

In The Value of Living Well, Mark LeBar develops a position that he calls “virtue eudaimonism” (ve). ve is both a eudaimonistic theory of practical reasoning and a constructivist account of the metaphysics of value. In this essay, I will explain the core of LeBar’s view and focus on two issues, one concerning ve’s eudaimonism and the other concerning ve’s constructivism. I will argue that, as it stands, ve does not adequately address the charge of egoism, once that charge has been formulated in the strongest way. I will also argue that a substantive constructivism like ve must have considerably less explanatory power than any (successful) constructivism that appeals to a formal characterization of agency. Although my remarks are largely critical, I offer them in a spirit of sympathetic engagement with LeBar’s impressive book.


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