scholarly journals The Effect of Investment, Financing, Dividend Decisions, Firm Growth, and Agency Costs on Firm Value

Author(s):  
R. Meutia ◽  
. Erlina ◽  
R. Bukit ◽  
K. A. Fachrudin
2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (6) ◽  
pp. 1599
Author(s):  
◽  
Kunsu Park

This study examines the link between foreign ownership and firm value in the context of dividend payouts and long-term firm growth. Consistent with prior studies, we find that foreign ownership is positively related to firm value. Next, we find that changes in foreign ownership are negatively related to changes in agency costs, which is linked to the improvement of future firm profitability. We also find a positive relationship between foreign ownership and dividend payouts. We further find that dividend payouts are negatively related to 3-year-ahead and 5-year-ahead sales (or earnings) growth as a proxy for long-term firm growth. However, for firms with high foreign ownership, we find a positive relationship between dividend payouts and long-term firm growth. These findings indicate that foreign ownership has a moderating effect on dividend payouts and long-term firm growth. Overall, our results suggest that foreign investors are expected to provide managers with an incentive to pursue long-term value for the sake of shareholders by monitoring and disciplining managers. Our study contributes to a better understanding of the value-increasing effects of foreign ownership on firm value by demonstrating that the reduction in agency costs due to the foreign ownership effect is associated with higher growth rates and thus higher firm value. Our study also contributes to the literature on the foreign ownership–firm value nexus by showing that foreign investors play a crucial role in ensuring sustainable firm growth.


2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 160
Author(s):  
Margarita Ekadjaja ◽  
Rorlen Rorlen ◽  
Fanny Andriani Setiawan ◽  
Kartika Nuringsih

Manajemen dan nilai perusahaan memiliki keterkaitan yang tidak dapat dipisahkan.  Dimana manajemen perusahaan merupakan penggerak roda perusahaan dan berorientasi pada nilai perusahaan. Peran seorang manajer adalah memaksimalkan kekayaan bagi pemegang saham.  Namun, manajer yang tidak memiliki kepemilikan saham yang signifikan di perusahaan dapat memilih untuk memaksimalkan keuntungan bersih mereka sendiri dengan mengorbankan pemilik perusahaan. Akibatnya, pemilik terpaksa mengeluarkan biaya agensi untuk memastikan bahwa manajemen perusahaan bertindak dengan cara yang tepat. Cara untuk mengurangi biaya agensi adalah memaksa perusahaan untuk meningkatkan hutang. Tujuan penelitian adalah  menguji hubungan simultan pertukaran antara ownership, leverage, dan nilai perusahaan sehubungan dengan keagenan pada perusahaan manufaktur di Indonesia dari tahun 2012-2018. Penelitian ini menambah pemahaman mengenai keterkaitan antara ownership dengan leverage, dan nilai perusahaan. Analisis data untuk argumen tentang keterkaitan simultan antara  ownership, leverage, dan nilai perusahaan melalui data panel regresi berganda 2 SLS (Two Stage Least Square). Bidang penelitian ini diperluas dengan mempertimbangkan model empiris di mana ownership dan leverage masing-masing diperlakukan sebagai variabel endogen atau ditentukan bersama.  Dalam metode 2 SLS ada 2 kali variabel yang diobservasi secara simultan untuk menghindari bayes sehingga variabel tersebut tidak bias, di mana variabel managerial ownership dan Leverage merupakan determinan non linier nilai perusahaan sebagai bagian integral dari pengambilan keputusan perusahaan dalam kerangka keagenan.  Persamaan Regresi hasil uji 2SLS memunjukkan keterkaitan nilai perusahaan dengan managerial ownership dan leverage. Hasil menunjukkan interaksi positif  tidak signifikan antara managerial ownerhip dengan nilai perusahaan, interaksi positif signifikan antara nilai perusahaan dengan leverage, dan interaksi yang negatif signifkan antara managerial ownership dengan leverage. Management and corporate value have an inseparable relationship. Where the company management is the driving force of the company and oriented to corporate values. The role of a manager is to maximize wealth of shareholders. However, managers who do not have a significant share in the company may choose to maximize their own net profits at the expense of the company owners. As a result, the owners are forced to incur agency costs to ensure that company management acts in an appropriate manner. The way to reduce agency costs is to force the company to increase debt. The research objective is to examine the exchange simultaneous relationship between ownership, leverage, and corporate value with respect to agency in manufacturing companies in Indonesia from 2012-2018. This study adds to the understanding of the relationship between ownership and leverage, and corporate value. Data analysis for arguments about the simultaneous relationship between ownership, leverage, and firm value through 2 SLS (Two Stage Least Square) multiple regression panel data. This field of research is extended by considering empirical models in which ownership and leverage are treated as endogenous or co-determined variables, respectively. Ownership and Leverage as an integral part of corporate decision making within an agency framework, which in turn will affect the value of the company. In the SLS 2 method, there are 2 variables that are observed simultaneously to avoid bayes so that the variable is not biased, in which the managerial ownership and leverage variables are nonlinear determinant corporate value as an integral part of corporate decision making within the agency framework, which in turn will affect firm value. The 2SLS regression equation results show the relationship between firm value and managerial ownership and leverage. The results prove that there is a positive interaction between managerial ownership between firm value, a significant positive interaction between firm value and leverage, and a significant negative interaction between managerial ownership and leverage.


Author(s):  
Jingxing (Rowena) Gan ◽  
Gerry Tsoukalas ◽  
Serguei Netessine

Initial coin offerings (ICOs) are an emerging form of fundraising for blockchain-based startups. We examine how ICOs can be leveraged in the context of asset tokenization, whereby firms issue tokens backed by future assets (i.e., inventory) to finance growth. We (i) make suggestions on how to design such “asset-backed” ICOs—including optimal token floating and pricing for both utility and equity tokens (a.k.a. security token offerings)—taking into account moral hazard (cash diversion), product characteristics, and customer demand uncertainty; (ii) make predictions on ICO success/failure; and (iii) discuss implications on firm operating strategy. We show that in unregulated environments, ICOs can lead to significant agency costs, underproduction, and loss of firm value. These inefficiencies, however, fade as product margins and demand characteristics (mean/variance) improve, and they are less severe under equity (rather than utility) token issuance. Importantly, the advantage of equity tokens stems from their inherent ability to better align incentives and thus continues to hold even absent regulation. This paper was accepted by Vishal Gaur, operations management.


Author(s):  
Samuel E. Bodily ◽  
Marc L. Lipson ◽  
Kenneth C. Lichtendahl

A small start-up company must make additional investments to maximize its firm value. But the company owner will not make this investment unless she can renegotiate outstanding debt claims. Solving this “debt overhang” problem through negotiation is the focus of the case. In this context, students are exposed to a variety of issues: the nature of financial claims, bargaining and negotiation fundamentals, and agency costs of debt.


2008 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 133-152 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vic Naiker ◽  
Farshid Navissi ◽  
VG Sridharan

ABSTRACT: Using a sample of 99 New Zealand stock-exchange-listed firms we employ agency framework and strategy typology to examine whether introduction of unionization legislation affects value of prospector firms more negatively than defender firms. The results from this examination indicate that firms characterized by strategy of higher Growth-Diversity and Innovation-Risk (prospector firms) experience greater loss in value. We attribute the results to the higher agency costs associated with the strategies adopted by prospector firms. The results hold after controlling for variables such as size, industry membership, labor intensity, and proportion of unionized workers.


Author(s):  
Richard T Thakor

Abstract This paper examines how the firm’s choice of investment horizon interacts with rent-seeking by privately informed, multitasking managers and the labor market. Two main results surface. First, managers prefer longer-horizon projects that permit them to extract higher rents from firms, so short-termism involves lower agency costs and is value maximizing for some firms. Second, when firms compete for managers, firms practicing short-termism attract better managerial talent when talent is unobservable, but larger firms that invest in long-horizon projects hire more talented managers when talent is revealed. (JEL D82, D86, G31, G32, J41) Received July 25, 2019; editorial decision July 7, 2020 by Editor Uday Rajan.


2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 813-827
Author(s):  
Dian   Melsa Irawati ◽  
Sri Hermuningsih ◽  
Alfiatul   Maulida

The purpose of this study was to determine the effect of capital structure, firm size, and firm growth on firm value in the food and beverages industry sector companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange for the 2016-2020 period. This study uses quantitative research with sampling using purposive sampling method, which is a method of selecting samples with certain predetermined criteria. So that in this study, 51 data were obtained from 13 companies that met the criteria. The data analysis technique used is panel data analysis. The results of the study found that partially capital structure had a significant negative effect on firm value, firm size had a significant positive effect on firm value, and firm growth had no positive effect on firm value. Keywords : capital structure, company size, company growth, company value


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