Heidegger’s Presentational Strategies:

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (II) ◽  
pp. 01-12
Author(s):  
Raza Hassan ◽  
◽  
Muhammad University

Drawing upon the interpretations of Martin Heidegger’sBeing and Timeoffered by the favorable commentators such as Hubert Dreyfus, Robert Dostal, Harrison Hall, and Charles Taylor, this paper responds to Heidegger’s unsympathetic commentator Herman Philipse’s critical interpretation of Being and Time(Sections 12-18 of Division I) and shows the validity of Heidegger’s claim for the ontological priority of the practical world over the theoretical world. This has been done by showing that the practical world where readiness-to-hand is the norm, emerges from a self-correcting,transient originary situation where readiness-to-hand is primordial to us while we arrive at the theoretical aspect of presence-at-hand when we encounter the unreadiness-to-hand. This paper also shows that Heidegger’s text is coherent and consistent. Thishas been done by looking at the structure of Heidegger’s presentational strategies and by making links explicit in them. We have also looked afresh at how he defines certain pivotal elements of his practical world and their relationship with each other.

Author(s):  
Rodrigo Benevides Barbosa GOMES (UFSCar)

Hubert L. Dreyfus, em What Computers Can’t Do (1972), tornou-se a mais proeminente voz crítica à abordagem representacional do então nascente campo da inteligência artificial. Partindo da filosofia heideggeriana, Dreyfus apontou que a simples predicação de objetos é insuficiente para reproduzir o tipo de existência não-representacional de um ser-no-mundo. O teste do tempo revelou a pertinência da crítica de Dreyfus. Dessa forma, pretende-se expor os argumentos de Dreyfus a partir de duas obras posteriores, a saber, o livro Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, Division I (1991) e o artigo Why Heideggerian Artificial Intelligence failed and how fixing it would require making it more Heideggerian (2007). O uso de obras tardias justifica-se por conta da conexão que Dreyfus faz entre Heidegger e Walter Freeman, apontando um exemplo do que seria uma inteligência artificial heideggeriana em contraposição à uma representacional.


2021 ◽  
Vol 55 ◽  
pp. 174-187
Author(s):  
Paul Goldberg ◽  

The dominant interpretation of Heidegger’s philosophy of science in Being and Time is that he defines science, or natural science, in terms of presence-at-hand (Vorhandenheit). I argue that this interpretation is false. I call this dominant view about Heidegger’s definition of science the vorhanden claim; interpreters who argue in favor of this claim I call vorhanden readers. In the essay, I reconstruct and then refute two major arguments for the vorhanden claim: respectively, I call them equipmental breakdown (Section 1) and theoretical assertion (Section 2). The equipmental breakdown argument, stemming mainly from Hubert Dreyfus, advances a vorhanden reading on the basis of three other interpretive claims: I call them, respectively, the primacy of practice claim, the decontextualization claim, and the breakdown claim. While I remain agnostic on the first claim, the argument fails because of decisive textual counterevidence to the latter two claims. Meanwhile, the theoretical assertion argument, which I reconstruct mainly from Robert Brandom, premises its vorhanden claim on the basis of some remarks in Being and Time indicating that theoretical assertions, as such, refer to present-at-hand things. Since science is taken to be a paradigmatic case of an activity that makes theoretical assertions, the vorhanden claim is supposed to follow. I refute this argument on the grounds that it equivocates on Heidegger’s concept of “theoretical assertion” and cannot account for his insistence that science does not principally consist in the production of such assertions. I conclude that, with the failure of these two arguments, the case for the vorhanden claim is severely weakened.


Author(s):  
David Egan

Division I of Being and Time offers an analysis of Dasein’s average everyday existence. Heidegger’s use of ‘Dasein’ to talk about human beings draws attention to the way in which we are embedded in a world that has significance to us. In particular, he observes how things show up to us within a holistic network of significance as ready-to-hand equipment, which he distinguishes from the atomistic thinghood of presence-at-hand. This account of practical engagement echoes Wittgenstein’s treatment of language as embedded in significant activities and forms of life. For Wittgenstein, a grammatical investigation of our criteria for the use of words is also an investigation of the significant world in which those words have a use.


2017 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 159-180
Author(s):  
Charles Scriven ◽  

How does the question of grace--its reality or not--affect self-understanding and moral aspiration? Søren Kierkegaard believed that conviction of grace, or of divine kindness at the heart of things, is crucial for human flourishing. This notion serves as a lever for critical reflection on perspectives concerning the secular turn Charles Taylor and others describe. The essay contrasts Kierkegaard’s thought with Iris Murdoch, Philip Kitcher, and co-authors Hubert Dreyfus and Sean Dorrance Kelly. Each of the secular perspectives, it turns out, maps onto a different one of three “stages” of human development that precede Kierkegaard’s highest, or Christian, form of existence. This provides an angle for assessing secularism as reflected in three contrasting accounts. Kierkegaard’s elaboration of the Christian ideal, and the shortfalls he saw in earlier stages, become the basis for a “justification” of grace as a premise for the well-lived life.


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