scholarly journals The Trajectory of Truth: A Longitudinal Study of the Illusory Truth Effect

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Emma L. Henderson ◽  
Daniel J. Simons ◽  
Dale J. Barr
2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott Wright ◽  
Xiaoning Guo ◽  
Drew Brown ◽  
Chris Manolis ◽  
John Dinsmore ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
Aumyo Hassan ◽  
Sarah J. Barber

AbstractRepeated information is often perceived as more truthful than new information. This finding is known as the illusory truth effect, and it is typically thought to occur because repetition increases processing fluency. Because fluency and truth are frequently correlated in the real world, people learn to use processing fluency as a marker for truthfulness. Although the illusory truth effect is a robust phenomenon, almost all studies examining it have used three or fewer repetitions. To address this limitation, we conducted two experiments using a larger number of repetitions. In Experiment 1, we showed participants trivia statements up to 9 times and in Experiment 2 statements were shown up to 27 times. Later, participants rated the truthfulness of the previously seen statements and of new statements. In both experiments, we found that perceived truthfulness increased as the number of repetitions increased. However, these truth rating increases were logarithmic in shape. The largest increase in perceived truth came from encountering a statement for the second time, and beyond this were incrementally smaller increases in perceived truth for each additional repetition. These findings add to our theoretical understanding of the illusory truth effect and have applications for advertising, politics, and the propagation of “fake news.”


2012 ◽  
Vol 43 (4) ◽  
pp. 1058-1063 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steffen Moritz ◽  
Ulf Köther ◽  
Todd S. Woodward ◽  
Ruth Veckenstedt ◽  
Alice Dechêne ◽  
...  

Journalism ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 146488491987800
Author(s):  
Graham Majin

The journalistic coverage of Russiagate, between 2017 and March 2019, has been described as ‘a catastrophic media failure’. Drawing on political and social psychology, this article seeks to enrich, and refresh, the familiar journalistic concepts of agenda-setting, framing and priming by combining them under the heading of the ‘news narrative’. Using this interdisciplinary approach to media effects theory, Russiagate is considered in terms of the Illusory Truth Effect and the Innuendo Effect. These effects hypothesise that the more audiences are exposed to information, the more likely they are to believe it – even when they are told that the information is unreliable. As a specific example, we focus on the stance taken by BBC News – which has an obligation to journalistic impartiality. We ask what implications arise from this analysis with regard to audience trust.


2016 ◽  
Vol 28 (5) ◽  
pp. 739-746 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wei-Chun Wang ◽  
Nadia M. Brashier ◽  
Erik A. Wing ◽  
Elizabeth J. Marsh ◽  
Roberto Cabeza

The “illusory truth” effect refers to the phenomenon whereby repetition of a statement increases its likelihood of being judged true. This phenomenon has important implications for how we come to believe oft-repeated information that may be misleading or unknown. Behavioral evidence indicates that fluency, the subjective ease experienced while processing information, underlies this effect. This suggests that illusory truth should be mediated by brain regions previously linked to fluency, such as the perirhinal cortex (PRC). To investigate this possibility, we scanned participants with fMRI while they rated the truth of unknown statements, half of which were presented earlier (i.e., repeated). The only brain region that showed an interaction between repetition and ratings of perceived truth was PRC, where activity increased with truth ratings for repeated, but not for new, statements. This finding supports the hypothesis that illusory truth is mediated by a fluency mechanism and further strengthens the link between PRC and fluency.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonas De keersmaecker ◽  
David Alan Dunning ◽  
Gordon Pennycook ◽  
David Gertler Rand ◽  
Carmen Sanchez ◽  
...  

People are more inclined to believe that information is true if they have encountered it before. Little is known about whether this illusory truth effect is influenced by individual differences in cognition. In seven studies (combined N = 2196), using both trivia statements (Studies 1-6) and partisan news headlines (Study 7), we investigate moderation by three factors that have been shown to play a critical role in epistemic processes: cognitive ability (Study 1, 2, 5), need for cognitive closure (Study 1), and cognitive style, that is, reliance on intuitive versus analytic thinking (Study 1, 3-7). All studies showed a significant illusory truth effect, but there was no evidence for moderation by any of the cognitive measures across studies. These results indicate that the illusory truth effect is robust to individual differences in cognitive ability, need for cognitive closure, and cognitive style.


Author(s):  
Emma L. Henderson ◽  
Samuel J. Westwood ◽  
Daniel J. Simons

AbstractPeople believe information more if they have encountered it before, a finding known as the illusory truth effect. But what is the evidence for the generality and pervasiveness of the illusory truth effect? Our preregistered systematic map describes the existing knowledge base and objectively assesses the quality, completeness and interpretability of the evidence provided by empirical studies in the literature. A systematic search of 16 bibliographic and grey literature databases identified 93 reports with a total of 181 eligible studies. All studies were conducted at Western universities, and most used convenience samples. Most studies used verbatim repetition of trivia statements in a single testing session with a minimal delay between exposure and test. The exposure tasks, filler tasks and truth measures varied substantially across studies, with no standardisation of materials or procedures. Many reports lacked transparency, both in terms of open science practices and reporting of descriptive statistics and exclusions. Systematic mapping resulted in a searchable database of illusory truth effect studies (https://osf.io/37xma/). Key limitations of the current literature include the need for greater diversity of materials as stimuli (e.g., political or health contents), more participants from non-Western countries, studies examining effects of multiple repetitions and longer intersession intervals, and closer examination of the dependency of effects on the choice of exposure task and truth measure. These gaps could be investigated using carefully designed multi-lab studies. With a lack of external replications, preregistrations, data and code, verifying replicability and robustness is only possible for a small number of studies.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lisa Fazio ◽  
Carrie Sherry

According to numerous research studies, adults who hear a statement twice are more likely to think that it is true compared to when they have only heard it once. Multiple theoretical explanations exist for this “illusory truth effect.” However, none of the current theories fully explain how or why people begin to use repetition as a cue for truth. This preregistered study investigates those developmental origins in 24 5-year-olds, 24 10-year-olds, and 32 adults. If the link between repetition and truth is learned implicitly, then even 5-year-olds should show the effect. Alternatively, realizing this connection may require metacognition and intentional reflection, skills acquired later in development. Repetition increased truth judgments for all three age groups and prior knowledge did not protect participants from the effects of repetition. These results suggest that the illusory truth effect is a universal effect learned at a young age.


2019 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 204-215 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonas De keersmaecker ◽  
David Dunning ◽  
Gordon Pennycook ◽  
David G. Rand ◽  
Carmen Sanchez ◽  
...  

People are more inclined to believe that information is true if they have encountered it before. Little is known about whether this illusory truth effect is influenced by individual differences in cognition. In seven studies (combined N = 2,196), using both trivia statements (Studies 1-6) and partisan news headlines (Study 7), we investigate moderation by three factors that have been shown to play a critical role in epistemic processes: cognitive ability (Studies 1, 2, 5), need for cognitive closure (Study 1), and cognitive style, that is, reliance on intuitive versus analytic thinking (Studies 1, 3-7). All studies showed a significant illusory truth effect, but there was no evidence for moderation by any of the cognitive measures across studies. These results indicate that the illusory truth effect is robust to individual differences in cognitive ability, need for cognitive closure, and cognitive style.


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