scholarly journals Game of Code: Challenges of Cyberspace as a Domain of Warfare

2018 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-72
Author(s):  
Christopher Rosana Nyabuto

The military capabilities that the world witnesses in modern day armed conflicts are a sort of science fiction brought to life. Most of the techniques in cyber warfare were never thought possible, let alone anticipated in times past especially during the framing of key International Humanitarian Law (IHL) instruments. This paper analyses the challenges that cyber warfare poses to state responsibility. The analysis also discusses how the anonymity of parties in cyber warfare presents challenges to the application of existing law. The rationale for this study is the fact that cyberspace as a domain of warfare is still in its early days despite the many ambiguities and puzzles it has sparked in various circles of discussion. The study relies on literature reviews and case studies to make its salient points. Ultimately, the study argues that cyber warfare is subject to IHL; however, it breeds new possibilities that may require greater adherence to consistent legal review of weapons and greater willingness of the international community to apply IHL to this domain of warfare.

2021 ◽  
Vol 74 (1) ◽  
pp. 20-26
Author(s):  
Oleksandra Severinova ◽  

The article analyzes the theoretical and methodological aspects of the formation and development of doctrinal ideas about the meaning of the concept of «armed conflict» in the history of world political and legal thought. The question of the name of the branch of law that regulates armed conflict, by analyzing its historical names such as «law of war», «laws and customs of war», «law of armed conflict», «international humanitarian law» and «international humanitarian law, used in armed conflicts». As a result of this analysis, it can be concluded that it would be most appropriate to use the terms «international humanitarian law» only in a narrow sense or «international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts», which is more cumbersome but most accurately describes the field. It is emphasized that due to the availability of new powerful weapons (economic, political, informational, cultural and weapons of mass destruction), which are dangerous both for the aggressor and for the whole world; the aggressor's desire to downplay its role in resolving conflicts in order to avoid sanctions from other countries and international organizations, as well as to prevent the loss of its authority and position on the world stage; the attempts of the aggressor countries to establish their control over the objects of aggression (including integrating them into their political, economic and security systems) without excessive damage to them is the transformation of methods and means of warfare. It is determined that the long history of the formation of the law of armed conflict has led to the adoption at the level of international law of the provision prohibiting any armed aggression in the world, which is reflected in such a principle as non-use of force or threat of force. At the same time, the UN Charter became the first international act in the history of mankind, which completely prohibited armed aggression and enshrined this principle at the international level, which is binding on all states of the modern world.


1998 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 245-261 ◽  
Author(s):  
María Teresa Dutli

From one perspective, the modern development of international humanitarian law has been a remarkable success. Its rules are among the most detailed and extensive of international law. Its principal treaties enjoy almost universal acceptance. For the other side of the picture, one has only to look at what is happening in most recent armed conflicts to realize that serious violations of humanitarian law are rife all over the world. This leads to the conclusion that it iscompliance— respect for the rules — which is the major challenge facing humanitarian law today rather than its very existence or the adequacy of its provisions.


Author(s):  
Laurent Gisel ◽  
Tilman Rodenhäuser ◽  
Knut Dörmann

Abstract The use of cyber operations during armed conflicts and the question of how international humanitarian law (IHL) applies to such operations have developed significantly over the past two decades. In their different roles in the Legal Division of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the authors of this article have followed these developments closely and have engaged in governmental and non-governmental expert discussions on the subject. In this article, we analyze pertinent humanitarian, legal and policy questions. We first show that the use of cyber operations during armed conflict has become a reality of armed conflicts and is likely to be more prominent in the future. This development raises a number of concerns in today's increasingly cyber-reliant societies, in which malicious cyber operations risk causing significant disruption and harm to humans. Secondly, we present a brief overview of multilateral discussions on the legal and normative framework regulating cyber operations during armed conflicts, looking in particular at various arguments around the applicability of IHL to cyber operations during armed conflict and the relationship between IHL and the UN Charter. We emphasize that in our view, there is no question that cyber operations during armed conflicts, or cyber warfare, are regulated by IHL – just as is any weapon, means or methods of warfare used by a belligerent in a conflict, whether new or old. Thirdly, we focus the main part of this article on how IHL applies to cyber operations. Analyzing the most recent legal positions of States and experts, we revisit some of the most salient debates of the past decade, such as which cyber operations amount to an “attack” as defined in IHL and whether civilian data enjoys similar protection to “civilian objects”. We also explore the IHL rules applicable to cyber operations other than attacks and the special protection regimes for certain actors and infrastructure, such as medical facilities and humanitarian organizations.


1997 ◽  
Vol 37 (320) ◽  
pp. 524-527
Author(s):  
Konstantin Obradovic

It is not without reservations that I am responding to the invitation from the Review for ‘veterans’ of the Diplomatic Conference on the reaffirmation and development of international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts (hereafter the Diplomatic Conference) to commemorate the signing 20 years ago of the Protocols additional to the Geneva Conventions. On 8 June 1977, all of us who contributed in one way or another to the drafting of those texts felt a sense of relief at having finally achieved our task. We also felt a kind of exhilaration at the thought that we had successfully completed an important undertaking that would benefit war victims. The two Protocols represented a major leap forward in the law of armed conflict. It should not be forgotten that practically two-thirds of the international community have now ratified these instruments. Yet compliance with them regrettably remains far from satisfactory. I need hardly recite the tragic litany of conflicts over the past 20 years that bear out this deficiency. The case best known to me is that of the “Yugoslav wars” (1991–1995). They constitute the clearest example of the yawning gap between the law itself and the degree to which it is implemented. What is even more worrying is that all of this is taking place in a world where the demise of “totalitarianism” has left the world with what is, for all practical purposes, a single centre of power. This centre comprises those States which, since the International Peace Conference held in 1899 in The Hague, have been inspired by their democratic traditions and their attachment to human rights and the rule of law to play a leading role in developing, affirming and reaffirming what today constitutes international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts. I therefore believe that this divergence between the letter of the law and the conduct of those responsible for implementing it results from a lack of determination on the part of governments to “ensure respect” for that law throughout the world. I am in no doubt whatsoever that they have sufficiently efficacious means at their disposal to do so. What is missing, unfortunately, is the political will.


2012 ◽  
Vol 94 (886) ◽  
pp. 787-799 ◽  
Author(s):  
Noel E. Sharkey

AbstractThis is a call for the prohibition of autonomous lethal targeting by free-ranging robots. This article will first point out the three main international humanitarian law (IHL)/ethical issues with armed autonomous robots and then move on to discuss a major stumbling block to their evitability: misunderstandings about the limitations of robotic systems and artificial intelligence. This is partly due to a mythical narrative from science fiction and the media, but the real danger is in the language being used by military researchers and others to describe robots and what they can do. The article will look at some anthropomorphic ways that robots have been discussed by the military and then go on to provide a robotics case study in which the language used obfuscates the IHL issues. Finally, the article will look at problems with some of the current legal instruments and suggest a way forward to prohibition.


2017 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 167-170
Author(s):  
Sabin Guțan

Abstract Drones are new means and methods of warfare which, apparently, are similar to combat aircrafts. A big difference between the two categories is the human personnel involved. Compared with airplanes, carrying a human crew on board - this one carrying out combat operations from inside the aircraft - drones do not have inside human beings, being coordinated from the ground (or sea) - the military actions carrying out from the place where the operators are. So the question arises: what kind of rules of international humanitarian law are applicable to the use of drones in armed conflicts? Starting from the rule that legal rules apply to legal relationships between people (but not directly to objects or animals), I analyze to what extent these means and methods of warfare are subject to the rules of armed conflict on land, sea or air.


1987 ◽  
Vol 27 (258) ◽  
pp. 267-268

On the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the adoption on 8 June 1977 of the Protocols additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions by the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, the Review wanted to involve National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies in the preparation of a special issue; the intention is to reflect as wide a variety as possible of views from National Societies throughout the world with regard to the Protocols and to show what the Societies have done to have them ratified and ensure that they are more widely known.


1991 ◽  
Vol 85 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
George H. Aldrich

Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, concluded in Geneva in 1977, is the most important treaty codifying and developing international humanitarian law since the adoption of the four Conventions themselves; and it is the first such treaty since 1907 to deal with methods and means of warfare and the protection of the civilian population from the effects of warfare. As such, its contributions to the law were long overdue and, on the whole, are both positive from the humanitarian point of view and practicable from the military point of view. Moreover, it offers the prospect of improved compliance with international humanitarian law, which would greatly benefit the victims of war and would bring the law in action closer to the law in the books. Yet, in January 1987, the President of the United States informed the Senate that he would not submit the Protocol to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification, calling it “fundamentally and irreconcilably flawed.” It is apparent that President Reagan’s decision resulted from misguided advice that exaggerated certain flaws in the Protocol, ignored the statements of understanding that would have remedied them, and misconstrued a humanitarian and antiterrorist instrument as one that could give aid and comfort to “terrorists.”


2016 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ian Kerr ◽  
Katie Szilagyi

This article contributes to a special symposium on science fiction and international law, examining the blurry lines between science and fiction in the policy discussions concerning the military use of lethal autonomous robots. In response to projects that attempt to build military robots that comport with international humanitarian law [IHL], we investigate whether and how the introduction of lethal autonomous robots might skew international humanitarian norms. Although IHL purports to be a technologically-neutral approach to calculating a proportionate, discriminate, and militarily necessary response, we contend that it permits a deterministic mode of thinking, expanding the scope of that which is perceived of as “necessary” once the technology is adopted. Consequently, we argue, even if lethal autonomous robots comport with IHL, they will operate as a force multiplier of military necessity, thus skewing the proportionality metric and amplifying new forms of destructive, lethal force.


2020 ◽  
Vol 102 (913) ◽  
pp. 481-492

Executive summary•Cyber operations have become a reality in contemporary armed conflict. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is concerned by the potential human cost arising from the increasing use of cyber operations during armed conflicts.•In the ICRC's view, international humanitarian law (IHL) limits cyber operations during armed conflicts just as it limits the use of any other weapon, means or method of warfare in an armed conflict, whether new or old.•Affirming the applicability of IHL does not legitimize cyber warfare, just as it does not legitimize any other form of warfare. Any use of force by States – cyber or kinetic – remains governed by the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant rules of customary international law, in particular the prohibition against the use of force. International disputes must be settled by peaceful means, in cyberspace as in all other domains.•It is now critical for the international community to affirm the applicability of international humanitarian law to the use of cyber operations during armed conflicts. The ICRC also calls for discussions among governmental and other experts on how existing IHL rules apply and whether the existing law is adequate and sufficient. In this respect, the ICRC welcomes the intergovernmental discussions currently taking place in the framework of two United Nations General Assembly mandated processes.•Events of recent years have shown that cyber operations, whether during or outside armed conflict, can disrupt the operation of critical civilian infrastructure and hamper the delivery of essential services to the population. In the context of armed conflicts, civilian infrastructure is protected against cyber attacks by existing IHL principles and rules, in particular the principles of distinction, proportionality and precautions in attack. IHL also affords special protection to hospitals and objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, among others.•During armed conflicts, the employment of cyber tools that spread and cause damage indiscriminately is prohibited. From a technological perspective, some cyber tools can be designed and used to target and harm only specific objects and to not spread or cause harm indiscriminately. However, the interconnectivity that characterizes cyberspace means that whatever has an interface with the Internet can be targeted from anywhere in the world and that a cyber attack on a specific system may have repercussions on various other systems. As a result, there is a real risk that cyber tools are not designed or used – either deliberately or by mistake – in compliance with IHL.•States’ interpretation of existing IHL rules will determine the extent to which IHL protects against the effects of cyber operations. In particular, States should take clear positions about their commitment to interpret IHL so as to preserve civilian infrastructure from significant disruption and to protect civilian data. The availability of such positions will also influence the assessment of whether the existing rules are adequate or whether new rules may be needed. If States see a need to develop new rules, they should build on and strengthen the existing legal framework – including IHL.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document